The  Desert  Mounted  Corps 


Southern  Branch 
of  the 

University  of  California 

Los  Angeles 


Form  L    I 


D 

5GS.7 

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r. 


THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 


LllXTKNANT-CiKNIiRAI.    SlU    H.    O.    ChALV1;1.,    K.C.B.,    K.C.M.O 

Commanding  the  Desert  .Mounted  Corps. 


THE 

DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

AN  ACCOUNT  OF  THE  CAVALRY  OPERATIONS 
IN   PALESTINE    AND    SYRIA 

1917-1918 

BY 

LIEUT.-COLONEL 
THE  HON.  R.  M.  P.  PRESTON,  D.S.O. 

With  an  Introduction   by 

LIEUT.-GENERAL 

SIR  H.  G.  CHAUVEL,  K.C.B.,  K.C.M.G. 


BOSTON    AND    NEW   YORK 
HOUGHTON    MIFFLIN    COMPANY 
1921 


6  H9o 


Printed  in  Oreat  Britain 


.'  ^ 


T"=^,2 


TO 

B 

DEAR   LOYAL   FRIEND    AND    PERFECT   COMRADE 

WITHOUT   WHOSE   ENCOrTRAGEMENT   AND   HELP 

THIS    BOOK    WOULD   NEVER  HAVE 

BEEN    WRITTEN 


4 


INTRODUCTION 


It  gives  me  great  pleasure  to  write  a  few  words  of 
introduction  to  Lieut. -Col.  Preston's  History  of  the 
Desert  Mounted  Corps,  which  I  had  the  honour  to 
command.    In  writing  this  History  Lieut. -Col.  Preston 
has  done  a  service  to  his  country  which  I  am  sure  will 
be  fully  appreciated,  particularly,  perhaps,  by  those 
N^    who  served  in  the  Corps,  and  who  feel  that  the  part 
N    they  played  in  the  Great  War  is  but  little  known  to 
^     the  general  public.     As  a  work  on  Cavalry  Tactics, 
^^'^  I  trust  it  will  be  of  some  value  to  the  student  of 
Military  History,  and,  if  it  does  nothing  else,  it  must 
demonstrate  to  the  world  that  the  horse-soldier  is 
J.   just  as  valuable  in  modern  warfare  as  he  ever. has 
c^  been  in  the  past.     Indeed,  the  whole  of  the  opera- 
tions in  Palestine  and  Syria,  under  General  Allenby, 
were  text-book  illustrations  of  the  perfect  combina- 
tion of  all  arms,  both  in  attack  and  defence,  and  the 
last  operations  in  this  theatre,  which  led  to  the  total 
destruction  of  the  Turkish  Arms  and  the  elimination 
of  Germany's  Allies  from  the  War,  could  not  have 
been  undertaken  without  large  masses  of  Cavalry. 

Lieut. -Col.  Preston  is  well  qualified  to  undertake 
the  work.  First  of  all  in  command  of  one  of  my 
finest  Horse  Batteries,  and  subsequently  as  C.R.A. 
of  the  Australian  Mounted  Division,  he  was  often  in 
touch  with  my  Staff,  being  constantly  employed  on 
reconnaissance  duties,   in  which  he  was  peculiarly 


viii         THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

expert.  He  served  throughout  the  whole  of  the 
operations  of  which  he  writes,  and  had  consider- 
able previous  experience  in  the  Sinai  Campaign,  in 
which  the  Horse  Artillery  of  the  Desert  Column 
played  so  conspicuous  a  part. 

This  History  commences  with  the  re-organisa- 
tion of  the  British  Troops  in  the  Egyptian  theatre 
of  the  War,  on  Sir  Edmund  Allenby  taking  over 
command  in  June  1917.  The  troops  operating  East 
of  the  Suez  Canal  had  hitherto  been  known  as  the 
'  Eastern  Force,'  which  had  been  successively  com- 
manded by  Sir  Herbert  Lawrence,  Sir  Charles  Dobell 
and  Sir  Philip  Chetwode,  who  were  again  directly 
under  the  orders  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  in 
Cairo. 

The  advanced  troops  of  '  Eastern  Force,'  viz.,  all 
the  available  Cavalry,  Horse  Artillery  and  Camel 
Corps,  with  from  one  to  two  Divisions  of  Infantry, 
had  been  organised  into  what  was  called  '  The  Desert 
Column.'  Sir  Edmund  Allenby  decided  to  take 
command  of  the  troops  in  the  Eastern  Field  himself. 
The  available  Infantry  was  formed  into  two  Army 
Corps,  and  the  Cavalry  of  the  Desert  Column  was 
formed  into  a  Cavalry  Corps  of  three  Divisions  (sub- 
sequently increased  to  four  on  the  arrival  of  the 
Indian  Cavalry  from  France  early  in  1918).  The 
name  of  the  original  Desert  Column  was  preserved 
as  far  as  possible  in  the  title  of  the  new  Cavalry  Corps, 
as  most  of  the  troops  composing  it  had  fought 
throughout  the  Sinai  Campaign,  and  by  them  much 
had  already  been  accomplished.  The  Turk  had  been 
driven  from  the  vicinitv  of  the  Suez  Canal,  across 


INTRODUCTION  ix 

the  Sinai  Desert  to  the  Palestine  Border  and  beyond, 
and  several  hard- won  battles  had  been  fought.  Also, 
covered  by  these  operations,  a  railway  and  pipe  line 
had  been  constructed,  without  which,  under  modem 
conditions,  the  further  invasion  of  Palestine  could 
not  have  been  attempted. 

The  Desert  Mounted  Corps  was  composed  of 
Australians,  New  Zealanders,  British  Yeomanry,  and 
Territorial  Horse  Artillery  and  Indian  Cavalry,  with 
French  Cavalry  added  for  the  last  operations ;  and  it 
says  much  for  the  loyalty  of  all,  and  the  mutual 
confidence  in  each  other,  that  the  whole  worked  so 
harmoniously  and  efficiently  to  one  end.  It  will  be 
readily  understood,  too,  that  operations  of  the  nature 
Colonel  Preston  describes  could  not  have  been  carried 
out  successfully  without  a  highly  efficient  staff.  I 
was  peculiarly  fortunate  in  the  personnel  of  my  staff 
and  also  in  my  Divisional  Commanders,  two  of  whom 
were  Indian  Cavalry  Officers,  one  a  British  Cavalry 
Officer,  and  the  fourth  an  Officer  of  the  New  Zealand 
Staff  Corps. 

To  a  leader  or  a  student  of  military  history  the 
campaign  was  intensely  interesting,  but  at  the  same 
time  there  were  many  hardships — intense  heat  in  the 
summer,  with  dust  and  insect  pests  inconceivable  to 
those  who  did  not  go  through  the  campaign,  and 
cold  and  heavy  rains  in  the  winter.  The  fortitude 
and  endurance  of  the  troops  was  beyond  all  praise, 
but  the  summer  of  1918  spent  by  the  Corps  in  the 
Jordan  Valley,  at  about  1200  feet  below  sea-level, 
with  a  temperature  varying  from  110  to  125  degrees, 
will  not  be  forgotten  by  them. 


X  THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

The  occupation  of  this  area  was  essential  to  the 
success  of  General  Allenby's  final  operations ;  and 
everything  possible  was  done  to  alleviate  the  con- 
ditions— with  considerable  success,  as,  though  our 
wastage  from  malaria  and  other  diseases  was  heavy, 
the  greater  bulk  of  the  cases  of  malaria  were  con- 
tracted after  leaving  the  areas  which  had  been 
treated  under  the  supervision  of  our  Medical  Staff. 
Our  most  serious  losses  occurred  after  reaching 
Damascus,  and,  on  the  farther  advance  to  Aleppo, 
one  division  was  brought  to  a  complete  standstill 
by  the  ravages  of  this  disease. 

Though  drawn  from  such  widely  different  quarters 
of  the  Empire,  the  personnel  of  the  Corps  was  well 
fitted  for  the  class  of  warfare  it  was  called  upon  to 
undertake.  The  horsemen  of  Australia  and  New 
Zealand  were  accustomed  to  wide  spaces  and  long 
days  in  the  saddle,  and  were  full  of  initiative,  self- 
reliance  and  determination  to  overcome  every  obstacle 
in  their  way.  The  Yeomanry,  though  not  so  accus- 
tomed to  hardships,  had  behind  them  the  glorious 
traditions  of  the  British  Cavalry,  in  the  annals  of 
which  their  charges  at  Huj  and  El  Mughar  will  live 
for  all  time.  The  Horse  Artillery  too,  drawn  from 
the  Counties  of  England  and  Scotland  and  the  City 
of  London,  lived  through  the  whole  of  the  campaigns 
in  Sinai  and  Palestine  with  their  comrades  from 
overseas,  and  showed  themselves  no  whit  behind- 
hand in  the  matter  of  endurance.  The  value  of 
their  work  is  best  shown  by  the  esteem  in  which  they 
were  held  by  the  other  troops.  The  long  apprentice- 
ship of  the  Indian  Cavalry  to  the  trench  warfare  of 


INTRODUCTION  xi 

the  Western  Front  had  robbed  them  of  none  of  their 
dash  and  briUiancy  in  the  open  warfare  to  which 
they  were  so  eminently  fitted.  The  personnel  of  the 
Signal  Service,  Engineers,  Army  Service  Corps,  Army 
Ordnance  Corps,  Army  Medical  Corps,  and  Army 
Veterinary  Corps  came  from  the  same  sources  as  the 
other  troops — units  often  being  composed  of  mixed 
personnel — and  to  the  efficiency  of  these  the  successes 
attained  by  the  Corps  were  very  largely  due. 

HARRY  CHAUVEL, 

Lieut. -General, 
late  Commayiding  the  Desert  Mounted  Corps. 

Commonwealth  of  Australia, 

Depabtment  of  Defence. 

Office  of  the  Inspector-General, 

ord  September  1920. 


AUTHOR'S  NOTE 

As  regards  both  the  numbers  engaged  and  the  results 
achieved,  the  campaign  in  Palestine  and  Syria  ranks 
as  the  most  important  ever  undertaken  by  cavalry. 
In  the  first  series  of  operations  our  troops  made  a 
direct  advance  of  seventy  miles  into  enemy  territory, 
and  captured  some  17,000  prisoners  and  about  120 
guns.  The  final  operations  resulted  in  an  advance 
of  450  miles,  the  complete  destruction  of  three 
Turkish  Armies,  with  a  loss  of  about  90,000  prisoners 
and  400  guns,  and  the  overwhelming  defeat  of  what 
had  hitherto  been  considered  one  of  the  first-class 
Mihtary  Powers. 

These  remarks  must  not  be  taken,  in  any  way,  as 
underrating  the  value  of  tJie  work  of  our  infantry, 
who,  as  always,  bore  the  brunt  of  the  fighting,  while 
denied  much  of  the  interest  and  excitement  of  the 
long  pursuits  that  fell  to  the  lot  of  the  cavalry.  In 
both  the  main  series  of  operations,  the  infantry  pre- 
pared the  way  for  the  cavalry,  and  enabled  them  to 
complete  the  victory  won,  in  the  first  instance,  by 
the  bayonets. 

General  Allenby's  campaign  divides  itself  naturally 
into  three  phases.  First,  the  Beersheba-Gaza  battle 
and  the  subsequent  pursuit  over  the  Philistine  Plain, 
culminating  in  the  capture  of  Jerusalem  ;  secondly, 
the  operations  in  the  Jordan  Valley,  and  east  of  the 
river  Jordan ;  and  thirdly,  the  final  series,  resulting 
in  the  destruction  of  the  Turkish  Armies,  and  the 


AUTHOR'S  NOTE  xiii 

capture  of  Damascus,  Aleppo,  etc.,  followed  by  the 
capitulation  of  the  Turkish  Empire. 

Though  the  Turks  at  their  best  are  not  to  be  com- 
pared in  fighting  value  with  the  troops  of  the  first- 
class  fighting  nations  of  Europe,  such  as  the  British, 
French,  and  Germans,  they  generally  fought  well 
against  our  infantry,  attacking  with  vigour,  and 
defending  their  entrenched  positions  most  stubbornly. 
They  were  well  supplied  with  all  the  appurtenances 
of  modern  warfare,  and,  in  the  first  part  of  the 
campaign,  were  generally  well  led. 

At  the  commencement  of  the  operations,  the 
Turkish  soldiers  were  of  good  morale  on  the  whole, 
their  physique  was  excellent,  and  their  health  satis- 
factory. There  was  a  large  proportion  of  seasoned 
soldiers  among  them,  many  with  the  Gallipoli  medal. 
In  the  latter  part  of  the  campaign,  however,  their 
morale  had  deteriorated  considerably,  their  physique 
was  greatly  undermined  by  disease,  and  there  were 
few  old  soldiers  left,  nearly  all  having  been  killed  or 
captured,  or  died  of  disease.  Many  units  were  full 
of  untrained  troops,  ill-disciplined  and  demoralised. 
After  the  first  day's  fighting,  there  wds  little  resist- 
ance by  the  enemy,  except  when  stiffened  by  a  large 
proportion  of  German  troops,  as  at  Semakh  and 
Jisr  Benat  Yakub. 

There  were  doubtless  many  causes  for  this  deteri- 
oration of  morale  among  the  Turkish  troops,  but, 
unquestionably,  one  of  the  chief  was  the  constant 
friction  that  existed  between  Turkish  and  German 
ofiicers,  which  spread  downwards  to  the  ranks  of 
both  nations.  The  hectoring  stupidity  of  the  Prussian 
was  nowhere  better  exemplified  than  in  his  treat- 
ment of  his  Turkish  Allies.  German  officers  openly 
and  constantly  expressed  their  contempt  for  the 
Turks,  whom  they  compared  to  niggers,  and  numerous 


xiv        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

instances  came  to  our  knowledge  of  German  N.C.O.'s 
and  privates  beating  and  kicking  Turkish  officers. 

The  three  things  which  the  Turks  feared  most  were 
a  threat  to  their  communications,  a  charge  of  cavalry, 
and  a  heavy  aerial  attack.  As  regards  the  first, 
there  was,  I  believe,  no  instance  in  the  campaign 
when  they  fought  on  to  the  end  after  being  sur- 
rounded, though,  on  several  occasions,  Turkish  units 
continued  to  attack  till  annihilated. 

The  losses  of  the  Turks  were  much  heavier  than 
ours  in  every  action  of  the  campaign,  even  when  they 
were  successful,  or  partially  so,  as  in  the  two  trans- 
Jordan  raids.  ^  This  fact  was  largely  due  to  their 
bad  rifle  shooting.  While  our  troops  were  good 
enough  shots  to  pick  off  Turkish  soldiers  showing 
their  heads  above  rocks  and  trenches,  the  Turks,  as 
a  rule,  could  only  hit  our  men  when  standing  up 
during  an  advance.  When  the  enemy  made  his 
great  effort  to  re-take  Jerusalem,  on  the  26th  of 
December  1917,  the  number  of  dead  Turks  found 
on  the  position  after  the  battle  was  greater  than  our 
total  casualties. 

As  a  set-off  to  their  bad  rifle  shooting,  the  enemy 
troops  were  suppHed  with  a  far  larger  proportion 
of  machine  guns  than  we  were.  Their  machine-gun 
companies,  which  were  largely  staffed  by  Germans, 
were  generally  effective,  and  caused  us  the  major 
part  of  our  casualties  during  the  war. 

Their  field  artillery  work  in  general  was  slow  and 
inaccurate,  but  the  heavy  artillery,  manned  by 
Germans  or  Austrians,  was  almost  invariably  good. 

The  above  remarks  as  to  morale  should  be  borne 
in  mind  in  estimating  the  tactics  of  General  Allenby. 

^  Except  in  the  two  first  battles  of  Gaza,  April  and  May  1917,  when 
our  losses,  in  comparison  with  the  numbers  engaged,  were  as  severe  as  in 
some  of  the  hardest  fought  battles  on  the  Western  Front. 


AUTHOR'S  NOTE  xv 

It  will  be  noticed  that  he  took  greater  risks  in  the 
latter  part  of  the  campaign  than  he  had  done  at  the 
beginning.  These  risks  were  fully  justified  by  the 
very  complete  knowledge  of  the  reduced  state  of  the 
enemy's  morale  which  had  been  acquired  by  our 
InteUigence  Staff. 

In  spite  of  the  indifferent  morale  of  the  enemy 
troops,  the  campaign  is  of  great  value  to  the  student 
of  cavalry  tactics,  being,  as  it  is,  the  only  instance  in 
modern  war  of  cavah'y  operating  on  a  large  scale.  It 
demonstrated  once  more  the  soundness  of  the  prin- 
ciples laid  down  in  our  training  manuals,  which 
appear  to  be  immutable,  in  spite  of  aircraft  and  other 
devilish  inventions  of  present  day  warfare. 

The  value  of  aeroplanes  and  armoured  cars  acting 
in  conjunction  with  cavalry  was  very  clearly  brought 
out,  notably  in  the  final  series  of  operations. 

My  thanks  are  due  to  Lieutenant-Colonel  R.  H. 
Osborne,  D.S.O.,  M.C.,  20th  Hussars,  cavalry  in- 
structor at  the  Staff  College  Camberley,  for  very 
kindly  reading  the  manuscript,  and  for  many  valu- 
able suggestions  and  corrections.  Also  to  Major 
A.  F.  Becke,  R.A.,  in  charge  of  the  Historical  Section, 
W.D.,  for  much  help  in  studying  war  diaries  and 
maps. 

My  thanks  are  also  due  to  the  many  officers,  too 
numerous '  to  mention  individually,  who  have  very 
kindly  lent  me  their  private  diaries,  or  given  me 
information  about  obscure  points.  I  have  taken 
every  care  to  make  the  narrative  as  accurate  as 
possible,  but,  if  any  who  read  it  notice  inaccuracies, 
I  shall  be  very  grateful  if  they  will  point  them  out 
to  me.  I  have  also  to  thank  those  who  have  allowed 
me  to  use  photographs  taken  by  them  as  illustra- 
tions. A  number  of  the  photographs  taken  on  the 
enemy  side  were  obtained  from  Mr.  C.  Raad,  photo- 


xvi        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

grapher,  of  Jerusalem,  who  had  secured  the  original 
negatives,  and  by  whose  permission  they  are  repro- 
duced in  the  book. 

Lastly,  I  desire  to  thank  Lieutenant-General  Sir 
H.  G.  Chauvel,  K.C.B.,  K.C.M.G.,  Commander  of  the 
Desert  Mounted  Corps  throughout  the  campaign,  for 
his  help  and  encouragement,  and  for  having  very 
kindly  written  the  preface  to  the  book. 


CONTENTS 
CHAPTER  I 

PAOR 

Preliminary.     Situation  in  the  East  in  June  1917.     Objectives  of 

the  Palestine  Campaign.     The  country.     The  opposing  armies  .  1 

CHAPTER  II 

Plan  of  the  operations.     Laying  the  foundations.     Cavalry  recon- 
naissances.    Work  of  the  engineers.     Maps  and  water  supply  .         10 

CHAPTER  III 

1917  The  first  round.     The  attack  on  Beersheba.     Charge 

Oct.  27th      of  the  4th  A.L.H.  Brigade.     Capture  of  the  town  with 

to  2000  prisoners.    Destruction  of  the  wells.     First  attack 

Nov.  1st        on  the  Gaza  defences.     German  buildings  in  Beersheba. 

Arab  sheikhs  and  the  Camel  Transport  Corps        ,         .         18 

CHAPTER  IV 

Nov.  2nd       The  decisive   battle.     Enemy  counter-stroke    on    the 

to  east.     Hard    fighting   of   the   cavalry   and   the    53rd 

Nov.  7th        Division.     Lack  of  water.     Capture  of  Tel  Khuweilfeh. 

And  of  Hareira  and  Sharia.     Enemy's  front  broken. 

Cavalry  through  the  gap.     Fall  of  Gaza        ...         38 

CHAPTER  V 

Nov.  8th        The  pursuit.     All  three  cavalry  divisions  employed. 

and  9tb  Strong  enemy  resistance.  Charge  of  the  Yeomanry  at 
Huj.  Water  at  last.  Sufferings  of  the  horses.  Delay 
caused  by  lack  of  water.  Arak  el  Mensliiye  and  Beit 
Duras     .........         50 

CHAPTER  VI 

Nov.  10th      The  Cavalry  Corps  in  line  from  the  railway  to  the  sea. 

to  Difficulties   of   supply.     Withdrawal   of   aU    but   two 

Nov.  12th     infantry  divisions.     Great  heat  and  lack  of  water  causes 

a  slackening  of  the  pursuit.     Anzac  Division  seizes  the 

Esdud   bridge.     Stiffening   of   the   enemy   resistance. 

The  action  of  Balin  ......         61 

b 


xviii      THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 
CHAPTER  VII 

PAGE 

Nov.  13th  Attack  on  the  enemy  line.  Charge  of  the  6th  Mounted 
to  Brigade  at  El  Mughar.     Armoured  cars  enter  Junction 

Nov.  15th  Station.  Capture  of  the  station.  Enemy  forces  cut 
in  two.  Right  group  driven  northwards  across  the 
River  Auja,  and  left  group  into  the  Judsean  Hills. 
Occupation  of  Ramleh,  Ludd,  and  JafEa.  The  Sidun- 
Abu  Shusheh  position.  Second  charge  of  the  6th 
Mounted  Brigade     .......         77 

CHAPTER  VIII 

Nov.  16th  Necessity  for  reinforcements,  and  exhaustion  of  horses 
and  17th  causes  a  lull  in  the  operations.  A  waterless  record. 
The  Australian  cavalry  horse.  Junction  Station.  Re- 
appearance of  the  Corps  Ammunition  Column.  The 
Predatory  Gunner.  The  A.P.M.'s  Odyssey.  A 
Turkish  communique         ......         93 

CHAPTER  IX 

Nov.  18th  The  advance  resumed.  Amwas.  ITie  Australian 
to  Mounted  Division  withdrawn  to  rest.     The  Yeomanry 

Nov.  25th  Division  enter  the  mountains.  Rain.  Unsuccessful 
attacks  on  the  Beitunia  Ridge.  Difficulties  of  the 
country.  Our  infantry  seize  Nebi  Samwil.  The 
Anzac  Mounted  Division  forces  the  crossing  of  the 
Nahr  el  Auja  in  the  plain.     And  is  driven  back      .         .       101 

CHAPTER  X 

Dec.  Ist  to  Hard  fighting  and  bad  weather  in  the  hills.  Our  corn- 
Dec.  31st.  munications  cut.  The  last  of  the  Yeomanry  Division. 
Winter  conditions  in  the  Philistine  Plain.  Rain  and 
mud.  Floods  cause  breakdowns  in  the  supply  services. 
A  '  Merry  Christmas.'  Enem3'  spies  in  the  mountains. 
Surrender  of  Jei-usalem.  Final  crossing  of  the  Auja. 
Results  achieved  by  the  Desert  Mounted  Corps  during 
the  operations  .         .         .         .         .         .         .112 

CHAPTER  XI 

1918  '  Rest  and  Refit.'     The  rmns  of  Gaza.     Decision  to 

Jan.  Ist  to     extend  the  battle  line  to  the  Jordan.     The  country  be- 

Feb.  28th      tween  Jerusalem  and  the  Dead  Sea  basin.     The  first 

descent  into  the  Jordan  Valley.     Occupation  of  Jericho. 


CONTENTS  xix 

PAGK 

A  naval  battle  1300  feet  below  the  level  of  the  ocean. 
Second  descent  into  the  Valley.  Our  right  flank 
established  on  the  river  Jordan.  Operations  of  the 
Arab  forces      ........       123 


CHAPTER  XIT 

Mar.  1st  The  first  trans-Jordan  raid.  Description  of  the  trans- 
to  Jordan   country.     Bridging   the   Jordan.     Difficulties 

Apr.  2nd  of  the  cavalry.  Rain  and  cold.  Hedjaz  Railway  cut 
north  and  south  of  Amman.  Unsuccessful  attacks 
on  the  town.  Large  enemy  reinforcements  arrive  on 
the  scene.  Floods  sweep  away  the  bridges  over  the 
Jordan.  Hard  fighting  at  El  Salt.  Attack  on  Amman 
abandoned.     Withdrawal  of  the  raiding  force        .  .       132 

CHAPTER  XIII 

Apr.  3rd  Results  of  the  raid.  Successes  of  the  Arab  Army. 
to  Reorganisation   of   the   Cavalry   Corps.     The   second 

May  4th  trans- Jordan  raid.  Capture  of  EI  Salt.  Failure  of 
first  attack  on  Shunet  Nimrin.  Enemy  reinforcements 
cross  the  Jordan  at  Jisr  el  Damieh,  4th  A.L.H. 
Brigade  hard  pressed.  Loss  of  the  guns.  Enemy 
clears  the  way  to  El  Salt.  The  Beni  Sakhr  play  us 
false.  Precarious  position  of  our  cavalry  in  the  hills. 
Failure  of  second  attack  on  Shunet  Nimrin.  Hard 
fighting  at  El  Salt.  Ammunition  running  out.  The 
raiding  force  withdraws  across  the  Jordan.  Results 
of  the  raid       ........       153 

CHAPTER  XIV 

May  5th  Decision  to  hold  the  Jordan  Valley  during  the  summer, 
to  The    Valley    fine.     Description    of    the    country    and 

Aug.  31st  climate.  Enemy  attacks  on  Abu  Tellul  and  El  Henu 
repulsed.  An  example  of  '  Kultur.'  Out  of  the  Valley 
of  Desolation  .......       177 

CHAPTER  XV 

Sept.  1st  Preparations  for  the  great  drive.  Description  of  the 
to  Turkish  line  and  the  country  behind  it.     The  opposing 

Sept.  18th  forces.  Precautions  to  ensure  secrecy.  Plan  of  the 
operations.  Lawrence's  Arabs  cut  the  enemy  railway 
at  Deraa  junction.     At  the  starting  post     .         .         .       190 


XX         THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 
CHAPTER  XVI 


PAOiE 


Sept.  19th  Opening  the  door.  Cavalry  through  the  gap  and  over 
to  the  Carmcl  Range,    On  the  Plain  of  Armageddon.    13th 

Sept.  2l8t  Cavalry  Brigade  captures  the  enemy  G.H.Q.  at  Naza- 
reth. Cavalry  seize  Afule,  Jenin,  and  Beisan.  Big 
haul  of  prisoners  at  Jenin  .....       202 

CHAPTER  XVII 

Sept,  19th  Rolling  up  the  enemy  flank.  Work  of  the  5th  A.L.H, 
to  Brigade.     Our  infantry  attack  all  along  the  line  and 

Sept.  22nd  drive  in  the  Turkish  front.  Oui"  cavalry  reoccupy 
Nazareth.  Sad  fate  of  the  '  Haifa  Annexation  Ex- 
pedition.' Chaytor's  force  closes  the  Jisr  el  Damieh 
road,  and  advances  on  Shunet  Nimrin.  Turkish 
armies  trapped         .  .  .  .  .  .  .217 

CHAPTER  XVIII 

Sept.  23rd  Drawing  the  net.  Action  of  Makhadet  Abu  Naj. 
Capture  of  Haifa.  Action  at  Makhadet  el  Masudi. 
Turkish  Vllth  and  Vlllth  Armies  completely  destroyed. 
Adventures  of  Chaytor's  Force.  Surrender  of  the 
Hedjaz  Corps.     British  and  Turks  as  '  Allies  '     .         .       229 

CHAPTER  XIX 

Sept.  24th  Decision  to  advance  on  Damascus.  The  orders  for 
to  the  advance.     4th  A.L.H.  Brigade  captures  Semakh. 

Sept.  27th  Treachery  of  the  Germans.  Capture  of  Tiberias.  The 
race  for  Damascus.  4th  Cavalry  Division  strikes  at 
the  flank  of  the  retreating  IVth  Army.  And  joins 
hands  with  the  Arab  forces        .....       247 

CHAPTER  XX 

Sept.  27th     The  action  at  the  Bridge  of  Jacob's  Daughters.     A 
and  memory  of  Napoleon's  campaign  in  Syria.     Last  cross- 

Sept.  28th  ing  of  the  Jordan.  Occupation  of  El  Kuneitra.  Some 
undisciplined  '  Allies.'  4th  Cavalry  Division  reaches 
El  Mezerib.  Turks  massacre  women  and  children. 
The  Arabs'  vengeance       ......       258 

CHAPTER  XXI 

Sept.  29th     The  last  lap  of  the  race  to  Damascus.     Orders  of  the 

to  Cavalry  Corps.     A  fight  in  the  darkness.     The  action 

Oct.  5th        of  Kaukab.     5th   A.L.H.   Brigade  closes  the  Beirut 


CONTENTS 


XXI 


road.  Ouv  two  columns  meet  at  Damascus,  End  of 
the  Turkish  IVth  Army.  Capture  of  the  city  with 
12,000  prisoners.  Terrible  condition  of  the  enemy 
troops.  A  record  charge  by  Australian  cavalry.  Dis- 
orders in  Damascus  ...... 


266 


CHAPTER  XXII 

Oct.  5th  Decision  to  advance  to  Rayak  and  Beirut.  Sickness 
to  in  the  Corps.     Occupation  of  Homs  and  Tripoli.     5th 

Oct.  31st  Cavalry  Division  ordered  to  advance  to  Aleppo.  A 
hunt  by  the  armoured  cars.  A  piece  of  bluff.  Fall  of 
Aleppo.  The  last  of  the  Turkish  army.  The  Armis- 
tice.    Captures  of  the  Desert  Mounted  Corps 


282 


CHAPTER  XXIII 

Police  work.  The  Desert  Mounted  Corps  administers  a  country 
larger  than  Scotland.  Condition  of  the  country  after  the 
Armistice.  Pax  Britannica.  Co-operation  of  the  Arabs.  Work 
of  the  Armenian  Reparations  Committee.  Character  of  the 
Armenians.  A  gamble  in  exchange.  Sport  and  games.  End 
of  the  Desert  Mounted  Corps.  Northern  Syria  handed  over  to 
the  French 295 

CHAPTER  XXIV 
Horse  Artillery 303 

CHAPTER  XXV 
Horses 311 


CHAPTER  XXVI 

Transport  and  Ammunition  Supply 

Appendix  I :  (a)  The  Desert  Mounted  Corps 

(6)  Infantry 
Appendix  II :  Note  on  the  Arab  Movement 
Appendix  III :  Terms  of  Turkish  Armistice 


322 

331 
335 
337 
342 


ILLUSTRATIONS 


Lieutenant-General   Sir   H.    G.    Chauvel,    K.O.B., 


K.C.M.G. 

. 

.    Frontispiece 

TO  FACE  PAGE 

Water  at  Esani 

20 

Country  near  Beersheba 

20 

Beersheba        .         .         . 

36 

Beersheba  First  Train 

36 

Turkish  Cavalry 

48 

Turkish  Machine  Guns      .... 

48 

After  the  Charge  at  Huj 

76 

Marching  over  Philistine  Plain 

76 

Von  Falkenhayn      ..... 

108 

Austrian  Howitzer  ..... 

108 

R.H.A.  IN  Action  in  Mountains 

120 

Reading  British  Proclamation  in  Jerusalem 

120 

Mosque  at  Gaza                 .... 

124 

German  Motor  Boat 

152 

Grain  from  Moab 

152 

River  Jordan  . 

176 

Shunet  Nimrin 

176 

Motor  Lorries  '  Before  '  . 

212 

Motor  Lorries  *  After  '    . 

212 

German  Aircraft 

228 

In  the  Hands  of  the  Enemy 

228 

Nazareth 

252 

Tiberias   .... 

252 

xxiv      THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

TO  FACB  PAOK 

R.H.A.  Fording  River  Jordan 270 

Bakada  Gorge,  Damascus 270 

Feisal's  Headquarters  at  Damascus          .         .         .  278 

Tripoli 278 

Aleppo      .........  288 

Arabs  and  Fbisal's  Soldiers 288 

River  Euphrates 296 

AiNTAB 296 

Inscription  at  Dog  River          .....  302 

LIST  OF  MAPS  AND  DIAGRAMS. 

Key  Map 327 

Folding  out. 

Map  A 122 

„   B 246 

,,   G 280 

„   D 294 

Full  page. 

Diagram  1          .......         .  18 

2 46 

3 80 

4 86 

5 170 

6 222 

7 236 


THE   DESERT   MOUNTED    CORPS 

AN  ACCOUNT  OF  THE  CAVALRY  OPERATIONS 
IN  PALESTINE  AND  SYRIA,  1917-1918 

CHAPTER  I 

THE  COUNTRY  AND  THE  OPPOSING  FORCES 

When  General  Allenby  arrived  in  Egypt  in  June 
1917,  and  assumed  command  of  the  Egyptian 
Expeditionary  Force,  British  prestige  in  the  East 
was  at  a  very  low  ebb.  The  evacuation  of  Galhpoli 
in  December  1915,  followed  by  the  fall  of  Kut  el 
Amara  four  months  later,  and  by  our  two  unsuccessful 
attacks  on  Gaza  in  the  spring  of  the  following  year, 
had  invested  the  Turkish  arms  with  a  legend  of  in- 
vincibility which  was  spreading  rapidly  in  all  Moslem 
countries.  For  the  first  time  in  seven  centuries, 
sang  the  journalistic  bards  of  Stamboul,  the  followers 
of  Islam  had  triumphed  over  the  Infidel ;  Allah  was 
leading  the  Faithful  to  victory ;  the  Empire  of  the 
Moslems  was  at  hand. 

The  fall  of  Baghdad  in  March  1917  somewhat 
dashed  these  high  hopes,  it  is  true.  But  the  Germans, 
to  whom  the  city  was,  at  the  moment,  of  no  more 
importance  than  any  other  dirty  Eastern  village,  had 
little  difficulty  in  persuading  the  Turks  that  its  loss 
was  a  mere  incident  in  the  world  war,  which  would 
be  more  than  made  good  in  the  final,  and  glorious, 
peace  terms.  Nevertheless,  the  Turks  insisted  on 
making  an  effort  to  recapture  the  place,  and  for  this 
purpose  a  special,  picked  force,  known  as  the  Yilderim, 


2  THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

or  Lightning,  Army  Group,  was  in  process  of  forma- 
tion in  northern  Syria  at  this  time.  The  command 
of  this  group  had  been  entrusted  to  the  redoubtable 
von  Falkenhayn,  who  was  at  Aleppo,  directing  the 
training  and  organisation  of  the  troops. 

Comforted  by  highly  coloured  accounts  of  the 
efficiency  and  fighting  value  of  this  force,  the  Turks 
rapidly  recovered  from  the  effects  of  the  loss  of 
Baghdad.  Bombastic  articles,  inspired  by  Potsdam, 
began  to  make  their  appearance  in  the  Turkish  press, 
chronicUng  the  doings  of  the  '  Lightning '  armies. 
They  were  to  recapture  Baghdad,  drive  the  British 
into  the  Persian  Gulf,  and  then  march  to  the  '  relief ' 
of  India.  Afterwards  the  presumptuous  little  force 
that  had  dared  to  oppose  the  Turks'  advance  into 
their  own  province  of  Egypt  would  be  dealt  with  in  a 
suitable  manner ;  Egypt  would  be  delivered  ;  and 
the  Suez  Canal,  '  the  jugular  vein  of  the  British 
Empire,'  would  be  severed. 

Aided  by  such  writings,  and  supported  by  German 
money,  Pan-Islamic  emissaries  were  busily  engaged 
in  every  Moslem  or  partly  Moslem  country,  stirring 
up  the  Faithful  to  sedition  and  revolt.  India, 
Afghanistan,  Persia,  and  Egypt  were  all  in  a  state  of 
suppressed  excitement  and  unrest,  and  it  is  probable 
that  one  more  British  reverse  in  the  East  would  have 
been  sufficient  to  set  all  these  countries  in  a  blaze. 
The  least  imaginative  can  form  some  idea  of  the 
tremendous  consequences  that  such  an  upheaval 
would  have  had  upon  the  war  in  general.  Yet  the 
newspapers  of  that  time  show  clearly  that  there 
was  a  considerable,  and  vociferous,  body  of  public 
opinion,  both  in  England  and  in  France,  that  regarded 
the  Syrian  and  Mesopotamian  campaigns  as  useless 
and  extravagant  '  side-shows,'  and  clamoured  in- 
sistently for  the  recall  of  the  troops  engaged  in  them. 


THE  ENEMY  DEFENCES  3 

Thus,  both  for  the  purpose  of  re-estabHshing  our 
waning  prestige  in  the  East,  and  of  silencing  the 
mischievous  agitation  at  home,  it  was  imperative 
that  a  signal  defeat  should  be  inflicted  on  the  Turks 
as  soon  as  possible.  The  capture  of  Jerusalem, 
which  city  ranks  only  after  Mecca  and  Stamboul 
among  the  holy  places  of  Islam,  would  set  a  fitting 
seal  upon  such  a  defeat,  and  would  be  certain  to 
create  a  profound  impression  upon  Moslems  the 
world  over. 

Jerusalem,  therefore,  became  the  political  objective 
of  the  new  British  Commander-in-Chief.  The  stra- 
tegical objective  will  be  discussed  later. 

The  situation  in  Palestine  in  the  summer  of  1917 
was  not,  however,  at  first  sight,  very  encouraging. 
Our  two  abortive  attempts  on  Gaza  had  shown  the 
German  commanders  the  weak  points  in  the  Turkish 
defences,  and  they  had  set  to  work,  with  character- 
istic energy  and  thoroughness,  to  strengthen  them. 
'  Gaza  itself  had  been  made  into  a  strong,  modern 
fortress,  heavily  entrenched  and  wired,  and  offering 
every  facility  for  protracted  defence.  The  remainder 
of  the  enemy's  line  consisted  of  a  series  of  strong 
localities,  viz. :  the  Sihan  group  of  works,  the  Atawineh 
group,  the  Abu  el  Hareira-Abu  el  Teaha  trench 
system  (near  Sharia),  and,  finally,  the  works  covering 
Beersheba.  These  groups  of  works  were  generally 
from  1500  to  2000  yards  apart,  except  that  the 
distance  from  the  Hareira  group  to  Beersheba  was 
about  four  and  a  half  miles.  .  .  .  By  the  end  of 
October  these  strong  localities  had  been  joined  up  so 
as  to  form  a  practically  continuous  line  from  the  sea 
to  a  point  south  of  Sharia.  The  defensive  works 
round  Beersheba  remained  a  detached  system,  but 
had  been  improved  and  extended.'  ^ 

^  Genera,!  Allenby's  despatch,  dated  16th  December  1917. 


4  THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

The  Turkish  forces  were  thus  on  a  wide  front,  the 
distance  from  Gaza  to  Beersheba  being  about  thirt}"- 
miles,  but  a  well-graded,  metalled  road,  which  they 
had  made  just  behind  their  line,  connecting  these 
two  places,  afforded  good  lateral  communication, 
and  any  threatened  point  of  their  front  could  be 
very  quickly  reinforced. 

From  July  onwards  continual  reinforcements  of 
men,  guns,  and  stores  had  arrived  on  the  enemy's 
front,  and  he  had  formed  several  large  supply  and 
ammunition  depots  at  different  places  behind  his 
lines.  He  had  also  laid  two  lines  of  railway  from  the 
so-called  Junction  Station  on  the  Jerusalem-Jaffa 
line,  one  to  Deir  Sineid,  just  north  of  Gaza,  and  the 
other  to  Beersheba,  and  beyond  it  to  the  village  of 
El  Auja,^  on  the  Turko-Egyptian  frontier,  some 
twenty-five  miles  south-west  of  Beersheba.  It  was 
evident  that  the  Turks  intended  to  hold  on  to  the 
Gaza-Beersheba  line  at  all  costs,  in  order  to  cover 
the  concentration  and  despatch  of  the  Yilderim 
Force  to  Mesopotamia. 

This  Junction  Station  was  to  be  the  strategical 
objective  of  our  operations.  From  the  junction  a 
railway  ran  northwards,  through  Tul  Keram,  Mes- 
sudieh,  Jenin  and  Afule,  to  Deraa  on  the  Hedjaz  Rail- 
way, whence  the  latter  line  continued  to  Damascus, 
Aleppo,  and  the  Baghdad  Railway.  With  the  junction 
in  our  hands,  any  enemy  force  in  the  Judsean  hills, 
protecting  Jerusalem,  would  be  cut  off  from  all 
railway  communication  to  the  north,  and  would  be 
compelled  to  rely  for  its  supplies  on  the  difficult 
mountain  road  between  Messudieh  and  Jerusalem, 
or  on  the  longer  and  still  more  difficult  road  from 

^  The  portion  of  the  line  between  Beersheba  and  El  Auja  was  raided  by 
our  cavalry  in  May  1917,  and  about  thirty  miles  of  the  track  destroyed,  in 
order  to  prevent  any  attempted  raid  on  our  conununications  via  the  latter 
place. 


ENEMY  SPIES  5 

Amman  station  on  the  Hedjaz  Railway,  thirty  miles 
east  of  the  Jordan,  via  Jericho  to  Jerusalem. 

Our  own  position  extended  from  the  sea  at  Gaza 
to  a  point  on  the  Wadi  Ghuzze  near  El  Gamli,  some 
fourteen  miles  south-west  of  Sharia  and  eighteen 
miles  west  of  Beersheba.  The  opposing  lines  thus 
formed  a  rough  '  V,'  with  its  apex  at  Gaza,  where  the 
lines  were,  in  some  places,  only  a  couple  of  hundred 
yards  apart.  From  here  they  diverged  to  El  Gamli, 
which  was  about  nine  miles  from  the  nearest  part  of 
the  Turkish  positions.  The  intervening  space  was 
watched  by  our  cavalry. 

The  right  flank  of  our  line  being  thus  '  in  the  air ' 
out  in  the  desert,  it  was  a  comparatively  eas}^  matter 
for  enemy  spies,  disguised  as  peaceful  natives,  to 
pass  round  it  under  cover  of  darkness,  and  approach 
our  positions  from  the  rear  in  daylight.  Native 
hawkers,  other  than  those  with  passes  from  the 
Intelligence  Staff,  were  forbidden  to  approach  our 
lines,  but  it  was  impossible  to  control  all  the  natives 
in  such  a  scattered  area,  and  much  can  be  seen,  with 
the  aid  of  a  pair  of  field-glasses,  from  the  top  of  a  hill 
a  mile  away.  There  were  also  at  least  two  very  daring 
Germans,  who  several  times  penetrated  our  Unes  dis- 
guised as  British  officers.  They  were  both  exceedingly 
bold  and  resourceful  men,  and  it  is  probable  that 
they  obtained  a  good  deal  of  useful  information, 
before  they  met  the  almost  inevitable  fate  of  spies. 

Before  the  end  of  our  time  of  preparation,  how- 
ever, methods  were  evolved  to  deal  with  this  nuisance, 
and  the  enemy  was  kept  in  ignorance  of  our  move- 
ments and  intentions  with  that  success  which  always 
attended  the  efforts  of  General  Allenby  in  this 
direction.  An  enemy  staff  document,  subsequently 
captured  by  us,  and  dated  just  prior  to  the  com- 
mencement   of    the    operations,    stated    that :     '  An 


6  THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

outflanking  attack  on  Beersheba  with  about  one 
infantry  and  one  cavaky  division  is  indicated,  but 
the  main  attack,  as  before,  must  be  expected  on 
the  Gaza  front.'  How  far  wrong  was  this  apprecia- 
tion of  the  situation  will  be  apparent  later  on.  The 
same  document  also  stated  that  we  had  six  infantry 
divisions  in  the  Gaza  sector,  whereas  at  the  time 
there  were  only  three. 

The  Royal  Air  Force  was  an  important  factor  in 
denying  information  to  the  enemy  during  the  latter 
part  of  our  time  of  preparation.  One  of  the  first 
things  the  Commander-in-Chief  had  done  on  his 
arrival  at  the  front,  was  to  re-equip  the  force  com- 
pletely. Hitherto  the  German  Flying  Corps  had 
done  what  it  hked  in  the  air  over  our  lines.  For 
several  months  on  end  our  troops  had  been  bombed, 
almost  with  impunity,  every  day.  Our  own  pilots, 
starved  alike  of  aeroplanes  and  of  materials  for  repairs, 
gingerly  manoeuvring  their  antiquated  and  rickety 
machines,  fought  gallantly  but  hopelessly  against 
the  fast  Taubes  and  Fokkers  of  the  German  airmen, 
and  day  by  day  the  pitiful  list  of  casualties  that 
might  have  been  so  easily  avoided  grew  longer. 

In  four  months  all  this  had  changed.  Our  pilots, 
equipped  with  new,  up-to-date  and  fast  machines, 
met  the  Germans  on  level  terms,  and  quickly  began 
to  obtain  supremacy  in  the  air.  By  the  end  of 
October  this  supremacy  was  definitely  established, 
and  the  few  enemy  pilots  who  crossed  our  lines  at 
that  time  flew  warily,  ever  on  the  look-out  for 
one  of  our  fighting  machines. 

The  country  occupied  by  the  opposing  armies 
varied  considerably  in  character.  The  district  near 
the  coast  consisted  of  a  series  of  high  dunes  of  loose, 
shifting  sand,  impassable  for  wheeled  traffic.  Farther 
east  the  ground  became  harder,  but  it  was  still  sandy 


ORGANISING  A  CAVALRY  FORCE  7 

and  heavy  going  for  transport.  Eastwards  again, 
towards  Beersheba,  the  country  changed  to  a  wilder- 
ness of  bare,  rocky  hills,  intersected  by  innumerable 
wadis  (dry  river  beds).  These  wadis  were,  for  the 
most  part,  enclosed  between  limestone  cliffs,  some- 
times 100  feet  or  more  in  height,  and  impassable 
except  where  the  few  native  tracks  crossed  them. 
The  whole  of  this  part  of  the  country  was  water- 
less, except  for  three  very  deep  wells  at  Khalasa 
and  one  at  Asluj  (all  of  which  had  been  destroyed 
by  the  Turks),  and  some  fairly  good  pools  in  the 
Wadi  Ghuzze  at  Esani  and  Shellal.  In  Beersheba 
itself  there  were  seven  good  wells. 

Northwards  of  the  enemy's  positions,  between  the 
Judsean  mountains  and  the  sea,  stretched  the 
great  plain  of  Philistia,  a  strip  of  rolling  down- 
land  fifteen  to  twenty  miles  wide,  admirably  suited 
for  the  employment  of  mounted  troops. 

The  appointment  of  General  AUenby,  himseK  a 
cavalryman,  to  the  command  of  the  Egyptian  Expedi- 
tionary Force,  presaged  the  employment  of  cavahy  on 
a  much  larger  scale  than  had  hitherto  been  attempted. 
From  his  first  study  of  the  problem  before  him,  the 
new  Commander-in-Chief  realised  the  predominant 
part  that  cavalry  would  play  in  the  operations,  and 
devoted  himself,  with  his  customary  energy,  to  or- 
ganising a  force  suitable  for  the  work  in  prospect. 

For  the  advance  across  the  Sinai  Desert  from  the 
Suez  Canal,  a  special  force  had  been  organised, 
under  the  command  of  Sir  Philip  Chetwode.  This 
force,  which  was  known  as  the  Desert  Column,  con- 
sisted of  the  Australian  and  New  Zealand  Mounted 
Division  (which  then  included  the  1st,  2nd,  and  3rd 
Australian  Light  Horse  Brigades  and  the  New 
Zealand  Mounted  Brigade),  the  5th  Mounted  Brigade 
(Yeomanry),  and  the  42nd  and  52nd  Infantry  Divisions. 


8  THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

The   2nd   Mounted   (Yeomanry)    Division,    which 
had  arrived  in  Egypt  in  April  1915,  had  been  sent 
to   GalUpoH  dismounted.     After  the  evacuation  of 
the  peninsula,   part  of  this  division  had  been  re- 
mounted.    The    5th    Mounted    Brigade    had    taken 
part   in   the  advance  across  Sinai,  and  other  units 
of  the  division  had  been  employed  in  the  campaign 
against  the  Senussi,  and  in  the  Fayoum  and  other 
parts  of  Egypt.     Most  of  these  scattered  units  had 
been  collected  prior  to  the  first  battle  of  Gaza,  and 
organised  into  two  divisions  of  four  brigades  each, 
including  a  new  brigade  of  Australian  Light  Horse 
(the  4th)  which  had  been  formed,  partly  out  of  Light 
Horsemen   who    had    returned   from   Gallipoli,  and 
partly  out  of  reinforcements  from  Australia.    General 
Allenby  now  remounted  the  remainder  of  the  Yeo- 
manry in  Egypt,  and  formed  out  of  them  two  new 
brigades.     The    ten    brigades    thus    available    were 
organised  as  a  corps  of  three  divisions  :  the  Australian 
and  New   Zealand   (1st   and   2nd   A.L.H.    Brigades 
and  the  New  Zealand  Brigade),  generally  known  as 
the  Anzac  Mounted  Division ;  the  Australian  Mounted 
Division    (3rd   and   4th   A.L.H.    and   5th   Mounted 
Brigades) ;   and   the   Yeomanry  Division   (6th,   8th, 
and  22nd  Mounted  Brigades).      The  corps  reserve 
consisted    of    the    7th    Mounted    Brigade,    and    the 
Imperial   Camel   Corps  Brigade,   while  the  (Indian) 
Imperial  Service  Cavalry  Brigade  ^  formed  part  of 
the   Army   troops.      Only   the    Yeomanry   Division 
and  the  7th  Mounted  and  Imperial  Service  Cavalry 
Brigades  were  at  this  time  armed  with  swords. 

It  was  originally  intended  to  call  this  force  the 
2nd  Cavalry  Corps,  but  General  Chauvel,  who  was 
appointed  to  command  it,  asked  that  the  name  of 
the  Desert  Column  might  be  perpetuated  in  that 

^  Raised  and  equipped  by  some  of  the  ruling  princes  of  India. 


THE  OPPOSING  ARMIES  9 

of  the  new  force.  It  was  accordingly  named  the 
Desert  Mounted  Corps.  ^ 

The  infantry  of  the  Expeditionary  Force,  largely 
augmented  by  troops  in  Egypt,  was  formed  into  two 
corps  of  three  divisions  each,  the  20th  under  Sir  Philip 
Chetwode,  and  the  21st  commanded  by  Lieutenant- 
General  Bulfin,  with  one  other  infantry  division. 
The  20th  Corps  (10th,  53rd,  and  74th  Divisions,  with 
the  60th  Division  attached)  was  in  the  eastern  sector 
of  our  Hne,  while  the  21st  Corps  (53rd,  54th,  and 
75th  Divisions)  held  the  trenches  opposite  Gaza.^ 

The  Imperial  Service  Cavalry  Brigade  was  attached 
to  the  21st  Corps  during  the  operations.  This  bri- 
gade had  not  yet  seen  any  serious  service,  and  its 
fighting  quahties  were  rather  an  unknown  factor. 
Later  on  in  the  campaign,  however,  all  three  regi- 
ments distinguished  themselves  greatly,  and  estab- 
lished a  fine  reputation  for  dash. 

Our  total  forces  numbered  some  76,000  fighting 
men,  of  whom  about  20,000  were  mounted,  with 
550  guns.  The  enemy  troops  opposed  to  us  con- 
sisted of  nine  Turkish  divisions,  organised  in  two 
armies,  the  Vllth  and  Vlllth,  and  one  cavalry 
division,  a  total  of  about  49,000  fighting  men,  3000 
of  whom  were  mounted,  with  360  guns.^  Our 
superiority  in  numbers,  though  considerable,  thus 
fell  short  of  the  Napoleonic  minimum  for  the  attack 
of  entrenched  positions,  but  our  large  preponderance 
of  cavalry  promised  great  results,  if  we  could  succeed 
in  driving  the  Turks  out  of  their  fortifications. 

^  See  Appendix  i.  a.  ^  See  Appendix  i.  b. 

^  The  Vllth  Army  was  commanded  by  the  German  General  Kress  von 
Kressenstein,  and  the  Vlllth  by  Fevzi  Pasha.  The  general  staff  of  all  the 
enemy  formations  was  in  the  hands  of  the  Germans,  All  ranks  of  the  fly- 
ing corps,  heavy  artillery  and  motor  transport  corps,  and  the  officers  of  the 
engineer  and  supply  services  and  of  the  railway  administration  were  also 
Germans.     There  were  a  few  German  and  Austrian  infantry  battalions. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  PLAN  OF  OPERATIONS 

The  Commander-in-Chief's  plan  was  bold  and  simple, 
and  promised  great  results.  It  depended  for  its 
success  largely  on  the  resolution  and  vigour  with 
which  the  first  part  of  the  plan,  the  attack  of  Beer- 
sheba,  was  carried  out.  Owing  to  the  waterless 
nature  of  the  country,  this  place  had  to  be  in  our 
hands  within  twenty-four  hours  from  the  commence- 
ment of  the  operations.  If  it  were  not,  the  troops 
would  have  to  be  withdrawn,  owing  to  lack  of 
water,  the  attack  abandoned,  and  the  operations 
commenced  anew  at  some  later  date,  against  an 
enemy  forewarned  of  our  plans,  and  with  the  prospect 
of  the  winter  rains  putting  a  stop  to  our  advance 
before  it  had  weU  begun. 

The  operations  as  a  whole  divided  themselves 
naturally  into  three  main  parts,  in  each  of  which  the 
fighting  would  be  of  a  totally  different  character. 
First,  the  attack  and  capture  of  the  enemy's  entrenched 
positions  from  Beersheba  to  the  sea.  This  was  pri- 
marily an  infantry  operation.  Secondly,  the  pursuit 
of  the  enemy  over  the  plain  of  Philistia,  culminating 
in  the  capture  of  Junction  Station,  and  the  conse- 
quent isolation  of  any  enemy  force  endeavouring 
to  cover  Jerusalem.  This  was  to  be  the  cavalry's 
opportunity.  And  lastly,  the  advance  through  the 
Judaean  hills,  and  the  capture  of  the  Holy  City. 

For  obvious  reasons  only  the  first  part  of  these 


THE  PLAN  OF  OPERATIONS  11 

operations  could  be  thought  out  in  detail  beforehand. 
The  plan  for  this  phase  was  as  follows  : — 

1.  To  seize  Beersheba  and  the  high  ground  to  the 
north  and  north-west  of  it,  by  a  combined  attack  of 
cavalry  and  infantry,  thus  throwing  open  the  left 
flank  of  the  main  enemy  position  at  Hareira  and 
Sharia.  After  the  fall  of  Beersheba  the  cavalry 
would  thus  all  be  concentrated  on  the  right  flank  of 
our  forces,  ready  to  pursue  the  enemy  when  driven 
from  the  remainder  of  his  positions.  The  possession 
of  Beersheba  would,  it  was  hoped,  give  us  the 
necessary  water  to  enable  us  to  maintain  our 
cavalry  on  this  flank  till  the  conclusion  of  the  second 
phase  of  the  attack. 

2.  To  deliver  the  main  infantry  attack  against  the 
enemy's  open  left  flank  at  Hareira,  and  endeavour 
to  roll  up  his  line  from  east  to  west. 

3.  In  order  to  deceive  the  enemy  up  to  the  last 
moment  as  to  the  real  point  of  our  main  attack,  to 
pin  him  to  his  positions,  and  to  draw  reinforcements 
away  from  his  left  flank,  an  attack,  preceded  by  a 
week's  bombardment,  was  to  be  launched  on  the 
Gaza  defences  twenty-four  to  forty-eight  hours  pre- 
vious to  2. 

As  the  attack  on  Beersheba  necessitated  a  march 
of  some  seventy  miles  on  the  part  of  the  cavalry, 
who  were  to  attack  from  the  east,  and  of  about 
twenty  for  the  infantry,  over  unknown  country,  a 
great  deal  of  preliminary  work  was  required.  The 
water  supply  had  to  be  developed,  tracks  and  the 
crossing  places  of  wadis  improved  and  marked  on  the 
maps,  and  the  enemy  positions  south  and  west  of 
Beersheba  most  carefully  reconnoitred.  It  was  also 
very  desirable  that  all  commanders  should  gain  some 
knowledge  of  the  country  over  which  they  were  to 
lead  their  troops. 


12  THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

To  these  ends  our  line  was  organised  as  follows  : — 

A  permanent  position,  strongly  entrenched  and 
wired,  was  constructed  from  the  sea  at  Gaza  to 
Shellal  on  the  Wadi  Ghuzze,  and  held  by  infantry. 
From  Shellal  a  lightly  entrenched  line  extended  to 
El  Gamli,  and  this  was  held  by  one  cavalry  division, 
which  also  supplied  the  outposts  and  patrols  in  the 
wide  '  no  man's  land '  at  this  end  of  the  line.  A 
second  cavalry  division  was  held  in  support  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Abasan  el  Kebir,  and  the  third 
was  in  reserve,  resting,  on  the  seashore  near  Tel  el 
Marrakeb.  These  divisions  relieved  one  another 
every  month. 

The  cavalry  divisions  in  the  line  and  at  Abasan 
lived  in  bivouacs  made  of  light,  wooden  hurdles, 
covered  with  grass  mats,  and  erected  over  rectangular 
pits  dug  in  the  ground.  These  bivouac  shelters  gave 
fair  cover  from  the  sun,  and  the  pits  afforded  some 
protection  from  enemy  bombs.  The  division  on  the 
seashore  was  accommodated  in  tents. 

The  two  former  divisions  had  to  be  ready  at  all 
times  to  move  out  to  battle  at  half  an  hour's  notice, 
and  much  of  the  training  was  directed  towards 
cutting  down  the  time  taken  to  turn  out  in  '  marching 
order.'  The  division  in  the  line  had  plenty  of  work  to 
do,  with  daily  outposts,  extended  patrol  work,  and 
the  long  reconnaissances  undertaken  every  fortnight, 
so  that  the  training  was  confined  to  the  periods  spent 
at  Abasan. 

As  the  operations  were  to  take  place  in  the  late 
summer,  and,  it  was  hoped,  would  be  concluded 
before  the  winter  rains  set  in,  no  great  provision 
against  cold  and  wet  was  called  for.  Blankets  and 
greatcoats  were,  therefore,  not  to  be  carried.  Each 
man  was  provided  with  a  pair  of  officers'  pattern 
saddle-wallets,    in    which    he    carried    three    days' 


PRELIMINARY  TRAINING  13 

rations  (including  the  iron  ration)  of  bully  beef, 
biscuit,  and  groceries,  besides  the  few  articles  of 
clothing  he  was  allowed  to  take.  Two  nose-bags  on 
each  saddle  carried  19  lb.  of  grain  (two  days'  forage 
on  the  marching  scale).  A  third  day's  forage  was 
carried  in  Umbered  G.S.  wagons,  three  to  each 
regiment.  The  divisions  were,  therefore,  self- 
supporting  for  three  days,  without  recourse  to  their 
divisional  trains.  The  latter,  during  the  subsequent 
operations,  did  not  accompany  their  divisions,  but 
acted  as  carriers  between  them  and  the  advanced 
ration  dumps  estabhshed  by  the  corps'  lorry  column 
each  day.  One  other  L.G.S.  wagon  was  allowed  per 
regiment  for  technical  stores,  cooking  utensils,  etc. 
All  entrenching  tools  were  carried  on  pack  animals. 

In  order  to  test  the  mobility  of  the  troops,  it  was 
the  custom  for  each  divisional  commander,  during  the 
period  when  his  division  was  in  the  Abasan  area,  to 
issue  from  time  to  time  a  surprise  order  for  the  troops 
to  turn  out  ready  for  operations,  and  rendezvous  by 
brigades  or  regiments  in  stated  places,  where  they 
were  carefully  inspected.  These  orders  were  generally 
issued  in  the  early  morning,  and,  as  no  hint  of  them 
was  ever  given  beforehand,  even  to  the  Staff,  they 
constituted  a  real  test  of  mobility.  The  time  taken 
by  each  unit  to  turn  out  was  noted  by  Staff  officers, 
and  the  keenest  rivalry  sprang  up  between  the 
divisions  and  the  different  units  of  each  division 
to  make  the  best  showing.  Ration  and  store  wagons 
were  packed  each  night,  nose-bags  filled  after  the  last 
feed  and  tied  on  the  saddles,  and  all  harness  and 
saddlery  laid  out  in  order  behind  the  horses.  The 
men's  waUets  were  kept  packed  permanently,  the 
rations  in  them  being  renewed  from  time  to  time, 
when  the  old  ones  were  consumed.  The  record 
ultimately    went    to    one    of    the    Horse     Artillery 


14         THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

batteries,  which  turned  out  complete  in  full  marching 
order,  with  all  its  ammunition,  rations,  and  stores 
correct,  in  eleven  minutes  from  the  receipt  of  the 
order. 

About  once  a  fortnight  the  cavalry  division  that 
was  in  the  line  made  a  reconnaissance  towards 
Beersheba,  the  other  two  divisions  closing  up  to 
Shellal  and  Abasan  respectively.  Moving  out  in  the 
afternoon,  the  division  would  march  all  night,  and 
occupy  a  line  of  posts  on  the  high  ground  west  of 
Beersheba  by  dawn  next  morning.  Behind  this 
line  of  protecting  posts  the  infantry  corps  and 
divisional  commanders,  and  innumerable  lesser  fry, 
disported  themselves  in  motor  cars  and  on  horseback. 
The  senior  corps  commander  and  his  staff  used  to  be 
irreverently  referred  to  as  the  '  Royal  Party,'  a 
flippant  term  which  may  be  excused  by  the  tedium 
and  discomfort  of  the  operations. 

After  seeing  the  last  of  the  infantry  commanders 
safely  away,  the  cavalry  used  to  withdraw,  and 
march  back  to  Shellal  during  the  night.  The  recon- 
naissances thus  entailed  two  nights  and  a  day  of 
almost  continual  movement  and  watchfulness,  with- 
out any  sleep  or  rest,  during  which  time  it  was  not 
uncommon  for  regiments  to  cover  seventy  miles  or 
more.  Apart  from  the  fatigue  occasioned  by  thirty- 
six  hours  of  constant  anxiety  and  hard  work,  the 
absence  of  water  caused  severe  hardship  to  the 
horses  and  no  little  discomfort  to  their  riders.  No 
water  for  horses  was  available  from  the  afternoon 
of  the  day  on  which  the  division  moved  out  till  the 
evening  of  the  following  day,  when,  as  a  rule,  they 
got  a  drink  at  Esani  on  the  way  back  to  Shellal. 
The  men  started  with  full  bottles,  and  got  one  refill 
from  the  regimental  water-carts. 

The  day  was  made  up  of  a  series  of  petty  annoy- 


CAVALRY  RECONNAISSANCES  15 

ances.  The  scattered  squadrons  were  invariably 
bombed  by  the  enemy,  generally  with  effect,  and  the 
Turks'  light  guns,  brought  out  to  concealed  posi- 
tions, from  which  they  had  previously  registered  all 
the  high  ground,  wadi  crossings,  etc.,  added  to  the 
general  discomfort  by  their  continual,  galling  shell 
fire.  Many  of  the  crossings  in  this  part  of  the 
country  consisted  of  a  narrow,  stony  cleft  in  the 
rock  sides  of  the  wadi,  down  which  troops  could  only 
move  in  very  narrow  formation,  often  only  in  single 
file.  When,  as  sometimes  happened,  a  whole  brigade 
of  cavalry  had  to  cross  by  one  of  these  narrow  drifts, 
while  the  bed  of  the  wadi  was  being  swept  by  shrapnel 
and  high  explosive  shell  the  whole  time,  tempers 
were  apt  to  get  short.  We  on  our  side  could  rarely 
spare  an  aeroplane  to  observe  for  one  of  our  own 
batteries,  and  so  were  seldom  able  to  locate  the 
hostile  guns.  The  inability  to  reply  effectively  in- 
creased the  exasperation  caused  by  their  fire.  Many 
of  the  surrounding  natives  had  been  armed  by  the 
Turks  and  stirred  up  against  us,  and,  though  they 
never  succeeded  in  causing  us  any  casualties,  their 
hostility  added  to  the  general  insecurity,  and  in- 
creased the  need  for  watchfulness. 

For  the  rest,  the  country  was  a  desert  of  blistering 
rocks  and  stones,  the  temperature  ranged  up  to 
110  degrees  in  the  shade  (of  which  there  was  none 
save  that  cast  by  the  bodies  of  men  and  horses),  and 
the  flies  were  innumerable  and  persistent.  It  was 
with  a  sigh  of  heartfelt  relief  that  the  troops  saw 
the  last  of  the  motor  cars  of  the  '  Royal  Parties ' 
disappear  in  a  cloud  of  dust  to  the  north-west,  and 
received  the  welcome  order  to  withdraw  and  march 
back  to  Shellal  through  the  cool  night. 

There  was,  however,  one  never-failing  amusement 
to  be  got  out  of  these  reconnaissances.     This  came 


16  THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

on  the  following  day,  when  we  intercepted  the 
Turkish  wireless  communique  on  its  way  to  the 
Berhn  press.  These  communiques  never  varied  in 
their  description  of  the  operations.  '  The  enemy 
made  a  determined  attack  on  Beersheba  with  about 
seventy  squadrons  supported  by  artillery.'  This 
was  the  invariable  formula.  '  After  heavy  fighting, 
the  hostile  forces  were  defeated  and  driven  right 
back  to  their  original  positions,  having  suffered 
important  losses !  '  One  imagines  that  even  the 
simple  Berliner  must  have  become,  at  last,  some- 
what sceptical  of  these  regular,  fortnightly  victories. 

The  result  of  this  series  of  reconnaissances  to  the 
west  and  south-west  of  Beersheba  was  that  every 
general  officer  who  was  to  lead  troops  over  this 
area  gained  a  very  thorough  knowledge  of  the 
country,  which  was  of  the  highest  value  in  the 
subsequent  operations.  The  sappers  attached  to 
the  cavalry  divisions  also  took  advantage  of  the 
reconnaissances  to  reconnoitre  for  water  at  Khalasa 
and  Asluj,  where  they  subsequently  repaired  the 
wells  that  had  been  destroyed  by  the  Turks,  and  to 
develop  the  supply  at  Esani  in  the  Wadi  Ghuzze. 
They  also  improved  and  marked  many  of  the  wadi 
crossings,  and  made  route  surveys  of  the  whole 
area. 

Our  line  of  communications,  at  this  time,  con- 
sisted of  a  broad-gauge  railway,  which  had  been 
laid  by  the  Royal  Engineers  across  the  130  miles 
of  desert  from  Kantara  on  the  Suez  Canal  to  Deir  el 
Belah,  about  eight  miles  south  of  Gaza.  The  rail- 
head of  this  line  had  followed  close  behind  the  Desert 
Column  during  its  advance  across  Sinai.  After  the 
occupation  of  El  Arish,  the  doubling  of  the  railway 
track  had  been  taken  in  hand,  and,  by  the  end  of 
September  1917,  the  double  track  extended  as  far 


THE  PREPARATIONS  COMPLETED   17 

as  Deir  el  Belah.  During  September  and  October 
a  branch  line  was  laid  from  this  place  to  Shellal, 
where  it  was  carried  over  the  Wadi  Ghuzze,  here 
some  800  yards  wide  and  sixty  feet  deep,  on  a 
fine  trestle  bridge  built  by  British  and  Australian 
Sappers.  Work  was  then  continued  towards  Karm, 
whence  a  narrow-gauge  line  was  to  be  run  out  to 
Beersheba,  as  soon  as  that  place  was  in  our  hands. 

In  order  to  relieve  the  railway  of  some  of  its 
heavy  traffic,  to  enable  it  to  bring  up  stores  for  the 
'  Big  Push,'  a  sea-borne  supply  line  from  Port 
Said  to  Deir  el  Belah  was  organised  by  the  Royal 
Navy  during  September.  All  the  supplies  for  the 
21st  Corps,  which  held  the  coastal  sector  of  our 
line,  were  then  carried  by  sea,  and  landed  in  surf 
boats  on  the  coast.  The  shipping,  convoying,  and 
landing  of  stores  were  admirably  carried  out  by  the 
Navy,  under  great  difficulties. 

Towards  the  end  of  October  these  long  and  careful 
preparations  were  completed,  and  the  troops  began 
to  move  unobtrusively  to  their  concentration  areas, 
leaving  their  old  camps  standing,  in  order  to  deceive 
enemy  aircraft.  So  well  were  these  large  troop 
movements  concealed,  that,  up  to  the  moment 
when  our  attack  was  launched,  the  enemy  believed 
that  we  had  six  infantry  divisions  still  in  the  Gaza 
sector  and  only  one  in  the  eastern  sector.  This 
apparent  disposition  of  our  troops  confirmed  him  in 
his  mistaken  opinion  that  our  main  attack  would 
be  delivered  against  Gaza,  and  caused  him  to  con- 
centrate most  of  his  available  reserves  behind  the 
western  portion  of  his  line,  a  fact  which  contributed 
materially  to  our  success  in  the  subsequent  opera- 
tions. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  FIRST  ROUND 

October  the  31st  was  the  date  fixed  for  the  capture 
of  Beersheba,  which  was  to  be  the  first  phase  of  the 
operations.     The  plan  of  attack  was  as  follows : — 

The  60th  and  74th  Divisions  were  to  attack  the 
outer  defences  on  the  west  and  south-west,  immedi- 
ately after  dawn,  and,  having  captured  them,  were 
to  hold  the  high  ground  west  of  the  town.  The 
53rd  Division  and  the  Camel  Corps  Brigade  were 
directed  to  protect  the  left  flank  of  these  operations. 

Meanwhile  the  Anzac  and  the  AustraUan  Mounted 
Divisions,  starting  respectively  from  Asluj  andKhalasa, 
were  to  march  during  the  night,  south  of  Beersheba, 
right  round  the  enemy  flank,  and  attack  the  town 
from  the  east,  where  the  defences  were  known  to  be 
less  formidable.  These  two  divisions  thus  had  night 
marches  of  twenty-five  and  thirty-five  miles  respec- 
tively before  reaching  their  fii'st  objectives.  The 
7th  Mounted  Brigade,  marching  direct  from  Esani, 
had  the  task  of  masking  the  strongly  entrenched 
hill  of  Ras  Ghannam,  which  formed  the  southern 
end  of  the  enemy's  outer  defences,  and  of  linking 
up  the  Australian  Mounted  Division  and  the  20th 
Corps.  To  the  cavalry  thus  fell  the  task  of  seizing 
the  town  of  Beersheba  itself. 

It  will  be  seen  that,  during  the  attack  on  Beer- 
sheba, there  would  be  a  gap  of  some  seventeen  miles 
between  the  20th  Corps  on  the  right  and  the  21st 
Corps  in  the  coastal  sector.     Our  railway  ran  right 

18 


Diagram   UUcstrating    Ike    bcsUion,    of    ihoofii    on    the  3lst  cf  Oct.  I9IJ. 


20         THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

up  into  this  gap,  the  railhead  at  Kami  being  actually 
in  front  of  our  line,  and  within  eight  miles  of  the 
main  enemy  positions  about  Hareira. 

To  cover  this  gap,  and  to  deal  with  any  attempted 
counter-attack  against  our  railhead,  the  Yeomanry 
Division  was  to  concentrate  at,  and  east  of,  Karm, 
with  the  10th  Division  in  support  about  Shellal.  The 
action  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  in  thus  trusting 
the  guarding  of  this  wide  gap  to  so  small  a  force  is  of 
particular  interest  as  indicating  his  readiness  to  accept 
a  considerable  risk  in  order  to  achieve  victory.  It 
also  demonstrates  his  complete  confidence  in  the 
success  of  his  efforts  to  deceive  the  enemy  as  to  our 
real  intentions. 

The  fortifications  of  Beersheba  consisted  of  two 
lines  of  defensive  positions.  The  outer  line,  heavily 
entrenched  and  wired,  ran  in  a  semicircle  along  the 
high  ground  north-west,  west,  and  south-west  of  the 
town,  from  the  Gaza-Beersheba  road  to  Ras  Ghannam, 
at  an  average  distance  of  7000  yards  from  the  town. 
On  the  north-east,  east,  and  south-east  the  outer 
defences  were  not  continuous,  but  consisted  of  a 
series  of  strong  posts,  chief  of  which  were  Tel  el 
Sakaty,  Tel  el  Saba,  and  two  stone  block-houses  on 
the  north  bank  of  the  Wadi  Saba.  The  inner  line 
ran  completely  round  the  town  itself,  and  on  its 
outskirts,  crossing  the  Wadi  Saba  just  south  of  the 
railway  bridge.  It  was  believed,  but  not  with  any 
great  degree  of  certainty,  that  the  portion  of  this 
hne  on  the  east  of  the  town  was  not  protected  by  wire. 

Beersheba  is  situated  on  the  east  bank  of  the  wadi, 
at  the  north-western  end  of  a  flat,  treeless  plain, 
about  four  miles  long  and  three  miles  wide,  completely 
surrounded  by  ranges  of  tumbled,  rocky  hills.  To 
the  north-east  these  hills  rise  gradually  to  join  the 
main  Judaean  range,  along  the  backbone  of  which 


Australian  engineers  developing  the  water  supply  at  Esani 


Cavalry  country  !     Near  Beersheba. 


THE  EL  BUGGAR  OUTPOST  LINE        21 

runs  the  road  to  Jerusalem,  through  El  Dhahariyeh, 
Hebron,  and  Bethlehem. 

On  the  evening  of  the  26th  of  October  all  prelimi- 
nary arrangements  for  the  attack  were  complete,  and 
the  20th  Corps  was  concentrating  about  Shellal.  The 
Australian  Mounted  Division  was  in  the  line  from 
Shellal  to  Gamli,  and  held  a  line  of  outposts  covering 
the  railway  construction  at  Karm,  from  El  Buggar, 
through  points  720  and  630,  nearly  to  the  Wadi 
Sharia,  a  distance  of  about  fourteen  miles.  This  out- 
post hne  was  manned  by  the  8th  Mounted  Brigade, 
which  had  been  lent  for  the  purpose  by  the  Yeo- 
manry Division,  and  which  came  under  the  orders  of 
the  53rd  Division  at  midnight  on  the  26th.  The 
Yeomanry  Division  was  concentrated  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  Hiseia  and  Shellal,  the  Anzac  Division 
was  at  Abasan  el  Kebir,  and  the  Camel  Brigade  at 
Shellal. 

At  dawn  on  the  27th,  the  centre  of  the  thinly  held 
cavalry  outpost  Hne  was  suddenly  attacked  by  an 
enemy  force  of  all  arms,  between  3000  and  4000 
strong.  The  post  on  point  630  was  driven  in,  but 
the  squadron  of  the  Middlesex  Yeomanry  that  formed 
the  garrison  withdrew  to  a  cruciform  trench  just 
below  the  top  of  the  hill,  which  had  been  cleverly 
sited  by  the  general  staff  of  the  Australian  Mounted 
Division.  In  this  trench,  though  surrounded  by  the 
enemy  and  repeatedly  attacked,  the  little  garrison 
held  out  all  day  with  the  greatest  gallantry,  till 
relieved  by  a  brigade  of  the  53rd  Division  at  half-past 
four  in  the  afternoon. 

As  soon  as  news  of  the  enemy  attack  was  received, 
General  Hodgson,  realising  that  it  was  impossible  for 
the  infantry  to  reach  the  outpost  line  in  time  to  save 
the  situation,  despatched  the  3rd  A.L.H.  Brigade 
and   the   Notts  Battery  R.H.A.  to  the  aid  of    the 


22  THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

Yeomanry.  Before  they  arrived  on  the  scene,  how- 
ever, the  small  garrison  on  point  720  had  been 
subjected  to  a  concentrated  shell  fire,  and  over- 
whelmed by  a  combined  mounted  and  dismounted 
attack.  This  was  the  first  and  last  time  that  the 
Turkish  cavalry  screwed  themselves  up  to  the  point 
of  a  charge.  One  of  the  only  three  survivors  of  the 
garrison  estimated  that  about  seventy  saddles  were 
emptied,  but  the  Turks  rode  on  like  men,  and  galloped 
right  over  the  post. 

The  reserve  regiment  of  the  8th  Brigade  held  the 
line  till  the  arrival  of  the  Australians,  and  frustrated 
the  enemy's  attempt  to  break  through  the  gap 
between  points  630  and  720.  The  enemy  withdrew 
at  dusk,  and  our  troops  reoccupied  the  position. 

From  the  large  force  employed  by  the  Turks  in  this 
operation,  it  appears  probable  that  they  had  intended 
to  hold  the  630-720  ridge  permanently,  if  they  suc- 
ceeded in  capturing  it.  The  ridge  commanded  a  full 
view  of  all  the  country  lying  between  it  and  the 
Wadi  Ghuzze,  and,  at  the  same  time,  concealed  this 
bit  of  country  from  direct  observation  from  the 
Turkish  positions  farther  east. 

The  Anzac  Mounted  Division  moved  out  from 
Abasan  el  Kebir  on  the  evening  of  the  27  th,  and 
reached  Khalasa  early  next  morning,  where  it 
remained  during  the  day. 

The  bombardment  of  Gaza  commenced  on  this 
day,  and  continued  with  gradually  growing  intensity 
till  the  morning  of  the  2nd  of  November,  when  the 
outer  defences  of  the  town  were  captured  by  the 
21st  Corps. 

On  the  28th  of  October  the  53rd  Division  relieved 
the  Australian  Mounted  Division  on  the  El  Buggar 
outpost  line,  the  8th  Mounted  Brigade  rejoined  the 
Yeomanry   Division,    and   the   Australian   Mounted 


THE  APPROACH  MARCHES  23 

Division  moved  out  at  dusk  and  marched  to  Khalasa, 
arriving  early  on  the  morning  of  the  29th.  The 
Anzac  Division  marched  the  same  night  from  Khalasa 
to  Asluj.  The  two  divisions  rested  at  these  places 
during  the  29th  and  30th,  in  preparation  for  the 
strenuous  work  ahead  of  them.  During  these  two 
days  the  60th  Division  marched  from  the  Shellal 
area  to  Bir  el  Esani,  the  advanced  brigade  pushing  on 
to  a  point  near  Ma  el  Mallaka.  One  brigade  of  the 
74th  Division  moved  forward  to  fill  the  gap  between 
the  53rd  and  60th  Divisions,  and  the  10th  Division 
concentrated  near  Shellal. 

Soon  after  dark  on  the  night  of  the  30th  the  troops 
left  their  bivouacs,  and  commenced  to  move  silently 
on  the  unconscious  enemy.  The  Anzac  Mounted 
Division,  in  the  lead,  was  to  send  one  brigade,  via 
Bir  el  Arara,  against  Bir  el  Hammam  and  Bir  Salim 
Abu  Irgeig,  the  first  objectives,  the  remainder  of  the 
division  marching  via  the  Wadi  el  Shreikiye,  Gebel 
el  Shegeib,  and  Iswaiwin  to  attack  Tel  el  Sakaty  and 
Tel  el  Saba,  and  then  close  in  on  Beersheba. 

The  Australian  Mounted  Division,  following  the 
Anzac  Division  along  the  Wadi  el  Shreikiye,  was  to 
halt  at  a  point  a  Httle  north  of  Iswaiwin,  and  be 
prepared  to  act  either  northwards,  in  support  of  the 
Anzac  Division,  or  westwards  towards  Beersheba,  as 
might  be  required.  The  7th  Mounted  Brigade  was 
ordered  to  march  from  Esani,  via  Itweil  el  Semin, 
against  Ras  Ghannam. 

The  leading  of  the  troops,  never  an  easy  matter  at 
night,  was  rendered  more  troublesome  by  the  fact 
that  the  country  beyond  Asluj  was  quite  unknown  to 
us,  and  was,  besides,  of  a  most  difficult  and  intricate 
nature.  Maps,  though  accurate  in  the  main,  were 
lacking  in  detail,  and  the  employment  of  native  guides 
was  too  risky  an  experiment  to  be  contemplated. 


24  THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

However,  favoured  by  a  bright  moon,  which  rose 
soon  after  dark,  the  marches  were  accomphshed 
without  mishap,  and  the  Anzac  Mounted  Division 
secured  its  first  objectives  without  serious  opposition 
about  eight  o'clock.  The  2nd  A.L.H.  Brigade  was 
now  directed  on  Tel  el  Sakaty,  and  the  New  Zealanders 
on  Tel  el  Saba,  the  1st  A.L.H.  Brigade  following  in 
reserve. 

The  Headquarters  of  the  Australian  Mounted 
Division  reached  the  high  hill  of  Khashim  Zanna 
about  ten  o'clock,  and  looked  down  upon  the  plain 
of  Beersheba  and  the  picturesque  little  town,  which 
had  to  be  in  our  hands  by  nightfall  at  all  costs. 
Shells  from  the  guns  of  the  60th  Division  were  bursting 
all  along  the  ridge  beyond  the  town,  and,  away  to  the 
right,  the  rattle  of  machine-gun  fire  told  where  the 
Anzac  Mounted  Division  was  engaged  at  Tel  el 
Sakaty.  Patrols  from  the  Australian  Mounted  Divi- 
sion were  pushed  out  to  the  west  to  reconnoitre  the 
approaches  to  Beersheba,  south  of  the  Wadi  Saba. 

Meanwhile  the  7th  Mounted  Brigade  dismounted, 
and,  scrambling  up  the  rocky  steeps  of  Ras  Ghannam, 
was  meeting  with  strong  opposition  from  the  well- 
entrenched  Turks  on  the  top  of  the  hill. 

The  enemy  resistance  soon  began  to  increase  con- 
siderably, and  the  Anzac  Division  made  but  slow 
progress  across  the  bare  open  plain.  The  entrenched 
hill  of  Tel  el  Sakaty  was  captured  by  the  2nd  A.L.H. 
Brigade  about  one  o'clock,  after  a  stiff  fight,  and  half 
an  hour  later  this  brigade  got  across  the  Jerusalem 
road. 

Shortly  before  this,  a  patrol  of  the  Australian 
Mounted  Division  had  smartly  rounded  up  and 
captured  a  Turkish  officer  with  a  small  escort.  He 
turned  out  to  be  the  personal  aide-de-camp  of 
Ismet  Bey,  the  commander  of  the  Beersheba  garrison. 


SUCCESS  OF  OUR  INFANTRY  25 

It  appeared  that  Ismet  had  been  sitting  in  his  battle 
headquarters,  on  a  hill  west  of  the  town,  since  early- 
morning,  watching  with  complete  equanimity  the 
attack  of  our  infantry,  which  he  believed  to  consist 
of  only  one  division.  About  eleven  o'clock,  happen- 
ing to  turn  his  head,  he  received  a  distinct  shock  on 
seeing  the  plain  behind  him  covered  with  cavalry. 
He  at  once  sent  his  staff  officer  off  ventre  a  ierre  to 
find  out  if  the  cavalry  intended  to  attack,  or  were 
only  making  a  demonstration.  The  officer  received 
full  information  on  this  point,  but,  as  he  was  not  in  a 
position  to  take  it  back  to  his  chief,  the  latter  became 
uneasy,  and  shortly  afterwards  appears  to  have  lost 
his  head  completely,  for  he  proceeded  to  fling  all 
his  reserves  into  the  fight  on  the  west,  before  the 
battle  was  well  begun. 

By  half-past  one  our  infantry  had  captured  all 
their  objectives  west  of  the  town,  and  commenced 
to  consolidate  on  the  positions  won.  From  the 
Cavalry  Corps  headquarters  the  enemy  troops  could 
be  seen  retiring  in  an  orderly  manner  into  Beer- 
sheba. 

The  headquarters  of  the  two  cavalry  divisions  were 
at  this  time  with  corps  headquarters,  on  Khashim 
Zanna,  which  was  the  highest  hill  for  miles  around. 
After  a  fight  but  satisfactory  lunch,  the  three  head- 
quarters Staffs  sat  down  in  a  long  line  on  the  very 
top  of  the  hill,  with  maps  and  field-glasses,  to  watch 
the  '  manoeuvres '  in  the  plain  below.  Observing 
the  irresistible  target  thus  presented  to  the  enemy 
artillery,  the  gunnery  staffs  of  the  two  divisions, 
moved  by  a  common  impulse,  faded  silently  into 
the  comparative  safety  of  the  open  plain.  Immedi- 
ately afterwards  a  salvo  of  high-velocity  shells 
landed  right  on  top  of  the  hill,  scattering  maps, 
field-glasses,  and  staff  officers  Hke  chaff   before  the 


26  THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

wind  !  Fortunately,  no  one  was  hurt,  but  for  the 
rest  of  the  day  the  staff  treated  the  enemy  gunners, 
always  good,  with  the  respect  due  to  them. 

Meanwhile  the  advance  of  the  cavalry  across  the 
plain  di-agged  slowly  on.  The  countrj'^  was  flat 
and  open,  and  there  were  no  trees  or  scrub  to  afford 
cover  even  to  dismounted  men.  The  whole  plain 
was  swept  by  the  fire  of  numerous  machine  guns 
and  field  guns  concealed  in  the  town  of  Beersheba, 
along  the  banks  of  the  Wadi  Saba,  in  the  two  block- 
houses on  the  north  bank  of  the  wadi,  and  on  the 
strongly  entrenched  hill  of  Tel  el  Saba.  From  the 
last-named  position  any  advance  across  the  plain 
was  enfiladed,  and  it  was  clear  that  this  hill  would 
have  to  be  taken  before  any  further  progress  could 
be  made. 

The  New  Zealand  Brigade  had  worked  along  the 
dry  bed  of  the  Wadi  Saba  for  some  distance,  and 
then,  leaving  the  horses  under  cover,  advanced  to 
attack  the  position  on  foot.  The  hill  is  steep  and 
rugged,  and  overlooks  the  bed  of  the  wadi  for  some 
400  yards  to  the  east,  where  it  makes  a  sharp  bend. 
The  New  Zealanders  got  as  far  as  this  bend, 
but  could  make  no  farther  progress,  as  every  part 
of  the  confined  river  bed  in  front  of  them  was  swept 
by  rifle  and  machine-gun  fire.  One  regiment  got 
out  of  the  wadi  on  the  north  side,  and  made  a  detour 
to  try  and  take  the  hill  in  rear,  but  could  make  little 
headway  over  the  exposed  ground,  in  face  of  the 
heavy  enemy  fire.  About  the  same  time  the  3rd 
A.L.H.  Brigade  and  two  batteries  from  the  Australian 
Mounted  Division  were  pushed  in  to  assist  the  attack 
from  the  south. 

The  day  was  now  far  gone,  and  the  advance 
seemed  to  be  at  a  standstill.  General  Chaytor  then 
put  in  his  reserve  brigade  (the  1st),  to  co-operate 


THE  ATTACK  OF  TEL  EL  SABA    27 

in  the  attack  on  Tel  el  Saba  from  the  south.  General 
Cox,  commanding  the  brigade,  directed  the  2nd 
A.L.H.  Regiment  on  the  two  block-houses,  and  the 
3rd  on  Tel  el  Saba.  From  the  shelter  of  a  small 
wadi,  some  three  miles  south  of  the  hill,  the  two 
regimental  commanders  scrutinised  the  open  plain 
in  front  of  them  in  an  effort  to  find  some  covered 
way  of  approach.  None  could  be  found,  so  the 
two  commanders  determined  to  make  a  dash  for  it 
mounted,  and  get  as  near  as  possible  before  dis- 
mounting to  continue  the  attack  on  foot. 

Deploying  from  the  wadi,  the  two  regiments 
swung  out  into  line  of  troop  columns  at  wide  inter- 
val, and  galloped  forward  over  the  open  plain  in  full 
view  of  the  enemy.  Several  Turkish  batteries  at 
once  opened  fire  on  them,  but  they  were  advanc- 
ing so  fast  that  the  enemy  gunners  seemed  to  be 
unable  to  get  the  range,  and  but  little  damage  was 
caused  by  their  fire.  It  was  not,  indeed,  till  the 
regiments  came  under  machine-gun  fire  that  casu- 
alties began  to  occur,  and,  even  then,  our  loss  was 
slight,  probably  owing  to  the  comparatively  steep 
angle  of  descent  of  machine-gun  bullets  at  long 
ranges,  and  to  the  difficulty  of  finding  and  keeping 
the  range.  At  1500  yards  from  the  position,  the}' 
rode  into  a  convenient  depression,  and  here  they 
dismounted  and  continued  the  advance  on  foot. 

There  was  no  cover  of  any  sort,  and  their  approach 
from  this  point  was  necessarily  slow,  in  face  of 
the  heavy  fire  which  they  encountered.  Now  that 
they  were  on  foot,  and  moving  slowly,  they  began 
to  suffer  severely,  whereas  they  had  advanced 
mounted  for  over  two  miles  with  scarcely  any 
casualties.  An  intense  fire  fight  developed,  as  the 
two  brigades  closed  gradually  in  on  the  enemy. 
Our   little   thirteen-pounder    Horse    Artillery   guns, 


28  THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

though  pushed  up  boldly  to  close  range,  could  make 
little  impression  on  the  well-built  enemy  trenches 
and  machine-gun  emplacements  on  Tel  el  Saba,  and 
none  at  all  on  the  thick  stone  walls  of  the  block- 
houses. They  did  good  service,  however,  in  keeping 
down  the  hostile  fire. 

About  two  o'clock,  the  2nd  A.L.H.  Regiment 
reached  and  stormed  the  block-houses,  and,  from 
the  captured  positions,  poured  a  heavy  fire  into 
the  flank  of  Tel  el  Saba.  This  caused  some  slacken- 
ing of  the  enemy's  fire,  of  which  the  New  Zealanders 
took  prompt  advantage.  With  a  sudden,  tremen- 
dous rush,  they  charged  down  the  bed  of  the  wadi, 
up  the  steep  sides  of  the  hill,  and  into  the  position, 
almost  before  the  Turks  were  aware  of  the  attack. 
A  few  minutes'  sharp  bayonet  fighting  completed 
the  capture  of  the  hill,  with  about  120  prisoners 
and  a  large  number  of  machine  guns.  This  success 
removed  the  last  obstacle  to  our  advance  on  Beer- 
sheba,  but  the  town  itself  still  held  out,  and  there 
was  a  wide  space  of  open  ground  still  to  be  crossed 
before  it  could  be  assaulted. 

Orders  were  issued  at  once  for  the  whole  of  the 
two  divisions,  less  the  5th  Mounted  Brigade,  to  ad- 
vance mounted,  and  endeavour  to  get  close  enough 
to  the  town  to  make  a  dismounted  attack  before 
darkness  fell.  This  order  reached  the  4th  A.L.H. 
Brigade,  which  had  not  yet  been  in  action,  at  half- 
past  four.  It  was  then  waiting  at  the  south-eastern 
edge  of  the  plain,  fully  three  miles  from  Beersheba, 
and,  as  sunset  was  due  at  five  o'clock,  there  was 
no  time  to  be  lost. 

Making  up  his  mind  instantly.  General  Grant, 
commanding  the  brigade,  collected  the  two  regiments 
he  had  with  him,  the  third  being  engaged  in  recon- 
naissance work,  and  moved  rapidly  forward  to  the 


CHARGE  OF  THE  4TH  A.L.H.  BRIGADE    29 

shelter  of  some  dead  ground  about  3000  yards  from 
the  enemy  trenches  south-east  of  the  town.  Having 
sent  a  message  to  the  two  nearest  batteries  of  the 
division,  '  A '  Battery  H.A.C.  and  the  Notts  Battery 
R.H.A.,  to  be  ready  to  support  his  attack,  he  ordered 
a  charge.  The  two  batteries  at  once  hmbered  up, 
and,  moving  rapidly  forward,  galloped  into  action  in 
the  open,  at  a  range  of  about  2500  yards,  and  opened 
a  heavy  fire  on  the  Turkish  trenches  and  field  guns 
in  front,  and  on  a  nest  of  machine  guns  to  the  left 
front. 

As  soon  as  the  batteries  were  in  action,  General 
Grant's  two  regiments  swept  out  into  the  open,  in 
column  of  squadrons  in  line,  and  galloped  straight 
at  the  Turkish  trenches. 

Seen  from  the  rising  ground  on  which  our  guns  were 
in  action,  it  was  a  most  inspiriting  sight.  It  was 
growing  dark,  and  the  enemy  trenches  were  outlined 
in  fire  by  the  flashes  of  their  rifles.  Beyond,  and  a 
little  above  them,  blazed  the  bigger,  deeper  flashes  of 
their  field  guns,  and  our  own  shells  burst  like  a  row 
of  red  stars  over  the  Turkish  positions.  In  front  the 
long  fines  of  cavalry  swept  forward  at  racing  speed, 
half  obscured  in  clouds  of  reddish  dust.  Amid  the 
deafening  noise  all  around,  they  seemed  to  move 
silently,  like  some  splendid,  swift  machine.  Over 
the  Turks  they  went,  leaping  the  two  lines  of  deep 
trenches,  and,  dismounting  on  the  farther  side, 
flung  themselves  into  the  trenches  with  the  bayonet.  ^ 
The  whole  position  was  in  our  hands  in  ten  minutes, 
and  was  consolidated  immediately. 

It  was  now  quite  dark,  so  General  Grant  collected 
his  squadrons  together,  attended  to  casualties,  and 
rounded  up  his  prisoners.     Then,  leaving  a  guard 

^  They  had  charged  with  bayonets  drawn  and  extended  in  front  of 
them  like  swords. 


30         THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

with  the  prisoners,  and  remounting  the  remainder  of 
his  men,  he  sent  them  at  a  gallop  into  the  town  itself. 
Through  the  streets  they  raced  in  the  darkness, 
riding  down  all  opposition,  and  so  hustling  the 
Turks  that  they  never  had  a  chance  to  rally.  Before 
six  o'clock  the  town,  with  1200  prisoners  and  14  guns, 
was  in  our  hands.  Ismet  Bey  escaped  in  a  motor-car 
ten  minutes  before  the  final  charge. 

In  the  interval  between  the  capture  of  the  trenches 
and  the  charge  into  the  town,  the  enemy  had  begun 
to  blow  up  the  wells  and  ammunition  depots.  Huge, 
mushroom-shaped  columns  of  violet  flame  and  smoke 
shot  up  here  and  there,  accompanied  by  sullen,  heavy 
explosions.  Shortly  afterwards,  the  main  store  and 
some  of  the  railway  station  buildings  were  set  on  fire, 
and  the  flames  from  these  burning  buildings  lighted 
up  the  whole  town,  and,  as  it  happened,  materially 
assisted  our  troops  in  their  task  of  handling  the 
prisoners.  These  proved  surly  and  rather  truculent, 
and  two  incidents  which  occurred  during  the  early 
part  of  the  night  warned  us  that  it  would  be  well  to 
get  them  away  as  soon  as  possible.  As  a  body  of 
prisoners  was  being  marched  out  of  the  town  to  a 
piece  of  open  ground  on  the  east  side,  where  they 
were  being  collected  and  counted,  some  of  them 
suddenly  halted  and  fired  several  Verey  lights  into 
the  air,  evidently  with  the  intention  of  signalling 
to  their  comrades  in  the  north.  Shortly  afterwards 
another  party  of  them  made  a  sudden  and  determined 
rush  for  one  of  the  captured  guns,  and  several  had 
to  be  shot  down  before  the  rush  was  stopped.  The 
attitude  of  these  prisoners  was  in  marked  contrast 
to  that  of  most  of  the  Turks  whom  we  captured,  who 
generally  accepted  their  fate  stoically,  if  not  with 
satisfaction.  They  seemed  to  resent  the  charge 
extremely,   and  there  is  no   doubt  that  they  were 


CAPTURE  OF  BEERSHEBA  31 

expecting  to  be  able  to  retire  quietly  along  the 
Gaza-Beersheba  road  during  the  night,  when  the 
sudden  dash  of  the  Australians  surprised  them. 

Including  those  taken  by  our  infantry,  about  2000 
prisoners  were  captured  at  Beersheba,  and  over  500 
Turkish  corpses  were  buried  on  the  battle-field.  The 
casualties  in  the  two  regiments  of  the  4th  Brigade, 
32  killed  and  32  wounded,  may  be  considered  re- 
markably light,  in  view  of  the  strength  of  the  enemy. 

General  Grant's  action  forms  a  notable  landmark 
in  the  history  of  cavalry,  in  that  it  initiated  that 
spirit  of  dash  which  thereafter  dominated  the  whole 
campaign.  When  he  received  the  orders  for  the 
attack,  he  had  to  consider  that  the  enemy  was  known 
to  be  in  strength,  well  posted  in  trenches,  and 
adequately  supplied  with  guns  and  machine  guns. 
In  order  to  reach  the  town  itself,  it  would  be  necessary 
to  cross  the  Wadi  Saba,  of  unknown  depth,  and, 
possibly,  with  precipitous  banks.  The  character  of 
the  intervening  country  was  known  only  in  so  far  as 
it  had  been  revealed  by  field-glasses.  It  was  not  even 
certain  that  there  was  no  wire  in  front  of  the  enemy's 
position.  On  the  other  hand,  the  town  had  to  be  in 
our  hands  before  nightfall,  or  the  whole  plan  failed. 

He  weighed  the  chances,  and  made  up  his  mind 
instantly  to  risk  all  in  a  charge,  and  the  success  he 
achieved  surprised  even  the  most  ardent  votaries 
of  the  white  arm. 

The  remainder  of  the  Australian  Mounted  Division 
moved  into  Beersheba  during  the  night,  leaving  the 
3rd  Brigade  to  assist  the  Anzac  Division  in  holding 
an  outpost  line  north  and  north-east  of  the  town, 
from  Bir  el  Hammam  to  the  Gaza-Beersheba  road. 
The  7th  Mounted  Brigade,  which  had  had  a  day  of 
desultory  fighting,  joined  the  division  in  the  town 
early  next  morning. 


32         THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

With  the  capture  of  Beersheba,  the  fii'st  phase  of 
the  operations  had  ended  satisfactorily,  and,  as  the 
earher  reports  from  the  town  as  to  the  water  supply 
were  favourable,  it  was  decided  to  commence  phase 
two,  the  attack  on  Gaza,  on  the  night  of  the  1st  of 
November.  The  attack  was  launched  at  11  p.m., 
and  stubborn  fighting  continued  all  night.  By  half- 
past  six  on  the  morning  of  the  2nd,  the  whole  of  the 
front  line  and  support  trenches,  from  '  Umbrella ' 
Hill,  about  the  middle  of  the  system,  to  Sheikh 
Hassan  on  the  sea  coast,  were  in  our  hands.  Sheikh 
Hassan  was  some  distance  behind  the  enemy's  front 
line,  and  its  capture  therefore  threatened  his  right 
flank.  The  positions  won  were  consolidated,  and  no 
further  advance  was  attempted,  as  it  was  considered 
that  the  object  of  the  attack,  which  was  to  deceive 
the  enemy  and  to  retain  his  reserves  in  the  coastal 
sector,  had  been  fully  secured. 

Preparations  were  at  once  commenced  for  phase 
three,  the  main  attack  on  the  enemy's  exposed  left 
flank  about  Sharia  and  Hareira.  For  this  purpose 
the  53rd  Division  made  a  long  march  on  the  1st,  and 
occupied  a  line  from  Toweil  Abu  Jerwal  to  Khurbet  el 
Muweileh,  with  the  Camel  Brigade  on  its  right.  The 
Anzac  Mounted  Division,  prolonging  this  line  from 
Abu  Jerwal  to  the  Hebron  road  about  Bir  el  Makruneh, 
met  with  more  opposition  than  had  been  expected, 
the  reason  for  which  was  to  become  apparent  in  the 
course  of  the  next  few  days.  The  division  captured 
about  200  prisoners  and  a  number  of  machine  guns 
during  the  day. 

Reports  sent  back  from  this  area  indicated  such 
a  lack  of  water  that  it  was  clear  that  no  more  than 
one  cavalry  division  could  be  maintained  there. 
Accordingly  the  Australian  Mounted  Division  was 
ordered  to  remain  in  Beersheba,  in  general  reserve, 


DESCRIPTION  OF  BEERSHEBA  33 

and  was  directed  to  endeavour  to  improve  the  water 
supply  there.  There  were  a  few  surface  pools  in 
the  Wadi  Saba,  the  result  of  a  thunderstorm  that 
had  broken  a  few  days  previously,  but  these  were 
already  rapidly  drying  up.  Of  the  seven  good  wells 
in  the  town,  five  had  been  blown  up  by  the  Turks 
on  the  night  of  the  31st,  and  the  remaining  two  had 
been  prepared  for  demoHtion,  but  the  charges  had 
not  been  fired.  Our  sappers  were  left  in  splendid 
isolation,  as  they  gingerly  probed  the  debris  round 
these  wells,  and  eventually  located  the  charges  and 
safely  removed  them. 

The  enemy  had  evidently  intended,  in  the  event 
of  his  having  to  abandon  Beersheba,  to  leave  nothing 
but  ruins  behind  him,  for  the  whole  place  was  a 
nest  of  explosive  charges,  '  booby  traps '  and  trip 
wires.  By  a  fortunate  chance  the  German  engineer 
who  was  responsible  for  the  destruction  of  the  town 
was  away  on  leave  in  Jerusalem  at  the  time  of  its 
capture.  Consequently  most  of  these  trip  wires 
were  not  yet  attached  to  their  detonators.  A  few, 
however,  had  been  connected  up  before  the  town 
was  taken.  The  writer  came  across  one  such,  while 
making  a  rapid  artillery  reconnaissance  round  the 
town  at  daybreak  on  the  1st  of  November.  Luckily 
it  was  noticed  before  the  party  rode  over  it,  and, 
on  being  cut  and  followed  to  its  source,  was  found 
to  be  connected  to  a  detonator  concealed  in  twenty 
cases  of  gelignite  in  the  railway  station, — enough  to 
have  laid  the  whole  town  in  ruins. 

Large  numbers  of  hand  grenades  had  been  con- 
cealed in  stores  of  grain  and  food  in  different  parts 
of  the  town,  and  there  were  one  or  two  accidents 
at  first  among  parties  of  too  eager  explorers.  Sir 
Philip  Chetwode,  commander  of  the  20th  Corps, 
moved   his  headquarters  into   Beersheba  a  day|;^or 


34         THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

two  later,  and  occupied  the  house  of  the  enemy 
commander.  On  examining  the  building  before  he 
moved  in,  our  sappers  found  it  packed  from  cellar 
to  garret  with  cases  of  explosives,  all  connected  to 
trip  wires. 

This  house  was  one  of  the  fine  stone  buildings,  of 
which   there   were   a   number,    surrounding   a   large 
public   garden,   and  which  had   been   built  by  the 
Germans  during  the  war.     The  whole  of  this  modern 
portion  of  the  town  appeared  to  have  been  built 
for  propaganda  purposes,  or  like  the  cities  of  lath 
and  plaster  which  are  run  up  in  a  few  days  for  cine- 
matograph productions.     From  time  to  time  articles 
on  the  war  in  the  East  appeared  in   the  German 
papers,   generally   synchronising   with   some  reverse 
on   the   Western    Front.     In   these   articles,    which 
were  lavishly  illustrated,   Beersheba   figured  under 
headings  such  as  '  the  Queen  City  of  the  Prairies.' 
Apparently,  in  order  to  supply  the  necessary  pictures, 
the  Germans  had  laid  out   a  large  public   garden, 
and  built  around  it  a  series  of  imposing  public  build- 
ings,   including    a    Governor's    house.    Government 
offices,    hospital,    barracks,    mosque,    and    even    an 
hotel.     The  surrounding  country  abounds  in  a  species 
of  hard  white  limestone  admirably  suited  for  build- 
ing, and  all  the  houses  were  built  of  this  and  roofed 
with  red  tiles.     They  were  ranged  round  the  square, 
like  four  rows  of  stiff  white  soldiers  with  red  helmets, 
and  were  so  sited  that  any  number  of  photographs 
could  be  taken  from  various  positions,  each  showing 
a  different  view,  and  each  hiding  the  real  town  be- 
hind the  brand  new  German  architecture.     But  once 
behind  these  houses,  a  shocking  contrast  met  the 
eye.     Here    was    the   real    Beersheba,    a    miserable 
collection  of  filthy  mud  hovels,  huddled  shrinkingly 
together  as  though  trying  to  hide  their  shabbiness 


DESCRIPTION  OF  BEERSHEBA  35 

from  their  gorgeous  neighbours.  The  place,  in  the 
centre  was  conspicuously  labelled  '  Bier  Garten,' 
and  was  laid  out  with  a  number  of  little  paths  in  an 
exact,  geometrical  pattern.  The  flower-beds  sup- 
ported a  few  dusty  shrubs  and  a  quantity  of  those 
hideous  '  everlastings '  so  dear  to  the  Teuton  heart. 
All  the  buildings  were  laid  out  exactly  facing  the 
four  points  of  the  compass,  except  the  mosque, 
which,  in  deference  to  Moslem  prejudices,  had  been 
built  with  its  mihrah  turned  towards  Mecca,  and 
consequently  was  lamentably  askew.  The  Huns 
had  taken  their  revenge,  however,  by  garnishing 
the  windows  with  German  stained  glass  of  an  ugli- 
ness so  startling  that  the  Australians  vowed  their 
horses  shied  at  it ! 

The  railway,  built  by  the  German  engineer, 
Meissner  Pasha,  of  Baghdad  Railway  fame,  was  an 
admirable  piece  of  work,  metalled  throughout,  and 
carried  over  the  numerous  wadis  on  fine,  arched 
bridges  of  dressed  stone.  The  bridge  over  the  Wadi 
Saba  was  upwards  of  400  yards  long.  One  wonders 
who  paid  for  all  the  work. 

While  we  were  in  occupation  of  Beersheba,  some 
one  in  the  Intelligence  Branch  of  the  staff  con- 
ceived the  brilliant  idea  of  trying  to  impress  the 
local  Arabs,  some  of  whom  were  hostile  to  us,  with 
the  majesty  and  power  of  the  British  Empire. 
Accordingly,  after  a  good  deal  of  trouble,  a  few  of 
the  neighbouring  sheikhs  were  induced  to  come  into 
the  town,  and  were  escorted  round  by  an  officer 
who  spoke  Arabic.  They  were  shown  first  a  regi- 
ment of  cavalry,  which  left  them  cold,  as  the  horses 
appeared  clumsy  to  them  in  comparison  with  their 
own  little  Arabs.  Then  lines  of  marching  infantry 
were  pointed  out  to  them,  and  field  guns,  and  more 
cavalry,    and    motor    lorries.     All    to    no    purpose. 


36  THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

An  occasional  grunt  and  a  half  concealed  yawn 
were  all  the  response  the  perspuing  officer  received. 
When  a  sixty-pounder  gun,  drawn  by  a  '  caterpillar ' 
motor  tractor,  hove  in  sight,  they  showed  some 
signs  of  uneasiness,  and  eyed  this  new  form  of  devil 
carriage  with  profound  distrust.  But  when  they 
found  that  it  could  only  move  at  a  walking  pace, 
they  became  reassured  and  lost  all  interest  in  it. 
The  hard-working  staff  officer  was  in  despair,  when, 
towards  evening,  the  first  ration  convoy  of  camels 
arrived.  We  had  at  that  time  about  30,000  camels 
in  the  force,  and  they  were  in  magnificent  condi- 
tion— big,  strong  beasts,  covered  with  muscle,  and 
free  from  the  blemishes  which  so  disfigure  the  desert 
Arabs'  animals. 

Here  was  something  the  sheikhs  could  understand. 
They  watched  the  camels  winding  into  the  town, 
line  after  line,  hundred  after  hundred,  and  their 
eyes  grew  round  with  wonder.  The  first  eager 
talk  died  away  to  an  astonished  silence.  When 
all  the  convoy,  about  1000  strong,  was  in,  and 
barracked  in  an  open  space,  the  natives  turned  to 
the  officer  with  a  volley  of  questions.  Seeing  the 
impression  made,  he  told  them,  in  an  off-hand 
manner,  that  the  British  had  more  than  twenty 
times  that  number  with  their  army.  The  sheikhs' 
looks  politely  conveyed  the  message  that  they 
considered  him  a  liar.  Determined  to  strike  while 
the  iron  was  hot,  he  bundled  them  all  into  a  couple 
of  motor  cars,  after  some  signs  of  panic  on  their 
part,  and  ran  them  across  to  Shellal,  where  in  truth 
they  saw  more  camels  than  they  had  ever  dreamed 
of.  They  spent  all  the  afternoon  visiting  the  camps 
of  the  Camel  Transport  Corps,  and  watching  the 
departure  of  laden  convoys  and  the  return  of  empty 
ones.     In  the  evening  they   mounted  their  horses 


Beersheba.     From  an  enemy  photograph  taken  before  the  completion 
of  the  new  German  buildings. 


Arrival  of  the  first  enemy  train  in  Beersheba.     Meissner  Pasha  in  white  helmet 

and  gaiters.     The  inscription  on  the  coach  means  "  Stamboul  to  Cairo." 

(From  an  enemy  photograph) 


ARABS  AND  THE  C.T.C.  37 

again,  and  rode  off  into  the  darkness  to  rejoin  their 
own  people.  But  before  they  left,  the  chief  among 
them,  acting  as  spokesman  for  all,  told  our  staff 
officer  that  they  were  now  quite  convinced  that 
the  Ingilizi  were  certainly  the  greatest  tribe  in  the 
world,  and  that  they  would  advise  their  young 
men  to  keep  on  friendly  terms  with  us  and  help  us 
in  every  way.  They  were  as  good  as  their  word, 
and  we  had  no  more  trouble  from  hostile  Arabs. 


S1'49t> 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  DECISIVE  BATTLE 

The  next  five  days  were  occupied  in  securing  the 
necessary  concentration  of  troops  for  the  main  attack 
on  Sharia  and  Hareira,  and  in  developing  the  scanty 
water  supply,  and  organising  water  convoys  to  enable 
these  troops  to  subsist  in  the  barren  country  in  which 
they  were  to  operate. 

The  Anzac  Division,  pushing  northwards  on  the 
2nd,  astride  the  Hebron  road  and  on  the  right  of 
the  53rd  Division,  encountered  increasing  resist- 
ance, and  made  but  slow  progress.  Very  hard  fighting 
continued  during  the  3rd,  4th,  and  5th,  in  the  course 
of  which  it  became  clear  that  the  enemy  had  con- 
centrated practically  the  whole  of  his  available 
reserves  in  this  area.  The  19th  Turkish  Division, 
the  remains  of  the  27th  (the  late  garrison  of  Beer- 
sheba),  and  part  of  the  16th  Division,  together  with 
the  whole  of  the  3rd  Cavalry  Division,  were  iden- 
tified in  this  fighting  round  Ain  Kohleh  and  Tel 
Khuweilfeh. 

In  thus  throwing  the  whole  of  their  available 
reserves  against  our  extreme  right  flank,  the  Turks 
were  committed  to  a  bold  but  dangerous  course. 
It  was  evident  that  they  hoped  to  compel  the  British 
Commander-in-Chief  to  detach  part  of  his  force  to 
meet  this  counter-attack.  Had  they  succeeded  in 
involving  any  considerable  portion  of  our  army  in 
the  difficult,  waterless  country  around  Tel  Khu- 
weilfeh, it  is  probable  that  our  main  force  would  have 


ENEMY  THRUST  ON  THE  EAST  39 

been  so  weakened  as  to  be  unable  to  attack  the 
Sharia  and  Hareira  positions  with  any  chance  of 
success.  Such  a  failure  might  well  have  brought 
the  whole  of  our  offensive  to  a  standstill,  and  enabled 
the  Turks  to  estabhsh  themselves  on  a  new  line 
from  Sharia  to  the  Hebron  road. 

On  the  other  hand,  should  we  succeed  in  holding 
the  enemy's  counterstroke  without  having  to  weaken 
our  main  striking  force,  he  ran  the  risk  of  finding 
his  reserves  immobilised  at  the  critical  moment, 
and  thus  prevented  from  rendering  any  assistance 
to  the  garrisons  of  Sharia  and  Hareira  when  those 
places  were  attacked.  This,  in  fact,  was  exactly 
what  happened.  General  Allenby  refused  to  be 
drawn  to  the  east,  and,  relying  on  the  Anzac  and 
53rd  Divisions  to  hold  the  enemy  in  check  at  Tel 
Khuweilfeh,  proceeded  resolutely  with  his  prepara- 
tions for  the  assault  on  the  left  flank  of  the  main 
Turkish  position. 

On  the  2nd  of  November  the  3rd  A.L.H.  Brigade, 
less  one  regiment,  rejoined  the  Australian  Mounted 
Division,  and  the  5th  and  7th  Mounted  Brigades 
were  attached  to  the  Anzac  Division.  The  5th 
Brigade  remained  in  Beersheba,  but  the  7th  joined 
the  Anzac  Division,  and  had  a  stiff  day's  fighting, 
culminating  in  the  seizing  of  the  hill  of  Ras  el  Nukb, 
near  Tel  Khuweilfeh,  to  which  the  enemy  attached 
great  importance,  and  which  he  defended  most  stub- 
bornly. The  brigade  withdrew  from  Ras  el  Nukb 
at  nightfall,  as  it  was  too  much  in  advance  of 
our  general  line  to  be  held  during  the  night.  The 
Anzac  Division  occupied  a  line  from  about  Bir  el 
Nettar  to  Deir  el  Hawa,  and  thence  south-west  to 
EJiurbet  el  Likiye,  whence  the  Camel  Corps  Brigade 
carried  on  the  line  to  the  right  of  the  53rd  Divi- 
sion near  Toweil  Abu  Jerwal. 


40  THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

Next  day  the  53rd  Division  attacked  the  heights 
of  Tel  Khuweilfeh,  but  met  with  strong  resistance 
from  the  enemy,  and  by  evening  had  gained  only 
a  precarious  footing  on  the  south-western  spur  of 
the  hill.  The  cavalry  were  engaged  throughout  the 
day  on  the  right  of  the  53rd,  towards  Dhahariyeh 
and  east  of  Tel  Khuweilfeh. 

The  fighting  continued  day  and  night  during  the 
4th  and  5th.  As  the  time  passed,  and  our  prepara- 
tions for  the  main  attack  neared  completion,  the 
enemy,  who  must  by  this  time  have  realised  our 
intention,  flung  his  reserves  more  and  more  reck- 
lessly against  our  weak  right  flank,  in  a  desperate 
endeavour  to  drive  it  in.  He  completely  failed  in 
his  effort,  and  our  troops,  after  three  days  and 
nights  of  incessant  flghting,  short  of  food  and  water, 
and,  at  one  time,  perilously  short  of  ammunition, 
not  only  held  their  own,  but  drove  back  the  Turks 
inch  by  inch,  and  at  last,  on  the  morning  of  Novem- 
ber 6th,  the  53rd  Division  captured  the  ridge  of 
Tel  Khuweilfeh.  One  magnificent  counter-attack  the 
enemy  made,  which  drove  our  men  off  the  ridge 
again,  but  it  was  a  last  despairing  effort.  His  ex- 
hausted troops  were  quickly  dislodged  from  the 
position,  and  the  ridge  remained  in  our  hands. 

The  fine  fighting  and  grim  endurance  of  the  53rd 
and  the  Anzac  Mounted  Divisions  during  these  three 
days  played  a  vital  part  in  the  success  of  the  subse- 
quent operations,  by  engaging  the  enemy's  principal 
reserves  and  defeating  his  counterstroke,  thus  per- 
mitting our  concentration  for  the  main  attack  to 
proceed  unhindered.  The  cavalry  had  an  especially 
hard  time.  The  country  was  quite  unsuited  for 
mounted  work,  and  so  all  their  fighting  was  done 
on  foot.  But  it  was  necessary  to  keep  their  horses 
always  near  them  in  order  to  be  in  a  position  to 


WATER  DIFFICULTIES  41 

pursue  the  enemy  at  once,  should  he  give  way  and 
endeavour  to  withdraw.  Water  was  very  scarce, 
and  the  few  known  wells  were  quite  inadequate 
for  the  requirements  of  the  division. 

When  our  troops  had  first  entered  this  region 
there  were  a  number  of  pools  in  the  wadis,  left  by 
the  thunderstorm  which  had  broken  a  few  days 
before  the  operations  began,  but  these  rapidly  dried 
up,  and,  by  the  morning  of  the  5th  of  November, 
had  finally  given  out.  The  horses  then  had  to  be 
sent  back  to  Beersheba  to  water.  From  theDhaha- 
ri3^eh  area  to  Beersheba  and  back  again  is  twenty- 
eight  miles,  and  a  record  of  the  movements  between 
these  two  places  from  the  3rd  to  the  6th  of  November 
will  give  some  idea  of  the  extra  work  entailed  on 
horses  and  men  by  the  lack  of  water. 

On  the  3rd  of  November  the  1st  Brigade  was 
relieved  by  the  5th,  and  marched  back  to  Beersheba 
to  water,  their  horses  having  then  been  thirty  hours 
without  a  drink.  On  the  4th  the  New  Zealanders 
relieved  the  5th  Brigade  at  Ras  el  Nukb  for  the 
same  purpose.  This  brigade  had  also  been  thirty 
hours  without  water.  On  the  5th  the  New  Zealanders 
remained  at  Has  el  Nukb,  since  there  was  no  brigade 
available  to  relieve  them,  but  sent  all  their  horses 
back  to  Beersheba  during  the  night.  They  had 
then  been  un watered  for  forty- eight  hours.  On  the 
6th  it  was  the  turn  of  the  2nd  Brigade  to  make  the 
weary  pilgrimage  to  Abraham's  Well. 

Thus  the  horses  of  each  of  these  brigades  had  only 
one  really  good  drink  during  the  four  days  they 
were  in  this  area.  Some  of  them,  it  is  true,  picked 
up  a  Httle  water  here  and  there,  generally  at  night. 
Indeed  many  units  of  the  division  spent  every  night 
in  a  search  for  water  that  too  often  proved  fruitless, 
and  only  added  to  the  fatigue  of  men  and  horses. 


42         THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

The  7th  Brigade  found  enough  water  on  the  east 
of  the  line  to  eke  out  a  bare  existence  for  its  horses. 

During  all  this  period  the  cavalry  were  continually 
engaged  with  the  enemy,  and  some  of  the  fighting 
was  severe.  The  Turks  assaulted  Ras  el  Nukb  re- 
peatedly on  the  3rd,  4th,  and  5th  of  November. 
This  hill  was  held  in  turn  by  the  7th  Brigade,  which 
had  captured  it  in  the  first  instance,  the  1st,  5th 
and  New  Zealand  Brigades,  and  each  of  these  had 
to  withstand  one  or  more  attacks. 

By  the  evening  of  the  5th  of  November  the  20th 
Corps  was  in  readiness  for  the  assault  on  the  Sharia- 
Hareira  positions,  which  was  to  complete  the  defeat 
of  the  Turks. 

The  situation  was  now  slightly  different  from 
what  had  been  expected.  The  action  of  the  enemy 
in  counter-attacking  against  our  right  flank  had 
resulted  in  prolonging  his  line  to  the  east.  The 
coming  operations,  therefore,  consisted  in  an  attempt 
to  pierce  his  line  at  Sharia,  instead  of  an  attack 
against  his  left  flank,  as  had  been  anticipated.  In 
order  to  secure  the  troops  engaged  in  this  attempt 
from  molestation  by  the  considerable  body  of  enemy 
about  El  Dhahariyeh,  a  force,  known  as  Barrow's 
Detachment,^  was  formed  to  protect  our  right  flank. 
This  force  consisted  of  the  53rd  Division,  the  New 
Zealand  Mounted  Brigade,  and  the  Camel  Corps 
Brigade,  with  the  Yeomanry  Division,  which  crossed 
over  to  the  right  of  our  line  on  the  night  of  the 
4th  to  join  the  detachment.  All  the  horses  of  this 
division  had  to  be  sent  back  to  Beersheba,  fifteen 
miles  away,  to  water.  The  Australian  Mounted 
Division  had  left  Beersheba  on  the  4th,  having 
nearly  exhausted  all  the  water  there,  and  moved  to 

^  From  its  commander,  jVIaj  or- General  Sir  G.  de  S.  Barrow,  G.O.C.  of 
the  Yeomanry  Division. 


THE  ATTACK  ON  HAREIRA  43 

Karm,  taking  up  a  line  of  observation  from  the  Wadi 
Hanafish  to  Hiseia. 

There  was  now  a  gap  some  twelve  miles  wide 
between  the  21st  Corps  at  Gaza  and  the  20th  Corps 
opposite  Sharia,  and  it  was  possible,  though  not 
very  probable,  that  the  enemy  might  attempt  to 
throw  his  cavalry  through  this  gap  in  an  endeavour 
to  raid  our  communications.  It  was  part  of  the 
task  of  the  Australian  Mounted  Division  to  frus- 
trate any  such  attempt. 

At  dawn  on  the  6th  November  the  10th,  60th, 
and  74th  Divisions  attacked  the  south-eastern  portion 
of  the  Hareira  defences,  known  as  the  Kauwukah 
and  Rushdi  systems.  The  74th,  after  some  of  the 
hardest  fighting  of  a  day  of  hard  fighting,  succeeded 
in  capturing  all  its  objectives  by  half -past  one.  The 
10th  and  60th  Divisions,  which  were  attacking  on 
the  left  of  the  74th,  had  farther  to  go,  and  the  heavy 
wire  of  the  main  Kauwukah  position  had  to  be 
methodically  cut  before  the  attack  could  be  launched. 
To  reach  its  objectives,  the  10th  (Irish)  Division 
had  to  cross  a  perfectly  flat,  open  plain,  two  miles 
wide,  which  was  swept  from  end  to  end  by  the  fiire 
of  enemy  guns  of  all  calibres,  and  by  machine  guns 
and  rifles.  The  advance  of  this  grand  division, 
marching  across  the  fire-swept  plain  as  steadily  as 
though  on  parade,  was  a  sight  that  will  never  be 
forgotten  by  those  who  were  privileged  to  see  it. 

By  haK-past  two  in  the  afternoon  both  the  10th 
and  the  60th  Divisions  had  penetrated  the  enemy 
lines,  and  captured  the  whole  of  the  Kauwukah 
and  Rushdi  systems.  The  60th  Division  reached 
Sharia  station,  but  was  unable  to  cross  the  Wadi 
Sharia  to  capture  the  hill  of  Tel  el  Sharia  that  night. 
This  hill,  together  with  the  main  redoubts  of  Hareira, 
remained,  therefore,  for  the  next  day's  task. 


44  THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

During  the  night  the  Austrahan  Mounted  Divi- 
sion  marched  to  a  concealed  position  three  miles 
south-west  of  Sharia,  in  readiness  for  the  expected 
break-through.  The  5th  Mounted  Brigade  rej  oined  the 
division  here,  and  the  7th  went  into  Corps  Reserve. 

The  role  of  the  cavalry  during  the  next  few  days 
was  to  sweep  across  the  plain  to  the  north-west,  in 
order  to  cut  off  or  pursue  the  retiring  enemy  troops, 
after  they  had  been  driven  out  of  their  positions 
from  Sharia  to  the  sea.  In  pursuance  of  this  role, 
the  Anzac  and  Australian  Mounted  Divisions  were 
ordered  to  push  forward,  as  soon  as  the  way  was 
clear,  the  Anzac  Division,  on  the  right  of  the  move- 
ment, being  directed  to  keep  well  in  advance,  so  as 
to  outflank  any  enemy  opposition.  The  60th  Divi- 
sion was  to  move  in  support  of  the  cavalry  on  the 
left  flank,  and  the  Australian  Mounted  Division,  in 
the  centre,  was  to  maintain  touch  with  the  Anzacs 
and  the  60th.  The  Yeomanry  Division  would  remain, 
at  first,  with  the  53rd  Division,  to  carry  out  a  special 
task. 

Water  for  the  cavalry  horses  was  an  essential 
prehminary  to  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy.  The 
country  north  of  Sharia  was  sparsely  populated, 
and  the  few  wells  to  be  found  there  were  of  great 
depth  and  poor  supply.  The  only  water  sources  on 
our  front  which  were  believed  to  be  capable  of 
supplying  the  large  number  of  horses  we  had  were 
at  Bir  Jemameh,  where  there  was  reported  to  be  a 
good  well  with  a  steam  pumping  plant,  and  at  Tel 
el  Nejile  and  Huj.  The  Anzac  Division  was  accord- 
ingly directed  on  the  two  first-named  places,  and 
the  Australian  Division  on  Huj.  The  former  divi- 
sion had  only  two  brigades  with  it,  having  left  the 
New  Zealand  Brigade  in  the  Jurat  el  Mikreh,  under 
the  orders  of  the  53rd  Division. 


THE  ATTACK  ON  HAREIRA  45 

The  attack  of  our  infantry  was  resumed  early  on 
the  7th,  and  the  10th  Division  stormed  the  Hareira 
positions  in  the  morning.  The  60th  Division  secured 
the  hill  of  Tel  el  Sharia  in  the  early  afternoon,  but 
the  enemy  succeeded  in  withdrawing  in  good  order 
to  a  long  ridge  on  the  north  side  of  and  overlooking 
the  Wadi  Sharia,  where  he  held  out  all  the  after- 
noon. The  approach  to  this  ridge  was  up  a  long, 
bare  slope,  devoid  of  cover,  and  the  enemy  made  full 
use  of  his  many  machine  guns  and  of  his  heavy 
artillery.^ 

At  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  the  4th  A.L.H. 
Brigade,  supported  by  two  batteries  of  the  AustraUan 
Mounted  Division,  was  sent  across  the  Wadi  Sharia 
dismounted,  in  order  to  cover  the  concentration  of 
the  60th  Division  for  a  final  assault.  When  the 
position  was  carried,  just  before  dark,  it  took  some 
time  to  disengage  this  brigade,  and  the  division  was 
consequently  unable  to  move  farther  that  night. 
The  3rd  A.L.H.  and  the  5th  Mounted  Brigades, 
however,  were  sent  round  the  right  flank  of  the 
60th  Division,  to  endeavour  to  make  a  mounted 
attack  on  the  retreating  enemy.  They  had  to  ride 
two  miles  to  the  east,  before  a  possible  crossing  place 
over  the  wadi  was  found,  and  it  was  then  too  late 
to  do  anything  more.  Two  regiments  of  the  5th 
Brigade  did  indeed  draw  swords,  and  canter  out 
into  the  open  north  of  the  wadi,  but  darkness  fell 
before  they  were  able  to  close  with  the  enemy. 

The  Anzac  Mounted  Division,  more  fortunate,  had 
been  able  to  push  through  the  gap  formed  in  the 
enemy's  line,  by  the  driving  in  of  his  inner  left  flank, 
and  advanced  on  its  first  objective,  the  station  of 

^  On  one  occasion,  the  Huns,  with  characteristic  ferocity,  deliberately 
turned  their  heavy  artillery  on  to  a  convoy  of  ambulance  camels  bearing 
wounded  out  of  the  fight,  and  utterly  destroyed  it. 


46  THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

Umm  el  Ameidat  on  the  Junction  Station-Beer- 
sheba  line,  where  the  enemy  had  a  large  supply  and 
ammunition  depot.  The  1st  Brigade,  in  the  lead, 
moved  forward  in  open  formation  over  the  plain, 
being  severely  shelled  by  enemy  guns  from  the  west 
and  north-west. 

About  11  A.M.  the  advanced  troops  were  fired 
at  on  approaching  the  station.  The  vanguard  regi- 
ment at  once  closed  up  and  charged,  capturing  the 
place  after  a  sharp  fight,  with  about  400  prisoners 
and  a  great  quantity  of  ammunition  and  stores. 
Reconnaissances  pushed  out  at  once  to  the  north 
and  east  located  a  strong  enemy  rearguard  in  posi- 
tion on  the  hill  of  Tel  Abu  Dilakh.  The  2nd  Brigade 
was  despatched  to  the  assistance  of  the  1st,  and  the 
two  brigades  attacked  the  hill  dismounted.  The 
position  was  taken  just  before  dark,  after  severe 
fighting,  but  our  troops  were  then  heavily  shelled 
on  the  hill,  and  the  Turkish  rearguard  only  retired 
a  short  distance  to  the  ridges  north  of  the  position. 
The  division  held  a  battle  outpost  fine  for  the  night 
from  Abu  Dilakh  to  a  point  about  two  miles  east 
of  the  railway. 

Scouts  of  the  3rd  A.L.H.  Brigade  succeeded  in 
gaining  touch  with  the  Anzac  Division  about  Abu 
Dilakh  late  at  night.  No  water  was  obtainable  for 
the  horses  of  either  division. 

There  had  been  an  extraordinary  instance  in  the 
morning  of  '  counting  chickens  before  they  are 
hatched.'  After  the  attack  on  Beersheba,  the  heavy 
wagon  echelons  of  the  cavalry  ammunition  columns 
had  been  withdrawn  from  their  divisions,  brigaded 
together,  and  placed  under  the  direct  command  of 
the  Corps.  The  intention  was  to  direct  this  Corps 
column  each  day  on  a  pre-arranged  place,  and  notify 
its  location  to  the  divisional  ammunition  columns. 


Om^ 


48  THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

which  could  then  send  their  Hght,  Hmbered  wagons 
to  that  place  to  refill.  The  spot  chosen  for  the 
7th  of  November  was  Tel  el  Sharia,  and  the  column 
was  directed  to  report  there  at  11  a.m.  The  order 
was  actually  issued  on  the  morning  of  the  6th,  the 
staff  officer  who  gave  it  believing  that  the  place 
would  be  in  our  hands  that  night,  whereas  it  was 
not  taken  till  the  following  afternoon.  Accordingly, 
about  nine  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  7th,  the 
ammunition  column  was  seen  marching  steadily 
towards  the  enemy,  to  the  admiration  of  the  spec- 
tators, and  the  no  small  consternation  of  the  staff 
officer  who  had  given  the  order  ! 

Fortunately  the  commander  of  the  column  noticed, 
as  he  explained  afterwards,  that  '  there  seemed  to  be 
something  wrong  at  Tel  el  Sharia,  so  he  thought  he 
had  better  go  to  ground  with  the  column  till  he 
could  find  out  who  the  beggars  on  the  hill  really  were.' 

While  the  20th  Corps  was  thus  occupied  driving  in 
the  enemy's  left  flank,  the  21st  Corps,  in  the  coastal 
area,  was  administering  the  coup  de  grace  to  Gaza. 
The  bombardment  had  been  resumed  on  the  3rd, 
and  had  continued  for  the  following  three  days  with 
growing  intensity.  On  the  5th  and  6th  the  Navy 
joined  in  the  fight,  and  plastered  the  town  with 
shells  of  heavy  cahbre.  During  the  night  of  the 
6th  a  series  of  attacks  carried  out  by  our  infantry 
on  the  enemy  positions  met  with  only  half-hearted 
resistance,  and,  when  a  general  advance  was  made 
on  the  morning  of  the  7th,  it  was  found  that  the  Turks 
had  retired  during  the  night. 

The  Imperial  Service  Cavalry  Brigade  at  once  went 
forward,  riding  through  the  ruins  of  Gaza,  and 
reached  Beit  Hanun,  just  south  of  the  Wadi  Hesi, 
early  in  the  afternoon.  At  the  same  time  two 
brigades  of  the  52nd  Division  made  their  way  along 


■Sit 


Turkish  Cavalry-  near  Shari;i. 
(Friim   an  enemy   photograph.) 


A  Turkish  cavah-^'  machine-gun   hattery  in  action   near  Sharia. 
(I'rom   an  enemy    piiotograph.) 


ENEMY'S  RIGHT  FLANK  TURNED        49 

the  seashore  under  cover  of  the  cliffs,  and  seized  the 
high  ground  north  of  the  Wadi  Hesi,  in  the  face  of 
strong  resistance  from  the  enemy. 

This  rapid  move  of  the  52nd  Division  was  of  the 
greatest  value  to  us.  The  Turks  had  constructed  a 
strong,  defensive  line  just  north  of  the  wadi,  and 
liad  evidently  hoped,  in  the  event  of  being  driven 
out  of  Gaza,  to  be  able  to  rally  on  this  line,  and  hold 
up  our  farther  advance.  Some  of  our  cavalry  subse- 
quently took  prisoner  the  engineer  officer  who  had 
superintended  the  making  of  this  line.  He  expressed 
keen  disappointment  that  the  Turks  had  been  driven 
out  of  it  before  they  had  had  time  to  settle  down, 
and  declared  that,  had  they  got  there  a  few  hours 
sooner,  all  our  operations  would  have  come  to  a 
standstill.  No  doubt  he  was  biassed  in  favour  of 
his  own  handiwork,  but  there  is  little  doubt  that  the 
Turks  would,  at  the  least,  have  been  able  to  organise 
their  retreat,  had  they  succeeded  in  holding  this  line 
even  for  a  short  time.  Now,  however,  driven  out  of 
their  last  entrenched  position,  and  with  their  forces 
disorganised  and  split  into  two  widely  separated 
groups,  they  were  compelled  to  retreat  over  open 
country,  pursued  by  a  vigorous  and  successful 
enemy. 


D 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  PURSUIT 

On  the  morning  of  the  8th  of  November  the  pursuit 
began.  The  enemy  had  made  the  best  use  of  the 
night  to  put  such  a  distance  between  his  troops  and 
ours  that  his  rearguards  were  able  to  entrench  hghtly, 
and  thus  ofifered  a  stm'dy  resistance  to  our  advance  all 
day.  He  well  knew  that,  if  he  could  keep  our  cavalry 
away  from  water  for  another  48  hours,  they  would 
have  to  be  withdrawn.  Once  free  from  the  harassing 
menace  of  the  mounted  troops,  the  Turks,  who  could 
always  outmarch  our  infantry,  would  have  ex- 
perienced little  difficulty  in  retiring  rapidly  to  the 
north,  aided  by  their  two  railways,  and  would  have 
had  time  to  select  and  entrench  a  strong  position  in 
the  Judaean  foothills,  on  which  to  bar  our  farther 
advance. 

The  cavalry,  supported  by  the  60th  Division,  were 
ordered  to  continue  their  advance  to  the  north-west, 
and  to  push  on  with  the  utmost  vigour,  so  as  to 
intercept  the  retirement  of  the  Gaza  garrison.  The 
Anzac  Division  was  directed  on  Bureir,  some  twelve 
miles  north-east  of  Gaza,  with  the  Australian  Mounted 
and  60th  Divisions  on  the  left,  in  echelon  to  the  rear. 
The  country  was  open,  rolling  down-land,  devoid  of 
trees  or  scrub,  and  dotted  with  prominent  hills  or 
'  tels.'  The  ground  surface  was  hard,  and  the  whole 
terrain  was  admirably  suited  for  cavalry  work. 

The  Anzac  Division  moved  off  at  dawn,  with  the 
1st  and  2nd  Brigades  in  line  covering  a  front  of  some 
six  miles,  with  centre  about  Abu  Dilakh,  and  in  touch 


THE  PURSUIT  BEGINS  61 

with  the  AustraHan  Mounted  Division  on  the  left.  The 
7th  Mounted  Brigade,  which  had  joined  the  division 
from  Corps  Reserve  early  in  the  morning,  marched  in 
support. 

From  the  commencement  of  the  advance,  the 
Turks  resisted  strongly.  Having  been  retiring  during 
the  two  previous  nights,  and  pressed  by  our  cavalry 
on  the  intervening  day,  they  had  not  had  any  oppor- 
tunity of  organising  a  definite  line  of  resistance,  but 
bodies  of  them,  varying  from  a  company  to  several 
regiments,  occupied  every  tel  or  other  commanding 
ground  along  the  line  of  our  advance,  and  held  on 
tenaciously. 

About  nine  o'clock,  in  order  to  expedite  the 
advance,  General  Chaytor  pushed  up  the  7th  Brigade 
between  the  other  two,  which  were  encountering 
strong  resistance.  At  eleven  o'clock  the  enemy 
counter-attacked  strongly  against  the  2nd  Brigade, 
which  was  on  the  right  of  our  line,  near  Tel  el  Nejile, 
and  held  up  its  advance.  The  7tli  Brigade,  in  the 
centre,  continued  to  push  on,  and  had  nearly  reached 
Bir  el  Jemameh,  about  one  o'clock,  when  it  was 
heavily  attacked  by  a  large  force  of  the  enemy 
covering  the  water  supply  there.  The  brigade  was 
forced  back,  and  its  left  flank  was  endangered,  when 
the  1st  Brigade  came  up  on  the  west,  and  drove 
back  the  Turks.  Following  up  their  advantage,  the 
leading  troops  of  this  brigade  fought  their  way  into 
Bir  el  Jemameh  shortly  after  three  o'clock,  capturing 
the  steam  pumpmg  plant  intact  and  complete,  even 
to  the  engineer  in  charge.  This  individual  had  been 
left  behind  to  blow  up  the  plant,  but  instead  remained 
to  work  it  for  us  with  great  docility. 

A  regiment  of  the  1st  Brigade  pushed  out  to  the 
north,  and  secured  the  high  ground  overlooking  Bir  el 
Jemameh,   and,   under  cover  of  this  regiment,  the 


52  THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

7th  Brigade  and  the  rest  of  the  1st  were  able  to  water 
all  their  horses.  The  enemy  fell  back  after  dark, 
and  the  2nd  Brigade  occupied  Tel  el  Nejile.  Some 
water  was  found  here  in  the  Wadi  el  Hesi,  but  it  was 
not  possible  to  water  the  horses  of  the  outpost  troops. 
The  division  established  a  night  outpost  line,  pro- 
tecting Nejile  and  Jemameh. 

Meanwhile  the  Australian  Mounted  Division,  on 
the  left  of  the  Anzacs,  and  with  the  60th  Division 
in  its  rear  and  a  httle  farther  west,  pushed  slowly 
after  the  retreating  enemy,  engaged  in  continuous, 
isolated  troop  actions  throughout  the  day,  in  the 
course  of  which  a  number  of  enemy  'guns,  particu- 
larly heavy  howitzers,  were  captured.  The  3rd 
A.L.H.  Brigade  especially  distinguished  itself  in  this 
form  of  warfare.  Troops  of  the  brigade  repeatedly 
stalked  enemy  guns  during  the  day,  and  then  charged 
them  suddenly  from  the  rear,  killing  the  gun  crews 
and  capturing  the  guns.  It  became  a  common- 
place to  find  an  enemy  5'9-inch  howitzer  in  a  hollow 
in  the  ground,  with  the  detachment  dead  around  it, 
and  the  words  '  captured  by  the  3rd  A.L.H.  Brigade  ' 
scrawled  in  chalk  on  the  chase  of  the  gun. 

Early  in  the  afternoon,  a  regiment  of  the  4th 
A.L.H.  Brigade  was  ordered  to  try  and  gain  touch 
with  the  right  of  the  21st  Corps,  which  was  out  of 
communication  with  our  troops  in  the  centre.  All 
the  afternoon,  the  regiment  rode  hard  over  the 
plain  to  the  north-west,  avoiding  the  enemy  troops 
where  possible,  brushing  them  aside  when  encoun- 
tered, and  succeeded  in  linking  up  with  the  Imperial 
Service  Cavalry  Brigade  about  Beit  Hanun  before 
nightfaU.     It  rejoined  the  division  at  Huj  next  day. 

About  3  P.M.,  as  the  right  flank  of  the  60th  Divi- 
sion was  approaching  Huj,  it  came  suddenly  under 
a  devastating  fire  at  close  range  from  several  con- 


YEOMANRY  CHARGE  AT  HUJ  53 

cealed  batteries  of  enemy  artillery,  which,  with  two 
battalions  of  infantry,  were  covering  the  withdrawal 
of  the  Vlllth  Army  headquarters.  The  country  was 
rather  like  Salisbury  Plain,  rolling  down-land  without 
any  cover,  and  our  troops  suffered  severely  from  the 
murderous  fire,  Major-General  Shea,  commanding 
the  division,  finding  Colonel  Gray-Cheape  of  the 
Warwick  Yeomanry  close  by  him,  requested  him 
to  charge  the  enemy  guns  at  once.  Colonel  Cheape 
collected  a  few  troops  of  his  own  regiment  that  he 
had  with  him,  and  some  of  the  Worcester  Yeomanry, 
and  led  them  away  to  the  right  front.  Taking 
advantage  of  a  shght  rise  in  the  ground  to  the  east 
of  the  enemy  position,  he  succeeded  in  leading  his 
troops  to  within  800  yards  of  the  Turkish  guns 
unseen.  He  then  gave  the  order  to  charge,  and 
the  ten  troops  galloped  over  the  rise,  and  raced  down 
upon  the  flank  of  the  enemy  guns.  The  Turks  had 
in  position  a  battery  of  field  and  one  of  mountain 
guns,  with  four  machine  guns  on  a  low  hill  between 
the  two  batteries,  and  three  heavy  howitzers  behind. 
As  our  cavalry  appeared,  thundering  over  the 
rise,  the  Turks  sprang  to  their  guns  and  swung 
them  round,  firing  point-blank  into  the  charging 
horsemen.  The  infantry,  leaping  on  the  limbers, 
blazed  away  with  their  rifles  till  they  were  cut 
down.  There  was  no  thought  of  surrender ;  every 
man  stuck  to  his  gun  or  rifle  to  the  last.  The  lead- 
ing troops  of  the  cavalry  dashed  into  the  first  enemy 
battery.  The  following  troops,  swinging  to  the 
right,  took  the  three  heavy  howitzers  almost  in  their 
stride,  leaving  the  guns  silent,  the  gun  crews  dead 
or  dying,  and  galloped  round  the  hill,  to  fall  upon 
the  mountain  battery  from  the  rear,  and  cut  the 
Turkish  gunners  to  pieces  in  a  few  minutes.  The 
third  wave,  passing  the  first  battery,  where  a  fierce 


54  THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

sabre  v.  bayonet  fight  was  going  on  between  our 
cavalry  and  the  enemy,  raced  up  the  slope  at  the 
machine  guns.  Many  saddles  were  emptied  in  that 
few  yards,  but  the  charge  was  irresistible.  In  a  few 
minutes  the  enemy  guns  were  silenced,  their  crews 
killed,  and  the  whole  position  was  in  our  hands. 

Most  of  the  Turkish  infantry  escaped,  as  our 
small  force  of  cavalry  was  too  scattered  and  cut  up 
by  the  charge  to  be  able  to  pursue  them,  but  few 
of  the  enemy  gunners  lived  to  fight  again.  About 
seventy  of  them  were  killed  outright,  and  a  very 
large  number  were  wounded. 

This  was  the  first  time  that  our  troops  had  '  got 
home '  properly  with  the  modern,  cavalry  thrust- 
ing sword,  and  an  examination  of  the  enemy  dead 
afterwards  proved  what  a  fine  weapon  it  is.  Our 
losses  were  heavy.  Of  the  170  odd  who  took  part 
in  the  charge,  seventy-five  were  killed  and  wounded, 
and  all  within  a  space  of  ten  minutes.  In  this 
charge,  as  in  all  others  during  the  campaign,  it  was 
noticeable  how  many  more  horses  were  killed  than 
men.  Apart  from  the  fact  that  a  horse  presents  a 
much  bigger  target  than  a  man,  it  is  probably  that 
infantry,  and  especially  machine  gunners,  when 
suddenly  charged  by  cavalry,  have  a  tendency  to 
fire  '  into  the  brown,'  where  the  target  looks  thickest, 
which  is  about  the  middle  of  the  horses'  bodies, 
thus  dropping  many  horses  but  failing  to  kill  their 
riders.  A  man  whose  horse  is  brought  down  is, 
however,  by  no  means  done  with,  as  the  Turks 
learnt  to  their  cost.  In  this,  as  in  subsequent 
charges,  many  a  man  whose  horse  had  been  shot 
under  him,  extricated  himself  from  his  fallen  mount, 
and,  seizing  rifle  and  bayonet,  rushed  on  into  the  fight. 

It  is  sad  to  have  to  relate  that  the  gaUant  officer 
who  led  this  great  charge,  met  his  death  subsequently, 


MOUNTED  ATTACK  METHODS  55 

not  on  the  field  of  battle  as  he  would  have  wished, 
but  in  the  Mediterranean,  when  the  transport  that 
was  taking  him  and  his  regiment  to  France  for  the 
final  act  of  the  war,  was  torpedoed  and  sunk  by  an 
enemy  submarine.^ 

The  action  was  of  interest  as  an  indication  of  what 
may  be  accomplished,  under  suitable  conditions,  by 
even  a  very  small  force  of  cavahy  when  resolutely  led. 
The  charge  was  made  on  the  spur  of  the  moment, 
with  little  preliminary  reconnaissance  of  the  ground, 
without  fire  support,  and  with  the  equivalent  of 
little  more  than  one  squadron  of  cavalry.  It  resulted 
in  the  capture  of  eleven  guns  and  four  machine  guns, 
and  the  complete  destruction  of  a  strong  point  of 
enemy  resistance,  at  a  cost  of  seventy-five  casualties. 

There  was  considerable  divergence  of  opinion  in 
the  cavalry  as  to  the  best  method  to  be  employed 
in  a  mounted  attack.  As  there  were  no  reliable  pre- 
cedents in  modern  warfare,  with  its  machine  guns 
and  quick-firing  artillery,  brigadiers  had  been  given  a 
free  hand  to  develop  the  tactics  they  favoured,  sub- 
ject to  the  principle  that  fire  support  should  always 
be  provided  if  available,  and  that  the  line  of  fire 
and  the  direction  of  the  mounted  attack  should  be 
as  nearly  as  possible  at  right  angles  to  one  another. 

Prior  to  the  operations  the  5th  Mounted  Brigade 
had  been  practising  the  following  method  for  the 
attack  of  lightly  entrenched  troops.  A  regiment 
charged  in  column  of  squadrons  in  line,  with  a  dis- 
tance of  150  to  200  yards  between  squadrons.  The 
leading  squadron  charged  with  the  sword,  and, 
having  passed  over  the  enemy  position,  galloped 
straight  on  to  attack  any  supports  that  might  be 
coming  up.     The  remainder  of  the  regiment  charged 

^  The  charge  formed  the  subject  of  a  brilHant  picture  by  Lady  Butler 
painted  from  notes  made  by  an  eye-witness  of  the  action. 


56  THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

without  swords.  The  second  squadron  galloped 
over  the  trench  while  the  eneni)^  troops  were  still 
in  a  state  of  confusion,  dismounted  on  the  farther 
side,  and  attacked  from  the  rear  with  the  bayonet. 
The  third  squadron  dismounted  before  reaching  the 
trench,  and  went  in  with  the  bayonet  from  the  front. 
Two  machine  guns  accompanied  this  last  squadron, 
and  came  into  action  on  one  or  both  flanks,  as  the 
situation  demanded,  to  deal  with  any  counter-attack 
that  might  develop.  If  more  than  one  regiment 
took  part  in  the  attack,  the  machine  guns,  of  course, 
moved  on  the  outer  flanks  of  the  regiments. 

Unfortunately  this  brigade  never  had  an  oppor- 
tunity of  putting  this  method  to  the  test,  but  the 
4th  A.L.H.  Brigade  used  it  in  a  modified  form  at 
Beersheba,  with  excellent  results. 

The  wisdom  of  accompanying  a  mounted  attack 
by  one  or  two  machine  guns  was  generally  recognised, 
and  in  most  cases  where  a  charge  was  made  deliber- 
ately and  after  due  preparation,  and  the  guns  were 
available,  this  method  of  support  was  employed. 

Where  a  mounted  attack  had  to  cover  a  consider- 
able distance  of  open  ground  before  reaching  charging 
distance,  the  most  usual  formation  was  in  column 
of  squadrons  in  line  of  troop  columns.  Our  own 
gunners  were  of  opinion  that  this  formation  offered 
the  most  difficult  target  to  artillery,  provided  the 
interval  between  troops  was  not  less  than  25  yards, 
and  the  distance  between  squadrons  not  less  than 
100  yards.  The  experience  of  the  campaign  seemed 
to  point  to  the  fact  that  cavalry  also  suffered  less 
from  machine-gun  fire  in  this  formation  than  in  any 
other,  at  any  rate  at  ranges  beyond  1000  yards. 

The  Turks  had  their  main  ammunition  depot  at 
Huj.  A  squadron  of  the  Worcester  Yeomanry  came 
upon  this  depot  just  after  the  charge,  and  found  a 


CAPTURE  OF  THE  EIGHTH  ARMY  H.Q.  57 

party  of  enemy  cavalry  engaged  in  setting  fire  to  it. 
The  squadron  commander  of  the  Worcesters  at  once 
decided  to  charge  the  fire  instead  of  the  enemy,  and 
his  prompt  action  was  the  means  of  putting  out  the 
fire  and  saving  the  ammunition.  Later  on  in  the 
campaign  we  made  considerable  use  of  captured 
enemy  guns,  especially  those  of  heavy  caHbre,  and  this 
vast  store  of  shells  was  of  th^  greatest  value  to  us. 

General  Ej-ess  von  Kressenstein  and  his  staff,  who 
were  still  at  Huj  when  our  cavahy  made  this  charge, 
narrowly  escaped  capture,  and  had  to  leave  every- 
thing behind  them  in  their  hurried  flight,  even  to 
their  wireless  code  book.  The  Turks  had,  of  course, 
abandoned  all  their  telephone  and  telegraph  wires, 
when  they  were  driven  off  their  positions  from  Gaza 
to  Beersheba.  During  the  retreat  over  the  plain  of 
Philistia  their  units  were  so  scattered  and  disorganised 
that  they  had  to  rely  almost  entirely  on  gallopers  for 
all  orders  and  messages.  Once  in  the  Judsean  hills, 
however,  they  re-estabhshed  their  wireless  service, 
and  thereafter  all  orders  were  sent  by  wireless,  until 
the  arrival  of  fresh  telephone  and  telegraph  equip- 
ment in  January  1918.  Armed  with  their  code  book, 
we  were  able  to  decode  all  their  messages,  and 
were  thus  always  in  possession  of  enemy  orders  as 
soon  as  they  were  issued.  This  piece  of  luck  stood 
us  in  good  stead  later  on,  more  particularly  at  the 
time  when  the  Turks  made  their  big  effort  to  recover 
Jerusalem  at  the  end  of  December. 

As  soon  as  it  had  arrived  at  Huj  the  Australian 
Mounted  Division  set  about  watering  horses  from  the 
two  weUs  there.  These  wells  were  each  about  150 
feet  deep,  and,  as  the  Turks  had  destroyed  the 
winding  apparatus,  water  could  only  be  obtained  by 
the  laborious  process  of  letting  down  and  hauling 
up  by  hand  a  few  small  canvas  buckets  attached  to  a 


58  THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

length  of  field  telephone  wire.  Most  of  the  horses 
had  been  without  any  water  since  the  afternoon  of  the 
6th,  and  the  poor  brutes  were  raging  with  thirst,  and 
drank  inordinately.  In  some  cases  a  single  troop 
took  over  an  hour  to  water.  All  night  long  and  all 
the  next  day  the  weary  work  went  on,  but,  on  the 
evening  of  the  9th,  when  the  advance  was  resumed, 
the  horses  of  the  divisional  ammunition  column  had 
not  yet  been  watered. 

The  task  of  the  Yeomanry  Division  on  the  8th  of 
November  was  to  attack  the  eastern  group  of  the 
enemy  forces  on  its  right  flank,  so  as  to  drive  it 
across  the  front  of  the  53rd  Division  and  the  Camel 
Corps  Brigade  about  Tel  KhuweiKeh.  The  Turkish 
flank  was  located  in  a  strong  position  on  the  high 
and  broken  ground  at  Khurbet  el  Mujeidilat.  The 
8th  Mounted  Brigade  attacked  this  position,  but  was 
unable  to  dislodge  the  enemy,  and,  before  a  further 
attack  could  be  organised,  orders  were  received  to 
break  off  the  action  and  march  to  Sharia  to  water, 
preparatory  to  taking  part  in  the  more  important 
task  of  pursuing  the  enemy  forces  over  the  coastal 
plain.  The  53rd  Division  and  the  Camel  Corps 
remained  in  observation  of  the  enemy.  The 
Yeomanry  watered  at  Sharia  that  evening,  and 
marched  to  Huj  on  the  following  day. 

It  was  now  clear  that  the  attempt  to  cut  off  the 
whole  of  the  enemy  forces  had  failed.  Most  of  the 
rearguards  left  by  the  troops  who  had  been  driven 
out  of  the  Sharia-Hareira  positions  had  been  disposed 
of  by  the  Anzac  and  Australian  Mounted  Divisions 
during  the  past  two  days,  but  the  sturdy  resistance 
offered  by  these  rearguards,  coupled  with  the  delay 
caused  to  our  cavalry  by  the  scarcity  of  water,  had 
afforded  time  for  the  Gaza  garrison  and  some  of  the 
enemy  troops  east  of  Gaza  to  make  good  their  escape. 


ADVANCE  OF  THE  INFANTRY  59 

The  r61§  of  the  cavalry  thus  changed  to  a  direct 
pursuit  of  the  enemy.  Accordingly  the  Anzac  Divi- 
sion, which  had  got  some  water  on  the  evening 
of  the  8th,  and  was  ready  to  move,  was  ordered  to 
push  across  the  plain  towards  the  coast,  with  Bureir 
as  the  first  objective  and  El  Mejdel  as  the  second. 
The  Australian  Mounted  Division,  on  completing 
the  watering  of  horses  at  Huj,  was  to  move  to  the 
north  on  Arak  el  Menshiye  and  El  Faluje,  thus 
coming  up  on  the  right  of  the  Anzac  Division.  The 
Yeomanry,  when  they  had  reached  Huj,  were  to 
push  on  and  come  into  line  on  the  right  of  the 
Australian  Division.  The  Corps  would  then  be  in 
line  across  the  plain,  from  the  foothills  to  the  sea, 
and  ready  for  the  further  pursuit  of  the  enemy. 

The  Anzac  Division  started  soon  after  daylight 
on  the  9th,  with  the  1st  and  2nd  Brigades  in  line, 
each  being  responsible  for  the  protection  of  its  own 
front  and  outer  flank,  and  the  7th  Brigade  in  support. 
The  1st  Brigade,  on  the  left,  entered  Bureir  about 
half-past  eight,  after  encountering  some  opposition. 
About  an  hour  later,  the  2nd  Brigade,  nearing  El 
Huleikat,  located  a  body  of  the  enemy  occupying 
some  high  ground  north-west  of  the  village.  The 
brigade  attacked  dismounted,  and  drove  off  the 
Turks,  capturing  about  600  prisoners.  There  was  no 
water  available  at  either  place. 

About  mid-day  the  1st  Brigade  reached  El  Mejdel, 
which  was  seized  with  little  difficulty,  the  small  force 
of  Turks  there  making  but  a  feeble  stand.  One 
hundred  and  seventy  prisoners  were  taken.  There 
was  a  good  well  with  a  steam  pump  here,  and  the 
brigade  was  able  to  get  water  for  all  the  horses. 

A  message  now  arrived  from  the  Corps  to  the 
effect  that  the  21st  Corps  was  marching  on  El  Mejdel 
and  Julis,  and  that  the  Anzac  Division  was  to  push 


60         THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

on  to  the  neighbourhood  of  Beit  Duras.  The 
division  accordingly  wheeled  to  the  right,  and  the 
line  of  advance  became  north-east.  The  troops 
pressed  on  as  fast  as  their  jaded  horses  could  carry 
them,  and,  towards  evening,  the  1st  Brigade  reached 
Esdud,  and  the  2nd  entered  the  villages  of  Suafir  el 
Sharkiye  and  Arak  Suweidan.  On  the  way  the 
latter  brigade  had  captured  a  Turkish  convoy,  with 
its  escort  of  about  350  men.  While  these  prisoners 
were  being  sent  to  the  rear,  some  enemy  guns  farther 
north  opened  fire  and  shelled  captors  and  captives 
with  a  fine  impartiality.  This  shelling  of  their  own  men 
when  taken  prisoner  was  of  such  frequent  occurrence 
that  it  is  impossible  not  to  suspect  German  inspiration. 

Just  before  dark  the  2nd  Brigade  rounded  up 
another  200  Turks.  The  division  occupied  a  battle 
outpost  line  along  the  high  ground  south  of  the  Wadi 
Mejma,  from  near  Esdud  to  Arak  Suweidan.  Just  at 
dusk  a  small  body  of  Turks  advanced  with  fixed 
bayonets  to  attack  the  outposts  of  the  2nd  Brigade. 
When  they  were  close  up  to  our  Une,  an  officer  in 
the  brigade,  who  had  evidently  been  studying  the 
Handbook  of  Turkish  Military  Terms,  shouted  in 
Turkish  a  peremptory  command  to  surrender.  The 
weary  Turks,  thinking  that  the  order  had  been  given 
by  one  of  their  own  officers,  and  being  only  too  glad 
to  comply  with  it,  obediently  laid  down  their  arms, 
and  were  added  to  the  bag  ! 

The  enemy  troops  encountered  during  the  day, 
and  especially  towards  evening,  were  utterly  dis- 
organised, and  offered  little  resistance  to  our  advance. 
They  were  quite  worn  out  by  their  exertions  of  the 
past  three  days.  Many  of  them  had  dysentery, 
and  all  were  suffering  severely  from  thirst. 

The  advanced  troops  of  the  52nd  Division,  21st 
Corps,  reached  El  Mejdel  in  the  evening. 


CHAPTER  VI 

OVEB  THE  PHILISTINE  PLAIN 

On  the  evening  of  the  9th  of  November,  as  the 
Anzac  Mounted  Division  was  '  in  the  air,'  it  was 
necessary  for  the  other  two  divisions  of  the  Desert 
Mounted  Corps  to  press  on  and  join  it  as  soon  as 
possible.  The  AustraUan  Mounted  Division,  there- 
fore, left  Huj  on  the  evening  of  the  9th,  although 
all  its  horses  were  not  yet  watered,  and  marched 
to  the  north-east,  the  first  objective  being  Tel  el 
Hesi,  and  the  second  Arak  el  Menshiye  and  El 
Faluje.  This  was  the  only  night  march  made  by 
the  cavalry  in  enemy  country  during  the  pursuit. 
The  3rd  Brigade,  with  a  battery  attached,  acted  as 
advance  guard,  being  followed  by  the  5th  and  4th. 
The  advance  guard  dropped  pickets  along  the  route 
every  quarter  of  a  mile,  which  were  picked  up  by 
the  5th  Brigade.  This  brigade,  in  turn,  dropped 
pickets  to  be  picked  up  by  the  rearguard.  Signallers 
with  lamps  were  sent  by  the  two  leading  brigades 
on  to  every  prominent  hill  top  during  the  march, 
to  flash  the  letters  of  the  divisional  signal  call  inter- 
mittently in  a  south-westerly  direction.  These 
arrangements  worked  well,  and  the  division  arrived 
at  Tel  el  Hesi  at  haK-past  four  in  the  morning,  and 
halted  there  till  daylight. 

There  were  several  large  pools  of  good  water  in 
the  Wadi  Hesi,  and  the  rest  of  the  horses  got  their 
fill  at  last,  having  been  without  water  for  three  days 
and  four  nights. 

61 


62         THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

The  division  pushed  on  at  once,  and  came  up  on 
the  right  of  the  Anzac  Division  at  Faluje  and  Arak 
el  Menshiye  Station  about  eight  o'clock.  It  was 
joined,  some  few  hours  later,  by  the  Yeomanry 
Division,  which  had  left  Huj  early  in  the  morning, 
after  having  spent  all  the  previous  night  tr3dng  to 
water  horses.  This  division  took  over  Arak  el 
Menshiye,  and  extended  a  little  farther  east.  Thus, 
on  the  afternoon  of  the  10th,  the  whole  of  the  Corps, 
with  the  exception  of  the  New  Zealand  Mounted 
Brigade,  was  in  hne  from  a  point  a  little  east  of  Arak 
el  Menshiye  to  the  sea,  and  ready  for  the  further 
pursuit  of  the  enemy. 

The  cavalry  were  now  some  thirty-five  miles  in 
advance  of  railhead  at  Deir  el  Belah,  and  the  problem 
of  supply  became  pressing.  No  help  could  be  ob- 
tained from  the  two  enemy  railways,  as  the  Turks 
had  blown  up  bridges  and  culverts,  and  destroyed 
portions  of  the  hne  during  their  retreat.  Our  only 
means  of  supply  was,  therefore,  by  motor  lorries 
and  camels  along  the  single,  narrow,  ill-metalled 
road  from  Gaza  to  Junction  Station.  Between 
Gaza  and  Beit  Hanun  the  road  was  unmetalled 
and  deep  in  sand,  and  lorries  had  great  difficulty 
in  getting  over  this  part,  even  with  the  light  load 
of  one  ton,  which  was  the  maximum  allowed  to  be 
carried.  The  marching  ration  of  our  horses  was 
only  9 J  lbs.  of  grain  a  day,  without  any  hay  or 
other  bulk  food,  but  even  this  small  ration,  when 
multiplied  by  25,000  (approximately  the  number  of 
horses  in  the  Corps),  worked  out  at  over  100  tons 
of  forage  a  day.  In  addition  to  this  there  were  the 
rations  for  the  men  of  the  Corps,  and  the  food  and 
forage  for  the  infantry. 

In  order  to  enable  the  pursuit  to  continue,  it  was 
clear  that  the  greater  part  of  the  infantry  would 


SCARCITY  OF  WATER  63 

have  to  be  left  behind.  Accordingly,  on  the  9th, 
the  whole  of  the  20th  Corps,  with  the  exception  of 
the  o3rd  Division,  which  was  still  watching  the  right 
group  of  the  enemy  forces,  withdrew  to  railhead  at 
Karm.  Of  the  21st  Corps,  only  the  52nd  and  75th 
Divisions  continued  the  advance.  The  54th,  which 
had  remained  at  Gaza,  gave  up  all  its  transport  to 
assist  the  other  two  divisions.  All  the  available 
motor  lorries  and  camels  were  organised  in  convoys 
along  the  Gaza-Junction  Station  road,  from  Deir 
el  Belah  to  El  Mejdel,  whence  the  supplies  were 
distributed  to  divisions  by  the  horse-drawn  wagons 
of  the  divisional  trains.  These  trains  had  heavier 
work  than  any  other  part  of  the  force.  Even  on 
the  rare  occasions  when  the  cavahy  got  some  rest 
at  night,  there  was  none  for  them,  as  they  were  dis- 
tributing supplies  from  nightfall  till  dawn.  Men 
and  horses  got  into  the  habit  of  sleeping  as  they 
marched,  and,  as  long  as  one  or  two  men  kept  awake 
to  lead  the  way,  the  wagons  always  reached  their 
destination  safely.  The  Divisional  Ammunition 
Columns  were  in  little  better  case,  and  the  Sharki^ 
or  hot  wind  from  the  east,  that  commenced  to  blow 
on  the  10th,  added  to  the  sufferings  of  the  unfortu- 
nate horses. 

The  whole  Corps  was  suffering  from  lack  of  water, 
but  the  Australian  Mounted  Division,  which  was 
advancing  through  the  almost  waterless  country 
along  the  edge  of  the  Judsean  range,  was  in  an 
almost  desperate  condition.  The  Anzac  Division, 
although  operating  in  the  better  watered  coastal 
area,  had  moved  farther  and  faster  and  had  more 
fighting  than  the  other  two,  and  was  also  in  a  bad 
way.  Moreover,  owing  to  the  rapid  advance  of  the 
last  two  days,  forage  and  rations  had  failed  to  reach 
this  division.     There  was  absolutely  no  grazing  to 


64  THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

be  found,  and  what  little  grain  the  Turks  had  left 
in  the  villages  was  securely  hidden.  The  2nd  A.L.H. 
and  7th  Mounted  Brigades,  some  of  the  horses  of 
which  had  not  had  a  drink  for  eighty-four  hours, 
carried  on  all  through  the  night  of  the  9th,  trying 
to  water  with  buckets  from  two  or  three  deep 
wells,  but  got  little  satisfaction.  The  depth  of  the 
shallowest  of  these  wells  was  150  feet,  and  of  the 
deepest  nearly  250  feet.  It  was  quite  clear  that 
these  two  divisions  could  make  no  further  substantial 
move  forward  till  all  their  horses  had  been  watered 
and  fed. 

Had  water  been  available  in  abundance  through- 
out the  advance,  there  is  little  doubt  that  our  cavalry 
would  have  been  able  to  overwhelm  the  retreating 
Turkish  armies,  and  the  capture  of  Jerusalem  might 
then  have  been  accomplished  by  a  rapid  raid  of 
mounted  troops.  As  it  was,  each  night  was  spent  by 
a  large  part  of  the  cavalry  in  a  heart-breaking  search 
for  water,  that  too  often  proved  fruitless,  while 
the  enemy,  moving  in  his  own  country,  utihsed  the 
hours  of  darkness  to  put  such  a  distance  between 
his  troops  and  their  pursuers  as  enabled  him  gene- 
rally to  entrench  lightly  before  our  cavalry  came 
up  with  him  in  the  morning.  The  marching  powers 
of  the  Turks  are  phenomenal.  Time  after  time, 
after  fighting  all  day,  they  would  retire  when  dark- 
ness feU,  and  march  all  night,  and  repeat  this  per- 
formance of  fighting  all  day  and  marching  all  night 
for  several  days  in  succession.  During  their  retreat 
they  systematically  destroyed  the  water-lifting  appa- 
ratus of  all  the  wells  they  passed,  thus  incidentally 
depriving  the  native  inhabitants  of  water. 

The  inevitable  delay  caused  by  the  necessity  of 
resting  our  cavalry  now  gave  the  enemy  the  oppor- 
tunity to   collect  his  scattered   forces  and  organise 


CAPTURE  OF  ESDUD  BRIDGE  65 

some  sort  of  line  of  resistance.  Already,  on  the 
10th  of  November,  his  troops  could  be  seen  digging 
in  along  the  high  ground  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Nahr  Sukereir,  and  aeroplane  reports  indicated  that 
he  was  preparing  a  second  line  farther  north. 

The  1st  A.L.H.  Brigade,  reconnoitring  north- 
wards on  the  10th,  located  the  Turks  in  position 
from  the  hill  of  Tel  el  Murre  near  the  sea,  along  the 
high  ground  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Nahr  Sukereir, 
through  Burka  to  Kustine.  Finding  a  small  force 
of  Turks  holding  the  bridge  at  Jisr  Esdud,  the  1st 
A.L.H.  Regiment  attacked,  and  drove  them  off. 
General  Cox  at  once  ordered  a  bridgehead  to  be 
established  on  the  north  bank,  and  entrenched. 
The  possession  of  this  bridge  was  of  great  value  to 
us  during  the  next  few  days.  The  Nahr  Sukereir, 
in  its  lower  course,  runs  between  high,  precipitous 
banks,  and  forms  a  barrier  to  movement  north  and 
south  very  difficult  to  pass  except  by  this  one  bridge. 
The  enemy  was  well  aware  of  this,  and  squandered 
some  of  his  best  and  freshest  troops  in  a  desperate 
attack  on  our  bridgehead,  supported  by  heavy 
artillery,  but  the  1st  Brigade  stood  fast,  and  beat 
off  the  attack. 

The  2nd  A.L.H.  Brigade  continued  the  weary 
business  of  watering  from  two  very  deep  wells  at 
Suafir  el  Sharkiye,  but  there  were  800  prisoners  here 
clamouring  for  water,  and  the  local  inhabitants,  who 
had  been  driven  from  the  wells  by  the  retiring  Turks, 
had  had  none  for  twenty-four  hours.  In  the  middle 
of  the  pandemonium  created  by  this  fight  for  water, 
some  enemy  guns  opened  fire  on  the  village,  causing  a 
number  of  casualties  among  the  Arabs  and  Turks. 
The  Arabs  fled  to  the  shelter  of  their  houses,  and  the 
prisoners  were  sent  back  out  of  the  way.  Later  on 
in  the  morning,  some  troops  of  the  brigade  returned 

E 


66         THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

to  the  village  to  continue  watering.  No  sooner  had 
they  entered  the  place,  than  the  enemy  guns  opened 
fire  again.  A  thorough  search  of  the  houses  now 
revealed  two  Turks  concealed  in  one  of  them,  direct- 
ing the  fire  of  the  enemy  guns  by  telephone.  They 
were  promptly  shot,  and  the  firing  at  once  ceased. 
A  more  callous  action  than  this  of  directing  gun-fire 
on  to  a  village  full  of  their  own  captured  comrades 
and  harmless  natives  could  hardly  be  imagined.  It 
again  suggests  German  influence,  as  the  Turks  did 
not,  as  a  rule,  do  such  things  on  their  own  initiative. 

In  the  evening  part  of  the  52nd  and  74th  Divisions 
arrived  at  Esdud  and  Suafir  el  Sharkiye,  and  the 
weary  2nd  A.L.H.  and  7th  Mounted  Brigades  were 
withdrawn  to  water  and  rest  near  Hamame.  The 
1st  A.L.H.  Brigade  held  an  outpost  line  during  the 
night  from  the  sea  west  of  Jisr  Esdud  to  a  point  on 
the  Wadi  Mejma  just  north  of  Beit  Duras,  in  touch 
with  the  infantry  on  the  right. 

Meanwhile  the  AustraUan  Mounted  Division  and 
the  Yeomanry  Division,  on  the  east,  pushing  their 
tired  horses  slowly  after  the  retreating  Turks,  ad- 
vanced a  few  miles,  and  located  the  left  half  of  the 
enemy's  line  running  from  Kustine,  roughly  through 
Balin  and  Berkusie,  to  the  neighbourhood  of  Beit 
Jibrin. 

The  headquarters  of  the  Australian  Division  was 
at  El  Faluje  on  the  10th  and  11th.  Shortly  after  its 
arrival  there,  the  headman  of  the  village,  which  is  the 
seat  of  a  Nahie,^  came  to  pay  his  respects  to  the 
British  General.  After  a  few  polite  compliments,  he 
asked  anxiously  if  we  had  any  men  from  his  village 

^  Turkish  provinces  are  divided  into  a  number  of  Sanjaks,  each  vmder 
a  Mutasserif ;  these  in  turn  are  divided  into  Kazas,  each  under  a  Kai- 
makam ;  and  each  Kaza  into  several  Nahiea  under  Mudirs  or  headmen  of 
villages. 


DESERTION  IN  THE  ENEMY  ARMY     67 

among  our  prisoners.  We,  of  course,  could  not  tell, 
as  all  prisoners  were  sent  back  as  soon  as  possible 
after  being  taken.  The  old  man  remarked  sadly 
that  he  had  not  had  much  hope  of  finding  any  of  them, 
as  he  believed  they  had  all  gone  to  the  Caucasus. 
About  two  years  ago,  he  said,  a  Turkish  battalion 
had  suddenly  arrived  at  the  village  one  morning, 
and  carried  oft*  500  of  his  young  men  to  be  pressed 
into  the  Army,  and  from  that  day  no  word  had  been 
heard  from  any  of  them. 

All  through  the  campaign  we  heard  similar  accounts 
of  Turkish  recruiting  methods.  The  Turks  always 
sent  then-  conscripts  to  fight  in  a  theatre  of  war  as 
far  removed  from  their  native  country  as  possible, 
in  order  to  discourage  desertion.  In  spite  of  this, 
their  soldiers  were  constantly  deserting,  either  to 
find  a  ready  hiding-place  in  some  neighbouring  town 
or  village,  or  to  give  themselves  up  to  us.  So  serious 
had  the  question  become  in  the  Turkish  Army  that 
there  was  a  standing  reward  of  £5  Turkish  offered  to 
all  natives  for  delivering  a  deserter  to  the  Army 
authorities.  An  organised  propaganda  was  also 
carried  on  by  the  officers,  by  means  of  lectures  to 
their  men,  the  chief  feature  of  which  was  a  description 
of  the  tortures  and  hideous  deaths  inflicted  on  their 
prisoners  by  British  soldiers.  These  lectures  were 
illustrated  by  pictures  supplied  by  Berlin.  Our  reply 
to  this  propaganda  was  to  scatter  from  our  aeroplanes 
hundreds  of  handbills  over  the  Turkish  lines.  These 
sheets  showed,  on  one  side,  the  signed  photograph  of 
a  fat  and  smiling  Turk,  one  of  our  prisoners,  with  an 
autograph  letter  from  him,  inviting  his  friends  to 
join  him,  and,  on  the  other  side,  a  bill  of  fare  of  the 
prisoners'  camps  that  must  have  made  the  hungry 
Turkish  soldiers  positively  slobber  ! 

The  strange  fact  was  that,  in  spite  of  these  constant 


68  THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

desertions,  the  Turks,  when  brought  to  bay,  nearly 
always  fought  splendidly,  and  that  not  alone  in 
defence,  but  in  attack  also.  Indeed,  some  of  their 
counter-attacks  were  simply  heroic.  Out-numbered, 
out-gunned,  out-manoeuvred,  doomed  to  defeat  be- 
fore even  the  attack  was  launched,  they  yet  ad- 
vanced with  the  most  reckless  courage,  shouting  their 
war  cry,  '  Allah  !  Allah  !  Allah  ! '  The  explanation 
must  probably  be  sought  in  their  religious  hatred 
of  the  infidel.  The  Turks  opposed  to  us  in  Palestine 
at  this  time  were  mostly  Anatolians,  of  fine  physique, 
and  sturdy  fighters. 

The  Commander-in-Chief  determined  to  continue 
the  advance  on  the  12th,  devoting  the  preceding  day 
to  preparations  for  the  attack  on  the  enemy  positions. 
The  delay  would  afford  time  for  the  52nd  and  74th 
Divisions  to  close  up  and  move  forward  to  their 
prehminary  positions. 

He  decided  to  attack  the  right  centre  of  the 
Turkish  fine  with  his  infantry,  and  turn  the  right 
flank  with  his  cavalry.  The  Anzac  Division  had 
now,  however,  only  one  brigade  (the  1st)  in  a  fit 
state  to  continue  the  operations.  Accordingly  the 
Yeomanry  Division  was  ordered  to  march  on  the 
11th  right  across  from  east  to  west,  behind  our  line, 
and  relieve  the  2nd  and  7th  Brigades  on  the  coast. 
The  Australian  Mounted  Division  was  directed  to 
extend  to  the  east,  to  a  point  south-west  of  Zeita, 
so  as  to  cover  the  country  vacated  by  the  Yeomanry. 
Its  role  was  to  protect  the  right  flank  of  our  forces 
during  the  operations,  and  to  attract  the  enemy's 
attention  to  this  flank.  All  patrol  work  was  to  be  made 
as  conspicuous  as  possible,  and  reconnaissances  were  to 
be  pushed  forward  vigorously.  This  work  was  excel- 
lently carried  out  throughout  the  day,  along  a  front 
extending  from  near  Zeita  nearly  to  Suafir  el  Sharkiye. 


CAPTURE  OF  TEL  EL  MURRE  69 

The  Yeomanry  Division  marched  via  Tel  el  Hesi, 
in  order  to  get  water  for  its  horses,  and  arrived  at 
El  Mejdel  in  the  evening.  At  the  same  time  the  New 
Zealand  Brigade  and  the  Camel  Corps  were  ordered 
up  from  the  Beersheba  area,  to  join  the  cavalry  force 
on  the  left  of  our  line.  These  two  brigades  started 
on  their  forty-mile  march  on  the  morning  of  the 
11th,  and  reached  El  Mejdel  late  on  the  following 
afternoon. 

In  order  to  facilitate  the  crossing  of  the  Nahr 
Sukereir,  the  1st  A.L.H.  Brigade  was  directed  to 
enlarge  the  bridgehead  at  Jisr  Esdud.  This  was 
found  to  be  impossible  as  long  as  the  enemy  held  the 
hill  of  Tel  el  Murre,  which  commanded  the  country 
north  of  the  bridge.  There  were  no  troops  available 
to  assist  the  1st  Brigade,  but  General  Cox  obtained 
permission  to  attempt  the  capture  of  the  hill.  The 
2nd  A.L.H.  Regiment,  which  was  selected  for  the 
task,  reconnoitred  the  river  west  of  the  bridge  during 
the  day,  but  found  no  crossing  place.  Undeterred 
by  this,  the  regiment  concentrated  in  the  evening 
under  cover  of  the  hill  of  Nebi  Yunus,  which  con- 
cealed it  from  the  Turks,  and  the  Australians  swam 
their  horses  across  the  river,  which  was  here  some 
fifty  yards  wide  and  ten  feet  deep.  Moving  forward 
dismounted  in  the  darkness,  they  completely  sur- 
prised the  Turks,  who  had  fancied  themselves  pro- 
tected on  that  side  by  the  river,  and  captured  the  hill 
after  a  sharp  bayonet  fight.  Now,  with  Tel  el  Murre 
and  the  Esdud  bridge  in  our  hands,  we  had  a  strong 
hold  on  the  north  bank  of  the  river. 

There  was  a  good  landing-place  on  the  coast  here, 
and,  a  few  days  later,  when  our  troops  had  pushed 
farther  north,  the  navy  reopened  the  sea-borne 
supply  line,  with  the  mouth  of  the  Nahr  Sukereir  as 
its  terminus.     The  reopening  of  the  sea  route  greatly 


70  THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

eased  the  supply  situation,  and  enabled  two  more 
infantry  divisions  to  be  brought  up  to  the  front. 

During  the  past  two  days,  the  10th  and  11th, 
there  had  been  a  noticeable  stiffening  of  the  enemy 
resistance  all  along  the  line,  and  this  fact,  coupled 
with  the  capture  of  prisoners  from  almost  every 
unit  of  the  Turkish  army,  showed  that  the  enemy 
rearguards  had  been  driven  in  on  his  main  body, 
and  that  we  were  now  opposed  by  the  whole  of  the 
remainder  of  his  force.  It  was  soon  apparent  that 
he  intended  to  rally  on  a  line  north  of  the  Nahr 
Rubin,  and  make  a  supreme  effort  to  hold  us  off 
the  vital  Junction  Station  till  he  had  been  able  to 
steady  his  forces  and  organise  his  retreat. 

During  the  past  few  days  several  new  units, 
portions  of  the  much  vaunted  Yilderim  group,  had 
arrived  from  the  north.  Assisted  by  these  fresh 
troops,  and  favoured  by  the  delay  to  our  cavahy 
caused  by  lack  of  water,  the  enemy  had  prepared, 
and  partly  entrenched,  a  defensive  line,  which  was 
located  by  the  Royal  Air  Force  on  the  11th,  running 
from  Kubeibe,  three  miles  north-east  of  Yebnah, 
through  Zernuka,  El  Mughar,  Katrah  and  Tel  el 
Turmus,  to  about  Beit  Jibrin.  Each  of  these  localities 
had  been  prepared  for  defence,  and  was  held  by  a 
considerable  force  of  Turks.  The  intervening  spaces 
were  covered  by  machine-gun  fire  from  the  defended 
posts.  The  forward  positions  ah'eady  located  by 
our  cavalry  north  of  the  Nahr  Sukereir  had  evidently 
been  established  to  delay  our  advance  long  enough 
to  enable  the  main  line  to  be  entrenched  and  con- 
solidated. 

Thus,  though  he  had  been  retiring  to  the  north, 
the  enemy's  line  now  ran  nearly  north  and  south. 
This  position  was  forced  on  him,  partly  by  the 
pressure  of  our  advance,  and  partly  by  the  lie  of 


CAPTURE  OF  BURKA     •  71 

the  ground.  The  Hne  ran  parallel  to,  and  about  five 
miles  to  the  west  of,  the  railway  he  wished  to  defend. 
The  right  flank  rested  on  a  high,  steep  ridge  connect- 
ing the  villages  of  El  Mughar  and  Zernuka,  and  ex- 
tending north-westwards  to  Kubeibe.  The  southern 
extremity  of  this  ridge  commanded  the  flat  country 
to  the  west  and  south-west  for  a  distance  of  two 
miles  or  more. 

The  attack  on  this  formidable  line,  originally 
planned  for  the  12th  of  November,  was  now  put 
off  till  the  next  day,  owing  to  the  necessity  of  first 
driving  the  enemy  from  his  advanced  positions 
along  the  north  bank  of  the  Nahr  Sukereir.  The 
hot  east  wind  had  continued  to  blow  throughout 
the  10th  and  11th,  raising  clouds  of  suli'ocating 
dust  over  all  the  country,  and  adding  to  the  dis- 
comforts caused  by  the  lack  of  water. 

In  order  to  clear  the  enemy  from  his  advanced 
positions,  a  brigade  of  the  52nd  Division  crossed 
the  Esdud  bridge  on  the  morning  of  the  12th,  and 
advanced  against  Burka,  supported  on  the  left  by 
the  1st  A.L.H.  Brigade,  and  on  the  right  by  part 
of  the  75th  Division.  The  Turks  were  well  posted, 
and  fought  stubbornly,  and  the  village  was  only 
taken  after  an  hour  and  a  half  of  strenuous  fighting. 
After  its  capture,  our  infantry  advanced  a  short  dis- 
tance without  further  opposition,  and  estabhshed  an 
outpost  hne  a  few  miles  north  of  the  Nahr  Sukereir. 

The  Yeomain-y  Division  came  up  in  the  after- 
noon on  the  left  of  the  infantry,  and  the  1st  A.L.H. 
Brigade  withdrew  to  bivouac  south  of  Esdud.  The 
8th  Mounted  Brigade  had  arrived  in  time  to  take 
part  in  the  capture  of  Burka.  The  New  Zealand 
Brigade  rejoined  the  Anzac  Division  in  the  evening, 
and  the  Camel  Corps  Brigade,  on  arrival,  was 
attached  to  the  Yeomanry. 


72         THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

On  the  right  of  our  Hne  the  Australian  Mounted 
Division  continued  its  task  of  making  a  big  noise, 
and  carried  it  out  so  effectively  as  to  attract  rather 
more  attention  from  the  enemy  than  was  altogether 
pleasant. 

The  5th  Mounted  Brigade  was  ordered  to  push 
into  Balin,  and  then  make  a  vigorous  reconnais- 
sance as  far  north  as  the  Wadi  Dhahr,  from  Tel  el 
Safi  to  the  Beersheba  Railway.  The  3rd  A.L.H. 
Brigade,  concentrated  in  a  concealed  position  at 
Summeil,  sent  a  squadron  into  Berkusie,  and  pushed 
out  strong,  fighting  patrols  to  the  east  and  south- 
east. The  4th  A.L.H.  Brigade  was  directed  to 
send  a  squadron  to  the  high  ground  near  the  Deir 
Sineid  Railway  line,  about  a  mile  south-west  of  Tel 
el  Turmus,  watch  the  country  between  that  point 
and  Balin,  and  force  the  enemy  to  disclose  his  posi- 
tions. 

About  one  o'clock  the  enemy  suddenly  flung  a 
force  of  about  5000  men  against  the  5th  Brigade 
in  Balin.  This  was  by  far  the  heaviest  counter- 
attack we  had  experienced  since  the  break-through 
at  Sharia  on  the  7th,  and  there  is  reason  to  believe 
that  it  was  directed  by  Marshal  von  Falkenhayn  in 
person.  The  attack  was  made  by  two  columns, 
one  of  which  had  come  down  the  track  from  Junc- 
tion Station  to  Tel  el  Safi,  and  the  other  by  rail  to 
El  Tine  Station.  Just  after  the  attack  was  launched 
two  large  motors  came  tearing  down  the  road  to 
Tel  el  Safi.  From  one  of  these  several  officers  got 
out,  and  climbed  a  little  way  up  the  hill  to  watch 
the  development  of  the  attack.  One  of  them,  from 
his  great  height,  was  believed  to  be  the  Marshal, 
but  unfortunately  the  party  was  out  of  range  of  our 
thirteen-pounders  in  BaHn. 

The  enemy  attack  was  pressed  with  the  greatest 


THE  ACTION  OF  BALIN  73 

vigour,  and  the  5th  Brigade  was  almost  surrounded. 
At  one  time  it  appeared  likely  that  the  guns  of  '  B ' 
Battery  H.A.C.,  attached  to  the  brigade,  would  be 
lost,  as  the  country  was  a  mass  of  rocks,  and  it  was 
impossible  to  move  them  quickly.  Assisted  by  the 
magnificent  fighting  of  the  Brigade  Machine  Gun 
Squadron,  however,  the  battery  was  able  to  with- 
draw slowly  by  sections,  firing  at  point-blank  range 
most  of  the  time. 

The  3rd  Brigade  was  sent  up  at  a  canter  from 
Summeil,  followed  by  the  remaining  two  batteries 
of  the  division,  and  the  leading  regiment  came  up 
on  the  right  of  the  5th  Brigade  just  as  the  latter 
had  cleared  BaUn.  Almost  immediately  afterwards 
the  enemy  turned  his  attention  to  Berkusie,  now 
occupied  by  a  regiment  of  the  3rd  Brigade.  Sup- 
ported by  a  heavy  fire  from  several  batteries,  the 
Turks  attacked  this  village,  and  forced  the  regi- 
ment to  retire. 

All  the  available  troops  of  the  division  were  now 
engaged,  and,  as  the  enemy  still  pressed  on,  the 
situation  became  somewhat  anxious.  The  4th  Bri- 
gade was  strung  out  to  the  west  as  far  as  the  Deir 
Sineid  line,  and  could  render  no  effective  aid  to 
the  other  two  brigades.  General  Hodgson,  there- 
fore, ordered  the  division  to  withdraw  slowly  to 
the  fine  Bir  Summeil-Khurbet  Jeladiyeh.  Hardly 
had  the  order  been  given  when  an  enemy  train 
appeared,  coming  south  along  the  Beersheba  line. 
It  stopped  west  of  Balin,  and  disgorged  a  fresh 
force  of  Turks,  which  deployed  rapidly,  and  advanced 
against  the  left  of  the  5th  Brigade.  Our  other  two 
batteries  were  now,  however,  in  action  on  the  high 
ground  north-west  of  Summeil,  and  they  at  once 
engaged  this  force.  The  Turks  were  moving  over 
an  open  plain,  in  full  view  of  our  gunners,  who  took 


74  THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

full  advantage  of  the  excellent  target  offered  by 
the  enemy,  and  made  such  good  practice  that  the 
attack  was  broken^  The  enemy  troops  fell  back  a 
little  on  this  flank,  and  commenced  to  dig  them- 
selves in. 

Fighting  steadily  and  skilfully,  the  two  brigades 
withdrew  till  they  reached  the  edge  of  Summeil 
village.  Here,  favoured  by  the  protection  afforded 
by  the  houses  and  walls  of  the  village,  and  by  the 
rocky  ground  on  either  side  of  it,  they  were  able  to 
make  a  stand,  and  the  enemy's  attack  was  finally 
held. 

The  Turks  did  not  attempt  to  renew  their  attack, 
which  was  just  as  well,  as  no  troops  could  have 
been  spared  to  assist  the  AustraHan  Division.  Our 
losses  had  been  somewhat  severe,  especially  in  the  5th 
Brigade  Machine  Gun  Squadi'on,  whose  fine  fighting 
was  the  chief  factor  in  extricating  the  brigade  from 
Balin.  Towards  the  end  of  the  fighting  there,  the 
Turks  had  got  to  within  a  few  hundred  yards  of  our 
troops  on  three  sides.  A  few  of  them  even  succeeded 
in  getting  across  our  line  of  withdrawal,  and  several 
of  the  battery  drivers  were  shot  from  the  rear  while 
getting  the  guns  away.  The  division  occupied  a 
battle  outpost  line  for  the  night  from  near  Arak  el 
Menshiye,  through  Summeil  and  along  the  high 
ground  north  of  the  Wadi  Mejma,  to  Khurbet 
Jeladiyeh,  in  touch  with  the  75th  Division  on 
the  left. 

The  employment  of  the  artillery  in  this  action 
deserves  notice.  In  some  of  the  cavalry  divisions 
it  had  been  the  custom  to  attach  a  battery  of  Horse 
Artillery  permanently  to  each  brigade.  General 
Hodgson,  however,  elected  to  keep  his  artillery 
together,  and  under  his  immediate  command,  only 
attaching   a   battery   to   a   brigade   when   on   some 


AN  ARTILLERY  LESSON  75 

special  mission,  as  in  this  case,  when  the  5th  Brigade, 
with  '  B  '  Battery  H.A.C.  attached,  was  sent  forward 
into  Bahn,  acting  as  a  sort  of  advance  guard  to  the 
division,  which  was  echeloned  to  the  rear  or  either 
side  of  it. 

Though  there  may  be  something  to  be  said  in  favour 
of  the  principle  of  attaching  each  battery  to  a 
brigade  when,  as  was  generally  the  case  in  these 
operations,  a  division  is  moving  on  a  very  wide 
front,  there  is  little  doubt  that  it  is  the  sounder  plan 
for  the  divisional  commander  to  keep  at  least  a  part 
of  his  artillery  in  his  own  hands. 

In  this  action  General  Hodgson,  having  his  other 
two  batteries  in  hand,  and  well  up  behind  the  centre 
of  the  front  covered  by  his  division,  was  able  to  throw 
them  at  once  into  the  fight  at  the  critical  moment, 
and  there  is  no  doubt  that  their  fire  materially 
assisted  in  the  final  defeat  of  the  enemy  thrust.  Had 
these  two  batteries  been  attached  to  the  3rd  and 
4th  Brigades,  one  of  them  would  probably  have  been 
far  to  the  south  towards  Zeita,  and  the  other  possibly 
nearly  as  far  west  as  the  Deir  Sineid  Railway.  Both 
would  almost  certainly  have  been  unavailable  at  the 
moment  when  their  services  were  most  urgently 
needed.  This  subject  is  dealt  with  more  fully  in 
Chapter  xxiv. 

The  attempt  of  the  enemy  to  arrest  our  pursuit  by 
using  his  reserves  in  a  bold  attack  against  our  weak 
right  flank  deserved  better  success  than  it  achieved. 
It  was  a  repetition,  on  a  smaller  scale,  of  his  tactics 
at  Tel  Khuweilfeh,  after  the  battle  of  Beersheba. 
In  both  instances,  had  his  troops  been  as  bold  in 
attack  as  they  were  tenacious  in  defence,  the  campaign 
might  well  have  taken  a  different  turn. 

One  of  General  AUenby's  most  marked  character- 
istics   was    his    capacity    for    gauging    the    fighting 


76  THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

qualities  of  his  enemy.  He  rarely  underestimated 
the  Turks'  strength  or  morale,  but  he  seemed  to  know, 
as  by  instinct,  the  minimum  force  necessary  to  hold 
any  counter-thrust  that  might  possibly  be  made. 
In  this  case  aeroplane  and  cavalry  reconnaissances 
had  established  the  fact  that  there  was  a  considerable 
force  of  the  enemy  on  our  right,  but  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  left  the  task  of  dealing  with  it,  with  complete 
equanimity,  to  one  cavalry  division. 


Hu.l.     After  the  charge. 


British   Horse  Artillery  anj  Australian  Cavah-y  aUvancinM 
over  the  Philistine  Plain. 


CHAPTER  VII 

NEARING  THE  HILLS 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  13th  the  attack  on  the 
enemy  positions  began. 

The  Yeomanry  Division  and  the  Camel  Corps 
Brigade  advanced  on  the  left  of  our  line,  with  the 
52nd  Division  on  their  right.  Then  came  the 
75th  Division  and  the  Austrahan  Mounted  Division, 
the  latter  covering  a  front  of  about  eight  miles. 
The  orders  to  this  division  were  to  watch  the  right 
flank  of  our  line,  and  attract  the  enemy's  attention, 
as  on  the  previous  two  days.  In  view  of  the  large 
area  of  country  to  be  covered,  the  2nd  A.L.H. 
Brigade,  now  Corps  Reserve,  was  stationed  at 
Khurbet  Jeladiyeh.  The  7th  Mounted  Brigade  re- 
Heved  the  5th,  the  horses  of  which  were  exhausted. 
The  2nd  and  7th  Brigades  had  only  been  withdrawn 
from  the  line  late  on  the  evening  of  the  11th,  and  had 
thus  had  but  one  day's  complete  rest.  One  of  the 
chief  difficulties  of  the  Corps  Commander  at  this 
time,  and  one  which  increased  daily,  lay  in  the  fact 
that  one  or  another  of  his  brigades  was  always  on  the 
verge  of  coming  to  a  standstill  owing  to  the  ex- 
haustion of  its  horses.  This  fact  compelled  the 
continual  movement  of  brigades  from  one  part  of 
the  line  to  another,  to  relieve  others  unable  to  carry 
on  the  pursuit,  thus  increasing  the  fatigue  and 
distress  of  the  horses. 

The  country  in  which  our  troops  were  now  operating 
is  an  undulating,  treeless  plain,  rising  here  and  there 

77 


78  THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

into  isolated,  rocky  hills,  similar  in  character  to  the 
coiintr}'  farther  south.  It  is,  however,  much  more 
populous  than  southern  Palestine,  and  is  extensively 
cultivated,  though  at  this  time  of  year  the  crops  had 
all  been  gathered,  and  the  land  was  as  bare  as  a 
village  common.  Partly,  no  doubt,  for  purposes  of 
defence,  and  partly  to  avoid  wasting  the  fertile  plain 
land,  most  of  the  villages  are  built  on  the  tops  of  the 
hills,  where  the  rock,  outcropping  over  large  areas, 
renders  the  land  unsuitable  for  cultivation.  Many 
of  these  villages  are  surrounded  by  trees  and  small 
enclosed  gardens,  and  some  are  encircled  by  stout 
mud  walls.  All  of  them  command  the  surrounding 
country  for  a  wide  space,  and,  with  their  walls  and 
cactus  hedges,  form  admirable  strong  points,  very 
difficult  to  reduce  without  the  aid  of  heavy  artillery. 
The  village  of  El  Mughar,  on  its  high  and  rocky 
ridge,  is  one  of  the  most  prominent  of  these  hill 
strongholds,  and  forms  a  notable  landmark  from  the 
flat  country  to  the  west  and  south  of  it. 

The  8th  Mounted  Brigade,  leading  the  Yeomanry 
Division,  approached  Yebnah  about  eight  in  the 
morning,  and  two  troops  were  sent  forward  to  gallop 
into  the  village  from  either  side.  This  was  the 
usual  method  adopted  by  our  cavahy,  when  ap- 
proaching villages  during  a  rapid  advance,  unless 
they  were  definitely  known  to  be  strongly  held  by 
the  enemy.  If  there  proved  to  be  few  Turks  in  the 
village,  or  none  at  all,  these  troops  would  signal  back 
to  their  regiment  or  brigade  to  advance.  If,  however, 
the  village  proved  to  be  strongly  held,  the  few  men 
in  the  exploring  troops,  moving  in  extended  order 
and  at  a  very  fast  pace,  seldom  sustained  many 
casualties,  while  they  nearly  always  succeeded  in 
gaining  a  fairly  accurate  idea  of  the  numbers  of  the 
enemy,  the  location  of  his  machine  guns,  etc. 


THE  EL  MUGHAR-KATRAH  LINE        79 

In  the  present  case  Yebnah  was  found  very  lightly 
held,  and  the  8th  Brigade  at  once  pushed  through  it, 
and  advanced  to  the  attack  of  the  villages  of  Zernuka 
and  Kubeibe,  on  which  rested  the  extreme  right 
flank  of  the  enemy's  line.  The  Turks  were  found  in 
force  in  these  two  places,  and  the  brigade  was  unable 
to  make  any  substantial  progress,  in  the  face  of  very 
heavy  machine-gun  fire. 

The  6th  Mounted  Brigade  remained  in  divisional 
reserve  at  Yebnah,  and  the  22nd  was  ordered  to  try 
and  push  between  Zernuka  and  El  Mughar,  and  seize 
the  village  of  Akir,  behind  the  enemy's  line.  In- 
tense machine-gun  fii*e  from  Zernuka,  however,  on 
the  flank  of  the  line  of  advance,  prohibited  the 
brigade  from  moving  forward  till  this  place  had  been 
taken. 

A  brigade  of  the  52nd  Division  attacked  the 
viUage  of  Katrah  from  the  south  about  nine  o'clock, 
and  captured  it  by  a  fine  bayonet  charge,  taking 
600  prisoners  and  a  large  number  of  machine  guns. 
The  brigade  then  advanced  on  El  Mughar,  and 
succeeded  in  reaching  the  Wadi  Jamus,  about  half 
a  mile  farther  north.  From  the  wadi  to  El  Mughar 
the  ground  sloped  gently  upwards,  devoid  of  any 
cover,  and  traversed  by  no  depression  capable  of 
concealing  troops.  The  infantry  extended  along 
the  wadi,  and  attempted  to  advance  up  the  slope 
towards  El  Mughar,  but  were  checked  by  a  tre- 
mendous fire  from  machine  guns  and  riflemen  con- 
cealed in  the  gardens  of  the  village,  and  from  field 
guns  in  action  farther  north.  It  was  soon  apparent 
that  they  could  not  hope  to  cross  the  wide  stretch 
of  open  ground,  and  they  were  withdrawn  into  the 
shelter  of  the  wadi.  The  52nd  Division  then  sent  a 
message  to  the  Yeomanry,  asking  the  latter  to  co- 
operate by  attacking  El  Mughar  from  the  east. 


80  THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

General  Barrow  ordered  the  6th  Mounted  Brigade, 
which  was  now  extended  from  Yebnah  to  ElGheyadah, 
about  a  mile  north  of  Beshshit,  to  carry  out  the 
attack. 

From  his  position  at  El  Gheyadah,  General  Godwin 
had  observed  that  the  infantry  advance  on  El  Mughar 
had  been  held  up,  and  was  anticipating  an  order  to 
co-operate  with  his  brigade.  He  had  accordingly 
already  got  one  of  his  regiments,  the  Bucks  Yeo- 
manry, into  the  Wadi  Jamus,  at  a  point  about  a 
mile  south-east  of  Yebnah,  and  had  sent  officers' 
patrols  forward  to  reconnoitre  a  line  of  approach. 
The  reports  of  these  patrols  confirmed  the  General's 
own  impression  that  the  enemy  position  could  only 
be  reached  by  a  mounted  charge.  The  country 
west  of  El  Mughar  was  just  as  bare  and  open  as 
that  to  the  south,  over  which  our  infantry  had 
found  themselves  unable  to  advance.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  absence  of  obstacles  favoured  a  galloping 
attack,  and,  though  the  distance  to  be  traversed  in 
the  open  (over  two  miles)  was  considerable,  there 
appeared  to  be  a  good  prospect  of  the  enterprise 
succeeding,  provided  it  was  adequately  supported  by 
the  R.H.A.  and  machine  gunners. 

Having  decided  on  a  mounted  attack.  General 
Godwin  brought  up  the  Dorset  Yeomanry,  and 
galloped  them  across  the  open  in  small  parties,  into 
the  shelter  of  the  Wadi  Jamus.  This  regiment  was 
directed  on  the  left,  or  northern,  end  of  the  enemy 
position,  and  the  Bucks  on  a  portion  of  the  ridge  to 
the  right  of  the  Dorsets'  objective,  and  immediately 
north  of  the  village  itself.  The  Berks  Yeomanry 
was  held  in  reserve,  west  of  the  wadi  and  near  the 
south  end  of  Yebnah.  The  Berks  Battery  R.H.A., 
which  was  at  Beshshit,  and  the  Machine  Gun  Squadron 
were  ordered  to  provide  covering  fire  from  the  south. 


Dia^ra/ft  Ulastra^g  the  action.  oF  £!L  Mugkcir 


82  THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

The  8th  Mounted  Brigade,  which  was  attacking 
Zernuka,  would  afford  protection  to  the  left  flank 
of  the  6th  during  the  action. 

The  Berks  Battery  was  soon  in  action  among  some 
trees  north  of  El  Beshshit,  registering  the  village  of 
El  Mughar,  and  the  ridge  to  the  north  of  it.  The 
machine  gunners,  taking  advantage  of  some  broken 
ground  south-east  of  Yebnah,  got  into  the  Wadi 
Shellal  el  Ghor,  and  worked  their  way  along  it  to  a 
position  about  1000  yards  south-west  of  El  Mughar 
village. 

As  soon  as  the  steady  bursts  of  fire  from  the  wadi 
apprised  General  Godwin  that  his  machine  guns 
were  in  action,  he  gave  the  order  to  advance,  and 
the  two  regiments  scrambled  up  the  steep  sides  of 
the  Wadi  Jamus  into  the  open,  and  trotted  forward 
over  the  plain  in  extended  order,  the  squadrons  of 
each  regiment  following  one  another  at  a  distance 
of  about  200  yards.  Two  machine  guns  on  pack 
horses  accompanied  each  regiment,  moving  on  the 
outer  flanks. 

The  appearance  of  the  cavalry  was  the  signal  for 
a  tremendous  fire  on  both  sides.  Every  weapon 
the  enemy  had  in  action  was  turned  on  the  advancing 
lines  of  cavalry,  while  the  Berks  Battery  and  the 
6th  Brigade  Machine  Gun  Squadron  poured  an  in- 
tense fire  on  the  ridge  of  Mughar,  sweeping  it  from 
end  to  end. 

The  regiments  trotted  quietly  across  the  open  till 
they  were  some  half  a  mile  from  the  enemy  position, 
when  they  shook  out  into  a  fast  canter,  and  swung 
up  the  rocky  slope  at  the  Turks.  A  hundred  yards 
from  the  top  the  order  to  charge  was  given,  and  the 
men  sat  down  and  rode. 

The  leading  squadron  of  the  Bucks  went  through 
the  Turks  with  the  sword  in  ten  seconds,   kiUing 


THE  CHARGE  AT  EL  MUGHAR     83 

many  of  them,  and  galloped  right  over  the  ridge 
before  they  could  pull  up.  Ere  the  enemy  troops 
had  time  to  rally,  the  second  and  third  squadrons 
dashed  into  them,  completing  the  rout.  In  a  few 
minutes  from  the  time  when  the  order  to  charge 
was  given,  the  Bucks  Yeomanry  had  secured  their 
objective,  and  commenced  to  consolidate  on  the 
position. 

The  Dorset  Yeomanry,  on  the  left,  encountered 
more  broken  ground,  and  the  leading  squadron  dis- 
mounted and  attacked  with  the  bayonet.  The 
other  two  squadrons,  however,  stuck  to  their  horses, 
and  reached  the  top  first.  There  was  not  much 
momentum  left  in  the  charge  by  the  time  the  cavalry 
met  the  enemy,  but  the  long  swords  do  not  need 
much  pace  behind  them  to  do  their  work  properly, 
and  the  issue  of  the  fight  was  never  in  doubt.  Before 
the  dismounted  squadron  had  gained  the  summit  of 
the  ridge,  the  other  two  had  cleared  the  position, 
and  the  surviving  Turks  were  in  flight  or  had  sur- 
rendered. Incidentally  it  may  be  remarked  that 
the  squadron  on  foot  lost  more  heavily,  both  in  men 
and  horses,  than  the  two  that  had  gone  in  with  the 
sword. 

While  the  position  was  being  cleared  and  con- 
sohdated,  a  number  of  the  enemy  in  the  village 
opened  fire  on  our  troops  with  machine  guns,  in- 
flicting some  loss,  and  interfering  with  the  work. 
Two  squadrons  of  the  Berks  were  sent  up  at  a  gallop, 
and  fought  their  way  into  the  village  on  foot, 
clearing  the  Turks  out  of  it,  and  taking  about  400 
prisoners. 

About  600  enemy  dead  were  counted  on  the  posi- 
tion afterwards,  and  many  more  were  killed,  as  they 
were  trying  to  escape,  by  the  fire  of  the  machine 
guns  which  had  accompanied  each  regiment  in  the 


84         THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

charge.  In  addition  to  those  taken  in  Mughar 
village,  1100  prisoners  fell  into  our  hands,  with 
three  guns  and  a  large  number  of  machine  guns. 
The  enemy's  right  was  completely  broken.  His 
troops  evacuated  Kubeibe  and  Zernuka  after  dark, 
and  fell  back  in  considerable  confusion. 

Our  casualties  in  the  two  regiments  were  129 
officers  and  men  and  265  horses  killed  and  wounded, 
not  an  unduly  heavy  bill  when  compared  to  the 
number  of  enemy  dead,  and,  still  more,  to  the  great 
results  obtained. 

The  22nd  Mounted  Brigade  rode  forward  to  attack 
Akir,  as  soon  as  Mughar  had  been  taken,  but  was 
held  up  till  nightfall  by  unexpectedly  strong  enemy 
opposition.  The  Brigade  rounded  up  seventy  pri- 
soners and  a  few  machine  guns  retiring  from  El 
Mughar,  and  occupied  Akir  next  morning,  the 
enemy  having  retired  during  the  night. 

Meanwhile,  in  the  centre,  the  75th  Division  had 
captured  Mesmiye  with  the  bayonet,  taking  200 
prisoners,  and  reached  a  point  on  the  Deir  Sineid 
line  about  two  miles  west  of  Junction  Station  in 
the  evening.  The  Turks  attacked  in  considerable 
force  during  the  night,  but  were  driven  off,  and  the 
division  entered  Junction  Station  early  next  morning. 

The  AustraUan  Mounted  Division  advanced  a  few 
miles,  covering  the  right  flank  of  the  75th  Divi- 
sion, and  seized  Tel  el  Turmus  without  encountering 
serious  opposition.  During  the  day  the  headquarters 
of  this  division,  at  the  village  of  El  Jeladiyeh,  three 
miles  east  of  El  Suafir  el  Sharkiye,  got  into  touch  by 
helio  with  the  53rd  Division  twenty  miles  away  to  the 
east,  and  exchanged  news.  This  was  the  first  and 
last  communication  between  the  two  parts  of  our 
force,  from  the  day  of  the  battle  of  Sharia,  till  the 
7th  of  December,  when  the  10th  A.L.H.  Regiment 


ENEMY  ARMY  SPLIT  IN  TWO  85 

gained  touch  with  the  53rd  Division  in  the  hills  ten 
miles  south  of  Jerusalem,  two  days  before  the  city 
fell. 

Next  day,  as  soon  as  it  was  light  enough  to  see,  our 
line  was  on  the  move  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy. 

Early  in  the  morning  a  couple  of  armoured  cars, 
sent  forward  to  reconnoitre,  entered  Junction  Station, 
and  drove  suddenly  into  a  crowd  of  some  400  Turks 
employed  in  setting  fire  to  the  buildings,  and  doing 
a  little  private  looting  on  their  own  account.  The 
commander  of  the  leading  car  summoned  these  men 
to  surrender,  and  was  answered  by  a  scattering  volley 
from  their  rifles.  Whereupon  he  shut  the  armoured 
doors  of  his  car,  and  charged  down  upon  them,  with 
his  machine  gun  going  full  blast.  The  discomfited 
Turks  turned  and  fled,  pursued  for  two  miles  by  the 
cars.  Over  200  of  them  were  killed  or  wounded ; 
the  remainder  escaped  into  the  hills. 

The  75th  Division  entered  Junction  Station  shortly 
afterwards,  and  collected  100  prisoners,  a  number  of 
guns,  and  a  quantity  of  rolling  stock. 

The  Australian  Mounted  Division  pushed  on  to 
the  north-east,  the  4th  Brigade  seizing  El  Tine 
Station,  on  the  Beersheba  line,  early  in  the  morning, 
where  large  quantities  of  ammunition  and  stores  were 
found  intact.  Continuing  their  move,  units  of  the 
division  penetrated  through  the  enemy  front,  which 
was  now  broken  at  Junction  Station,  and  reached  the 
railway  two  miles  east  of  the  station. 

The  Yeomanry  Division,  moving  in  advance  of 
the  52nd,  pushed  through  Akir  to  Naane.  The  two 
brigades  which  occupied  the  latter  place  were  heavily 
shelled  by  the  enemy  from  about  Abu  Shusheh,  some 
three  miles  farther  east,  but  no  other  opposition  was 
met  with. 

The  rapidity  with  which  the  Mughar-Kutrah  line 


86  THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

had  been  captured  on  the  previous  day  had  resulted 
in  the  Turkish  army  being  again  broken  into  two 
separate  parts.  The  thrust  of  the  Yeomanry  to 
Naane  had  now  driven  a  wedge  between  these  two 
parts,  and  the  operations  of  the  next  two  days  were 
directed  towards  widening  the  gap.  The  larger 
portion  of  the  enemy  force  entered  the  hills  to  the 
east,  and  commenced  to  retire  along  the  main  road 
towards  Jerusalem,  shepherded  by  the  Yeomanry  and 
Australian  Mounted  Divisions.  The  smaller  portion 
retired  northwards  over  the  plain,  followed  by  the 
Anzac  Division.  The  1st  A.L.H.  and  New  Zealand 
Brigades  made  good  Kubeibe  and  Zernuka  early  in 
the  morning,  and  then  advanced  on  Ramleh  and 
Khurbet  Surafend  respectively,  with  the  Camel 
Corps  Brigade  patrolling  the  sand  dune  country  on 
their  left.  The  New  Zealanders  encountered  a  force 
of  Turks  on  the  high  hill  of  Ayun  Kara  (Richon-le- 
Zion)  about  two  in  the  afternoon,  and  drove  them 
off  without  much  difficulty.  Half  an  hour  later  the 
Turks  emerged  from  the  shelter  of  the  large  fruit 
orchards  and  vineyards  which  surround  Ayun  Kara, 
and  launched  an  unexpected  counter-attack  on  the 
New  Zealand  Brigade.  They  were  well  supplied 
with  bombs,  and  pushed  their  attack  fiercely  right 
up  to  our  line.  The  New  Zealanders  then  went  in 
with  the  bayonet,  and  drove  them  back  to  the  bottom 
of  the  hill,  inflicting  heavy  losses  on  them.  Two 
squadrons  from  the  1st  Brigade  and  a  company  of 
the  Camel  Corps  reinforced  the  New  Zealand  Brigade, 
which  had  suffered  somewhat  severely,  but  the  enemy 
had  had  enough,  and  made  no  further  attack.  This 
was  the  only  serious  fighting  of  the  day. 

The  two  brigades  held  an  outpost  line  for  the  night 
from  the  sea  coast,  through  Ayun  Kara  to  Khurbet 
Deiran,  in  touch  with  the  Yeomanry  on  their  right. 


88  THE  DE8ERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

The  Camel  Corps  Brigade  occupied  a  support  line  a 
short  distance  farther  south.  Tlie  Yeomanry  Divi- 
sion remained  in  occupation  of  Akir  and  Naane, 
watching  the  northern  exits  from  the  latter  place, 
with  the  52nd  Division  lying  behind  it  about  El 
Mughar.  The  75th  Division  had  a  brigade  in 
Junction  Station,  and  the  remainder  of  the  division 
at  Mesmiye,  while  the  Australian  Mounted  Division 
held  an  outpost  line  in  observation  of  the  country 
to  the  south-east. 

On  the  15th  the  Anzac  Mounted  Division,  moving 
northwards  over  the  plain,  occupied  Ramleh  without 
opposition,  taking  about  350  prisoners,  and  on  the 
following  day  the  New  Zealand  Mounted  Brigade 
entered  Jaffa,  where  it  was  received  with  acclama- 
tion by  the  populace.  On  the  17th  the  division  had 
reached  the  Nahr  el  Auja,  near  its  mouth,  without 
having  yet  succeeded  in  bringing  the  enemy  to  action. 
Favoured  by  the  hard  ground  on  the  plain,  and 
assisted  to  some  extent  by  the  railway  along  which 
they  were  retreating,  the  Turks  made  the  best  use  of 
the  nights  during  this  period,  and  never  stopped  till 
they  had  put  the  wide  and  deep  channel  of  the  river 
Auja  between  themselves  and  our  troops.  They 
were  now  located,  entrenched  along  the  north  bank 
of  the  river,  from  near  the  sea  to  about  EJiurbet 
Hadrah.  The  Anzac  Division  received  orders  to 
halt  opposite  this  line,  and  remain  in  observation  of 
the  enemy,  pending  the  arrival  of  reinforcements, 
while  the  more  important  task  of  the  advance  on 
Jerusalem  was  taken  in  hand. 

Meanwhile  the  Yeomanry  division  was  engaged 
driving  the  right  half  of  the  enemy  army  into  the 
hills.  The  road  from  Jerusalem  to  Jaffa  runs  through 
a  deep  and  narrow  valley  in  the  mountains,  which 
has  its  outlet  at  Amwas,  near  Latron.     Here  the 


ACTION  OF  ABU  SHUSHEH  89 

valley  opens  out  into  the  Vale  of  Ajalon,  which  slopes 
gently  down  to  the  level  of  the  coastal  plain.  Running 
north  and  south  across  the  western  end  of  the  Vale, 
a  bold  ridge  stands  up  sharply  from  the  plain, 
between  the  villages  of  Sidun  and  Abu  Shusheh. 
The  northern  end  of  this  ridge  terminates  at  Abu 
Shusheh,  and  the  southern  end  at  the  hill  of  Tel 
Jezer,  the  ancient  Gezer,  round  which  so  many 
battles  have  been  fought  in  the  past. 

The  enemy  had  posted  a  strong  rearguard  on  the 
northern  end  of  the  ridge,  to  cover  the  retreat  of  his 
main  body  up  the  Jerusalem  road.  The  Yeomanry 
Division  was  ordered  to  dislodge  this  rearguard,  and 
then  clear  up  the  foothill  country  from  Amwas,  at 
the  eastern  end  of  the  Vale  of  Ajalon,  to  Ramleh. 

The  enemy's  position  was  one  of  great  natural 
strength,  and  was  held  by  a  force  of  about  4000 
Turks,  well  supplied  with  machine  guns  and  artillery. 
The  greater  part  of  this  force  was  distributed  in,  and 
on  each  side  of,  the  village  of  Abu  Shusheh,  but  a 
considerable  body  of  Turks  with  machine  guns  was 
stationed  some  distance  farther  south,  evidently  in 
order  to  outflank  any  attack  on  the  village  from  the 
west.  The  country  on  that  side  of  the  position  was 
of  an  undulating  nature,  and  afforded  some  cover  to 
troops  advancing  over  it.  The  ridge  itself  rose 
abruptly  from  this  undulating  country,  a  forbidding- 
looking  mass  of  boulders  and  scrub.  In  places  the 
solid  rock  outcropped  from  the  hill  over  large  areas, 
and  there  were  a  number  of  caves  among  the  rocks, 
in  many  of  which  the  Turks  had  posted  machine 
guns. 

General  Barrow  directed  the  22nd  Mounted  Brigade 
and  the  Camel  Corps  to  attack  the  hill  on  the  north- 
west and  north  respectively,  and  the  6th  Mounted 
Brigade  from  the  south-west.     At  seven  o'clock  the 


90  THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

two  former  brigades  were  in  action,  advancing  dis- 
mounted. In  view  of  the  open  nature  of  the  country 
on  the  west  side  of  the  ridge,  and  the  distance  to 
be  covered.  General  Godwin,  who  had  been  recon- 
noitring the  position  with  his  regimental  commanders 
since  dawn,  decided  to  repeat  his  tactics  of  the  13th. 
Had  he  been  able  to  obtain  a  nearer  view  of  the 
appalling  country  over  which  he  was  launching  his 
squadrons,  it  is  possible  that  he  might  have  decided 
to  make  at  least  the  final  assault  on  foot,  in  which 
case  we  should  have  lost  a  classic  example  of  the 
capabilities  of  cavalry  when  well  led. 

Having  made  up  his  mind  to  attack  mounted,  he 
sent  half  of  the  brigade  machine  guns,  covered  by  a 
squadron  of  the  Berks  Yeomanry,  to  push  forward 
dismounted,  taking  advantage  of  what  cover  the 
ground  afforded,  to  a  point  west  of  Abu  Shusheh, 
and  as  close  in  as  possible,  from  which  to  engage 
the  enemy  machine  guns  on  the  ridge.  The  Berks 
Battery  R.H.A.,  from  a  position  some  3500  yards 
south-west  of  the  village,  assisted  in  this  task.  The 
Bucks  Yeomanry  were  ordered  to  charge  the  enemy 
at  Abu  Shusheh,  while  the  remainder  of  the  Berks 
charged  on  the  left,  against  a  spur  running  out  to 
the  west  of  the  ridge,  just  north  of  the  village.  The 
Dorset  Yeomanry  were  held  in  reserve  on  the  right, 
to  protect  that  flank.  The  attack  of  the  22nd 
Brigade  protected  the  left  flank. 

As  soon  as  the  battery  and  the  machine  guns 
were  in  action.  Colonel  Cripps  led  the  Bucks  Yeo- 
manry out  into  the  open,  in  column  of  squadrons 
in  line  of  troop  columns,  and  cantered  forward 
towards  the  village,  under  a  fairly  heavy,  but  ill- 
directed,  fire.  As  they  neared  the  position,  the 
Yeomanry  came  under  severe  enfilade  fire  from  the 
group    of    enemy    machine    guns    on    the    southern 


ACTION  OF  ABU  SHUSHEH  91 

portion  of  the  ridge.  Leading  his  regiment  at  a 
gallop  into  the  shelter  of  some  dead  ground,  Colonel 
Cripps  halted  them  and  signalled  back  for  support. 
The  Dorset  Yeomanry  were  at  once  sent  off  to  make 
a  turning  movement  to  the  south,  and  take  the 
hostile  machine  guns  in  rear.  Some  of  the  guns  of 
the  Berks  Battery  were  also  turned  on  to  this  party 
of  the  enemy. 

The  appearance  of  the  Dorsets  engaged  the  atten- 
tion of  the  Turkish  machine  gunners,  and  the  Bucks 
Yeomanry,  taking  advantage  of  the  respite,  emerged 
from  concealment,  and  raced  at  the  position. 

Their  appearance  was  met  by  an  outburst  of 
hysterical  fire  from  Abu  Shusheh,  through  which 
they  passed  almost  unscathed,  and  reached  the  foot 
of  the  ridge.  Then,  catching  their  horses  short  by 
the  head,  they  put  them  at  the  slope.  Slipping  and 
sliding,  scrambling  like  cats  among  the  rocks,  they 
galloped  up,  and  went  over  the  Turks  with  a  cheer. 

The  two  squadrons  of  the  Berks  galloped  up  on 
the  left  at  the  same  moment,  and  completed  the 
work.  Once  our  cavalry  were  in  the  position  the 
enemy  made  but  a  poor  fight. 

Meanwhile  the  Dorsets  took  advantage  of  the  con- 
fusion caused  in  the  enemy  ranks  to  charge  the 
machine  guns  farther  south.  The  charge  got  well 
home,  and  most  of  the  Turks  were  sabred ;  the  rest 
surrendered. 

While  the  three  regiments  were  clearing  the  ridge 
of  isolated  parties  of  the  enemy  who  still  showed 
fight,  a  force  of  Turks  appeared  from  among  the 
rocks  farther  south,  and  attempted  a  counter-attack 
against  the  right  of  our  troops.  The  Berks  Battery, 
however,  was  on  the  watch,  and  at  once  opened  a 
rapid  and  accurate  fire  on  these  Turks,  driving  them 
back  with  heavy  losses,  and  breaking  up  the  counter- 


92  THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

attack.  By  nine  o'clock  the  whole  of  this  strong 
position  was  in  our  hands,  with  360  prisoners,  and 
all  the  enemy  machine  guns.  About  400  Turks 
were  killed  with  the  sword  alone,  and  many  more 
were  found  dead  on  the  position,  as  a  result  of  our 
gun  and  machine-gun  jGLre. 

Our  own  losses  were  extraordinarily  light,  only 
thirty-seven  of  all  ranks  killed  and  wounded.  The 
Berks  Battery  and  the  Machine  Gun  Squadron,  by 
their  effective  covering  fire,  had  helped  materially 
to  keep  down  our  casualties ;  but  the  chief  credit  for 
this  desirable  result  must  be  given  to  the  Turks  them- 
selves, whose  shooting  during  the  attack  was  exceed- 
ingly bad,  and  appeared  to  be  completely  out  of 
control.  It  is  probable  that  among  the  garrison 
were  m^.ny  who  had  spoken  with  survivors  from  El 
Mughar,  and  we  may  be  sure  that  the  story  of  that 
charge  had  lost  nothing  in  the  telhng,  and  probably 
contributed  largely  to  the  '  nerves '  of  the  Turks. 
The  action  earned  a  generous  tribute  from  the 
Commander-in-Chief,  who  described  it  in  his  despatch 
as  a  brilliant  piece  of  cavalry  work. 

The  22nd  Brigade  pursued  the  enemy  towards 
Am  was,  rounding  up  a  few  prisoners,  but  the  majority 
of  the  Turks  escaped  over  the  rocky,  inaccessible 
country  to  the  east,  where  our  cavalry  had  little 
chance  of  catching  them. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

AN  ENTR'ACTE 

The  enemy  had  now  been  driven  into  a  tract  of 
difficult  mountain  country,  very  favourable  for 
defensive  tactics,  and  most  unsuited  for  cavalry. 
Reinforcements  of  men  and  guns  were  being  hurried 
southwards  from  Aleppo  to  his  aid ;  some  had 
already  arrived.  In  order  to  drive  the  eastern 
group  of  his  forces  through  the  mountains,  and  at 
the  same  time  hold  the  northern  group  on  the  plain, 
more  infantry  would  be  required. 

The  Royal  Navy  was  reorganising  the  sea-borne 
supply  line,  but  the  landing  of  stores,  which  had  to 
be  carried  out  in  surf  boats,  depended  on  a  con- 
tinuance of  fine  weather,  and  the  20th  Corps  could 
not,  therefore,  be  brought  up  with  safety  until  our 
railway  had  been  pushed  considerably  farther  north. 
Relays  of  Sappers  had  been  working  on  the  line  day 
and  night  since  the  fall  of  Gaza,  and  the  railhead 
was  moving  forward  at  a  pace  that  beat  all  previous 
records  for  railway  construction  in  any  part  of  the 
world.  Even  under  the  most  favourable  condi- 
tions, however,  it  would  take  at  least  a  fortnight  to 
reach  a  point  from  which  it  would  be  possible  to 
supply  our  troops  in  the  mountains. 

The  54th  Division,  21st  Corps,  was  already  under 
orders  to  march  from  Gaza,  but,  before  it  could 
start,  its  transport,  which  had  been  lent  to  the 
52nd  and  75th  Divisions,  had  to  be  returned,  and 
this  necessitated  a  complete  rearrangement  of  trans- 
port in  the  Corps. 

•      93 


94  THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

Moreover,  the  operations  had  now  continue 
seventeen  days  practically  without  cessation,  '< 
rest  was  absolutely  necessary,  especially  fo: 
horses.  The  cavalry  divisions  had  covered  i 
170  miles  since  the  29th  of  October,  and  their  1 
had  been  watered,  on  an  average,  only  once  in 
thirty-six  hours  during  that  time.  The  heat 
had  been  intense,  and  the  short  ration,  9J  11 
grain  per  day,  without  any  bulk  food,  had  wea. 
them  greatly.  Indeed  the  hardships  endure 
some  of  the  horses  were  almost  incredible.  0 
the  batteries  of  the  Australian  Mounted  Di 
had  only  been  able  to  water  its  horses  three 
in  the  past  nine  days,  the  actual  intervals  be 
waterings  being  68,  72,  and  76  hours  respect 
Yet  this  battery,  on  its  arrival  at  Junction 
tion,  had  only  lost  eight  horses  from  exhau 
not  counting  those  killed  in  action  or  evac 
wounded. 

As  an  indication  of  the  reduction  in  the  fig 
strength  of  the  cavalry,  due  to  casualties  and 
ness  among  men  and  horses,  it  may  be  ment 
that  the  G.O.C.  of  the  5th  Mounted  Brigade  rep 
on  the  16th  of  November  that  he  had,  in  his 
regiments,  only  690  men  mounted  and  fit  for 
It  is  true  that  this  brigade  had  suffered  more  se"\ 
than  most  of  the  others  in  the  Corps,  but  all 
much  under  strength  in  men  and  horses,  ai 
urgent  need  of  a  rest. 

The  majority  of  the  horses  in  the  Corps 
Walers,  and  there  is  no  doubt  that  these  1 
Australian  horses  make  the  finest  cavalry  mi 
in  the  world.  For  many  years  past  the  Austn 
have  been  bujdng  up  the  well-bred  failures  oi 
English  Turf,  and  buying  them  cheap ;  no 
racing  purposes,  but  to  breed  saddle  horses  fo: 


ENGLISH  HORSES  AND  WALERS         95 

ry  stations.  As  a  result  of  this  policy,  they 
now  got  types  of  compact,  well  built,  saddle 
arness  horses  that  no  other  part  of  the  world 
how.  Rather  on  the  light  side,  according  to 
leas,  but  hard  as  nails,  and  with  beautifully 
legs  and  feet,  their  record  in  this  war  places 

far  above  the  cavalry  horses  of  any  other 
I.     The  Australians  themselves  can  never  under- 

our  partiality  for  the  half-bred,  weight-carry- 
mter,  which  looks  to  them  Uke  a  cart  horse. 

contention  has  always  been  that  good  blood 
irry  more  weight  than  big  bone,  and  the  ex- 
ce  of  this  war  has  converted  the  writer,  for 
mtirely  to  their  point  of  view.  It  must  be 
ibered  that  the  Australian  countrymen  are 
,  heavier  men  than  their  English  brothers, 
formed  just  half  the  Corps,  and  it  is  probable 
tiey  averaged  not  far  short  of  twelve  stone  each 
3d.  To  this  weight  must  be  added  another 
nd  a  half  stone,  for  saddle,  ammunition,  sword, 
dothes  and  accoutrements,  so  that  each  horse 
1  a  weight  of  over  twenty-one  stone,  all  day 
rery  day  for  seventeen  days,  on  less  than  half 
Tmal  ration  of  forage,  and  with  only  one  drink 
ry  thirty-six  hours  ! 

weight-carrying  English  hunter  had  to  be 
I  back  to  fitness  after  these  operations,  over 
y  period,  while  the  little  Australian  horses, 
it  any  special  care  other  than  good  food  and 

of  water,  were  soon  fit  to  go  through  another 
ign  as  arduous  as  the  last  one. 
ction   Station   was  the   first  place   where  we 

unHmited,  and  accessible,  water.  Owing  to 
gorous  action  of  the  armoured  cars,  the  Turks 
LOt  had  time  to  destroy  the  steam  pumping 

there,   and  our  engineers  soon  had  rows  of 


96  THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

drinking  troughs  erected,  and  a  steady  stream  of 
sweet  clear  water  flowing  into  them.  It  was  good 
to  see  the  horses  burying  their  heads  in  the  water, 
and  drinking  their  fill  at  last.  The  Anzac  Mounted 
Division,  about  the  same  time,  found  excellent 
water  and  a  steam  pump  at  the  big  Zionist  wine 
press  at  Richon-le-Zion. 

Everything  about  Junction  Station  spoke  of  the 
methodical  German.  Solidly  built,  stone  storehouses 
and  locomotive  sheds,  well-found  machine  shops, 
orderly  stacks  of  priceless  timber,  p3n'amids  of  drums 
of  oil  and  petrol ;  everything  in  its  place,  and  a 
place  for  everything.  Neat  finger-posts  and  notice- 
boards  directed  the  stranger  where  to  go,  and  where 
not  to  go,  and  a  host  of  the  inevitable  '  Verboten ' 
signs  bristled  on  every  side.  It  was  noticeable 
that  these  last  were  the  only  ones  that  were  written 
in  Turkish  as  well  as  German,  except  the  name  of 
the  station,  which  the  Germans  called  Wadi  Surar. 
We  found  in  the  station  tw^o  locomotives  and  a 
number  of  railway  wagons,  which  were  of  great 
value  to  us  during  the  ensuing  few  weeks,  tiU  our 
own  railway  reached  Ludd. 

The  heavy  echelons  of  the  cavalry  ammunition 
columns,  which  had  last  been  seen  at  Sharia  on  the 
7tli  November,  advancing  boldly  on  the  enemy, 
turned  up  at  Junction  Station  on  the  19th.  They 
had  been  completely  lost  during  the  intervening 
twelve  days,  and  had  wandered  about,  neglected 
and  forlorn,  in  the  wake  of  the  cavalry.  During 
all  this  time  they  had  received  no  rations,  and  had 
been  maintained  entirely  by  the  predatory  genius 
of  the  gunner  subaltern  in  command.  As  this  officer 
has  now  returned  to  civilian  life,  and  is  a  respected, 
and  it  is  to  be  hoped  respectable,  member  of  society, 
it  is,  perhaps,  kinder  to  draw  a  veil  over  his  methods 


THE  A.P.M.'S  ODYSSEY  97 

Suffice  it  to  say  tliat  he  brought  his  command  of  600 
horses  and  men  into  the  Station,  all  fit  and  well, 
and  no  questions  were  asked.  And  if,  sometimes,  a 
battahon  waited  in  vain  for  its  rations  ;  if,  now  and 
then,  a  .harried  supply  officer  found  that  one  of  his 
camel  convoys  had  delivered  its  supplies  during 
the  night  to  some  unknown  unit,  owing  to  a  mistake  ; 
if  guards  on  ration  dumps  are  notoriously  vuhier- 
able  to  cigarettes  and  soft  words,  one  can  only  reflect 
that  war  is  a  sad,  stern  business,  in  which  '  dog 
eats  dog '  when  opportunity  arises. 

On  the  same  day  another  wanderer  returned, 
whose  Odyssey  was  even  more  remarkable.  When 
the  headquarters  of  the  Australian  Mounted  Division 
had  been  at  KJiurbet  Jeladiyeh  on  the  13th,  the 
divisional  interpreter,  a  Greek  named  Theodore, 
had  overheard  certain  remarks  made  by  a  man  in 
the  village,  who  was  dressed  as  a  native.  The  man 
was  arrested,  and  proved  to  be  a  Turkish  spy. 
Terrified  at  finding  himself  discovered,  the  miserable 
wretch  begged  for  his  life,  and  promised,  if  he  was 
spared,  to  put  us  on  the  track  of  the  man  who,  he 
said,  was  the  head  of  the  native  spy  organisation  of 
the  Turkish  Army.  He  was  told  to  say  what  he 
knew,  and  we  would  consider  whether  his  informa- 
tion was  worth  his  life.  He  then  gave  particulars  of 
the  man,  who,  it  appeared,  was  his  own  father,  and 
said  that  he  believed  him  to  be  at  Beit  Jibrin. 

Accordingly  the  A. P.M.  of  the  division  set  off  next 
day  with  two  cars  of  a  light  car  patrol  ^  and  the 
interpreter,  to  try  and  surprise  the  arch  spy  at 
Beit  Jibrin.  The  party  arrived  at  the  village  about 
nine  o'clock  in  the  morning,  to  find  the  bird  flown. 
On  making  inquiries,  they  learnt  that  he  had  gone 
on — to  quote  the  report  of  the  A.P.M. — '  to  a  place 

^  Unarmoured  Ford  vans  carrying  a  machine  gun  each. 
Q 


98  THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

called  Ram  Allah  Rakhman,  which  we  took  to  be 
somewhere  near  Bethlehem,  but  subsequently  dis- 
covered to  be  the  same  place !  '  The  enemy's 
right  group  was  at  this  time  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  Hebron,  and  his  left  group  was  west  of  Junction 
Station,  so  that  Bethlehem  was  a  good  fifteen  miles 
behind  his  hne.  But  this  triflmg  fact  did  not  in 
any  waj^  deter  the  pursuers.  What  could  the  Turkish 
Army  do  against  two  Ford  cars  and  two  machine 
guns  ?     They  bhthely  took  the  track  to  Bethlehem. 

Shortly  afterwards  they  came  suddenly  upon  a 
patrol  of  six  Turkish  cavalrymen.  '  We  opened 
fire  at  once,'  so  runs  the  A.P.M.'s  report,  '  and 
killed  the  men  and  five  of  the  horses.  The  sixth 
horse  unluckily  escaped,  but  we  came  up  with  it 
later  on  and  destroyed  it,  thus  leaving  no  trace  of 
the  enemy  patrol !  '  A  few  miles  farther  on,  they 
encomitered  another,  and  larger,  body  of  enemy 
cavalry.  '  This  time,'  says  the  report,  '  there  were 
about  thirt}^  of  them,  but,  as  we  came  upon  them 
unawares,  we  had  no  difficulty  in  driving  them  off, 
after  killing  a  good  few,  and  we  then  proceeded  on 
our  way.' 

Late  in  the  afternoon  the  cars  drove  into  Beth- 
lehem, where  our  men  were  received  with  transports 
of  Joy  by  the  inhabitants,  nearly  all  of  whom  are 
Christians.  The  poor  people  crowded  round  then 
dehverers  to  kiss  then'  hands,  shouting  and  weeping, 
and  pressmg  offerings  of  food  on  them,  much  to 
their  embarrassment. 

As  it  was  getting  late,  and  they  found  that  their 
quarry  had  again  moved  on,  the  hunters  consented 
to  stay  and  eat  with  some  of  the  notables  of  the 
town,  after  which  they  got  under  way  again,  and 
drove  a  short  distance  along  the  Beersheba  road,  to 
a  place  where  they  could  hide  the  cars  for  the  night. 


A  TURKISH  COMMUNIQUE  99 

At  dawn  next  morning  they  resumed  their  journey, 
and  motored  right  through  the  enemy  force,  at  Hebron, 
without  being  detected.  Fortunately  the  Turks  had 
no  post  actually  on  the  road,  and  it  is  probable  that 
a  couple  of  cars  coming  from  behind  their  Unes 
attracted  httle  attention.  The  party  drove  quietly 
on  to  Beersheba,  where  they  found  a  canteen,  and, 
having  loaded  up  with  stores,  returned  in  triumph 
to  Junction  Station. 

In  the  meantime  Corps  Headquarters  had  become 
seriously  alarmed  at  their  long  absence,  and  had 
despatched  another  patrol  of  two  cars  to  try  and 
find  them.  These  cars  got  to  Beit  Jibrin,  where 
they  found,  and  captured,  the  spy  who  was  the 
cause  of  aU  the  trouble,  and  who  had  doubled  back 
on  his  tracks  from  Bethlehem.  Then,  hearing  that 
the  cars  had  started  off  with  the  intention  of  going 
to  Bethlehem,  they  gave  them  up  for  lost,  and 
returned  to  headquarters  to  report. 

Meanwhile  an  aeroplane,  that  had  also  been  sent 
to  look  for  the  first  patrol,  came  upon  the  second 
one  returning  from  Beit  Jibrin,  and  at  once  flew  back 
to  Corps  Headquarters  and  reported  that  the  lost 
sheep  were  found,  and  were  on  their  way  back.  The 
second  patrol  came  in  a  few  hours  afterwards,  and 
reported  that  there  were  no  signs  of  the  missing 
cars,  which  must  have  been  captured  by  the  enemy. 

By  now  the  Corps  was  thoroughly  puzzled,  and 
not  a  Httle  angry.  The  result  was  that,  when  the 
blushing  Ulysses  did  finally  arrive,  instead  of  receiv- 
ing a  '  few  kind  words  of  praise  '  for  carrying  out  an 
exceedingly  daring  reconnaissance,  he  got  an  un- 
merciful dressing  down  for  giving  headquarters  such 
a  fright ! 

On  the  18th  of  November  the  populations  of  the 
enemy  countries  received  their  first  intimation  that 


100        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

all  was  not  well  in  the  East.  Up  till  this  date  the 
Tuikish  papers,  after  chronicling  each  day  the 
many  victories  won  in  the  past  twenty-four  hours 
in  France  and  Russia,  had  added  gravely,  '  On  the 
Palestine  front  there  is  no  change  !  '  At  last  the 
Germans  came  to  the  conclusion  that  this  bluff 
might  possibly  be  carried  too  far,  so  they  caused  to 
be  printed  in  their  own  papers  what  purported  to 
be  an  official  Turkish  communique,  though  none  of 
the  Turkish  papers  received  it  till  after  it  had  been 
published  in  BerUn.  This  precious  document  stated 
that  in  Palestine  '  there  had  been  a  retirement 
according  to  plan.^  It  might  have  been  added  that 
the  plan  included  leaving  12,000  prisoners  and  more 
than  100  guns  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy  ! 


CHAPTER  IX 

MOUNTAIN  WARFARE 

The  advance  was  resumed  on  the  18th  of  November. 
Durmg  the  preceding  two  days  there  had  been  no 
movement  of  importance  on  the  part  of  om*  forces. 
The  22nd  Momited  Brigade  had  located  the  Turkish 
rearguard  at  Am  was  on  the  16th,  and  had  then 
cleared  the  foothill  country  as  far  as  Ramleh,  without 
meeting  any  more  of  the  enemy.  On  the  same  day 
the  8th  Mounted  Brigade  had  entered  Ludd  without 
opposition,  rounding  up  a  few  prisoners  there.  The 
Anzac  Division  remained  in  observation  of  the 
northern  group  of  the  Turkish  forces,  along  the 
Nahr  el  Auja,  and  the  Australian  Mounted  Divi- 
sion moved  close  to  Amwas,  in  preparation  for  the 
advance  up  the  Jerusalem  road. 

In  order  to  avoid  fighting  in  or  near  the  Holy 
Places,  the  Commander-in-Chief  determined  to  try 
and  isolate  pJerusalem  completely.  In  order  to  do 
this  it  was  necessary  to  gain  possession  of  the  only 
road  which  traverses  the  Judsean  Range  from  north 
to  south,  between  Nablus  and  Jerusalem. 

The  Yeomanry  Division  was  accordingly  dii'ected 
to  move  by  the  old  Roman  road  from  Ludd,  through 
Berfilya  and  Beit  Ur  el  Tahta,  to  Bire,  pushing 
through  the  mountains  as  quickly  as  possible.  The 
two  available  infantry  divisions  were  to  advance 
up  the  Jerusalem  road,  preceded  by  two  brigades 
of  the  Australian  Mounted  Division,  to  about  Kuryet 
el  Enab,  whence  they  were  to  strike  north-eastwards 

101 


102        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

towards  the  Nablus  road.  The  5th  Mounted  Brigade, 
moving  up  the  Wadi  Surar,  would  protect  the 
right  flank  of  the  infantry  during  their  advance. 
Finally  the  53rd  Division,  now  about  Hebron,  was 
to  press  on  from  that  place,  and  secure  the  Jericho 
road,  east  of  Jerusalem. 

The  city  would  thus  be  cut  off  from  all  sources  of 
reinforcement  and  supply,  and,  it  was  hoped,  would 
capitulate  without  further  bloodshed. 

On  the  morning  of  the  18th  the  Austrahan 
Mounted  Division  found  a  force  of  the  enemy  en- 
trenched on  the  hill  of  Amwas,  which  stands  square 
in  the  middle  of  the  pass,  just  where  it  debouches 
into  the  Vale  of  Ajalon.  The  artillery  of  the  divi- 
sion, assisted  by  some  of  the  guns  of  the  75th  Divi- 
sion, opened  a  vigorous  fire  on  the  enemy  on  Amwas 
Hill,  to  which  the  Turks  made  but  a  feeble  reply, 
while  the  3rd  A.L.H.  Brigade  endeavoured  to  pass 
through  the  hills  to  the  north,  round  the  enemy's 
right  flank. 

All  day  the  regiments  struggled  on  among  the 
rocks,  scrambhng  up  and  down  the  steep  hills,  and 
making  very  slow  progress.  By  four  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon  they  had  advanced  barely  five  miles, 
and  the  order  was  then  given  to  return,  and  leave 
the  task  to  the  infantry  the  next  day.  The  tlireat 
to  their  flank  had,  however,  been  enough  for  the 
Turks,  who  retired  during  the  night,  abandoning 
four  guns,  the  teams  of  which  had  been  kiUed  by 
the  fire  of  the  R.H.A. 

There  had  been  no  fighting  to  speak  of,  but  the 
action  was  of  great  interest  from  the  associations  of 
the  place.  From  its  position  in  the  mouth  of  the 
valley,  Amwas  is,  and  always  has  been,  the  key  of 
the  pass  to  Jerusalem.  Who  holds  this  hill  holds 
the  city.     From  the  earliest  ages,  all  the  armies  that 


INTO  THE  HILLS  103 

have  sought  to  take  Jerusalem  have  passed  this 
way,  save  only  that  of  Joshua.  Philistine  and 
Hittite,  Babylonian  and  Assyrian,  Egyptian  and 
Roman  and  Greek,  Frankish  Knights  of  the  Cross, 
all  have  passed  this  way,  and  all  have  watered  the 
hiU  of  Amwas  with  their  blood. 

The  Australian  Mounted  Division  handed  over  the 
further  advance  to  the  75th  Division  next  day,  and 
withdrew  to  the  mouth  of  the  Nahr  Sukereir,  to  get 
grazing  for  its  horses.  Two  days  later  the  division 
marched  back  to  El  Mejdel,  in  order  to  relieve  the 
supply  situation.  Our  broad-gauge  railway  had 
now  nearly  reached  this  place,  and  it  was  possible 
to  draw  supplies  direct  from  railhead  with  the  divi- 
sional train. 

The  8th  and  22nd  Brigades  of  the  Yeomanry 
Division  plunged  into  the  hills  on  the  mornmg  of  the 
18th,  and  soon  found  themselves  in  difficulties.  In 
this  mountain  country,  in  which  there  were  no 
wheeled  vehicles,  and  aU  goods  were  carried  on  the 
backs  of  donkeys,  what  was  known  to  the  natives  as 
a  good  road  was  usually  little  more  than  a  goat 
track,  winding  in  and  out  among  the  boulders.  As 
far  as  Beit  Sira  there  was  some  semblance  of  a  road, 
though,  even  on  this  portion  of  it,  the  gunners  were 
at  work  all  day  removing  the  biggest  of  the  boulders 
from  the  path,  before  their  guns  could  pass.  Beyond 
Beit  Sira  the  road  was  nothing  but  the  merest  foot- 
path, leading  straight  down  and  up  the  numerous 
deep  and  narrow  ravines  that  intersect  the  country 
in  aU  directions.  Sometimes  it  required  haK  an 
hour's  reconnaissance  to  move  forward  half  a  mile. 

Under  such  conditions,  the  8th  Brigade  accom- 
pUshed  a  remarkable  feat  in  penetrating  nearly  as 
far  as  Beit  Ur  el  Tahta  by  nightfall.  The  22nd 
Brigade  reached  Shilta  the  same  evening,  but  had  to 


104        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

send  back  all  its  guns  and  transport,  owing  to  the 
difficulties  of  the  country.  The  6th  Brigade,  starting 
on  the  following  morning,  reached  Beit  Ur  el  Tahta 
about  two  in  the  afternoon. 

Cavalry,  as  such,  were  really  unable  to  operate  in 
this  country.  They  were  confined  to  the  roads,  or 
the  tracks  that  did  duty  as  roads,  and,  even  on  these, 
they  could  often  move  only  in  single  file.  Conse- 
quently they  were  exceedingly  vulnerable,  and  their 
inabihty  to  make  effective  use  of  flank  guards,  or 
even  to  deploy  quickly  when  attacked,  increased  the 
dangers  to  which  they  were  exposed.  Horses  were 
little  more  than  an  encumbrance,  reducing  the  number 
of  men  available  for  dismounted  fighting,  largely 
increasing  the  amount  of  transport  required,  and 
adding  but  Httle  to  the  mobility  of  the  troops. 

In  the  present  case,  however,  there  were  several 
reasons  for  attempting  to  push  the  Yeomanry  through 
the  hills.  In  the  first  place  it  was  known  that  the 
enemy  forces  had  been  broken  into  two  widely  sepa- 
rated groups,  and  there  was  thus  little  danger  of  any 
attack  from  the  north,  for  the  next  few  days  at  any  rate. 
Moreover  there  was  a  saving  of  time  in  employing  the 
Yeomanry  instead  of  the  52nd  Division,  as  the  latter 
was  a  day's  march  farther  west  when  the  plan  of 
advance  was  decided  upon.  Finally,  native  reports 
of  the  hill  country  had  led  to  the  belief  that  it  was 
of  a  much  easier  nature  than  proved  to  be  the  case. 

The  winter  rains  broke  with  a  heavy  downpour 
on  the  19th,  and  this  added  to  the  difficulties  of 
the  cavalry,  turning  the  vaUey  bottoms  into  a  sea 
of  viscid,  black  mud,  and  the  beds  of  the  ravines 
into  rushing  torrents.  The  sudden  drop  in  tempera- 
ture which  accompanied  the  rain  was  a  severe  trial 
to  our  troops,  who  were  dressed  in  light,  khaki-drill 
clothing,  and  had  no  blankets,  greatcoats,  or  tents. 


THE  BEITUNIA  RIDGE  105 

During  the  morning  of  the  19th  of  November  the 
8th  and  22nd  Brigades  struggled  thi'ough  the  rain 
and  mud  along  the  Wadi  el  Sunt,  towards  Beitunia 
and  Ain  Arik  respectively,  but  about  mid-daj  they 
encountered  a  force  of  Turks  which  had  come  down 
the  main  road  from  Nablus  to  Bire,  and  then  marched 
westwards  to  oppose  the  Yeomanry  advance.  Un- 
able to  make  headway  against  the  difficulties  of  the 
country  and  the  opposition  of  the  enemy,  who  was  in 
considerable  force,  the  brigades  held  their  position, 
and  awaited  the  arrival  of  the  6th  Brigade. 

On  the  20th  the  division  made  another  effort  to 
get  on,  the  6th  Brigade  moving  to  the  assistance  of 
the  8th.  All  wheels,  including  the  guns,  had  to  be 
sent  back  to  Itamleh,  as  they  were  unable  to  move, 
and  water  for  horses  was  scarce,  despite  the  rain. 
Strong,  organised  resistance  was  now  encountered 
at  Beitunia,  and  prisoners  captured  from  the  enemy 
in  the  course  of  the  fighting  proved  to  be  men  from 
fresh,  well-trained  units  from  Aleppo,  part  of  the 
Yilderim  force.  Little  headway  was  made  during 
the  day.  Rain  came  on  again  in  the  night,  and  no 
supplies  were  able  to  reach  the  division. 

Next  day  the  Yeomanry  made  a  final  attempt  to 
storm  the  high  ridge  of  Beitunia,  which  had  held 
up  their  advance  for  two  days.  The  6th  and  8th 
Brigades  attacked  the  ridge  itself  from  the  west, 
while  the  22nd  Brigade,  operating  farther  north 
towards  Ram  Allah,  tried  to  turn  the  enemy's  right 
flank.  The  attacking  brigades  got  to  within  a  few 
hundred  yards  of  Beitunia  village,  on  the  top  of  the 
ridge,  when  they  encountered  a  fresh  enemy  force, 
that  outnumbered  them  by  three  to  one.  The 
Turks  had  a  number  of  field  and  mountain  guns, 
that  had  come  from  the  north  along  the  metalled 
road,    while    our    troops    had    only    one    mountain 


106        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

battery.  The  Yeomanry  made  several  desperate 
attempts  to  force  their  way  up  the  steep,  rocky  sides 
of  the  ridge,  but  were  unable  to  reach  the  top.  Early 
in  the  afternoon,  more  enemy  reinforcements  ar- 
rived from  the  north,  and  counter-attacked  strongly, 
forcing  our  troops  back  into  the  deep  ravine  on  the 
west  side  of  the  ridge.  The  situation  soon  became 
serious,  and  orders  were  given  for  all  three  brigades 
to  break  off  the  action  and  retire  to  Beit  Ur  el  Foka. 
The  withdrawal  began  after  dark,  and  was  carried 
out  successfully. 

It  is  almost  impossible  to  exaggerate  the  difficulties 
of  the  cavalry.  The  country  was  a  maze  of  high, 
rocky  ridges,  running  in  all  directions,  and  separated 
by  deep  and  narrow  ravines,  the  sides  of  which  were 
almost  precipitous,  and  the  bottoms  muddy  morasses. 
The  ground  was  covered  with  a  mass  of  boulders, 
among  which  grew  sparse  patches  of  coarse  scrub. 
Mounted  work  was,  of  course,  out  of  the  question  in 
such  country,  and  all  the  horses  had  to  be  kept  far 
back  from  the  fighting  line.  A  quarter  of  the  whole 
force  was  thus  occupied  in  holding  the  horses,  and, 
as  the  division  had  already  been  considerably 
weakened  by  the  fighting  of  the  past  three  weeks, 
the  actual  number  of  rifles  available  for  the  advance 
was  hopelessly  inadequate.  It  was  clear  that  the 
attempt  of  the  division  to  reach  the  main  road  had 
been  definitely  checked,  and  the  only  thing  to  be 
done  was  to  try  and  hold  on  to  the  positions  already 
gained  till  reinforcements  could  arrive.  Men  and 
horses  were  short  of  food,  owing  to  the  great  difficulty 
of  getting  up  supplies  in  these  roadless  mountains 
during  the  rains. 

While  the  Yeomanry  Division  was  slowly  fighting 
to  a  standstill  in  the  north,  the  75th  Division, 
advancing  along  the  main  road  towards  Jerusalem, 


CAPTURE  OF  NEBI  SAMWIL  107 

and  the  52nd  Division  on  the  track  north  of  this  road, 
through  Beit  Likia,  pressed  slowly  forward,  against 
strong  resistance  from  the  enemy,  to  Kustul  and  Beit 
Dukka  respectively.  The  latter  division  sent  a 
brigade  to  the  north  on  the  night  of  the  21st,  and 
seized  the  high  hiU  of  Nebi  Samwil,  the  traditional 
tomb  of  the  Prophet  Samuel.  This  hill  dominates 
aU  the  country  to  the  east,  even  to  Jerusalem  itself, 
which  can  be  seen  from  its  summit.  It  was  from  here 
that  the  followers  of  Richard  Coeur  de  Lion  first 
looked  upon  Jerusalem  in  1192,  and  pointed  it  out  to 
the  King.  But  Richard  hid  his  face  in  his  casque, 
lest  he  should  see  it,  and  prayed :  '  Lord  !  let  me 
not  set  mine  eyes  upon  Thy  Holy  City  till  I  have 
rescued  it  from  the  Infidel.' 

Recognising  the  importance  of  this  hill  in  opera- 
tions against  Jerusalem,  the  Turks  next  day  launched 
a  series  of  determined  attacks  against  it,  but  were 
unable  to  retake  it.  Day  after  day,  till  within  a 
few  days  of  the  surrender  of  the  city,  the  enemy 
attacked  the  hill,  and  the  fiercest  and  most  sustained 
fighting  of  the  campaign  took  place  round  it.  But 
in  spite  of  aU  their  efforts,  it  remained  in  our  hands, 
and  became,  at  last,  the  key  that  opened  to  us  the 
gates  of  the  Holy  City. 

The  next  four  days  were  comparatively  quiet  on 
the  mountain  front.  Both  sides  were  too  exhausted 
by  the  arduous  fighting  they  had  undergone,  and 
by  the  cold  and  wet,  to  make  much  effort,  and 
operations  were  confined  to  minor  enterprises. 

During  this  period  the  Yeomanry  Division  held  a 
line,  running  north  and  south,  along  the  heights  Just 
east  of  Beit  Ur  el  Foka,  and  extending  for  about 
three  miles.  On  the  23rd  all  horses  had  to  be  sent 
back  to  Ramleh,  as  it  was  impossible  any  longer 
to  transport  forage  to  them  in  the  mountains.     The 


108        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

following  day  the  division  made  a  demonstration 
along  the  whole  front  to  assist  the  attack  of  the 
infantry  against  El  Jib,  where  the  Turks  held  a 
position  barring  our  advance  to  the  Nablus  road. 
The  enemy,  however,  was  found  in  too  great  force 
for  the  attack  to  be  pushed  home,  and,  after  being 
repulsed  in  three  desperate  assaults,  our  infantry 
had  to  abandon  the  attempt. 

^?t  Meanwhile,  on  the  plain,  the  Anzac  Division  had 
remained  in  observation  of  the  enemy  along  the 
Auja,  and  had  been  engaged  in  active  patrol  work 
and  reconnaissances  for  crossing  places.  Four  possible 
places  had  been  located ;  a  road  bridge  at  Khurbet 
Hadrah,  a  ford  about  two  miles  farther  east,  another 
at  Jerisheh,  and  a  third  at  the  mouth  of  the  river. 
All  these  crossings  were  held  by  parties  of  the  enemy., 
The  average  width  of  the  river  was  thirty-five  yards, 
and  the  depth  five  to  seven  feet.  The  banks  were  in 
most  places  steep,  and  the  bottom  was  very  muddy. 

On  the  24th  the  Division  received  orders  to  estab- 
Hsh  one  or  more  bridgeheads  north  of  the  river, 
with  the  object  of  inducing  the  enemy  to  beheve 
that  we  intended  to  make  a  farther  advance  along 
the  coast.  At  least  one  of  these  bridgeheads  was 
to  be  retained  if  possible. 

General  Chaytor  decided  to  force  the  passage  of 
the  river  by  the  ford  at  the  mouth,  where  the  bottom 
was  sandy,  covering  the  crossing  by  demonstrations 
at  Hadrah  and  at  the  other  two  fords.  The  only 
troops  available  for  the  enterprise  were  the  New 
Zealand  Brigade  and  two  battahons  of  infantry  lent 
by  the  54th  Division,^  a  small  enough  force,  in  view 
of  the  known  strength  of  the  enemy.     The  rest  of 

^  This  division  had  arrived  from  Gaza  on  the  19th,  and  was  holding  a 
line  from  the  right  of  the  Anzac  Division  to  the  village  of  ShUta,  about 
five  miles  west  of  the  left  of  the  Yeomanry  Division. 


Arrival  of  Marshal  von   Fallienhayn  in  Jerusalem  in   1917. 
(From  an  enemy  photograph.) 


9.4.S  inch  Austrian  Howitzer  on  the  Nahlus  road, 
(From  an  enemy  photograph  ) 


FIRST  PASSAGE  OF  THE  AUJA         109 

the  Anzac  Division  was,  however,  required  to  watch 
the  enemy  forces  on  the  right,  about  Mulebbis,  and 
in  the  foothills  farther  east. 

The  operations  commenced  shortly  after  mid-day, 
the  infantry  advancing  with  much  noise  and  display 
on  the  bridge  and  upper  fords,  while  the  New  Zea- 
landers  made  for  the  ford  at  the  mouth  of  the 
river.  They  crossed  here  without  much  difficulty, 
overpowering  the  small  enemy  post  covering  the 
ford,  and  then  galloped  along  the  north  bank  to 
Sheikh  Muannis.  An  armoured  car  battery  was  now 
pushed  up  to  the  south  bank  of  the  Auja  opposite 
Hadi'ah,  and  opened  j&re  on  the  Turks  holding  the 
bridge  there.  At  the  same  time  the  New  Zealanders 
swept  down  on  the  flank  from  Muannis,  and  drove 
off  the  enemy.  A  battalion  of  infantry  now  crossed 
the  river,  and  established  a  bridgehead  on  the  north 
bank,  with  half  the  battahon  at  the  bridge  and  half 
in  the  village  of  Muannis.  During  the  night  two 
squadrons  of  the  New  Zealand  Brigade  were  posted 
on  the  high  ground  north  of  Hadrah  and  Sheikh 
Muannis,  and  a  third  covered  the  ford  at  the  mouth 
of  the  river.  Under  cover  of  the  darkness  the 
divisional  engineers  threw  a  pontoon  bridge  across 
the  river  at  Jerisheh,  which  was  held  by  the  other 
battalion  of  infantry. 

Just  after  dawn  next  morning,  the  cavahy  north 
of  the  river  were  heavily  attacked  by  a  large  force 
of  Turks,  and  driven  back.  The  enemy  followed  up 
resolutely,  and  attacked  the  bridgehead  at  Hadrah. 
The  squadron  at  the  mouth  of  the  river,  reinforced 
by  another  regiment,  was  ordered  to  move  against 
the  Turkish  right,  while  the  remaining  regiment  of 
the  brigade  moved  up  to  the  south  bank  of  the 
Auja  at  Hadrah.  The  Somerset  Battery  R,.H.A., 
the  only  available  artillery,  came  into  action  close 


110        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

by,  the  lire  of  the  guns  being  directed  by  the  battery 
commander  from  a  house  in  Sheikh  Muannis,  across 
the  river. 

At  half-past  eight,  the  bridgehead  at  Hadrah  was 
driven  in,  and  the  infantry  fell  back  across  the 
river.  At  the  same  time  the  two  companies  in 
Sheikh  Muannis,  which  were  moving  to  the  support 
of  the  bridgehead,  were  heavUy  counter-attacked, 
and  driven  back  to  Jerisheh,  where  they  crossed  by 
the  pontoon  bridge,  covered  by  the  two  squadrons 
of  New  Zealanders.  The  led  horses  of  these  squadrons 
were  sent  back  to  the  ford  at  the  mouth  of  the  river 
at  a  gallop.  They  had  to  run  the  gauntlet  of  close- 
range  rifle  and  machine-gun  fire,  but  got  through 
with  comparatively  few  casualties,  and  crossed  the 
river  under  cover  of  the  squadron  there,  which 
then  withdrew  to  the  south  bank. 

The  last  man  to  leave  Sheikh  Muannis  was  the 
battery  commander.  He  remained,  coolly  direct- 
ing the  fire  of  his  guns,  till  the  Turks  were  in  the 
village,  and  then  made  a  run  for  it,  swimming  the 
river  under  fire,  and  got  safely  away.  His  fine  work 
had  greatly  assisted  the  retirement  of  our  small 
force. 

As  soon  as  the  last  of  our  troops  had  been  safely 
withdi'awn,  the  Anzac  Division  fell  back  to  a  posi- 
tion on  the  high  ground  overlooking  the  south  bank 
of  the  Auja,  from  Yahudieh,  through  Nebi  Tari,  to 
the  sea,  and  hurriedly  dug  in,  expecting  an  attack. 
The  Turks,  however,  seemed  to  be  content  with 
having  thrown  our  troops  back  across  the  river, 
and  made  no  further  move. 

The  operations  had  shown  that  the  enemy  was  in 
such  force  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  maintain 
a  bridgehead  on  the  right  bank,  without  holding  the 
whole  of  the  high  ground  two  miles  north  of  the  river. 


THE  AUJA  LINE  111 

As  sufficient  troops  were  not  available  for  this  purpose, 
the  line  south  of  the  Auja,  which  commanded  all 
the  crossing  places,  was  entrenched  and  held  by  the 
Anzac  Division,  supported  by  a  brigade  of  infantry, 
until  the  second,  and  successful,  passage  of  the  river 
four  weeks  later. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE  FALL  OF  JERUSALEM 

On  November  the  27th  the  enemy  renewed  his 
activity  in  the  hills.  The  Yeomanry  Division  was, 
at  the  time,  reduced  to  about  800  rifles  in  the  line, 
and  was  holding  a  position  nearly  four  miles  long 
with  this  imposing  force.  To  add  to  the  sense  of 
security,  there  was  a  gap  of  about  five  miles  between 
the  left  flank  of  the  division  and  the  nearest  post 
of  the  54th  Division  at  Shilta.  Moreover,  the  only 
line  of  communications  was  still  by  the  Beit  Sii'a- 
Berfilya-Ludd  road,  up  which  the  division  had 
marched  on  its  first  advance.  This  road,  along 
which  all  ammunition  and  supplies  had  to  come, 
ran  parallel  to,  and  only  just  behind,  this  gap  in 
the  line,  and  there  seemed  to  be  no  particular  reason 
why  the  enemy  should  not  walk  through  the  gap 
whenever  he  felt  so  inclined,  and  sit  down  on  tlie 
road.  The  '  line '  consisted  of  a  few  posts,  held  by 
as  many  men  as  could  be  spared,  and  a  number  of 
small,  roving  patrols.  One  of  these  posts,  con- 
sisting of  three  officers  and  sixty  men,  was  in  a  small 
stone  building  on  the  top  of  a  ridge  near  Zeitun.  It 
was  attacked  early  in  the  afternoon  of  the  27th  by 
a  battalion  of  Turks  with  machine  guns  and  artillery. 
The  fight  went  on  till  dark,  when  the  Turks  drew 
ofi  to  nurse  their  wounds  and  get  their  breath  for 
another  attack.  The  commander  of  the  garrison, 
now  reduced  to  twenty-eight  all  ranks,  sent  an 
apologetic  signal  message  to  the  6th  Brigade  head- 


YEOMANRY  DIVISION  HARD  PRESSED     113 

quarters  to  ask  if  a  few  men  could  be  spared  to  rein- 
force him.  The  house  which  his  men  had  been 
holding  had  been  destroyed  by  shell  fire,  and  every 
part  of  the  top  of  the  hill  was  reeking  with  the  fumes 
of  high  explosive  shell.  Two  weak  troops  were  sent 
to  the  assistance  of  the  garrison,  though  it  was 
realised  that  the  provision  of  this  reinforcement 
dangerously  weakened  the  rest  of  the  front ! 

Thus  strengthened  and  encouraged,  the  garrison  of 
the  Zeiti!in  post  successfully  held  out  aU  night  against 
repeated  attacks.  The  Turks  were  again  reinforced 
during  the  night,  however,  and  next  morning,  as 
it  was  clear  that  the  little  garrison  could  not  hope 
to  hold  out  any  longer,  it  was  withdrawn.  The 
enemy  immediately  occupied  the  Zeitiin  ridge,  the 
possession  of  which  gave  him  command  over  our 
positions,  and  necessitated  a  withdrawal  of  our 
line.  On  the  left  flank  the  22nd  Brigade  was  thrown 
back,  covering  Beit  Ur  el  Tahta,  and  the  line  then 
ran  from  that  village,  through  Beit  Ur  el  Foka,  to 
about  El  Tire.  The  right  flank  of  the  division  was 
in  exiguous  and  intermittent  touch  with  the  52nd 
Division.     The  left  was  entirely  '  in  the  air.' 

Throughout  the  day  Turkish  troops  were  moving 
to  the  north,  and  making  their  way  westwards 
towards  the  gap  in  our  line  west  of  Beit  Ur  el  Tahta. 
Large  parties  continually  attacked  the  Yeomanry  at 
different  points,  thus  preventing  the  division  from 
making  any  effective  change  of  dispositions  to  meet 
the  threatened  envelopment. 

The  7th  Mounted  Brigade,  which  was  in  Corps 
Reserve  at  Zernuka,  and  the  Australian  Mounted 
Division,  resting  at  El  Mejdel,  were  ordered  up. 
Both  made  forced  marches  during  the  night  of  the 
27th,  and  the  former  arrived  at  Beir  Ur  el  Tahta 
at  five  in  the  morning  of  the  28th,  just  in  time  to 

H 


lU        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

help  the  22nd  Mounted  Brigade  to  repulse  a  heavy 
attack  from  the  north. 

A  brigade  of  the  52nd  Division  was  sent  to  rein- 
force the  exposed  left  flank  of  the  Yeomanry  Divi- 
sion, but,  before  it  arrived  there,  a  small  party  of 
Turks  with  some  machine  guns  walked  quietly 
through  the  gap  between  the  Yeomanry  Division 
and  the  54th,  and  took  up  a  position  overlooking 
the  Berfilya  track.  Later  in  the  morning,  a  section 
of  the  Yeomanry  Divisional  Ammunition  Column, 
coming  up  the  road  from  Ramleh  with  sorely  needed 
ammunition  for  the  division,  was  ambushed  by  the 
Turks  and  utterly  destroyed.  A  motor  cycHst  going 
down  to  Ramleh  reached  the  scene  immediately 
afterwards,  and,  seeing  the  wi^ecked  wagons  and 
the  dead  men  and  horses  on  the  road,  swung  round 
his  machine,  and  raced  back  again  as  fast  as  the 
track  would  allow.  The  Turks  opened  fire  with 
their  machine  guns,  but  failed  to  hit  him,  and  he 
carried  the  news  back  to  the  division  that  the  road 
was  cut.  A  detachment  from  the  brigade  of  the 
52nd,  which  had  been  sent  up  to  cover  this  flank, 
pushed  ahead,  and  drove  off  this  party  of  Turks. 
The  brigade  then  attacked  the  village  of  Suffa, 
which  was  full  of  enemy  troops,  in  order  to  try 
and  relieve  the  pressure  on  the  left  of  the  Yeomanry 
Division,  but  the  Turks  were  found  in  too  great 
strength  to  be  dislodged.  Fortunately,  however, 
they  made  no  further  attempt  to  penetrate  through 
the  gap,  probably  because  they  were  really  unaware 
of  its  existence.  Positions  on  both  sides  were  exceed- 
ingly ill-defined,  owing  to  the  impossibility  of  digging 
trenches  in  the  solid  rock,  of  which  most  of  the  hill 
and  ridge  tops  were  composed.  Very  heavy  fighting 
continued  throughout  the  day,  but  the  enemy,  though 
continually  remforced,  was  unable  to  break  our  line. 


RELIEF  OF  THE  YEOMANRY  115 

The  Australian  Mounted  Division  arrived  at  Khur- 
bet  Deiran  early  in  the  morning,  having  marched 
the  twenty-one  miles  from  Mejdel  in  one  night. 
The  4th  A.L.H.  Brigade  at  once  pushed  on  into  the 
hills,  and  came  into  the  hne  in  the  centre,  in  support 
of  the  6th  Brigade,  about  five  in  the  evening.  The 
hard- worked  52nd  Division  contrived  to  spare  another 
battahon,  which  reinforced  the  7th  Brigade  on  the  left. 

The  attack  on  this  brigade  was  resumed  at  dark, 
but  was  driven  off,  after  prolonged  and  bitter  fight- 
ing. As  an  indication  of  the  close  nature  of  the 
struggle,  it  may  be  mentioned  that  the  headquarters 
of  two  of  the  Yeomanry  brigades  used  up  all  their 
revolver  ammunition  during  the  day. 

Next  day  the  Yeomanry  Division  and  the  7th 
Brigade  were  relieved  in  the  hne  by  two  more  brigades 
of  infantry  from  the  52nd  and  74th  Divisions,  the 
latter  of  which  had  Just  arrived  from  the  south. 
These  reliefs  were  carried  out  in  the  intervals  between 
repeated  fierce  attacks  by  the  enemy,  who  flung 
his  troops  against  our  line  all  day  with  the  greatest 
determination.  Had  it  not  been  possible  to  reheve 
the  Yeomanry  about  this  time,  there  is  no  doubt 
that  they  would  have  been  overwhelmed.  So  de- 
pleted were  their  ranks  that  the  substitution  of  two 
brigades  of  infantry  for  the  four  cavalry  brigades 
meant  six  rifles  in  the  line  for  every  one  that  had 
been  there  before.  This  increase  in  strength,  with 
the  addition  of  the  Australian  Mounted  Division, 
sufficed  to  hold  all  the  enemy  attacks. 

On  the  following  morning  the  3rd  A.L.H.  Brigade 
reheved  the  brigade  of  the  52nd  Division  on  the 
left  of  the  Yeomanry  line,  near  El  Burj,  and  the 
headquarters  and  artillery  of  the  division  moved  up 
in  the  evening. 

On  the  same  day,  the  weary  troops  of  the  Yeo- 


116        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

manry  Division  withdrew  to  Annabeli,  whence  they 
marched  to  the  neighbourhood  of  El  Mughar  to  rest 
and  refit,  within  sight  of  the  hill  which  they  had 
captured  so  brilliantly  a  fortnight  earlier. 

During  their  twelve  days  in  the  hills  they  had 
been  fighting  continually,  day  and  night,  not  only 
against  a  vigorous  and  determined  enemy,  but 
against  the  difficulties  of  a  roadless  mountain  country. 
Exposed  to  constant  rain  and  cold,  without  tents, 
blankets  or  greatcoats,  often  short  of  food,  and 
opposed  at  all  times  by  greatly  superior  forces  of 
the  enemy,  they  had  set  an  example  of  dogged 
courage  and  tenacity  and  of  unquenchable  cheer- 
fulness that  has  never  been  surpassed. 

These  were  the  last  operations  in  the  East  in  which 
they  were  destined  to  take  part.  In  the  following 
spring,  in  response  to  the  urgent  call  from  France 
for  more  troops  to  stem  the  great  German  attack, 
the  division  was  disbanded,  and  reorganised  into  a 
number  of  dismounted  machine  gun  companies. 
After  a  short  course  of  training,  these  companies 
embarked  for  France,  there  to  earn  fresh  laurels  for 
their  old  division  in  the  last  great  act  of  the  war. 

Units  of  the  division  had  fought  in  nearly  every 
action  since  the  beginning  of  the  war  with  Turkey, 
and  all  had  distinguished  themselves.  At  Suvla 
Bay  in  the  Peninsula ;  at  Solium  and  Mersa  Matruh 
in  the  western  desert ;  at  Romani,  Maghdaba  and 
Rafa  during  the  advance  across  Sinai ;  in  the  two 
first  battles  of  Gaza  ;  and  lastly  in  the  great  ride 
over  the  Plains  of  Philistia,  and  the  stubborn  drive 
into  the  Judsean  Mountains.  Everywhere  the  Turks 
had  learned  to  dread  the  long  swords  and  the  steady 
rifles  of  the  Yeomen.  Their  comrades  of  the  Desert 
Mounted  Corps  bade  farewell  to  the  gallant  division 
with  real  sorrow. 


TURKISH  STORM  TROOPS  117 

The  enemy  made  one  more  attempt  to  break  our 
line  at  its  weakest  part  on  the  night  of  the  30th. 
About  two  o'clock  in  the  morning  a  battahon  of 
picked  assault  troops  from  his  19th  Division  was 
launched  against  the  position  held  by  the  3rd  A.L.H. 
Brigade.  The  Turks  were  well  supplied  with  hand 
grenades,  which  were  not  carried  by  our  cavalry  at 
that  time,  and  pushed  their  attack  in  the  most 
resolute  manner.  Our  line  was  forced  back  a  few 
hundred  yards,  and  a  small,  but  important,  hill 
was  lost  for  a  time.  A  squadron  of  the  Gloucester 
Yeomanry  (5th  Mounted  Brigade)  and  a  company 
of  infantry  from  the  52nd  Division  reinforced  the 
3rd  Brigade,  and  the  Turks'  attempt  to  break  through 
was  finally  defeated,  but  only  after  the  complete 
destruction  of  the  enemy  battalion.  Three  times 
during  the  night,  between  2  a.m.  and  6  a.m.,  this 
gallant  regiment  flung  itself  against  our  positions, 
pressing  on  each  time  with  the  most  reckless  courage. 
Each  attack  was  repelled  with  heavy  losses  to  the 
enemy,  and  in  the  end  the  battalion  was  wiped 
out:  172  Turks,  many  of  them  wounded,  remained 
in  our  hands  as  prisoners  ;   the  rest  were  killed. 

The  5th  Mounted  Brigade  rejoined  the  Australian 
Division  from  the  21st  Corps  on  the  1st  of  December, 
being  replaced  by  the  10th  A.L.H.  Regiment,  which 
remained  on  the  right  flank  of  the  60th  Division, 
and  gained  touch  with  the  53rd  Division  on  the 
7th  December. 

The  Australian  Mounted  Division  remained  in  the 
mountains  till  the  end  of  December,  when  it  was 
withdrawn  to  Deir  el  Belah  to  rest  and  refit.  It  had 
little  fighting  during  the  period  spent  in  the  hills, 
but  the  awful  weather  fully  made  up  for  any  lack 
of  activity  on  the  part  of  the  enemy.  During  the 
whole  time  rain  fell  almost  incessantty,  and  the  cold 


118        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

winds  that  swept  up  and  down  the  naiTow  valleys 
were  exceedingly  trying  to  men  who  were  nearly 
always  in  wet  clothes. 

But,  if  the  conditions  in  the  hiUs  were  execrable, 
those  in  the  coastal  plain,  where  all  the  horses  of  the 
division  were  kept,  were  nearly  as  bad.  The  rains 
broke  late  this  year,  and,  when  they  did  come,  fell 
with  unusual  violence.  The  plain  was  soon  trans- 
formed into  a  deep  sea  of  mud.  Large  areas  were 
completely  under  water,  and  the  flood  carried 
immense  quantities  of  soil  into  the  innumerable 
small  wadis  that  intersect  the  plain,  filling  them 
bank  full  with  mud.  When  the  waters  subsided  a 
Httle,  from  time  to  time,  these  wadis  were  indis- 
tinguishable from  the  surrounding  country,  and 
became  very  dangerous  traps.  There  was  more  than 
one  instance  of  men  and  horses  being  engulfed  and 
drowned  in  their  horrible  black  depths. 

Christmas  Eve  and  Chiistmas  Day  1917  are  never 
likely  to  be  forgotten  by  any  of  the  troops  who  were 
in  Palestine  at  the  time.  A  raging  storm  of  rain  fell 
without  intermission  for  thirty-six  hours.  The  rail- 
way was  washed  away  in  several  places,  wagons 
and  lorries  were  unable  to  move,  and  hundreds  of 
camels  in  the  ration  convoys  lay  down  in  the  water 
that  covered  the  land,  and  died.  No  food  or  other 
suppUes  could  be  brought  up  to  the  troops. 

A  small  party  of  Yeomanry,  making  its  way  north- 
wards from  Esdud,  reached  the  bridge  over  the  Nahr 
Sukereir  about  mid-day.  The  men  halted  to  feed 
their  horses  on  the  bridge,  which  consisted  of  a  single 
high  stone  arch,  and  was  comparatively  dry.  After 
half  an  hour's  halt,  they  attempted  to  continue  their 
march,  but  found  the  country  to  the  north  of  the 
river  so  deep  in  water  and  mud  that  they  could  not 
get  on.     They  then  tried  to  go  back  again,  but,  in 


NATIVE  SPIES  119 

the  meantime,  the  waters  had  risen  behind  them,  and 
they  found  themselves  cut  off  on  the  bridge,  which 
was  now  a  smaU  island  in  an  apparently  Hmitless  sea 
of  muddy  water.  Marooned  on  their  tiny  island, 
lashed  by  the  rain  and  the  bitter  wind,  they  spent 
the  night  and  the  next  day  (Christmas  Day)  huddled 
miserably  together,  without  food,  fire,  or  shelter  I 
On  the  26th  the  waters  subsided  a  little,  and  they 
were  able  to  struggle  back  to  their  camp. 

The  horses,  already  thin  and  tired  after  the  heavy 
work  and  short  rations  of  the  past  month,  went  back 
rapidly  in  condition.  They  were  standing  always  up 
to  their  hocks  in  mud,  wet  through  nearly  the  whole 
time,  and,  in  this  treeless  country,  there  was  little  or 
no  shelter  from  the  biting  winds.  Forage,  too,  was 
often  woefully  short,  owing  to  partial  breakdowns  of 
the  supply  columns.  It  is  small  wonder  that,  by  the 
end  of  December,  when  the  division  was  relieved,  they 
resembled  ragged  scarecrows  rather  than  horses. 

Much  trouble  was  caused  in  the  mountains  owing 
to  the  impossibility  of  preventing  information  reach- 
ing the  enemy  from  the  natives.  A  regulation, 
prohibiting  the  inhabitants  of  the  villages  behind 
our  lines  from  leaving  their  houses  during  the  hours 
of  darkness,  was  rigidly  enforced,  and  any  natives 
found  at  large  durmg  the  night  were  liable  to  be  shot 
at  sight.  Nevertheless,  with  a  line  so  lightly  held  as 
was  ours,  and  with  no  regular  system  of  trenches,  it 
was  a  comparatively  easy  matter  for  the  villagers  to 
pass  between  the  lines,  even  in  daylight,  and  much 
information  undoubtedly  reached  the  enemy  in  this 
way. 

One  day  a  small  patrol  of  five  men  of  the  Australian 
Mounted  Division  was  making  its  way  cautiously 
forward  towards  the  enemy  position  in  the  village  of 
Deir   el   Kuddis.     Crossing   the   bottom   of   a   deep 


120        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

valley,  the  patrol  came  upon  a  solitary  Arab  squatting 
among  the  rocks  in  the  bottom  of  the  ravine.  He 
said  he  had  come  from  Deir  el  Kuddis,  and  that  it 
had  been  evacuated  by  the  enemy.  Our  men,  one  of 
whom  spoke  a  little  Arabic,  questioned  him  closely, 
but  he  stuck  to  his  story,  and  also  showed  them  a 
path  which  led  to  the  village.  They  left  him  in  the 
ravine,  and,  taking  the  path  indicated,  moved  warily 
forward  towards  the  village.  Shortly  afterwards, 
they  heard  a  jackal  cry  in  the  valley  behind  them, 
but,  as  the  hills  were  full  of  these  beasts,  whose 
mournful  wailing  was  to  be  heard  all  night  long,  the 
men  paid  no  attention  to  it  at  the  time.  Almost 
immediately  afterwards  a  concealed  enemy  machine 
gun  opened  fire  on  them  unexpectedly,  killing  one 
man  and  wounding  another.  They  withdrew,  carry- 
ing their  dead  comrade  with  them,  and  were  making 
their  way  back  towards  the  ravine  where  they  had 
left  the  native,  when  one  of  them  was  suddenly 
struck  by  the  thought  that  he  had  never  before  heard 
a  jackal  call  in  the  daytime.  After  a  discussion,  they 
came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  jackal  cry  must  have 
been  made  by  the  Arab  they  had  seen,  as  a  signal 
to  the  enemy.  One  of  them  accordingly  went  to 
look  for  the  man,  and  found  him  in  the  same  place. 
As  soon  as  he  saw  the  soldier,  the  native  jumped  up 
with  a  cry,  and  attempted  to  run  away,  but  was 
promptly  shot  dead  by  the  Australian. 

The  body  of  this  man  lay  unburied  in  the  bottom  of 
the  ravine  all  the  time  we  were  there,  as  none  of  the 
villagers  would  touch  it.  They  had  taken  and  buried 
the  bodies  of  several  other  natives  who  had  been 
shot  when  found  away  from  their  villages  after 
dark,  and,  as  they  would  not  give  the  same  treat- 
ment to  this  man,  it  is  possible  that  he  was  a  Turk 
in  disguise. 


One  of  our  Horse  Artillery  batteries  in  action  in  the  mountains  west  of  Jerusaler 
Note  the  bivouac  shelters  pitched  among  the  guns  as  camouflage. 


Reading  the  British   Proclamation  in  Jerusalem,   llth  November.   1917. 
General  Allenby  with  Allied  Representatives  in  the  centre. 


SURRENDER  OF  JERUSALEM  121 

In  the  latter  half  of  November  the  four  infantry 
divisions  that  had  remained  about  Gaza  and  Karm 
during  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy  commenced  to  move 
up  to  the  front,  and,  by  the  end  of  the  month,  were 
all  in  the  line  from  the  sea  to  Nebi  Samwil.  At  the 
beginning  of  December  the  53rd  Division  began  its 
advance  up  the  Hebron  road,  and,  on  the  early  morn- 
ing of  the  9th,  was  in  touch  with  the  60th  Division, 
and  had  one  brigade  fighting  its  way  up  the  Mount  of 
Olives.  The  latter  division,  pivoting  on  the  hill  of 
Nebi  Samwil,  had  made  a  wonderful  fighting  wheel 
to  the  left  during  the  past  three  days,  and  had  now 
closed  in  on  Jerusalem  on  the  west  and  south. 

At  eight  o'clock  in  the  morning  the  keys  of  the 
Holy  City,  borne  by  the  Mayor  under  a  flag  of  truce, 
were  handed  to  an  officer  of  the  60th  Division. 

After  six  hundred  years  the  Christian  had  returned. 

General  Allenby  made  his  official  entry  into  Jeru- 
salem on  the  11th,  accompanied  by  representatives 
of  the  Allied  Nations.  This  event,  and  the  magnifi- 
cent infantry  fighting  that  led  up  to  it,  have  been 
too  well  chronicled  elsewhere  to  need  recapitulation 
in  this  narrative,  which  is  concerned  only  with  the 
doings  of  the  cavahy. 

One  may  be  permitted,  however,  to  emphasise 
once  more  the  impressive  contrast  between  the  entry 
of  the  Conqueror  of  Jerusalem  and  that  of  the  crazy 
mountebank  who  had  visited  it  twenty  years  before. 
The  German  Emperor  entered  on  horseback,  sur- 
rounded by  an  immense  retinue,  in  uniforms  blaz- 
ing with  medals  and  decorations.  General  Allenby 
entered  on  foot  and  almost  alone,  dressed  in  worn, 
service  khaki,  and  carrying  a  cane.  But  he  went 
through  the  Jafia  Gate,  which,  in  accordance  with 
ancient  tradition,  is  opened  only  to  a  conqueror  of 


122        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

the  Holy  City  ;  the  Kaiser  entered  through  a  breach 
in  the  wall. 

The  AustraUan  Mounted  Division  was  relieved  by 
the  10th  Infantry  Division  on  the  1st  of  January,  and 
the  3rd  and  5th  Brigades  withdrew  from  the  hills 
that  day,  and  marched  south  for  Deir  el  Belah,  fol- 
lowed a  week  later  by  the  4th  Brigade.  The  three 
days'  march  was  carried  out  in  continual,  heavy  rain, 
changing  to  hail  and  sleet  every  now  and  then,  and 
through  a  country  that  was  nearly  all  under  water. 
Once  among  the  clean,  dry  sandhills  of  Deir  el  Belah, 
however,  all  troubles  were  over,  and  soon  afterwards 
the  weather  improved,  and  clothes  could  be  dried 
for  the  first  time  for  seven  weeks.  The  Yeomanry 
Division  had  moved  into  the  same  area  shortly 
before  the  Australian  Division  arrived. 

The  Anzac  Division  remained  on  the  Auja  till 
the  7th  of  December,  when  it  withdrew  to  rest  at 
Richon-le-Zion.  Cavalry  operations  were  much  ham- 
pered by  the  continual  rain  and  deep  mud,  but  the 
division  carried  out  a  series  of  daring  and  successful 
raids  on  the  enemy,  which  kept  him  constantly  on 
the  jump,  and  paved  the  way  for  the  final  crossing 
of  the  Auja  on  the  21st  and  22nd  of  December.  Two 
brigades  took  part  in  this  operation,  in  support  of  the 
52nd  and  54th  Divisions,  and,  as  soon  as  our  line  was 
consolidated  on  the  north  bank,  the  whole  division  was 
withdrawn,  and  went  into  camp  near  the  coast  to  rest. 

Between  the  31st  of  October  and  the  end  of 
December  the  Desert  Mounted  Corps  had  advanced 
some  eighty  miles,  ^  fought  nine  general  engagements, 
and  captured  about  9500  prisoners  and  80  guns. 

^  The  actual  distances  covered  by  the  three  divisions  in  the  period 
were : — Anzac  Mounted  Division,  one  hundred  and  seventy  miles ;  Yeo- 
manry Division,  one  himdred  and  ninety  miles;  Australian  Mounted 
Division,  two  hundred  and  thirty  miles. 


-r"^--*«,--^.»-»-  ^  - 


.V^'^^'*-^^3fs>:=->W5r:;  --^:r:~::prr: 


35' 


0'  \ 


31'0' 


wholly 
Other  tracks 
Railways 


Under  SOOfeet 

Between  500  <t  WOO 
..      WOO  A  1500 
1500  & 

,,      2000  &. 
..     2500  d 

Aboue  3000 


CHAPTER  XI 

DOWN  TO  THE  JORDAN 

The  advance  across  the  Nalir  el  Auja  at  the  end  of 
December  1917,  and  the  infantry  operations  north 
of  Jerusalem  about  the  same  time,  established  our 
Hne  sufficiently  far  north  of  Jaffa  and  Jerusalem  to 
secure  these  two  places  from  all  but  long-range  gun 
fire  from  the  enemy.  The  line  was  then  consoU- 
dated,  and  a  period  of  trench  warfare  set  in,  which, 
with  the  exception  of  several  minor  operations,  was 
to  last  till  the  autumn  of  the  following  year. 

For  the  first  part  of  this  period,  the  Desert  Mounted 
Corps  remained  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Gaza  to 
rest  and  train. 

The  horses  were  in  a  sorry  state,  and  the  remount 
depots  were  empty,  save  for  a  few  animals  which 
had  been  returned  from  veterinary  hospitals,  after 
treatment  for  wounds  or  other  injuries.  Owing  to 
the  shortage  of  shipping,  there  was  no  prospect  of 
any  fresh  remounts  arriving  in  the  country  for  an 
indefinite  time.  Consequently  all  the  horses  of  the 
Corps  had  to  be  nursed  back  to  condition  before 
the  cavalry  could  take  part  in  any  further  serious 
work. 

The  divisions  were  all  camped  on  deep  sand, 
among  the  coastal  dunes — the  Yeomanry  and  the 
Austrahan  Mounted  Divisions  round  Gaza,  the  Anzac 
Division  farther  north.  The  heaviest  rain  drained 
through  this  sand  immediately,  and  half  an  hour 
of  sunshine  was  enough  to  dry  the  surface.     For  the 

128 


124        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

first  time  in  many  weeks  the  horses  had  clean,  dry 
standings,  and  the  effect  of  this  was  soon  evident 
in  the  improved  condition  of  their  legs  and  coats. 
At  the  end  of  the  first  fortnight,  which  was  a  period 
of  rest  for  men  as  well  as  horses,  there  was  an  all 
round  improvement.  Forage  was  plentiful  again, 
and  of  fair  quality,  though  every  one  would  have 
given  a  great  deal  for  a  few  tons  of  good  oats,  in 
place  of  the  eternal  barley. 

After  the  first  fortnight,  training  recommenced, 
gradually  at  first,  so  as  not  to  check  the  recovery  of 
the  horses.  By  the  end  of  the  month,  however, 
brigade  and  divisional  schemes  were  in  full  swing. 

The  training  was  varied  by  salvage  work  on  the 
old  trenches  at  Gaza,  from  which  a  great  quantity 
of  ammunition  and  stores  of  every  description  was 
collected.  Most  of  the  men  had  an  opportunity  of 
visiting  Gaza,  and  many  were  the  '  cm-ios '  collected 
among  the  ruins,  to  be  taken  home  to  sweethearts 
and  wives  on  that  glorious  '  leave,'  that  was  always 
coming,  but  never  quite  came. 

At  a  little  distance  the  city  appeared  to  be  intact, 
except  for  two  minarets,  accidentally  broken  by 
shell  fire,  the  jagged  stumps  of  which  stood  up  con- 
spicuously. This  curious,  undamaged  appearance  was 
due  to  the  great  quantity  of  trees  which  grew  all 
over  the  town,  and  which  had  now  put  on  their 
spring  coat  of  green.  The  kindly  leaves  hid  the 
scarred  and  broken  skeletons  of  the  trees,  and  veiled 
the  shapeless  ruins  of  the  houses. 

Inside,  however,  was  a  scene  of  utter  desolation. 
Not  a  living  thing  was  to  be  seen  in  this  city,  which 
once  held  40,000  souls,  save  an  occasional,  hungry 
pariah  dog,  engaged  in  his  horrible  work  among  the 
graves  of  the  dead. 

The  great  mosque,  which  had  once  been  a  noble, 


Ruins  of  the  llreat  Mosque  at  Gaza,  shuwini;  one  of  tlic  iirches 
of  the  old  Crusader  Church. 


THE  RUINS  OF  GAZA  125 

Christian  church,  was  almost  entirely  destroyed,  but 
not  by  our  guns.  The  Turks  had  used  it  as  an 
ammunition  depot,  with  that  callous  disregard  for 
the  Holy  Places  of  their  own  religion  which  was 
always  so  characteristic  of  them,  and,  when  the  city 
was  abandoned,  they  blew  up  the  great  store  of  shells 
there,  and  laid  the  mosque  in  ruins.  Some  of  the 
lower  arches  remained,  and  one  beautiful  Norman 
gateway,  but  all  the  rest  was  a  heap  of  tumbled 
masonry. 

The  German  headquarters  was  in  the  north-west 
corner  of  the  town,  close  to  the  remains  of  a  graceful 
little  Greek  church.  The  house  in  which  the  officers 
lived  was  screened  from  view  on  all  sides,  and,  as  it 
was  far  removed  from  any  of  the  enemy  defences, 
it  had  escaped  serious  damage.  But  it  was  satis- 
factory to  note  that  both  the  tennis  courts,  which 
had  been  made  with  such  evident  pains,  had  been 
visited  by  eight-inch  shells. 

The  rest  of  the  city  was  a  mass  of  ruins,  stark  and 
silent.  And  so  it  is  likely  to  remain  for  all  time, 
an  awful  witness  to  the  devastation  of  war.  Its  in- 
habitants have  neither  the  energy  of  the  people  of 
Europe,  nor  the  incentive  of  a  bitter  climate,  and 
they  are  never  likely  to  rebuild  it. 

By  the  end  of  January  our  front  had  been  thor- 
oughly consohdated,  and  the  infantry  had  recovered 
from  the  hard  fighting  and  cruel  weather  of  December. 
The  Commander-in-Chief  now  determined  to  extend 
his  line  to  the  Jordan,  in  order  to  secure  his  right 
flank. 

There  were  several  other  advantages  to  be  gained 
by  securing  possession  of  one  or  two  crossings  over 
the  river.  The  enemy  was  at  this  time  obtaining 
large  supphes  of  grain  from  the  districts  round  Kerak, 
in   the   land   of   Moab,   on   the   eastern   and   south- 


126        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

eastern  shores  of  the  Dead  Sea.  This  grain  was 
carried  across  the  sea,  in  barges  towed  by  motor 
boats,  to  the  north  end,  whence  it  was  transported 
to  the  Turkish  front  by  the  good  metalled  road 
from  Jericho  to  Jerusalem.  With  Jericho  and  the 
crossings  of  the  Jordan  immediately  north  of  the 
Dead  Sea  in  our  hands,  we  should  have  control  of 
the  sea,  and  all  this  traffic  would  be  stopped.  The 
grain  would  then  have  to  be  brought  up  to  Amman, 
thirty  miles  east  of  the  Jordan,  by  the  Hedjaz  Rail- 
way, and  transported  from  there  over  some  fifty 
miles  of  bad  mountain  track.  In  the  extremely 
disorganised  state  of  the  Turkish  transport,  this 
would  be  likely  to  cause  the  enemy  much  inconveni- 
ence and  delay.  The  control  of  the  river  crossings 
at  Jericho  would  also  facilitate  raiding  operations 
across  the  Jordan,  directed  against  the  enemy's  line 
of  communications  with  the  Hedjaz. 

The  operations  necessary  to  secure  these  objects 
were  limited  to  the  establishment  of  one  or  more 
bridgeheads  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Jordan,  and  to 
an  advance  of  our  line  northwards  as  far  as  the 
Wadi  el  Auja,  a  small,  perennial  stream  that  flows 
into  the  Jordan  some  nine  miles  north  of  the  point 
where  the  latter  enters  the  Dead  Sea. 

The  watershed  between  the  Mediterranean  and  the 
deep  cleft  of  the  Jordan  Valley  runs  roughly  north 
and  south,  through  the  Mount  of  Olives.  Some 
description  of  the  difficulties  of  the  country  on  the 
west  of  the  watershed  has  already  been  given.  On  the 
east  side  they  are  very  much  greater.  The  streams 
that  run  down  from  the  mountains  to  the  plain 
have  cut  gorges  through  the  rock,  often  many  hun- 
dreds of  feet  deep,  which  divide  the  eastern  portion 
of  the  range  into  a  series  of  parallel  ridges  running 
east  and  west.     Innumerable  tributaries  of  the  main 


INTO  THE  JORDAN  VALLEY  127 

watercourses  run  in  all  directions,  and  split  these 
ridges  again  into  isolated  masses  of  rocks.  It  is 
only  possible  to  cross  the  main  wadis  in  a  few  places, 
so  that  movement  north  and  south  on  the  part  of 
any  considerable  body  of  troops  is  out  of  the  question. 

Going  down  the  road  from  Jerusalem  to  Jericho, 
the  general  fall  of  the  ground  is  gradual  to  Talaat  el 
Dumm,  the  Hill  of  Blood,  above  the  Good  Samaritan 
Inn.  From  here  the  road  pitches  down,  in  a  series 
of  zigzags  and  hairpin  turns,  to  the  valley  floor 
nearly  3000  feet  below.  Farther  north,  at  Jebel 
Kuruntul,  the  traditional  Mount  of  Temptation,  the 
mountains  end  abruptly  in  a  single  stupendous  cliff, 
over  1000  feet  high. 

Over  this  country  the  60th  Division  and  the  Anzac 
Mounted  Division,  which  had  concentrated  at  Beth- 
lehem on  the  18th  of  February,  were  directed  to 
move  on  Jericho. 

The  advance  began  on  the  19th  of  February,  in 
heavy  rain.  All  day  the  infantry  struggled  forward, 
against  strong  opposition  from  the  enemy,  and  by 
nightfall  had  advanced  nearly  three  miles,  to  a  posi- 
tion about  a  mile  west  of  Talaat  el  Dumm. 

Meanwhile  the  cavalry,  moving  to  the  south  of  the 
60th  Division,  through  the  Wilderness  of  Jeshimon, 
had  reached  El  Muntar,  about  seven  miles  from  the 
Dead  Sea,  and  some  four  miles  south  of  the  Jericho 
road. 

Next  day  the  infantry  stormed  Talaat  el  Dumm 
shortly  after  dawn,  and  advanced  against  the  high 
ridge  of  Jebel  Ekteif,  about  one  mile  farther  south, 
while  the  cavalry  moved  on  Jebel  Kalimun  and  Tubk 
el  Kuneitra.  Both  these  places  were  strongly  held, 
and  the  only  possible  lines  of  approach  were  under 
accurate  shell  and  machine-gun  fire  from  the  hill  of 
Nebi  Musa,  a  little  to  the  north.     The  cavahy  had 


128        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

to  advance  in  single  file  along  a  iaw  goat  paths, 
and  they  suffered  considerably  from  the  enemy  fire, 
without  being  able  to  make  any  adequate  reply. 
Shortly  after  mid-day,  however,  two  regiments  of  the 
New  Zealand  Mounted  Brigade,  having  left  their 
horses  under  cover  in  a  ravine,  made  an  assault  on 
foot  against  the  two  hills,  and  captured  both  of  them 
after  a  sharp  struggle. 

Meanwhile  the  1st  A.L.H.  Brigade  found  a  way 
down,  along  the  gorge  of  the  Wadi  Kumran,  and 
debouched  on  to  the  plain,  on  the  shores  of  the 
Dead  Sea,  at  dusk. 

At  dawn  on  the  21st,  the  New  Zealand  Brigade, 
with  a  battalion  from  the  60th  Division,  occupied 
Nebi  Musa  without  opposition,  the  enemy  having 
retired  along  his  whole  line  during  the  night.  The 
1st  A.L.H.  Brigade  pushed  rapidly  over  the  plain, 
and  entered  Jericho,  which  was  found  deserted,  soon 
after  eight  in  the  morning.  From  here  patrols  were 
sent  out  to  the  east  and  north,  and  located  the  enemy 
holding  a  bridgehead  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Jordan 
at  Ghoraniyeh,  east  of  Jericho,  and  in  position  along 
the  Wadi  el  Auja  to  the  north. 

A  squadron  of  the  New  Zealand  Brigade,  patrolling 
east  from  Nebi  Musa,  reached  Rujm  el  Bahr,  at  the 
north-west  corner  of  the  Dead  Sea,  which  was  the 
northern  base  for  the  fleet  of  German  motor  boats 
engaged  in  towing  grain  barges  across  the  sea. 
Shortly  afterwards  some  of  our  troops  found  one 
of  these  boats  alongside  the  jetty,  and  succeeded 
in  capturing  it  intact.  Mounting  a  machine  gun  in 
the  bows,  they  at  once  set  out  across  the  sea,  and, 
soon  afterwards,  encountered  another  German  boat. 
After  an  exciting  chase  they  forced  the  enemy  to 
strike  his  colours,  and,  putting  a  '  prize  crew  '  aboard, 
continued    their    voyage.     In    the    course    of    their 


INTO  THE  VALLEY  AGAIN  129 

cruise  they  sank  another  boat,  and  drove  a  fourth 
aground  !  Later  on,  these  captured  boats  were  taken 
over  by  a  detachment  of  the  Royal  Navy,  and  did 
good  service  patrolHng  the  sea,  and  keeping  open 
the  communications  between  our  forces  and  the 
Sherifian  troops.  They  achieved  the  distinction  of 
being  the  first  British  war  vessels  to  be  navigated 
1300  feet  below  the  level  of  the  ocean. 

As  the  enemy  bridgehead  at  Ghoraniyeh  was 
found  to  be  strongly  held,  and  its  capture  would 
have  entailed  heavy  losses,  it  was  decided  not  to 
attempt  an  attack.  Our  infantry  withdrew  to  a 
position  running  north  and  south  astride  the  Jericho 
road,  at  Talaat  el  Dumm,  and  the  Anzac  Mounted 
Division  returned  to  Bethlehem,  leaving  one  regi- 
ment to  patrol  the  valley. 

Some  idea  of  the  difficulties  of  the  country  during 
these  operations  may  be  gathered  by  the  fact  tPiat 
a  battery  of  field  artillery,  unhampered  by  enemy 
action,  took  thirty-six  hours  to  advance  eight  miles. 

During  the  first  half  of  March  the  60th  Division 
again  descended  into  the  valley,  and,  after  some  very 
stiff  fighting,  succeeded  in  establishing  our  fine  north 
of  the  Wadi  el  Auja,  from  the  Jordan  to  the  moun- 
tains. Thereupon  the  Turks  withdrew  their  bridge- 
head at  Ghoraniyeh,  and  retired  to  the  east  bank  of 
the  river. 

This  operation  cleared  the  lower  Jordan  Valley  of 
the  enemy,  and  established  a  base  broad  enough  to 
enable  a  raid  to  be  undertaken  against  the  Hedjaz 
Railway,  the  Turkish  line  of  communications  for  the 
force  operating  against  the  Arabs  round  Maan. 

The  Arab  forces,  which  were  under  the  control  of 
General  Allenby,  were  based  on  Akaba,  at  the  north 
end  of  the  Red  Sea.  They  were  supplied  by  us  with 
arms,  ammimition  and  light  guns,  and  largely  led 

I 


130        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

by  British  officers,  chief  among  whom  were  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonels Lawrence  and  Joyce. 

Though  intolerant  of  anything  in  the  nature  of 
discipline,  and  constantly  at  war  among  themselves, 
many  of  the  Arab  tribes  of  the  Hedjaz  had  joined  the 
standard  of  the  old  Sherif  Hussein,  moved  thereto  by 
their  hatred  of  the  Turks.  Under  Hussein's  energetic 
son  Feisal,  they  had  carried  on  a  successful  guerilla 
warfare  against  the  scattered  Turkish  garrisons  since 
June  1916.  Their  operations  were  directed  especially 
against  the  Hedjaz  Railway.  Under  the  leadership 
of  the  daring  and  beloved  Lawrence,  train  wrecking 
was  elevated  among  the  Arabs  to  the  status  of  a 
national  sport.  Many  of  the  wrecked  trains  yielded 
rich  booty  to  the  Sherif,  and  on  one  occasion  the 
haul  included  £20,000  in  Turkish  gold.  Eighteen 
months  of  this  warfare  had  given  the  Arabs  valuable 
experience,  and  numerous  minor  successes  had  in- 
duced many  tribes  who  were  wavering  to  throw  in 
their  lot  with  the  Sherif. 

By  the  end  of  1917  the  Emir  Feisal' s  forces  were 
strong  enough  to  undertake  more  serious  operations. 
In  January  1918  he  seized  the  high  ground  a  few  miles 
south  of  Maan,  while  another  force,  under  a  local 
leader,  destroyed  a  large  part  of  the  Turkish  light 
railway  which  had  been  built  from  Kalaat  Aneiza 
on  the  Hedjaz  Hne  to  the  Hish  Forest,  and  was  used 
to  transport  wood  as  fuel  for  locomotives.  Shortly 
afterwards  another  force  raided  a  station  on  the 
Hedjaz  Une,  some  thirty  miles  north  of  Maan,  destroy- 
ing the  station  buildings  and  some  engines  and  roUing 
stock.  In  this  raid  the  Arabs  took  over  200  prisoners, 
and  killed  a  large  number  of  Turks.  Farther  north, 
Arabs  of  the  Huweitat  tribe  captured  Tafile,  which 
is  only  fifteen  miles  south-east  of  the  south  end  of 
the  Dead  Sea.     A  considerable  Turkish  force,  with 


AN  ARAB  SUCCESS  131 

guns  and  machine  guns,  which  was  sent,  towards 
the  end  of  January,  to  recapture  this  place,  was 
decisively  beaten  by  the  Arabs,  with  a  loss  of  500 
killed  and  250  prisoners.  In  March  a  larger  body 
of  Turkish  troops,  reinforced  by  a  German  battalion, 
reoccupied  Tafile,  the  Arabs  withdrawing  to  the 
south.  ^ 

*  See  Appendix  ii.  for  note  on  the  Arab  Movement. 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE  FIRST  TRANS-JORDAN  RAID 

In  view  of  the  successes  obtained  by  the  Arabs, 
General  AUenby  now  judged  the  time  to  be  ripe  for  a 
raid  by  our  troops  on  the  Hedjaz  Railway  at  Amman, 
which  he  had  long  contemplated.  The  immediate 
effect  of  such  a  raid  would  be  to  compel  the  enemy 
to  withdraw  the  force  which  had  recently  occupied 
Tafile.  It  might,  in  addition,  force  him  to  call  on 
the  Turkish  troops  at  Maan  for  aid,  thus  weakening 
the  garrison  there,  and  giving  the  Arabs  an  oppor- 
tunity to  attack  the  place  with  some  prospects  of 
success.  A  further  result  to  be  expected  from  the 
raid  would  be  to  induce  the  enemy  to  keep  a  large 
part  of  his  army  east  of  the  Jordan,  thus  correspond- 
ingly weakening  his  forces  in  the  Judsean  hills. 
The  deep  and  difficult  vaUey  of  the  Jordan,  and  the 
river  itself,  would,  moreover,  form  a  dangerous  ob- 
stacle to  communication  between  the  two  portions  of 
his  army,  a  fact  which  might  be  expected  to  assist 
us  materially  in  our  next  general  advance. 

Amman  was  the  one  really  vulnerable  point  on 
the  Hedjaz  Railway.  The  Arabs  had  frequently 
destroyed  portions  of  the  line  farther  south,  but 
such  raids  only  resulted  in  interrupting  the  traffic 
for  a  few  days  at  a  time.  Material  for  repair  was 
available  at  every  station,  and  long  practice  had 
brought  the  Turkish  engineers  to  a  high  state  of 
efficiency  in  restoring  these  temporarily  damaged 
places.     At  Amman,  however,  the  line  ran  over  a 

1S2 


THE  TRANS-JORDAN  COUNTRY        133 

viaduct,  and  through  a  considerable  tunnel.  If  these 
two  works  could  be  thoroughly  destroyed,  the  result- 
ing interruption  of  traffic  might  well  be  so  pro- 
longed as  to  compel  the  retirement  of  the  whole  of 
the  enemy  force  in  the  Maan  area.  Such  a  prospect 
justified  the  acceptance  of  greater  risks  than  General 
Allenby  proposed  to  incur. 

The  Turks  were  well  aware  that  Amman  was  the 
Achilles'  heel  of  the  Hedjaz  Expeditionary  Force, 
and  had  provided  for  its  protection  as  many  troops 
as  they  could  spare.  The  town  itself,  which  lay  im- 
mediately to  the  west  of,  and  covering,  the  tunnel 
and  viaduct,  had  been  garrisoned  and  prepared  for 
defence.  An  advanced  defensive  position  had  been 
estabHshed  astride  the  Jericho-El  Salt  road,  ex- 
tending from  El  Hand  to  Shunet  Nimrin,  and  a 
third  position  was  in  course  of  preparation  on  the 
east  bank  of  the  Jordan,  opposite  El  Ghoraniyeh. 

The  Anzac  Mounted  Division,  with  the  Camel 
Corps  Brigade  attached,  and  the  60th  Division  were 
detailed  to  carry  out  the  raid,  which  had  as  its  sole 
object  the  destruction  of  the  viaduct  and  tunnel. 
The  town  of  Amman,  which  is  the  principal  Circassian 
settlement  in  Sjn^ia,  lies  some  thirty  miles  east- 
north-east  of  the  north  end  of  the  Dead  Sea,  and  is 
connected  with  Jericho  by  an  indifferent  metalled 
road,  passing  through  El  Salt,  which  the  Turks  had 
constructed  during  the  war.  From  the  Jordan  at 
El  Ghoraniyeh,  1200  feet  below  the  level  of  the  sea, 
to  Naaur,  sixteen  miles  farther  east,  at  the  edge  of 
the  plateau  on  which  Amman  lies,  the  ground  rises 
4300  feet.  Nearly  the  whole  of  this  rise  occurs  in 
the  last  ten  miles  before  Naaur  is  reached,  and  the 
intervening  country  is  a  maze  of  rocky  hills,  inter- 
sected by  deep  ravines,  and  traversed  only  by  a 
few  narrow  footpaths. 


134        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

In  the  course  of  the  ages  the  Jordan  has  cut  a 
deep  trough  through  the  valley,  varying  in  width 
from  a  few  hundred  yards  to  a  mile  or  more,  and 
lying  about  100  feet  below  the  general  level  of  the 
surrounding  country.  The  bottom  of  this  trough  is 
a  flat  plain  covered  with  a  dense  jungle  of  tamarisk, 
and  the  banks  are,  in  most  places,  perpendicular. 
The  present  channel  winds  about  down  the  trough, 
and  is  only  about  forty  yards  wide  in  normal  weather, 
but  the  river  is  deep  and  very  swift,  and  hable  to  a 
rapid  rise  after  heavy  rain. 

The  main  watercourses  descend  from  the  hills  on 
the  east  in  a  series  of  deep  gorges,  which  traverse 
the  narrow  strip  of  flat  country  between  the  foot- 
hills and  the  old  channel,  and  form  a  succession  of 
barriers  to  movement  along  this  strip,  north  and 
south.  Many  of  these  gorges  can  only  be  crossed 
by  a  single  track,  which  runs  from  near  Beisan, 
fifteen  miles  south  of  Lake  Tiberias,  to  El  Ghor- 
aniyeh. 

The  plan  was  for  the  60th  Division  to  force  the 
passage  of  the  river,  drive  the  enemy  from  his  posi- 
tion at  Shunet  Nimrin,  and  then  advance  up  to 
Jericho-Amman  road,  as  far  as  El  Salt,  which  was 
to  be  seized  and  held.  Meanwhile  the  rest  of  the 
cavalry  and  the  Camel  Brigade  were  to  move  direct 
on  Amman  by  the  tracks  through  Naaur  and  Ain  el 
Sir.  After  blowing  up  the  viaduct  and  tunnel  at 
Amman,  and  destroying  as  much  of  the  railway  hne 
as  they  could,  they  were  to  withdraw  on  the  60tli 
Division,  and  the  whole  force  would  then  recross 
the  Jordan,  leaving  permanent  bridgeheads  on  the 
east  bank. 

The  operation  was  thus  purely  a  raid.  Our 
cavalry  would  again  be  engaged  in  a  country  that 
was  at  least  as  unsuited  for  mounted  work  as  was 


BRIDGING  THE  JORDAN  135 

the  Judsean  Range,  of  which  we  had  already  had 
such  unfavourable  experience.  The  only  informa- 
tion available  about  the  Amman  hills,  other  than 
that  of  natives,  which  was  always  quite  unreliable, 
was  contained  in  a  memorandum  written  for  the 
Commander-in-Chief  by  two  mission  fathers  who  had 
spent  many  years  in  the  country  east  of  the  Jordan 
and  Dead  Sea.  This  document  was  an  admirable 
ethnographical  and  geographical  treatise,  but,  from 
the  military  point  of  view,  which  requires  the  utmost 
detail  of  description  as  regards  the  terrain,  it  left 
much  to  be  desired.  It  appeared,  however,  that 
cavahy  might  be  expected  to  be  able  to  move  with 
some  speed  up  the  Naaur-Ain  el  Sir  track  to  Amman, 
in  fine  weather,  and  thus  carry  out  the  necessary 
demolition  on  the  railway,  and  make  good  their 
retreat,  before  the  enemy  should  have  time  to  rein- 
force his  troops  east  of  the  Jordan. 

During  the  night  of  the  21st  of  March  a  party  of 
swimmers  of  the  60th  Division  succeeded,  after  many 
fruitless  attempts,  in  getting  a  line  across  the  Jordan 
at  Makhadet  Hajlah,  some  six  miles  south  of  El 
Ghoraniyeh,  and  bridge  building  began  at  once.  Our 
infantry  and  engineers  suffered  severely  from  the 
enemy's  fire,  but  the  bridge  was  completed  by  eight 
in  the  morning,  and  by  mid-day  a  brigade  of  infantry 
was  over  the  river,  and  forcing  its  way  through  the 
dense  tamarisk  jungle  on  the  east  side. 

Meanwhile,  similar  attempts  to  cross  at  El  Ghor- 
aniyeh during  the  night  had  been  frustrated  by  the 
strength  of  the  current.  The  efforts  had  to  be 
abandoned  during  the  daytime,  owing  to  the  activity 
of  the  enemy,  but  were  renewed  during  the  night  of 
the  22nd.  These  attempts  again  failed,  and  it  was 
not  until  the  morning  of  the  23rd  that  a  raft  was 
got  across  here.     At  four  o'clock  in  the  morning  a 


136        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

regiment  of  the  New  Zealand  Mounted  Brigade 
crossed  the  river  by  the  pontoon  bridge  at  Mak- 
hadet  Hajlah,  and,  galloping  along  the  bank  to  the 
north,  cleared  the  enemy  from  the  east  bank  opposite 
Ghoraniyeh,  thus  facihtating  the  crossing  of  our  in- 
fantry at  that  place.  By  mid-day  this  regiment  had 
seized  the  high  ground  commanding  El  Ghoraniyeh, 
capturing  about  seventy  prisoners  and  several  machine 
guns. 

They  were  followed  across  the  Jordan  by  a  regi- 
ment of  the  1st  A.L.H.  Brigade,  which  cleared  the 
enemy  from  the  country  south  of  Hajlah,  and  gained 
touch  with  a  party  of  infantry  which  had  crossed 
the  Dead  vSea  in  motor  boats,  and  landed  on  the  east 
bank  of  the  river  near  its  mouth. 

By  nightfall  a  second  pontoon  bridge  had  been 
thrown  across  the  Jordan  at  Hajlah,  and  three  more 
had  been  completed  at  Ghoraniyeh.  The  whole 
force  detailed  for  the  raid  had  safely  crossed  the 
river  before  daylight  on  the  24th. 

As  soon  as  it  was  light  enough  to  see,  the  advance 
on  Amman  commenced.  The  1st  A.L.H.  Brigade 
moved  up  to  El  Mandesi,  about  three  miles  north  of 
Ghoraniyeh,  to  cover  the  left  flank  of  the  60th  Divi- 
sion during  the  attack  on  the  enemy  positions  astride 
the  Amman  road,  at  El  Hand  and  Shunet  Nimrin. 
El  Haud  was  captured  about  three  in  the  afternoon, 
after  hard  fighting,  and  its  possession  enabled  our 
infantry  to  turn  the  right  flank  of  the  enemy,  who 
then  retired  on  El  Salt.  A  squadron  of  the  New 
Zealanders  pursued  the  Turks,  followed  by  our  in- 
fantry, but  the  bad  state  of  the  road,  which  the 
enemy  blew  up  in  several  places  as  he  retired,  delayed 
the  pui'suit.  The  rest  of  the  New  Zealand  Brigade 
moved  on  El  Sir  up  the  Wadi  Jofet  el  Ghazlaniye. 
At   nightfall   our   infantry   had   only   succeeded   in 


ADVANCE  ON  EL  SIR  137 

advancing  about  four  miles  from  Shunet  Nimrin, 
and  were  in  touch  with  the  enemy  astride  the  road. 

Meanwhile  the  2nd  A.L.H.  Brigade,  followed  by 
the  Camel  Corps,  had  been  floundering  up  the  Wadi 
Kef  rein,  south  of  the  road,  and  reached  Rujm  el 
Oshh'  about  half-past  three  in  the  afternoon.  Here 
the  track,  such  as  it  was,  petered  out  altogether,  and 
all  wheeled  transport  had  to  be  sent  back,  the  ammuni- 
tion being  transferred  to  camels.  This  caused  a  long 
delay,  and  it  was  not  till  half -past  nine  at  night  that 
the  march  could  be  renewed.  Heavy  rain  had  fallen 
for  several  days  prior  to  the  commencement  of  the 
operations,  and  all  the  tracks  were  deep  in  mud. 

Rain  came  on  again  during  the  night  of  the  24th, 
and  continued  during  the  whole  of  the  next  three 
days,  accompanied  by  bitter  cold.  Under  this  down- 
pour the  tracks  marked  on  the  map  revealed  them- 
selves for  what  they  really  were,  the  beds  of  mountain 
streams.  Each  of  them  was  transformed  into  a  rush- 
ing torrent,  carrying  down  rocks  and  mud  in  its 
course.  Bad  as  they  were,  however,  they  formed 
the  only  possible  lines  of  advance  in  this  mountain 
country,  and  the  cavalry  had  to  make  the  best  of 
them. 

Pushing  and  pulling  their  shivering  and  exhausted 
animals  up  the  track,  the  2nd  A.L.H.  Brigade  and 
the  Camel  Corps  stumbled  on  in  the  rain  and  dark- 
ness all  night.  At  half-past  four  next  morning  the 
head  of  the  column  reached  Ain  el  Hekr,  having  taken 
just  twenty-four  hours  to  cover  the  sixteen  miles 
from  the  Jordan.  The  whole  day  was  spent  in 
closing  up  the  remainder  of  the  column,  and  it  was 
not  till  half-past  seven  in  the  evening  that  the  last 
of  the  Camel  Corps  got  in,  having  walked  the  whole 
way,  pulling  their  camels  after  them. 

As  soon  as  they  were  in,  the  advance  was  continued, 


138        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

via  Naaur,  in  pouring  rain.  Diuing  this  part  of  the 
march  the  way  was  not  so  steep  as  in  the  earher  part, 
but  the  alternate  deep  mud  and  shppery  rock  over 
which  the  track  led  caused  endless  delays,  especially 
to  the  camels,  and  the  force  was  soon  strung  out 
again  over  a  length  of  many  miles.  At  five  on  the 
morning  of  the  26th,  the  head  of  the  column  met  the 
New  Zealand  Brigade  at  the  cross  tracks  one  mile 
east  of  El  Sir.  The  New  Zealanders  had  encountered 
similar  difficulties  of  country  and  climate,  and  both 
men  and  horses  were  in  an  exhausted  condition. 

General  Chaytor  now  received  orders  to  push  on 
at  once,  and  seize  Amman  !  But,  as  his  men  had 
been  marching  for  three  consecutive  nights  (includ- 
ing the  move  to  the  point  of  assembly  west  of  the 
Jordan),  under  conditions  of  the  utmost  discomfort 
and  fatigue,  he  considered  that  they  were  in  no  state 
to  make  an  attack  on  a  strongly  held  position,  even 
if  it  were  possible  to  reach  Amman  before  nightfall, 
which  was  extremely  unlikely.  He  therefore  asked, 
and  received,  permission  to  halt  for  twenty-four 
hours,  and  march  on  Amman  next  morning.  Out- 
posts were  placed  north,  east,  and  south  of  El  Sir, 
and  strong  patrols  of  the  2nd  Brigade  were  sent  out 
to  reconnoitre  northwards,  as  far  as  the  El  Salt- 
Amman  road.  These  patrols  encountered  a  body  of 
the  enemy  near  El  Sweileh,  and  dispersed  it,  taking 
170  prisoners.  They  also  destroyed  thirty  German 
motor  lorries  and  a  car,  which  they  found  here,  stuck 
fast  in  the  mud. 

While  the  Anzac  Division  was  struggling  towards 
El  Sir  on  the  25th,  the  infantry  of  the  60th  Division 
had  been  marching  up  the  main  road  from  Shunet 
Nimrin  towards  El  Salt,  with  the  1st  A.L.H.  Brigade 
on  their  left  flank,  on  the  Wadi  Arseniyet  track. 
This  brigade  reached  El  Salt  about  six  in  the  evening. 


TWO  RAILWAY  RAIDS  139 

and  was  joined  there,  some  two  hours  later,  by  a 
brigade  of  the  60th  Division.  A  second  infantry 
brigade  arrived  at  midnight.  The  place  had  been 
evacuated  by  the  enemy,  in  consequence  of  the  threat 
to  his  rear  caused  by  the  advance  of  our  cavalry  to 
El  Sir. 

Our  infantry  were  now  quite  as  exhausted  as  the 
cavalry.  They  had  been  marching  or  fighting  con- 
tinually for  three  days  and  nights,  over  difficult 
mountain  country,  and  in  most  inclement  weather, 
and  it  was  necessary  to  give  them  a  day's  rest.  The 
first  A.L.H.  Brigade  was  directed  to  remain  at  El 
Salt,  and  patrol  the  country  to  the  north  and  north- 
west of  that  place. 

Thus,  on  the  morning  of  the  27th,  when  the  advance 
was  resumed,  the  foremost  troops  of  the  raiding  force 
were  little  more  than  two-thirds  of  the  way  to  Amman. 
The  delay  had  been  of  the  utmost  value  to  the  Turks, 
who  were  hurrying  up  reinforcements  by  road  and 
rail. 

During  the  previous  night  General  Chaytor  had 
sent  two  small  raiding  parties,  mounted  on  the 
freshest  horses  available,  to  try  and  blow  up  the 
Hedjaz  Railway  north  and  south  of  Amman,  in  order 
to  entrap  a  considerable  quantity  of  rolling  stock 
which  was  reported  to  be  in  the  station.  The  2nd 
A.L.H.  Brigade  party  made  for  the  railway  north  of 
Amman,  but  encountered  a  body  of  Turkish  cavalry, 
and  was  forced  to  turn  back.  The  New  Zealanders, 
who  were  directed  south  of  the  town,  were  more 
fortunate,  and  succeeded  in  reaching  the  railway  at 
a  point  some  seven  miles  south  of  Amman  station. 
Having  destroyed  a  considerable  stretch  of  the  line, 
they  withdrew  safely,  and  made  their  way  back  to 
El  Sir. 

This  march,  carried  out  at  night,  in  unknown  and 


140        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

very  difficult  country,  without  guides  or  reliable 
maps,  and  into  the  heart  of  the  enemy's  country, 
was  a  striking  example  of  the  special  qualities  of  the 
Australian  and  New  Zealand  Cavalry.  Trained  from 
the  cradle  in  the  art  of  finding  their  way  in  un- 
charted country,  they  have  the  bushman's  almost 
uncanny  sense  of  direction.  Tireless  as  the  wiry 
horses  they  breed  and  ride,  possessed  of  a  wonderful 
keenness  of  vision,  alert,  wary  and  supremely  self- 
confident,  they  are  the  finest  scouts  in  the  world. 

The  advance  on  Amman  was  resumed  on  the  27th. 
Early  in  the  morning  a  light  car  patrol  arrived  at 
Sweileh  from  El  Salt,  but  could  get  no  farther  east, 
owing  to  the  mud.  General  Chaytor,  therefore, 
ordered  the  cars  to  remain  at  Sweileh,  as  a  flank 
guard  to  his  division  during  the  attack  on  Amman. 
A  brigade  of  infantry,  with  two  mountain  batteries, 
set  out  from  El  Salt  at  five  in  the  morning,  to  march 
to  the  support  of  the  Anzac  Division.  This  brigade 
could  not  be  expected  at  Amman  till  late  at  night, 
but  it  was  hoped  that  the  Anzac  Division  would  be 
able  to  take  the  place  before  then.  Unfortunately 
the  delay  to  our  troops  caused  by  the  rain  had 
afforded  time  to  the  enemy  both  to  improve  his 
defence  and  to  reinforce  his  garrison. 

General  Chaytor  directed  the  New  Zealand  Brigade 
to  cross  the  Wadi  Amman,  south-west  of  the  town, 
and  move  against  the  high  ground  overlooking 
the  town  and  station  from  the  south.  One  bat- 
tahon  of  the  Camel  Corps  Brigade,  acting  on  the 
right  of  the  New  Zealanders,  was  to  destroy  as  much 
of  the  fine  as  possible. 

The  2nd  A.L.H.  Brigade  was  ordered  to  push 
forward  to  the  railway  north  of  Amman  as  quickly 
as  possible,  and  cut  the  line,  in  order  both  to  isolate 
the  rolling  stock  in  the  station,  and  to  delay  the 


FIRST  ATTACK  ON  AMMAN  141 

arrival  of  possible  reinforcements  from  the  north. 
The  brigade  was  then  to  attack  the  enemy  positions 
from  the  north-west.  The  Camel  Corps  Brigade,  less 
one  battahon,  was  to  attack  from  the  west. 

There  was  no  divisional  reserve.  It  was  con- 
sidered that  the  superior  mobility  of  our  cavalry  and 
camehy  would  enable  them  to  disengage  from  the 
fight,  should  such  a  course  become  necessary,  and 
fall  back  on  our  infantry  advancing  from  El  Salt. 
Moreover,  the  difficulties  of  the  country  were  so 
great  that  it  was  doubtful  if  a  divisional  reserve  could 
have  reached  any  distant  part  of  the  Hne  that  was 
hard  pressed,  in  time  to  be  of  any  service. 

The  three  brigades  set  out  from  Ain  el  Sir  at  nine 
o'clock.  AU  three  were  much  impeded  by  difficulties 
of  terrain.  Deep  mud  alternated  with  stretches  of 
wet  and  slippery  rock,  on  which  neither  camels  nor 
horses  could  get  secure  foothold.  The  camels  suffered 
particular^  severely.  Designed  by  nature  for  work 
in  the  soft  and  yielding  sand  of  the  desert,  they  are 
more  unfitted  than  any  other  animal  to  march  over 
stony  country,  or  through  mud.  Many  of  them  fell 
and  broke  their  legs,  and  had  to  be  shot.  Many 
more  had  aheady  met  the  same  fate  during  the 
awful  climb  up  to  the  plateau  from  the  Jordan  Valley. 
In  several  places  large  morasses  were  encountered, 
and  much  precious  time  was  wasted  finding  a  way 
round  these.  The  wadis,  too,  were  deep  and  pre- 
cipitous, particularly  the  Wadi  Amman,  which  was 
impassable  save  in  one  or  two  places,  and  then  only 
in  single  file. 

The  New  Zealanders  reached  this  wadi  about 
half-past  ten  in  the  morning,  and  were  delayed  so 
long  in  crossing  it  that  it  was  three  in  the  afternoon 
before  they  reached  the  railway. 

The   Camel   Corps   Battalion   then   moved   south 


142        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

along  the  line,  with  a  demolition  party,  blowing  up 
the  railway.  While  engaged  on  this  work,  they  met 
an  enemy  train,  steaming  slowly  over  the  very 
portion  of  the  line  that  had  been  blown  up  by  the 
New  Zealanders  the  night  before  !  The  train  was  en- 
gaged with  machine-gun  fire,  and  withdrew.  Our  men 
then  examined  the  line,  and  learnt  a  valuable  lesson 
in  the  art  of  temporary  destruction  of  a  railway. 

It  was  the  custom  at  that  time  for  our  raiding 
parties,  which  could  only  carry  a  small  quantity  of 
explosives,  and  no  tools  suitable  for  carrying  out  a 
systematic  destruction,  to  blow  a  piece  out  of  each 
rail,  by  means  of  slabs  of  gun-cotton  placed  on  each 
side  of  it.  The  gaps  thus  made  were  about  a  foot 
long.  A  length  of  several  miles  of  line,  in  which 
each  rail  had  a  piece  cut  clean  out  of  the  middle,  had 
the  appearance  of  having  been  very  thoroughly 
destroyed,  and  it  was  believed  that  the  whole  line 
would  have  to  be  relaid  with  new  rails  before  it 
could  be  used.  But  the  ingenious  German  engineers 
discovered  that,  if  a  hard-wood  sleeper  were  pushed 
into  each  gap,  with  its  end  flush  with  the  inner  edge 
of  the  rail,  trains  could  be  run  over  the  line  at  once, 
provided  they  were  driven  slowly. 

As  a  result  of  this  experience.  Captain  Brisbane, 
an  engineer  officer  of  the  Australian  Mounted  Divi- 
sion, devised  a  better  method,  which  consisted  in 
attaching  one  slab  of  gun-cotton  only  to  the  outside 
of  the  rails  at  each  joint.  When  this  was  detonated, 
the  fishplates  were  blown  off,  and  the  ends  of  the 
two  rails  were  bent  sharply  inwards.  Demolitions 
carried  out  by  this  method  could  only  be  repaired  by 
relaying  the  line  completely.^ 

^  At  a  demonstration  given  some  months  later  by  a  small  party  of 
engineers  specially  trained  by  this  officer,  one  mile  of  track  was  com- 
pletely destroyed  in  ten  minutes. 


ANOTHER  RAILWAY  RAID  143 

While  the  New  Zealanders  had  been  searching  for 
a  crossing  place  over  the  wadi,  the  2nd  A.H.L. 
Brigade  had  pushed  forward  on  the  north-west,  and 
got  to  within  three  miles  of  Amman,  when  it  was 
heavily  counter-attacked,  about  eleven  o'clock,  by  a 
large  force  of  the  enemy,  well  supplied  with  artillery. 
The  attack  was  beaten  off,  after  severe  fighting,  but 
more  Turks  appeared  to  the  north  of  the  brigade, 
and  began  to  work  round  its  left.  General  R3rrie 
had  to  form  a  defensive  flank  to  meet  this  threat, 
and  his  advance  was  stopped.  Meanwhile  the  Camel 
Brigade,  advancing  straight  on  Amman  astride  the 
Sweileh  track,  was  held  up  by  heavy  machine-gun 
fire,  on  reaching  the  open  ground  west  of  the  town, 
and  could  get  no  farther. 

The  New  Zealanders  fared  no  better.  They  were 
very  heavily  attacked  when  attempting  to  seize 
the  high  ground  south  of  Amman,  and  forced  to 
give  ground.  The  Turks  attacked  repeatedly  on  the 
north,  west  and  south,  and  in  ever  increasing  numbers, 
and  our  small  force  was  hard  put  to  it  to  hold  its 
own.  It  was  soon  obvious  that  no  farther  progress 
was  possible.  General  Chaytor,  therefore,  ordered 
his  brigades  to  hold  their  present  positions  as  night 
outposts,  till  the  arrival  of  the  infantry,  and  to  keep 
touch  with  the  enemy  by  means  of  frequent  patrols. 
The  force  was  strung  out  over  a  wide  front,  lateral 
communication  was  very  difficult,  and  only  small, 
local  reserves  were  available.  Fortunately  the  Turks 
contented  themselves  with  digging  hard  all  night, 
and  erecting  rock  sangars,  and  made  no  serious 
attempt  to  attack. 

During  the  night  a  raiding  party,  consisting  of  a 
few  men  from  the  2nd  A.L.H.  Brigade,  succeeded  in 
penetrating  through  the  enemy  in  the  dark,  and  blew 
up  a  two-arch  bridge  near  Khurbet  el  Raseife,  seven 


144        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

miles  north  of  Amman.  The  gallant  little  party 
returned  safely  before  dawn,  having  done  damage 
sufficient  to  interrupt  traffic  from  the  north  for  at 
least  forty-eight  hours.  Before  that  period  had 
expired,  it  was  hoped  that  Amman  would  be  in  our 
hands. 

Dawn  found  our  weary  troops  cramped  and  stiff 
with  their  long  night's  vigil  in  the  bitter  cold.  They 
had  been  marching  and  fighting  for  four  days  and 
nights,  with  only  one  night's  rest,  and  had  been  wet 
through  the  whole  time.  The  Turkish  guns  opened 
the  ball  soon  after  dayhght,  and  shelled  our  positions 
intermittently  dm-ing  the  morning. 

About  mid-day  two  battalions  of  infantry  arrived 
from  El  Salt.  They  had  been  delayed  at  Sweileh, 
the  previous  night,  in  consequence  of  having  marched 
into  the  middle  of  a  sort  of  Belfast  riot  between  the 
Circassians  (Moslems)  of  Sweileh  and  the  Christian 
Arabs  of  El  Fuheis.  With  two  separate  wars  thus 
going  on  in  the  same  area,  the  situation  appeared  too 
obscure  for  farther  advance,  especially  as  both  Cir- 
cassians and  Arabs  showed  a  disposition  to  fire  impar- 
tially on  all  who  came  within  range,  quite  irrespective 
of  their  reUgion  or  politics.  The  column  had,  there- 
fore, halted  for  the  night. 

General  Chaytor  had  expected  to  be  reinforced  by 
a  brigade  of  infantry  during  the  previous  night,  and, 
in  anticipation  of  its  arrival,  had  issued  orders  for 
an  attack  soon  after  daylight.  Though  disappointed 
at  receiving  only  two  battalions,  and  those  not  till 
twelve  hours  later  than  he  had  expected,  he  decided, 
in  view  of  the  urgency  of  the  situation,  to  attack 
at  once. 

The  infantry  were  pushed  in  between  the  Camel 
Corps  and  the  2nd  A.L.H.  Brigade,  and  ordered  to 
advance  with    their  right   on    the  Sweileh- Amman 


SECOND  ATTACK  ON  AMMAN  145 

road.  The  attack  commenced  at  two  o'clock,  and 
the  whole  line  pressed  forward  vigorously,  and  got  to 
within  1000  yards  of  the  enemy  positions  in  the 
centre,  when  a  very  heavy  counter-attack  was 
launched  against  the  2nd  A.L.H.  Brigade.  The 
cavalry  were  pressed  back  some  distance  under  the 
weight  of  this  attack,  thus  exposing  the  left  of  the 
infantry.  Intense  machine-gun  fire  was  now  opened 
on  the  infantry  and  Camel  Corps,  who  were  on  the 
edge  of  a  bare,  open  plateau,  which  extends  for  some 
distance  west  of  the  town.  Our  attack  was  brought 
to  a  stop,  and,  as  it  was  clearly  impossible  to  make 
any  farther  progress  in  face  of  the  strong  enemy  re- 
sistance, and  as  night  was  coming  on,  General  Chaytor 
withdrew  his  force  a  little,  to  positions  suitable  for 
battle  night  outposts,  and  ordered  them  to  hold  on 
till  next  morning,  when  the  remainder  of  the  in- 
fantry brigade  was  expected  up. 

Desultory  firing  continued  all  night,  but  the  enemy 
made  no  attack.  Parties  of  the  2nd  A.L.H.  and  New 
Zealand  Brigades  were  active  throughout  the  night, 
patrolUng  up  to  and  across  the  railway,  north  and 
south  of  Amman.  They  were  assisted  by  friendly 
Arabs,  who  spent  the  hours  of  darkness  sniping  at 
parties  attempting  to  mend  the  bridge  which  had 
been  blown  up  the  previous  night.  Others  co- 
operated with  a  troop  of  the  New  Zealand  Brigade, 
to  prevent  any  trains  approaching  Amman  from  the 
south. 

The  rest  of  the  infantry  brigade,  accompanied  by 
two  mountain  batteries,  joined  General  Chaytor' s 
force  about  mid-day  on  the  29th.  We  then  had  two 
brigades  of  cavalry,  one  of  infantry,  and  the  Camel 
Brigade  at  Amman ;  a  cavalry  brigade  and  an  infantry 
brigade  at  El  Salt,  fifteen  miles  farther  west ;  and  a 
third  brigade  of  infantry  between  Shunet  Nimrin  and 

K 


146        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

the  bridgeheads  on  the  Jordan.     There  were  no  troops 
available  to  increase  this  force.  * 

During  the  morning,  fresh  enemy  reinforcements 
reached  Amman  by  rail  from  the  north,  and  these 
troops  immediately  developed  a  strong  attack  against 
the  left  flank  of  our  line.  The  2nd  A.L.H.  Brigade 
drove  off  this  attack,  but  the  Turks  repeatedly  as- 
saulted the  position  held  by  the  brigade  during  the 
day,  and  gave  our  weary  troops  no  rest. 

Meanwhile  a  further  complication  had  arisen,  owing 
to  a  considerable  body  of  the  enemy  from  west  of 
the  Jordan  having  crossed  the  river  at  Jisr  el  Damieh, 
fifteen  miles  north  of  Ghoraniyeh,  on  the  previous 
day,  and  commenced  to  advance  up  the  track  towards 
El  Salt.  On  the  morning  of  the  29th,  the  advance 
guard  of  this  force,  .consisting  of  the  Turkish  3rd 
Cavalry  Division  and  two  brigades  of  infantry,  was 
beginning  to  make  its  pressure  felt  against  our  posi- 
tions at  El  Salt.  The  1st  A.L.H.  Brigade,  supported 
by  some  field  artillery,  moved  out  to  oppose  it. 

The  rain  had  continued  without  abatement  from 
the  commencement  of  the  operations,  and  the  country 
was  now  in  an  almost  impassable  state.  To  add  to 
our  difficulties,  the  Jordan  suddenly  rose  no  less  than 
nine  feet  during  the  morning  of  the  29th,  and  the 
flood  water  swept  away  all  but  one  of  our  bridges. 
The  approaches  to  the  remaining  bridge  were  under 
water,  and  it  was  evident  that,  if  the  river  rose  any 
higher,  it,  too,  would  be  swept  away,  and  our  force  east 
of  the  river  would  be  cut  off  in  the  enemy's  country. 
It  was  clear  that,  if  Amman  was  to  be  taken,  there 
was  no  time  to  be  lost.  General  Chaytor  had  in- 
tended to  attack  as  soon  as  the  infantry  reinforce- 
ments had  arrived,  but,  in  view  of  their  exhausted 
state,  he  decided,  after  consultation  with  the  brigadier, 
General  Da  Costa,  to  put  off  the  attack  till  dark. 


THIRD  ATTACK  ON  AMMAN  147 

Such  men  as  could  be  spared  from  the  fighting  had 
been  set  to  work  repairing  the  road  beyond  El  Salt, 
and,  by  the  afternoon  of  the  29th,  it  was  sufficiently 
restored  to  enable  a  battery  of  Horse  Artillery  to 
start  for  Amman  from  Shunet  Nimrin. 

The  New  Zealand  Brigade,  with  one  battalion  of  the 
Camel  Corps  on  its  right,  was  directed  to  seize  Point 
3039,  a  high  hill  about  a  mile  south-east  of  Amman 
town,  which  commanded  both  the  town  and  the 
station.  This  hill  was  strongly  held  by  the  enemy, 
who  occupied  two  lines  of  entrenchments,  one  above 
the  other,  on  the  southern  slopes.  The  Camel  Corps 
Brigade  and  the  infantry,  moving  respectively  south 
and  north  of  the  El  Salt  road,  were  to  attack  the 
town  and  the  old  citadel.  The  2nd  A.L.H.  Brigade 
was  instructed  to  make  itself  as  offensive  as  possible 
on  the  north  flank,  so  as  to  distract  the  enemy's 
attention  from  the  movements  of  our  troops  farther 
south. 

The  advance  began  at  two  o'clock  in  the  morning. 
It  was  very  dark  and  raining  hard,  and  the  troops 
had  great  difficulty  in  keeping  in  touch  and  main- 
taining direction  over  the  rocky  ground.  The  New 
Zealanders,  very  skilfully  led,  evaded  the  enemy 
trenches  at  the  bottom  of  the  hill,  and  reached  the 
second  line,  higher  up  the  slope,  which  they  attacked 
with  the  bayonet,  and  captured.  When  day  broke 
the  Turks  in  the  trenches  below  were  forced  to  sur- 
render without  firing  a  shot.  The  New  Zealanders 
now  got  on  to  the  top  of  3039  at  the  southern  end, 
where  they  were  held  up  by  intense  machine-gun 
fire.  The  Turks  followed  up  this  fire  with  a  deter- 
mined counter-attack,  just  at  dawn,  which  was 
beaten  off,  but  only  with  the  greatest  difficulty. 

Meanwhile  the  Camel  Brigade  and  the  infantry, 
in  the  centre,  had  met  with  success  at  first,  having 


148        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

captured  the  enemy's  advanced  trenches,  with  about 
200  prisoners.  About  nine  o'clock  the  Camel  Brigade, 
then  about  800  yards  west  of  the  main  enemy  posi- 
tion, came  under  heavy  machine-gun  fire  from  both 
flanks,  especially  from  the  north  end  of  3039,  which 
the  New  Zealanders  had  been  unable  to  take,  and 
from  the  old  citadel  on  the  left  front.  At  the  same 
time  the  enemy  launched  a  powerful  counter-attack 
against  the  left  flank  of  our  infantry,  in  the  gap 
between  them  and  the  2nd  A.L.H.  Brigade.  This 
attack  was  repulsed,  but  the  Turks  maintained  a 
continuous  and  heavy  pressure  against  this  flank  all 
day,  and  our  troops  were  barely  able  to  hold  their 
ground. 

Fresh  enemy  reinforcements  arrived  from  the 
north  about  ten  o'clock,  and  immediately  launched 
another  violent  attack  on  the  New  Zealand  Brigade, 
which  was  chnging  precariously  to  the  southern  edge 
of  Hill  3039.  The  attack  was  repulsed,  but  only 
after  prolonged  and  anxious  fighting.  The  Somerset 
Battery  R.H.A.,  which  had  left  Shunet  Nimrin  the 
previous  day,  and  had  been  marching  for  thirty 
hours,  arrived  just  in  time  to  take  a  decisive  part  in 
repelling  this  attack. 

The  enemy  then  directed  an  intense  shell  fire  on 
the  New  Zealanders,  and  attacked  the  Camel  Corps 
battalion  on  their  right,  with  the  evident  intention 
of  outflanking  our  troops  on  the  hill.  This  attack 
was  also  beaten  off,  and,  for  the  rest  of  the  day,  the 
Turks  contented  themselves  with  shelling  the  hill 
heavily,  but  did  not  succeed  in  dislodging  the  New 
Zealand  Brigade. 

Early  in  the  afternoon  the  persistent  enemy  attacks 
against  the  left  flank  of  our  infantry  ceased,  pro- 
bably as  a  result  of  a  push  forward  made  by  the  2nd 
A.L.H.   Brigade  farther  north.     The  infantry  took 


WITHDRAWAL  OF  THE  RAIDING  FORCE    149 

advantage  of  this  respite  to  resume  their  dogged 
advance  on  the  Amman  town  position.  They  pressed 
forward  till  they  were  held  up  by  the  deep  fosse  on 
the  west  side  of  the  citadel.  Here  they  came  under 
a  murderous  machine-gun  fire  from  both  flanks.  The 
few  mountain  guns  with  our  force  were  quite  inade- 
quate to  the  task  of  keeping  down  this  hostile  fire, 
and  could  make  no  impression  on  the  thick  stone 
walls  of  the  old  citadel.  Our  infantry  had  to  with- 
draw to  shelter. 

Fresh  enemy  troops  continued  to  arrive  from  the 
north,  and  General  Chaytor  now  reluctantly  reported 
that  he  saw  no  hope  of  taking  Amman  with  the  force 
at  his  disposal,  and  that  any  further  attempt  would 
only  entail  useless  loss  of  life.  No  reinforcements 
were  available  ;  indeed,  during  the  day,  a  battalion 
of  infantry  had  been  ordered  back  from  Amman  to 
El  Salt.  This  battalion  was  the  only  one  that  had 
not  been  engaged,  and  constituted  the  last  of  our 
reserves. 

El  Salt  itself  had  been  heavily  attacked  all  day 
long.  The  enemy  column  that  had  crossed  the 
Jordan,  and  advanced  up  the  Jisr  el  Damieh  track, 
drove  in  our  advanced  post  on  that  side  during 
the  morning.  The  Turks  continued  to  press  their  at- 
tack with  the  greatest  determination  from  the  west, 
north-west  and  north,  and  soon  all  our  scanty  reserves 
were  involved.  One  battalion  of  infantry  had  been 
spared  from  the  brigade  that  was  covering  the 
country  from  the  Jordan  to  Shunet  Nimrin,  and 
one  had  been  sent  back  from  Amman,  as  already 
stated. 

At  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  our  troops  at 
Amman  and  El  Salt  were  only  just  holding  their  own, 
and  it  was  doubtful  if  they  could  do  so  much  longer, 
in  face  of  the  constantly  increasing  strength  of  the 


150        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

enemy.  General  Shea,^  who  was  in  command  of  the 
whole  force,  decided  to  withdraw.  The  troops  at 
Amman  were  to  move  first,  breaking  off  the  action 
as  soon  as  it  was  dark,  and  retiring  along  the  Ain  el 
Sir  tracks. 

As  soon  as  darlaiess  fell  the  New  Zealand  Brigade 
and  the  detached  battalion  of  the  Camel  Corps  dis- 
engaged, and  fell  back  to  the  west  bank  of  the  Wadi 
Amman,  where  they  held  a  line  of  posts  to  cover  the 
withdi'awal  of  the  infantry  and  the  Camel  Corps 
Brigade.     The  infantry  marched  along  the  El  Salt 
road,  covered  by  the  2nd  A.L.H.  Brigade,  as  far  as 
Sweileh,  where  they  turned  off  towards  El  Sir,  to 
avoid  the  fighting  that  was  going  on  at  El  Salt.     The 
New  Zealanders  held  their  position  west  of  the  wadi 
till  the  infantry  had  reached  El  Sir,  and  had  a  sharp 
action  with  the  Turks,  who  had  followed  up  closely. 
The  enemy  was  finally  repulsed  at  daybreak,  and  the 
New  Zealanders  then  fell  back  slowly  to  Ain  el  Sir, 
which  they  reached  in  the  evening.     The  retirement 
continued  through  the  night,  in  the  rain  and  darkness. 
Just  as  the  rearguard  troops  of  the  New  Zealand 
Brigade  were  moving  out  of  El  Sir,  they  were  treacher- 
ously fired  on  by  some  of  the  local  inhabitants.     A 
troop  was  at  once  sent  back  into  the  village,  and 
attacked  a  party  of  Arabs  caught  in  the  act  of  sniping 
at  our  men.     Thirty  of  the  natives  were  killed  in  the 
encounter,    and   this   condign   punishment   had   an 
instant  effect.     We  had  no  more  trouble  from  the 
local  Arabs. 

Meanwhile  the  fierce  attacks  on  El  Salt  had  con- 
tinued all  through  the  31st,  and  it  was  not  till  eleven 
o'clock  at  night  that  the  Turks  finally  drew  off 
exhausted.     During  the  night  of  the  1st  of  April, 

1  Major-General  Sir  J.  S.  M.  Shea,  K.C.M.G.,  C.B.,  D.S.O.,  command- 
ing the  60th  Division. 


TRIALS  OF  THE  WOUNDED  151 

our  troops  withdrew  from  the  village  unmolested, 
covered  by  the  1st  A.L.H.  Brigade,  having  destroyed 
all  the  enemy  ammunition  and  stores  there,  and  the 
whole  force  was  safely  across  the  Jordan  by  the 
evening  of  the  2nd. 

The  operations  had  lasted  twelve  days,  and  it 
had  rained  almost  the  whole  time.  The  troops  were 
without  tents  or  shelter  of  any  kind,  and,  for  the 
last  ninety  hours  of  the  operations,  they  had  been 
marching  and  fighting  continuously,  without  sleep 
or  rest.  The  fighting,  too,  had  been  severe,  and  our 
casualties,  about  1600  killed,  wounded  and  missing, 
sufficiently  heavy,  considering  the  small  size  of  our 
force,  and  the  absence  of  any  great  artillery  concen- 
tration against  us. 

The  wounded  suffered  severely.  The  nearest  hos- 
pital was  at  Jerusalem,  separated  from  Amman  by 
more  than  sixty  miles  of  bad  mountain  road.  From 
the  firing  line  the  wounded  were  taken  in  camel 
cacolets  ^  to  a  motor  ambulance  relay  station  on  the 
road  between  Amman  and  El  Salt.  The  tortures  of 
this  mode  of  conveyance  to  a  wounded  man  have  to 
be  experienced  to  be  believed.  When  the  animal, 
having  received  its  double  burden,  rises  with  its 
peculiar  jerk  forward,  it  nearly  pitches  the  patients 
out  of  the  cacolets.  Thereafter,  each  lurching  step 
of  the  long,  agonising  march  stretches  the  unhappy 
victims  upon  a  species  of  rack  comparable  to  that 
of  a  mediaeval  torture  chamber. 

At  the  relay  station,  five  miles  east  of  El  Salt, 
the  wounded  were  transferred  to  ambulance  motor 
cars,  which  ran  them  into  El  Salt.  Here  there  was 
an  advanced  dressing  station,  where  wounds  were 
attended  to,  and  then  the  victims  were  again  loaded 

^  Canvas  hammocks,  stiffened  with  bamhoo  poles  and  slung  one  on 
each  side  of  the  camel,  to  take  a  man  lying  down. 


152        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

into  ambulances,  and  run  down  to  the  main  dressing 
station  at  Shunet  Nimrin.  At  this  station  they  were 
taken  over  by  a  fresh  relay  of  cars,  which  carried 
them  as  far  as  Jericho,  if  they  were  lucky.  When  the 
bridges  were  washed  away,  however,  it  was  for  a 
time  unsafe  for  the  cars  to  cross  the  one  remaining 
bridge,  and  the  men  had  to  be  carried  across  the 
river  on  stretchers,  and  put  into  cars  on  the  west 
bank.  At  Jericho  there  was  an  operating  unit  for 
serious  cases,  and  there  is  no  doubt  that  this  unit 
saved  the  lives  of  many  by  an  immediate  operation, 
who  would  almost  certainly  have  died  had  they  been 
sent  straight  on  to  Jerusalem.  Another  change  of 
ears  was  made  at  Jericho,  and  another  at  Talaat  el 
Dumm.  And  then  at  last  the  long  nightmare  of  the 
journey  ended  in  the  blessed  peace  and  comfort  of  a 
hospital  in  Jerusalem. 

Nearly  2000  cases,  including  the  sick,  were  evacuated 
in  this  way  during  the  operations. 


German  motor  boat  leavinji  Jerusalem  for  the  Dead  Sen 
(From  an  enemy  photograph.) 


Turks  loading  grain  from  Moah  for  transport  across  the   Dead  Sea. 
(From  an  enemy  photograph.) 


CHAPTER  XIII 

THE  SECOND  TRANS-JORDAN  RAID 

Though  the  raid  on  Amman  had  failed  in  its  primary 
object  of  so  damaging  the  railway  as  to  compel  the 
withdrawal  of  the  Turkish  forces  in  the  Hedjaz,  it 
had  succeeded  in  drawing  northwards  and  retaining 
not  only  the  Turkish  troops  which  had  been  operat- 
ing against  the  Arabs,  but  also  a  portion  of  the 
garrison  of  Maan  and  the  stations  farther  south. 
Indeed  the  number  of  enemy  troops  east  of  the 
Jordan,  in  the  Amman-El  Salt-Shunet  Nimrin  area, 
was  doubled  as  a  result  of  these  operations. 

Taking  advantage  of  this  weakening  of  the  Turkish 
forces  opposed  to  him,  the  Emir  Feisal  renewed  his 
attempts  on  Maan,  and,  during  the  first  half  of  April, 
successfully  destroyed  a  considerable  portion  of  the 
railway  both  north  and  south  of  it,  and  even  cap- 
tured an  outwork  of  the  town  itself,  within  two  miles 
of  the  main  positions. 

Apart  from  the  help  given  to  the  Arabs,  the  raid 
had  resulted  in  a  loss  to  the  enemy  of  nearly  1000 
prisoners  and  of  all  his  ammunition  and  stores  at 
El  Salt.  His  losses  in  kiUed  and  wounded  were 
estimated  to  have  been  not  less  than  1700. 

Moreover  the  bridgehead  which  had  been  estab- 
lished across  the  Jordan  at  Ghoraniyeh  was  main- 
tained and  improved,  and,  a  little  later  on,  another 
bridge  was  thrown  over  the  river  some  four  miles 
farther  north,  at  the  mouth  of  the  river  Auja. 

These  bridges  were  a  perpetual  menace  to  the 
Turks  across  the  Jordan,  and  caused  them  great  un- 

153 


154        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

easiness.  On  April  11th  they  made  a  determined 
attack  on  the  Ghoraniyeh  bridgehead  simultaneously 
with  an  attack  by  German  troops  on  our  positions 
west  of  the  Jordan,  north  of  the  Wadi  el  Auja.  The 
bridgehead  was  held  at  the  time  by  the  1st  A.L.H. 
Brigade,  and  the  Auja  positions  by  the  2nd  A.L.H. 
Brigade  and  the  Camel  Corps.  Both  attacks  were 
pressed  vigorously  throughout  the  day,  but  ended 
in  the  complete  defeat  of  the  enemy,  who  left  som« 
500  dead  on  the  two  positions,  and  over  100  prisoners 
in  our  hands. 

Towards  the  end  of  April  preparations  were  begun 
for  a  second  raid  across  the  Jordan.  After  the  failure 
of  his  attack  on  the  Ghoraniyeh  bridgehead,  the 
enemy  had  largely  increased  his  forces  east  of  the 
river,  and  had  improved  and  strengthened  his  en- 
trenched position  at  Shunet  Nimrin.  At  the  end  of 
April  he  had  about  8000  troops  occupying  this  position. 
General  Allenby  determined  to  try  to  cut  off  and  de- 
stroy this  force,  and,  if  successful,  to  hold  El  Salt  till 
the  Arab  forces  could  advance  and  relieve  our  troops. 

The  great  German  offensive  in  France  in  March 
and  April  resulted  in  the  force  in  Palestine  being 
called  upon  to  send  to  Europe  every  man  and  gun 
that  could  be  spared.  Thus,  during  April,  the 
Yeomanry  Division  and  two  infantry  divisions, 
besides  ten  other  infantry  battalions  and  a  number 
of  siege  batteries  and  machine  gun  companies,  were 
withdrawn  from  the  line,  and  embarked  for  France. 
These  troops  were  replaced  by  Indian  regiments,  the 
Yeomanry  by  Indian  cavalry  from  France,  and  the 
infantry  partly  by  the  Lahore  Division  from  Meso- 
potamia, and  partly  by  untrained  native  troops 
from  India.  ^ 

^  See  Appendix  i.  a  for  composition  of  Desert  Mounted  Corps  after  the 
reorganisation. 


THE  BENI  SAKHR  155 

It  was  originally  intended  that  the  raid  should 
take  place  about  the  middle  of  May,  when  the  re- 
organisation had  been  completed,  and  the  full  strength 
of  the  Desert  Mounted  Corps  would  have  been  avail- 
able. A  necessary  part  of  the  raid,  however,  was  the 
co-operation  of  the  powerful  Beni  Sakhr  tribe  of 
Arabs,  numbering  some  7000  fighting  men,  which 
was  at  that  time  in  the  district  round  Madeba,  about 
twelve  miles  east  of  the  north  end  of  the  Dead  Sea. 
Towards  the  end  of  April  this  tribe  reported  that 
their  supplies  would  be  exhausted  by  the  4th  of 
May,  and  that  they  would  then  have  to  move  to  their 
summer  grazing  grounds  farther  south.  The  Com- 
mander-in-Chief therefore  decided  to  attack  at  once, 
without  waiting  for  the  arrival  of  the  Indian  troops, 
though,  in  doing  so,  he  was  compelled  to  carry  out 
the  operations  with  a  considerably  smaller  force  than 
would  have  been  the  case  if  he  had  been  able  to  wait 
another  fortnight. 

Thus  the  troops  available  for  the  raid  consisted 
only  of  the  Anzac  and  Australian  Mounted  Divisions, 
with  two  brigades  of  the  60th  Division,  and  the 
(Indian)  Imperial  Service  Cavalry  and  Infantry 
Brigades. 

There  was  good  reason  for  the  employment  of 
this  large  proportion  of  cavalry  in  an  operation  that 
was  to  be  carried  out  in  country  most  unsuited  for 
mounted  work. 

General  AUenby  was  always  reluctant  to  keep  his 
mounted  troops  in  the  trenches,  if  he  could  avoid 
doing  so.  Cavalry  are  most  uneconomical  troops  in 
trench  warfare,  since  at  least  a  quarter  of  them  are 
occupied  caring  for  the  horses,  and  consequently  are 
not  available  for  the  firing  Une.  Moreover,  while 
employed  in  the  line,  they  are  deprived  of  the  oppor- 
tunity of  training  for  mounted  work,  and  their  horses 


15G        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

generally  lose  condition,  since  there  are  not  enough 
men  to  look  after  them  properly. 

When,  however,  the  three  cavalry  divisions  were 
not  used  in  the  trenches,  there  were  barely  sufficient 
troops  left  to  hold  our  long  line  securely,  and  very 
few  infantry  could  be  spared  for  extraneous  enter- 
prises. Moreover,  though  he  would  not  put  his 
cavalry  into  the  line,  if  he  could  help  it,  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief had  no  intention  of  allowing  them 
to  grow  rusty  for  lack  of  active  operations.  He  was 
a  firm  believer  in  the  old  prize-ring  adage  that  the 
best  training  for  a  fight  is  fighting. 

The  enemy's  position  ran  north  and  south,  astride 
the  Jericho- Amman  road,  just  west  of  Shunet  Nirnrin, 
his  left  resting  on  the  deep  gorge  of  the  Wadi 
Kefrein,  and  his  right  flank  thrown  back  in  a  half 
circle  across  the  Wadi  Arseniyat  track  to  El  Haud. 
Both  flanks  were  protected  by  detachments  of  cavalry. 
From  Shunet  Nimrin  two  roads  led  back  to  Amman  ; 
the  metalled  road  through  El  Salt,  and  the  more 
direct  track  through  El  Sir.  The  former  was  the 
only  one  available  for  wheeled  traffic,  but  the  latter 
had  been  considerably  improved  by  the  Turks  since 
our  last  raid  into  Gilead.  The  plan  was  for  the  in- 
fantry to  attack  this  position  from  the  west,  with  the 
New  Zealand  Mounted  Brigade  on  their  right  flank, 
while  the  rest  of  the  cavalry,  moving  along  the  east 
bank  of  the  Jordan  as  far  as  Umm  el  Shert  and  Jisr  el 
Damieh,  turned  into  the  hills  up  the  tracks  from 
these  two  places,  and  captured  El  Salt,  thus  cutting 
the  road  to  Amman.  The  Beni  Sakhr  Arabs  under- 
took to  hold  the  Ain  el  Sir  track.  With  their  only 
two  lines  of  reinforcement  or  retreat  thus  closed, 
there  appeared  to  be  a  good  prospect  of  capturing  or 
destroying  the  enemy  forces  at  Shunet  Nimrin. 

In  order  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  transferring 


THE  EL  DAMIEH  BRIDGEHEAD        157 

troops  from  the  east  to  the  west  bank  of  the  Jordan 
at  Jisr  el  Damieh,  as  he  had  done  during  the  previous 
raid,  one  brigade  of  cavalry,  the  4th  A.L.H.,  was 
directed  to  seize  the  Turkish  bridge  at  that  place  if 
possible.  If,  however,  it  proved  too  strong  to  be 
taken,  the  brigade  was  to  take  up  a  position  cover- 
ing the  track  to  El  Salt,  and  endeavour  to  prevent 
the  enemy  crossing  the  river. 

Our  force  crossed  the  Jordan  on  the  night  of  the 
29th  of  April,  and  by  dawn  the  cavalry  were  through 
the  scrub  on  the  east  bank,  and  advancing  up  the 
narrow  plain  between  tlie  river  and  the  mountains, 
led  by  the  4th  A.L.H.  Brigade.  The  1st  and  2nd 
A.L.H.  Brigades  were  attached  to  the  Australian 
Mounted  Division  during  the  operations. 

The  5th  Mounted  Brigade,  followed  by  the  2nd 
A.L.H.,  turned  off  up  the  Umm  el  Shert  track,  and 
made  for  El  Haud,  while  the  3rd  A.L.H.  Brigade 
turned  up  the  track  from  Jisr  el  Damieh  towards 
El  Salt. 

The  4th  A.L.H.  Brigade,  followed  by  the  1st,  in 
reserve,  continued  its  march  towards  the  bridge,  and 
was  fired  on,  just  after  dawn,  from  a  prominent  hill 
on  the  east  bank  about  6000  yards  north-east  of 
Umm  el  Shert,  known  to  us  as  Red  Hill.  The  1st 
A.L.H.  Regiment  (1st  Brigade)  was  directed  against 
this  hill,  and  the  4th  Brigade  passed  to  the  east  of  it, 
and  reached  Jisr  el  Damieh  about  six  o'clock.  The 
11th  Regiment  was  at  once  sent  forward  to  seize  the 
bridgehead,  but  found  the  Turks  in  great  force  and 
strongly  entrenched,  and  was  unable  to  dislodge 
them.  A  further  attempt  to  drive  in  the  bridgehead 
also  failed,  and  it  was  evident  that  the  brigade  was 
not  strong  enough  to  carry  out  the  task.  Red  Hill, 
however,  fell  to  the  1st  Regiment  about  mid-day, 
after  some  sharp  fighting,  and  the  4tli  A.L.H.  Brigade 


158        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

then  took  up  a  position  facing  north-west  about 
2000  5^ards  west  of  the  foothills,  and  covering  the 
Jisr  el  Damieh-El  Salt  track,  from  the  Nahr  el  Zerka 
to  a  point  about  half  a  mile  south  of  the  track, 
with  the  1st  Regiment  on  Red  Hill.  It  was  sup- 
ported by  the  three  R.H.A.  batteries  of  the  Australian 
Mounted  Division. 

Early  in  the  afternoon,  columns  of  enemy  troops 
were  observed  marching  down  to  the  west  bank  of 
the  Jordan.  They  were  engaged  by  our  batteries 
and  dispersed,  disappearing  among  the  broken  ground 
on  the  far  side  of  the  river.  It  was  not  known  at 
the  time  that  the  Turks  had  a  pontoon  bridge  between 
Red  Hill  and  El  Damieh.  It  was  towards  this  bridge 
that  they  were  advancing,  avoiding  the  one  at  El 
Damieh,  which  they  knew  to  be  under  observation 
by  our  troops,  and  within  range  of  our  guns  and 
machine  guns. 

At  three  o'clock  the  1st  A.L.H.  Brigade  was 
directed  by  the  Corps  to  follow  the  rest  of  the  cavalry 
towards  El  Salt,  by  the  Umm  el  Shert  track,  leaving 
only  one  squadron  on  Red  Hill. 

Meanwhile  our  infantry  had  attacked  the  Shunet 
Nimrin  positions  on  the  west,  and  captured  the 
advanced  works,  but  were  unable  to  make  any 
farther  progress,  in  face  of  greatly  superior  numbers 
of  the  enemy. 

The  3rd  A.L.H.  Brigade,  pushing  very  fast  up  the 
track  from  Jisr  el  Damieh,  approached  El  Salt  late 
in  the  afternoon,  and  was  held  up  by  fire  from  some 
enemy  works  covering  the  town  on  the  north-west. 
The  9th  and  10th  Regiments  attacked  these  works 
at  once,  and  stormed  them  with  the  bayonet  after 
a  stiff  fight.  As  soon  as  the  position  was  taken,  the 
8th  Regiment,  which  had  been  held  in  reserve  under 
cover,  mounted  and  galloped  into  the  town,  which 


CAPTURE  OF  EL  SALT  159 

was  full  of  enemy  troops.  The  Turks,  surprised  by 
this  sudden  charge,  fought  without  cohesion,  and 
the  hustling  tactics  of  the  Australians  broke  up  all 
attempts  at  reorganisation.  By  seven  in  the  evening 
the  whole  place  was  in  our  hands,  with  some  three 
hundred  prisoners,  a  large  number  of  machine  guns, 
and  all  the  papers  and  documents  of  the  Turkish 
IVth  Army  headquarters,  which  was  located  in  the 
town.  The  commander  of  the  army,  indeed,  only 
just  made  good  his  escape.  One  regiment  picketed 
the  approaches  of  the  town  on  the  north,  while  the 
position  was  being  cleared  and  the  prisoners  collected. 

A  squadron  of  the  8th  Regiment  pursued  the 
enemy  some  distance  down  the  Amman  road,  and 
captured  a  considerable  number  of  prisoners.  On 
its  return,  about  eleven  o'clock  at  night,  the  10th 
Regiment  was  sent  out  along  the  road  in  the  dark, 
to  make  good  the  junction  of  the  Amman- Ain  el 
Sir  roads,  some  seven  miles  east  of  El  Salt.  The 
enemy  was  located  in  position  astride  the  road  at 
Ain  Hemar,  just  west  of  the  junction,  and,  as  it  was 
impossible  to  ascertain  his  strength  in  the  darkness, 
the  regiment  threw  out  pickets,  and  remained  facing 
the  Turks  till  daylight. 

The  5th  Mounted  and  the  2nd  and  1st  A.L.H. 
Brigades,  with  the  headquarters  of  the  Australian 
Mounted  Division  and  two  mountain  batteries,  were 
overtaken  by  night  on  the  Umm  el  Shert  track. 
They  had  to  lead  their  horses  in  single  file  up  a  very 
steep  goat  path,  and  made  but  slow  progress.  The 
head  of  the  column  reached  El  Salt  earty  in  the 
morning  of  the  1st  of  May,  and  the  2nd  Brigade  at 
once  pushed  on  along  the  Amman  road  to  Ain  Hemar, 
di'ove  off  the  small  force  of  Turks  there,  and  occupied 
the  road  junction.  The  3rd  Brigade  held  an  out- 
post line  north-west  and  north  of  El  Salt,  and  the  1st 


160        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

Brigade  a  similar  line  to  the  west,  astride  the  El  Shert 
track.  The  three  brigades  thus  formed  a  cordon  round 
El  Salt  on  the  east,  north,  and  west.  The  5th  Brigade 
was  ordered  to  move  down  the  main  road  towards 
Shunet  Nimrin,  and  attack  the  enemy's  rear  vigor- 
ously. 

Meanwhile,  down  in  the  valley,  the  4th  A.L.H. 
Brigade  was  in  difficulties.  All  night  long  the  enemy 
had  been  crossing  the  river  unseen,  by  the  pontoon 
bridge  mentioned  above.  About  half-past  seven  in 
the  morning  some  4000  Turkish  infantry  deployed 
from  the  broken  ground  east  of  the  Jordan,  and 
advanced  in  open  order,  with  their  right  flank 
directed  on  the  gap  between  the  left  of  the  4th 
Brigade  and  Red  Hill.  When  the  1st  Brigade  had 
been  withdrawn  the  previous  evening,  leaving  only 
one  squadron  on  the  hill.  General  Grant  had  sent  a 
squadron  from  the  11th  Regiment  to  reinforce  it, 
and  had  ordered  two  armoured  cars  which  he  had 
with  him  to  watch  the  gap.  One  of  these  cars  was 
put  out  of  action  very  soon  by  a  direct  hit  from  a 
Turkish  shell,  but  the  other  remained  in  action, 
and  did  much  to  stem  the  first  rush  of  the  Turks, 
until  it  was  forced  to  retire,  owing  to  casualties  and 
lack  of  ammunition. 

Our  three  batteries  at  once  opened  a  rapid  and 
accurate  fire  on  the  advancing  Turks.  They  were 
immediately  engaged  by  enemy  batteries  on  the  west 
bank  of  the  Jordan,  and  heavily  shelled,  but  con- 
tinued in  action,  and  caused  severe  casualties  to  the 
enemy. 

Simultaneously  with  the  attack  from  the  west, 
about  1000  Turldsh  infantry  and  500  cavalry,  who 
had  made  their  way  up  the  Nahr  el  Zerka,  debouched 
from  the  river  bed,  and  attacked  the  right  flank  of 
the  4th  Brigade.     This  attack  was  driven  off,  after 


FOURTH  BRIGADE  HARD  PRESSED      161 

a  very  sharp  fight,  but  the  Turks  still  continued  to 
advance  over  the  open  ground  from  the  west.  At 
nine  o'clock  their  forward  lines  had  been  annihilated 
by  our  fire,  and  they  fell  back  a  little,  taking  cover 
in  some  broken  ground. 

For  about  an  hour  there  was  a  lull  in  the  fighting. 
At  ten  o'clock  a  large  body  of  the  enemy,  that  had 
evidently  worked  south  along  the  bed  of  the  Jordan, 
suddenly  appeared  in  the  open,  and  swept  over  Red 
Hill,  overwhelming  the  little  garrison  there.  The 
remnants  of  our  two  squadrons  withdrew  to  the 
broken  ground  south  and  south-east  of  the  hill. 

Immediately  afterwards,  the  Turks  attacked  again 
along  the  whole  line,  rushing  forward  recklessly, 
shouting  '  Allah  !  AUah  !  Allah  !  '  Our  small  force, 
outnumbered  by  five  to  one,  and  hampered  by  its 
horses  in  the  difficult  country,  was  gradually  forced 
back  to  the  east  against  the  hiUs,  fighting  desperately 
every  step  of  the  way.  The  right  flank  was  driven 
back  across  the  El  Damieh-El  Salt  track,  and  the 
enemy  entered  the  foothills  north  of  the  track,  and 
began  to  work  round  to  the  rear.  At  the  same  time 
parties  of  Turks  began  to  push  southwards,  between 
the  left  flank  of  the  4th  Brigade  and  the  remnants  of 
the  Red  Hill  garrison,  now  clinging  grimly  to  their 
position  south  of  the  hill.  Two  troops,  all  that  could 
be  spared,  were  sent  out  to  try  and  check  this  move- 
ment long  enough  to  allow  the  right  flank  of  the 
brigade  to  be  withdrawn.  The  brigade  headquarters 
and  every  man  of  '  B '  Battery  H.A.C.  that  could  be 
spared  from  the  service  of  the  guns  were  also  thrown 
into  the  fight.  This  Httle  handful  of  men  fought 
heroically,  but  hopelessly,  against  the  ever  advancing 
waves  of  the  enemy,  and  at  last  was  pushed  back 
across  our  line  of  retreat  to  the  south. 

When  his  right  flank  was  turned,  General  Grant, 

L 


162        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

realising  the  impossibility  of  holding  on  any  longer  in 
the  face  of  such  odds,  had  ordered  a  retirement  to  a 
shorter  line  farther  south,  covering  the  Umm  el 
Shert  track.  The  right  flank  regiment  was  to  retire 
first,  followed  by  the  regiment  in  the  centre,  and  the 
line  was  to  be  re-formed,  east  and  west  across  the 
valley,  just  north  of  Red  Hill. 

The  brigade  was  now,  however,  in  a  very  difficult 
position.  Our  troops  had  been  forced  back  till  they 
were  facing  due  west,  with  their  backs  to  the  tangled 
maze  of  rocky  hills,  impassable  for  cavalry  and  guns. 
Some  of  the  Turks  were  across  their  line  of  retreat 
to  the  south,  though  only  in  small  numbers  as  yet. 
Others  were  working  round  the  right  flank  of  the 
brigade.  All  along  the  line  our  troops  were  hotly 
engaged  at  close  quarters.  To  withdraw  to  a  flank 
under  such  conditions  was  a  very  hazardous  opera- 
tion, but  it  appeared  to  offer  the  only  chance  of  ex- 
tricating the  brigade  from  its  desperate  situation. 

Two  regiments  of  the  New  Zealand  Mounted 
Brigade,  which  had  been  co-operating  in  the  attacks 
on  the  Shunet  Nimrin  positions  from  the  south,  had 
been  despatched  to  the  assistance  of  the  4th  Brigade, 
but  they  had  fifteen  miles  of  bad  ground  to  cover, 
and  could  not  possibly  arrive  in  time  to  save  the 
position.  The  most  they  could  hope  to  do  was  to 
form  a  rallying  point  for  the  4th  Brigade  to  fall  back 
upon. 

The  4th  A.L.H.  Regiment,  on  the  right  flank,  held 
on  till  the  enemy  closed  to  within  200  yards,  in  a 
desperate  effort  to  cover  the  retirement  of  our  guns. 
'  A '  Battery  H.A.C.  was  in  this  sector  of  the  fine, 
the  Notts  Battery  R.H.A.  near  the  centre,  and  '  B  ' 
Battery  H.A.C.  at  the  south  end.  The  position  of 
the  two  northernmost  batteries  was  quite  hopeless. 
Driven  back  to  the  verge  of  the  impassable  hills,  they 


LOSS  OF  R.H.A.  GUNS  163 

were  in  action  in  the  open  in  the  front  line,  and  the 
only  way  of  retreat  feasible  for  wheeled  vehicles  was 
to  the  south,  down  the  line  of  our  troops,  and  in  full 
view  of  the  enemy  at  a^  few  hundred  yards  distance. 

Nevertheless  the  two  batteries  fought  steadily  on, 
attempting  the  impossible  task  of  retiring  by  sections 
to  the  left  flank.  Each  time  a  Turkish  attack  broke 
and  melted  away  before  their  fire,  the  enemy  dead 
lay  a  little  closer  to  our  guns.  Each  time  a  short 
retirement  was  made,  the  heavy  pressure  of  the 
enemy  pushed  the  guns  farther  into  the  hills  ;  and 
each  time  there  were  fewer  men  and  horses  to  move 
them.  At  last  they  were  forced  into  a  position  from 
which  there  was  no  way  out,  and  here  they  made  a 
final  stand,  fighting  till  all  their  ammunition  was 
exhausted,  and  the  Turks  were  within  two  or  three 
hundred  yards  on  three  sides  of  them.  Even  then 
a  last  effort  was  made  to  find  a  way  out,  but  the 
teams  were  mown  down  by  machine-gun  fire,  and 
the  guns  had  to  be  abandoned.  The  remaining  men 
and  horses  scrambled  up  the  hills  to  the  east,  and 
succeeded  in  reaching  the  Wadi  el  Retem.  The 
Australian  troopers  accompanied  them,  fighting  grimly 
and  silently,  as  an  old  dog  fox,  run  into  by  the 
hounds,  turns  on  his  pursuers,  slashing  right  and 
left,  and  dies  with  his  teeth  locked  in  a  hound. 

'  B '  Battery  H.A.C.,  having  a  shorter  distance  to 
go,  succeeded  in  retiring  to  the  south,  through  the 
enemy,  and  came  into  action  again  near  the  Umm  el 
Shert  track,  to  cover  the  withdrawal  of  the  rest  of 
our  troops.  During  its  retirement  a  gun  was  over- 
turned in  the  bottom  of  a  deep  wadi,  and  had  to 
be  abandoned.  A  party  of  men,  under  an  officer, 
descended  into  the  ravine,  and  made  a  fine  effort 
to  right  the  gun  and  get  it  away ;  but  the  Turks 
appeared  on  the  banks  above,  and  opened  fire  on 


164        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

them  with  machine  guns,  killing  nearly  all  the  horses, 
and  the  attempt  had  to  be  abandoned. 

Scrambhng  hurriedly  through  the  foothills,  our 
troops  reassembled  on  the  new  position  about  mid- 
day, and  took  up  a  line  along  the  south  side  of  a 
small  wadi,  facing  north,  with  Red  Hill,  which  was 
occupied  by  the  enemy,  slightly  to  their  left  rear. 
General  Chaytor,  of  the  Anzac  Division,  now  arrived 
in  a  motor,  and  assumed  command.  He  at  once 
decided  to  make  a  further  retirement  to  a  position 
immediately  north  of,  and  covering,  the  Umm  el 
Shert  track.  This  withdrawal  was  carried  out  suc- 
cessfully, with  the  assistance  of  the  two  New  Zealand 
regiments,  and  a  line  was  estabhshed  along  the 
Wadi  el  Retem,  from  the  Jordan,  to  the  foothills. 
Three  times  during  the  day  the  enemy  attacked  this 
position  in  a  most  determined  manner,  but  the  line 
stood  fast,  and  each  attack  was  repulsed  with  heavy 
losses  to  the  Turks.  When  night  fell,  the  vital  Umm 
el  Shert  track,  which  was  now  the  only  way  of  com- 
munication with  El  Salt,  was  still  open.  Late  in 
the  afternoon  touch  was  established  with  the  1st 
A.L.H.  Brigade  in  the  hills. 

While  the  4th  Brigade  was  fighting  desperately  to 
keep  open  our  communications  with  El  Salt,  the 
infantry  were  heavily  engaged  in  another  attack  on 
the  enemy's  position  at  Shunet  Nimrin.  Fighting 
continued  all  day,  but  very  little  headway  was  made. 
Our  light  field  guns  could  make  no  impression  on 
the  rock-hewn  trenches  of  the  Turks,  and  the  wire, 
protected  and  partly  concealed  by  the  innumerable 
boulders  in  front  of  the  positions,  could  not  be  effec- 
tively cut. 

In  spite  of  the  weakness  of  our  force,  and  the 
strength  of  the  enemy's  position,  the  attack  might 
have  been  successful  had  the  Beni  Sakhr  carried  out 


HARD  FIGHTING  IN  THE  HILLS       165 

their  part  of  the  bargain.  Unfortunately,  either 
through  cowardice  or  treachery,  they  played  us  false, 
and  never  put  in  an  appearance  at  all.  Consequently 
the  track  through  Ain  el  Sir  remained  open  to  the 
enemy,  and,  towards  evening,  reinforcements  began 
to  arrive  at  Shunet  Nimrin  by  this  road. 

The  5th  Mounted  Brigade  had  set  out  from  El 
Salt,  soon  after  dawn,  to  co-operate  with  our  infantry 
by  attacking  the  enemy's  rear  about  El  Howeij.  So 
great  were  the  difficulties  of  the  country,  however, 
that  it  was  not  till  nearly  one  o'clock  that  the  brigade 
got  in  touch  with  the  enemy,  near  the  road  bridge 
at  El  Howeij.  The  Turks  were  in  great  force,  and 
strongly  entrenched,  and  the  5th  Brigade  was  un- 
able to  make  much  headway.  The  1st  A.L.H. 
Brigade  was  ordered  to  assist  by  attacking  the 
enemy's  flank  farther  west,  at  El  Haud,  while  still 
guarding  the  El  Shert  track.  Little  progress  was 
made  during  the  day,  and,  as  soon  as  darkness  fell, 
the  2nd  A.L.H.  Brigade  was  withdrawn  from  Ain 
Hemar,  and  sent  to  the  assistance  of  the  5th.  Orders 
were  sent  to  these  two  brigades  that  the  60th  Divi- 
sion would  attack  Shunet  Nimrin  and  El  Haud  at 
dawn  on  the  2nd,  and  that  they  were  to  co-operate 
in  this  attack  by  endeavouring  to  seize  the  high 
ground  about  Arkub  el  Khaluf . 

In  view  of  the  precarious  position  of  the  4th  A.L.H. 
Brigade,  down  in  the  valley,  the  1st  Brigade  was 
ordered  to  employ  its  whole  strength  in  protecting 
the  Umm  el  Shert  track  from  all  directions,  and  to 
keep  touch  with  the  4th.  These  dispositions  left 
only  the  3rd  Brigade  to  protect  El  Salt  on  the  east, 
north,  and  north-west. 

Our  cavahy  were  now  in  a  very  precarious  posi- 
tion. The  strong  force  at  Shunet  Nimrin  barred  the 
main  road,  and  the  Wadi  Arseniyat  track,  on  the 


166        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

south-west.  The  Turkish  3rd  Cavalry  Division  and 
part  of  an  infantry  division,  having  cleared  our  troops 
from  their  Une  of  advance  from  Jisr  el  Damieh,  were 
advancing  on  El  Salt  from  the  north-west ;  and  a 
tliird  force  was  closing  in  on  the  east  from  Amman. 
The  only  line  of  supply  or  retreat  still  open  was  by 
the  difficult  Umm  el  Shert  track. 

Ammunition  and  food  were  running  short,  and 
fresh  supplies  had  to  be  sent  up  to  El  Salt  before 
morning.  No  vehicles  could  get  up  the  Umm  el 
Shert  track,  and,  as  the  journey  had  to  be  done  in 
the  night,  camels  were  equally  out  of  the  question. 
Each  of  the  cavalry  regiments  had  at  this  time  a  few 
donkeys,  which  were  used  by  cooks  and  batmen,  who 
did  not  usually  accompany  their  units  into  action. 
About  200  of  these  were  collected  at  Ghoraniyeh 
in  the  evening,  loaded  with  ammunition  and  stores, 
and  sent  off  in  charge  of  a'  subaltern  of  the 
gunners. 

Marching  all  night,  they  succeeded  in  reaching  El 
Salt,  which  Avas  then  being  hotly  attacked  by  the 
enemy,  on  the  morning  of  the  2nd,  delivered  their 
sorely  needed  ammunition,  and  returned  safely  to 
Ghoraniyeh.  The  distance  covered  on  the  double 
journey  was  forty  miles,  over  an  appalling  country, 
and  with  the  prospect  of  stumbling  into  the  enemy 
at  any  moment.  The  men  of  the  convoy  had  had 
no  sleep  for  the  two  previous  nights,  and,  being 
cavalrymen,  were  unaccustomed  to  marching.  That 
they  carried  out  their  task  in  the  face  of  such  diffi- 
culties, with  no  greater  mishap  than  the  loss  of  a 
number  of  donkeys,  which  strayed  from  their  half- 
dead  drivers  on  the  way  back,  is  a  fine  tribute  to  the 
hardihood  and  determination  of  the  men  and  the 
skill  of  the  young  officer  in  charge. 

The  60th  Division  began  the  attack  before  dawn. 


EL  SALT  SURROUNDED  167 

but  made  very  slow  progress  up  the  rocky  steeps  of 
Shunet  Nimrin,  in  face  of  the  strong  force  of  Turks, 
well  posted  on  the  heights  above.  The  5th  Mounted 
Brigade  commenced  its  advance  on  the  Turkish 
right  flank  at  El  Howeij  about  eight  o'clock,  having 
been  delayed  in  coming  to  grips  with  the  enemj'', 
owing  to  the  extreme  difficulty  of  the  country. 
Even  after  the  advanced  troops  of  the  brigade  had 
engaged,  it  was  estimated  that  the  attack  would  take 
three  hours  to  develop.  At  half-past  ten,  however, 
the  whole  brigade  was  in  action  against  the  first 
objective,  the  Howeij  bridge  position.  The  2nd 
Brigade,  which  had  farther  to  go,  had  not  yet  reached 
El  Hand. 

Early  in  the  morning,  the  enemy  column  that  had 
advanced  from  El  Damieh,  after  driving  in  the  4th 
Brigade,  reached  El  Salt,  and  developed  a  strong 
attack  on  the  position  held  by  part  of  the  3rd  Brigade, 
north-west  of  the  village.  Under  the  weight  of  this 
attack,  our  line  was  pressed  back  a  little,  and,  at 
eleven  o'clock,  a  regiment  from  the  1st  Brigade  had 
to  be  despatched  to  the  aid  of  the  3rd.  Half  an 
hour  later  a  second  regiment  was  withdi'awn  from 
the  1st  Brigade,  for  the  same  purpose.  The  donkey 
convoy,  carrying  100,000  rounds  of  small-arm  ammuni- 
tion and  about  300  rounds  for  the  mountain  batteries, 
arrived  at  a  most  critical  moment.  The  3rd  Brigade 
machine  guns,  which  had  almost  been  reduced  to 
silence,  awoke  again,  and  the  Turkish  attack  was 
temporarily  driven  back. 

Just  at  this  time,  the  brigadiers  of  the  2nd  and 
5th  Brigades  telephoned  to  El  Salt  that  the  country 
was  so  difficult  that  they  saw  no  prospect  of  gain- 
ing their  objectives  before  dark.  General  Hodgson 
directed  them  to  push  on  as  fast  as  they  could,  and 
attack  the  enemy  with  the  utmost  vigour,  in  order 


168        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

to  assist  our  infantry  in  their  attempt  on  the  western 
slopes  of  the  Shunet  Nimrin  positions. 

Half  an  hour  later  General  Kelly,  commanding  the 
5th  Brigade,  reported  his  left  flank  in  danger  from 
a  force  of  the  enemy  at  El  Fuheis,  south  of  El  Salt. 
This  was  most  disquieting  news.  With  a  large  force 
of  Turks  attacking  El  Salt  on  the  north  and  north- 
west, and  another  force  reported  advancing  on  the 
east  from  Amman,  General  Hodgson  had  no  troops 
to  spare  for  defence  on  the  south  side.  The  cavalry 
were  labouring  under  the  inevitable  disadvantage  of 
having  a  quarter  of  their  number  occupied  in  hold- 
ing the  horses  of  the  remainder,  since  all  fighting  in 
such  country  had  to  be  done  on  foot.  A  whole  brigade 
of  cavahy  was,  therefore,  barely  equivalent  in  rifle 
strength  to  a  single  infantry  battalion. 

There  was  a  gap  of  five  miles  of  jagged,  mountain 
country  between  the  small  force  at  El  Salt  and  the 
5th  Brigade,  which  was  fully  occupied  at  El  Howeij, 
and  it  appeared  probable  that  the  enemy  troops  at 
El  Fuheis  might  penetrate  through  this  gap.  In 
that  case  the  position  of  the  5th  Brigade,  and  pro- 
bably also  of  the  2nd,  would  be  hopeless.  General 
Hodgson,  however,  could  send  no  help.  The  only 
chance  lay  in  driving  in  the  enemy's  flank  at  El 
Howeij  and  El  Haud,  and  thus  giving  our  infantry 
the  opportunity  to  assault  Shunet  Nimrin  from  the 
west  with  some  prospect  of  success.  He  ordered  the 
5th  and  2nd  Brigades  to  push  on  at  all  costs. 

Half  an  hoiu*  later,  however,  the  advance  of  the 
enemy  force  from  Amman  had  become  so  threatening 
that  he  telephoned  to  the  Corps  Commander,  asking 
if  the  attack  of  these  two  brigades  could  be  stopped, 
in  order  that  he  might  have  them  in  hand  for  the 
defence  of  El  Salt.  Our  infantry  at  this  time  were 
closely  engaged  on  the  west  of  Nimrin,  fighting  their 


FAILURE  OF  HOWEIJ  ATTACK         169 

way  desperately  up  the  hills,  and  there  still  appeared 
to  be  a  chance  of  carrying  the  position,  provided  the 
cavalry  continued  to  press  against  the  enemy's  right 
flank.  General  Chauvel,  therefore,  decided  that  the 
attack  of  the  2nd  and  5th  Brigades  must  be  con- 
tinued, but  allowed  one  regiment  of  the  2nd  to  be 
withdrawn  for  the  defence  of  El  Salt.  Shortly  after- 
wards he  consented  to  a  second  regiment  being  with- 
drawn from  this  brigade.  This  left  only  the  5th 
Brigade,  already  reduced  in  strength  by  casualties, 
and  one  regiment  of  the  2nd  Brigade,  to  carry  on 
the  action  at  El  Howeij. 

By  two  o'clock  these  troops  had  progressed,  with 
infinite  difficulty  and  no  Uttle  loss,  to  the  edge  of 
a  tributary  of  the  Wadi  Nimrin,  just  north  of 
El  Howeij.  At  haK-past  two  the  1st  Brigade  was 
ordered  to  send  another  regiment  at  once  to  join  the 
two  regiments  of  the  2nd  Brigade  at  El  Salt,  who 
were  hard  pressed.  There  was  now  only  one  regi- 
ment of  the  1st  Brigade  left  on  the  west  side  of  the 
village,  and  this  was  the  only  regiment  of  the  force 
in  the  Une  not  in  action  with  the  enemy.  The  3rd 
Brigade,  holding  a  hne  north-west  and  north  of  El 
Salt,  was  heavily  engaged  all  along  the  line.  Two 
regiments  of  the  2nd  and  one  of  the  1st  Brigade  were 
fighting  on  the  north-east  and  east,  and  the  remain- 
ing regiment  of  the  1st  was  in  divisional  reserve  in 
the  village. 

At  haK-past  four  General  Kelly  reported  that  he 
was  unable  to  advance  at  all.  A  body  of  Turkish 
cavalry  was  threatening  his  left  flank  and  rear,  and 
he  was  anxious  about  his  led  horses.  General  Hodg- 
son had  no  troops  to  spare,  and  indeed  was  hard  put 
to  hold  his  own  at  El  Salt.  He  directed  General 
KeUy,  while  protecting  his  flank  and  rear  as  best  he 
could  with  the  6th  A.L.H.  Regiment  (2nd  Brigade), 


170        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

to  put  in  his  reserve  regiment  in  one  last  attack  on 
El  Howeij.  If  this  attack  failed,  he  was  to  remain 
in  contact  with  the  enemy,  and  attract  as  much 
attention  as  possible. 

General  Kelly  formed  a  defensive  left  flank  with 
the  6th  A.L.H.  Regiment,  and  threw  in  his  reserve 
regiment  to  the  attack.  Scrambling  painfully  up  the 
steep,  rocky  slope,  the  three  regiments  struggled 
forward*  with  the  utmost  gallantry,  against  a  mur- 
derous fire.  Worn  out  by  three  days  and  nights  of 
continuous  marching  and  fighting,  reduced  by  casu- 
alties, and  with  no  supports  to  give  their  attack 
depth,  they  had  no  chance  of  reaching  the  enemy's 
position.  The  Turks,  strong  in  numbers,  and  well 
posted  in  trenches  and  behind  sangars,  swept  the 
slope  with  a  hail  of  bullets,  through  which  our  little 
force  could  make  no  headway.  The  attack  failed 
completely.  The  brigade  re-formed,  and  took  up  a 
fire  position  on  the  north  side  of  the  wadi,  facing  the 
Turks. 

On  the  west  the  attack  of  our  infantry  had  also 
failed,  and,  in  the  evening,  our  troops  drew  ofi  a 
little,  and  remained  in  observation  of  the  Turks 
during  the  night.  The  enemy  had  been  greatly  re- 
inforced at  Shunet  Nimrin  during  the  day,  and  it 
was  now  clear  that  the  operations  would  have  to  be 
abandoned.  The  problem  was  how  to  withdraw  the 
cavalry  from  the  mountains.  All  day  long  the 
Turks  had  been  closing  in  on  El  Salt  from  the  east, 
north,  and  north-west.  From  midnight  onwards  the 
enemy's  fire  had  been  very  heavy  on  the  front  of  the 
2nd  Brigade,  and,  in  the  early  hours  of  the  morning, 
his  troops  had  worked  up  to  within  fifty  yards  of 
the  3rd  Brigade  at  Kefr  Huda.  At  the  first  sign  of 
dawn  on  the  3rd,  a  squadron  from  this  brigade  made 
a    desperate    bayonet    charge    on    this    force.     The 


Diagrctm,   cu.a.-sLi 


sbxctUiQ  &Kt    sOuaUon,  on  the  ^7 rd.  of  Max/  19 fS. 


172        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

Australians  crashed  into  the  Turks,  just  as  they  were 
massing  for  an  assault,  fighting  like  tigers,  and  drove 
them  back  more  than  half  a  mile,  killing  over  a 
hundred  of  them. 

This  charge  reheved  the  pressure  on  the  north  side 
for  a  little  while,  but  another  large  enemy  force  now 
appeared  on  the  Amman  road  to  the  east,  and  at 
once  attacked  the  2nd  Brigade.  Our  troops  were 
forced  back  by  the  weight  of  the  attack,  and,  for  a 
time,  it  looked  as  if  our  line  would  be  broken.  The 
situation  was  cleared  by  the  action  of  Major  Shannon, 
commanding  the  8th  A.L.H.  Regiment  (3rd  Brigade), 
which  was  temporarily  attached  to  the  2nd  Brigade. 
He  despatched  a  single  troop,  all  that  he  could  spare, 
with  instructions  to  work  round  the  Turks'  right 
flank,  unseen  by  the  enemy  if  possible,  and  charge 
them  from  the  rear.  This  desperate  expedient  was 
completely  successful.  The  troop  succeeded  in  getting 
behind  the  Turks  just  as  they  were  preparing  for 
another  attack,  and  charged  them  with  the  bayonet, 
while  the  remainder  of  the  8th  Regiment  attacked 
in  front.  There  were  only  twenty-five  men  in  the 
troop,  but  they  swung  into  the  enemy  with  magni- 
ficent dash  and  a  great  deal  of  noise,  and  the  sudden 
and  unexpected  attack  from  behind  so  disconcerted 
the  Turks  that  they  were  thrown  into  confusion. 
The  8th  Regiment,  charging  in  front  at  the  same 
time,  completed  the  discomfiture  of  the  enemy  troops, 
who  were  driven  back  disorganised,  and  left  300 
prisoners  in  our  hands. 

This  success  held  up  the  enemy's  offensive  for 
some  time,  but,  about  seven  o'clock,  the  Turks  were 
seen  to  be  again  massing  for  an  attack,  and  it  became 
necessary  to  withdraw  the  6th  A.L.H.  Regiment 
from  El  Howeij  to  support  the  3rd  Brigade.  Shortly 
afterwards  the  5tli  Brigade  was  called  on  to  send  a 


EVACUATION  OF  EL  SALT  173 

regiment  to  El  Salt.  The  remaining  two  regiments, 
a  mere  handful  of  men,  were  directed  to  watch  the 
rear  of  our  force  at  El  Salt,  and  endeavour  to  prevent 
the  eneni}^  from  advancing  up  the  road  from  Shunet 
Nimrin.  Our  infantry  on  the  west  assisted  in  this 
task  by  keeping  up  a  sharp  fire  fight. 

Arrangements  were  now  put  in  hand  to  evacuate 
the  wounded  and  such  of  the  camel  transport  as 
was  not  required  with  the  fighting  troops,  down  the 
El  Shert  track,  preparatory  to  the  withdrawal  of  the 
whole  force.  Camels  are  slow  and  obstinate  beasts, 
even  in  their  native  desert.  Moving  in  single  file 
down  the  precipitous  goat  path  to  Umm  el  Shert, 
they  made  barely  half  a  mile  an  hour.  Frightened 
by  the  shppery  rocks,  their  feet  cut  and  bruised  by 
the  sharp  stones  of  the  path,  groaning  and  protesting 
in  the  manner  of  camels  at  every  step,  the  unwieldy 
beasts  lurched  perilously  down  the  track.  Every 
now  and  then  one  of  them  would  stop  short,  blocking 
the  way  for  those  behind  it,  and  refuse  obstinately  to 
move  on.  What  the  wounded  men  in  the  cacolets 
must  have  suffered  during  this  terrible  journey  can 
sc8.rcely  be  imagined.  It  was  past  mid-day  before 
the  last  camel  had  cleared  El  Salt. 

Since  the  failure  of  their  first  attacks  in  the  morn- 
ing, the  enemy  troops  had  maintained  a  heavy  fire  on 
our  positions  east  and  north  of  the  town,  but  had  made 
no  further  serious  attempt  at  an  assault.  Parties 
of  them  were,  however,  working  round  to  the  south, 
and  the  situation  was  becoming  increasingly  grave. 

At  haK-past  twelve  a  force  of  about  3000  Turkish 
infantry  was  observed  advancing  up  the  El  Damieh 
track,  the  head  of  the  column  being  then  about  three 
miles  from  El  Salt.  Two  hours  later  this  force  had 
deployed,  and  was  attacking  the  3rd  Brigade.  At 
the  same  time  the  enemy  renewed  his  pressure  on 


174        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

the  east.  As  the  wounded  were  now  well  on  their 
way  down  to  the  valley,  the  Corps  Commander 
ordered  General  Hodgson  to  withdraw  to  a  position 
south-west  of  El  Salt,  covering  the  El  Shert  track. 
As  soon  as  this  withdrawal  began,  the  enemy  pushed 
forward,  and  engaged  our  troops  most  severely.  One 
of  our  posts  on  the  north-west  was  driven  in,  but, 
before  any  counter-attack  could  be  organised,  a 
message  was  received  from  Corps  Headquarters 
ordering  the  cavalry  to  withdraw  altogether  from 
the  hills,  if  able  to  do  so. 

The  1st  Brigade  was  now  in  position  across  the 
El  Shert  track,  south-west  of  El  Salt,  and  facing 
east.  The  remainder  of  the  force  withdiew  through 
this  line,  by  regiments,  after  dark,  and  marched  down 
the  track  during  the  night.  As  they  could  only 
move  in  single  file,  daylight  found  them  strung  out 
for  several  miles  along  the  path.  The  evacuation 
of  El  Salt  was  completed  by  half-past  two  in  the 
morning,  but  the  Turks  did  not  discover  this  fact 
till  dawn.  They  at  once  pushed  on  through  the 
village  to  attack  the  1st  Brigade.  At  the  same  time 
enemy  guns  heavily  shelled  the  rearguard  of  the 
brigade,  and  several  hostile  aeroplanes  bombed  our 
troops  in  the  defile,  causing  a  number  of  casualties. 
The  Turks  continued  to  press  the  1st  Brigade  rear- 
guard till  it  was  three  miles  west  of  El  Salt,  when 
they  drew  off,  evidently  fearing  to  venture  farther 
towards  our  troops  in  the  valley. 

By  half-past  ten  the  whole  of  our  force  was  clear 
of  the  hills,  and  moving  in  extended  order  down  the 
valley  towards  El  Ghoraniyeh,  covered  by  the  4th 
A.L.H.  Brigade  and  part  of  the  New  Zealand  Brigade. 
These  two  brigades  had  been  in  action  almost  con- 
tinuously since  they  had  taken  up  the  position  cover- 
ing the  Umm  el  Shert  track  on  the  1st.     They  had. 


WITHDRAWAL  OF  OUR  FORCE         175 

however,  succeeded  in  repelling  all  attacks,  with 
heavy  losses  to  the  enemy.  On  the  evening  of  the 
3rd  the  Turks,  abandoning  the  attempt  to  break 
our  line  in  the  valley,  had  withdrawn  to  the  north, 
and  followed  their  comrjades  towards  El  Salt.  The 
dogged  fighting  of  the  4th  Brigade  and  the  New 
Zealanders  had  saved  the  situation.  Had  they 
given  way,  the  Turks  would  have  reached  the  Umm 
el  Shert  track,  and  the  whole  of  our  cavalry  force  in 
the  hills  must  then,  almost  certainly,  have  fallen 
into  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 

By  nightfall  the  whole  of  our  force  had  withdrawn 
behind  a  brigade  of  infantry  which  had  been  brought 
across  the  Jordan  from  the  west  to  form  an  extended 
bridgehead.  During  the  night  the  troops  recrossed 
the  river,  and  the  force  was  all  safely  on  the  west 
bank  before  morning  on  the  5th.  The  Ghoraniyeh 
bridgehead  was  restored,  and  the  Australian  Mounted 
Division  took  over  the  left  sector  of  the  Jordan 
Valley  defences,  along  the  river  Auja,  including  a  new 
bridge  and  bridgehead  which  had  been  thrown  across 
the  Jordan,  at  its  junction  with  the  Auja,  during  the 
operations.  The  Anzac  Mounted  Division  took  over 
the  right  sector  of  the  valley  defences,  including  the 
Ghoraniyeh  bridgehead. 

Although  the  raid  had  failed  in  its  primary  object, 
which  was  the  destruction  of  the  enemy  force  at 
Shunet  Nimrin,  it  had  not  been  altogether  unsuccess- 
ful. In  the  first  place  the  Turks  had  been  very 
roughly  handled,  and,  besides  having  many  of  their 
troops  killed  and  wounded,  had  lost  nearly  1000 
prisoners.  The  really  important  result  of  the  opera- 
tions, however,  lay  in  the  fact  that  the  raid  finally 
convinced  the  enemy  that,  in  our  next  general 
advance,  our  cavalry  would  be  directed  on  Amman 
and  Deraa  Junction. 


176        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

Under  the  influence  of  this  idea,  he  was  led  to 
place  practically  the  whole  of  his  IVth  Army  east 
of  the  Jordan,  which  was  thus  separated  by  the  river, 
with  its  deep  and  difficult  channel,  from  the  remainder 
of  his  forces  in  the  Judsean  Hills.  It  was  this  fact 
that  enabled  us,  in  the  following  September,  to  en- 
velop and  completely  destroy  the  Vllth  and  Vlllth 
Armies,  before  tlie  IVth  Army  could  intervene. 


r-A  ''-rjm»  '.  j!«:  :^. 


The  River  Jordan  at  Ghoranitseh. 


Shunet  Nimrin  and  the  Amman  Road.     Looking  east,  towards  the 
positions  held  by  the  enemy. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

THE  VALLEY  OF  DESOLATION 

The  Commander-in-Chief  had  now  to  decide  whether 
or  not  he  should  hold  the  Jordan  Valley  during  the 
summer.  Local  authorities  declared  emphatically 
that  it  was  impossible  for  Europeans  to  exist  there 
during  the  summer  months,  owing  to  the  intense 
heat  and  the  prevalence  of  malaria  of  a  most  virulent 
type.  They  pointed  to  the  fact  that  even  the  native 
Arabs  move  out  of  it  to  the  hills  during  the  hot 
weather,  and  that  Jericho  itself  is  deserted.  The 
only  inhabitants  of  the  district  during  the  summer 
are  the  small  and  miserable  tribe  of  the  Abid  Miriam, 
a  people  of  negroid  origin,  descendants  of  African 
slaves  imported  by  the  Arabs  in  former  times.  These 
Uve  about  Ain  el  Duk,  where  they  carry  on  a  rude 
form  of  irrigation  by  means  of  a  few  of  the  old, 
Roman  water  channels  that  still  exist. 

The  official  military  handbook  of  Palestine  con- 
firmed the  local  opinion  by  the  statement  that 
'  Nothing  is  known  of  the  climate  of  the  lower  Jordan 
Valley  in  summer  time,  since  no  civilised  human 
being  has  yet  been  found  to  spend  a  summer  there  '  ! 

On  the  other  hand,  there  were  several  strong 
reasons  for  continuing  to  hold  the  valley  line  if 
possible.  Some  of  these  have  been  indicated  at  the 
beginning  of  Chapter  xi.,  but  there  was  now  another, 
and  stronger,  reason  for  holding  it,  which  was  to 
confirm  the  enemy  in  his  belief  that  we  intended  to 
strike  east  of  the  Jordan  in  our  next  big  advance. 

M 


178        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

Moreover,  since  it  was  clear  that  it  would  be  neces- 
sary to  occupy  the  valley  and  the  river  crossings, 
when  the  next  advance  was  commenced,  it  was  con- 
sidered less  costly  to  continue  to  hold  it  during  the 
summer  than  to  have  to  retake  it  later  on. 

After  careful  consideration,  General  Allenby  re- 
solved to  hold  the  valley  line  permanently,  and,  as 
several  of  the  German  staff  documents  which  we  had 
captured  assumed  that  we  would  strike  in  that  part 
of  our  Une  near  which  the  cavalry  was  stationed,  it 
was  decided  to  put  them  there. 

The  line  was  accordingly  organised  in  two  sectors. 
The  left  sector  extended  from  the  foot  of  the  Judsean 
mountains,  along  the  north  bank  of  the  Wadi  el 
Auja,  to  its  junction  witli  the  Jordan,  and  included 
the  bridge  and  bridgehead  there.  A  rocky  ridge, 
several  hundred  feet  high,  ran  north  and  south  through 
this  position,  from  Tel  el  Sultan,  near  Jericho,  and 
extended  north  of  the  Auja,  along  the  hill  of  Abu 
Tellul,  ending  in  an  abrupt  bluff  at  Musallabeh.  This 
ridge  was  held  by  us,  so  thstt  this  portion  of  the  line 
resembled  a  fist  with  the  first  finger  extended,  the 
finger  representing  the  ridge,  and  the  Wadi  el  Auja 
the  line  of  the  knuckles.  Abu  Tellul  and  Musallabeh 
overlooked  a  dreary  expanse,  part  swamp,  part  stony 
plain,  covered  with  large  patches  of  dense  scrub,  and 
intersected  by  innumerable  deep  wadis.  The  Turks 
were  able  to  move  unseen  among  the  scrub  and  wadis 
all  round  the  sahent  in  our  line,  a  fact  which  caused 
us  much  annoyance  all  the  time  we  were  in  occupa- 
tion of  the  valley.  It  was,  however,  necessary  to 
hold  Abu  Tellul  and  Musallabeh,  both  to  preserve 
the  water  supply  of  the  Auja  for  ourselves,  and  to 
deny  it  to  the  enemy. 

The  right  sector  extended  from  the  mouth  of  the 
Auja,  along  the  right  bank   of  the  Jordan,  to  the 


CLIMATE  OF  THE  JORDAN  VALLEY    179 

Dead  Sea,  and  included  the  bridges  and  bridgehead 
at  Ghoraniyeh. 

The  reorganisation  of  the  cavalry  was  completed 
by  the  middle  of  May,  and  the  Desert  Mounted  Corps 
now  consisted  of  the  Anzac  and  Australian  Mounted 
Divisions  and  the  4th  and  5th  (Indian)  cavalry  divi- 
sions.^ The  valley  line  was  held  by  two  cavalry 
divisions,  one  in  each  sector,  supported  by  a  brigade 
of  Indian  infantry,  and  two  battalions  of  the  British 
West  Indies  Regiment.  This  organisation  permitted 
of  two  divisions  at  a  time  being  withdrawn  to  rest 
in  camps  established  in  the  cool  hills  near  Bethlehem, 
so  that  each  cavalry  division  had  alternatively  a 
month  on  duty  in  the  valley,  and  a  month  at  rest  in 
the  hills.  For  the  gunners  of  the  Corps,  however, 
there  was  no  relief,  owing  to  the  shortage  of  artillery 
in  the  force,  and  they  had  to  pass  the  whole  summer 
in  the  valley,  till  the  end  of  July,  an  experience  which 
none  of  them  is  ever  likely  to  forget. 

In  past  ages  the  Dead  Sea  covered  a  much  greater 
area  than  it  does  at  the  present  day.  The  lower 
Jordan  valley  is,  therefore,  the  bottom  of  the  old 
sea,  and  is  covered  with  a  layer  of  white  marl,  several 
feet  deep,  which  is  strongly  impregnated  with  salt. 
In  spring  the  land  supports  a  little  thin  grass,  but 
the  fierce  sun  of  early  summer  scorches  it  in  a  few 
days  to  brittle  dust.  Under  the  feet  of  men  and 
horses  the  marl  of  the  valley  floor  soon  broke  up  into 
a  white  powder,  as  fine  as  flour,  which  lay  every- 
where, in  places  over  a  foot  deep.  Every  morning, 
after  a  breathless  night,  a  strong  hot  wind  arose 
from  the  north,  and  swept  the  dust  down  the  valley 
in  dense,  choking  clouds.  About  eleven  o'clock  in 
the  morning  the  wind  used  to  die  down  as  suddenl}^ 
as  it  had  arisen,  and  for  about  half  an  hour  there  was 

^  See  Appendix  i.  a,  for  detail  of  cavuirjr. 


180       THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

a  period  of  deathlike  stillness,  accompanied  by  the 
most  intense  heat  of  the  day.  Then  the  wind  recom- 
menced violently,  but  blowing  from  the  south,  and 
continued  till  about  eight  in  the  evening.  Innumer- 
able, violent  air  currents  swept  about  the  valley, 
often  carrying  along  '  dust  devils  '  of  immense  height. 
It  was  no  uncommon  thing  for  one  of  these  devils  to 
tear  up  a  tent,  and  lift  it  bodily  high  into  the  air. 

There  was  a  tiny  patch  of  green  cultivation  at 
Ain  el  Duk,  about  five  miles  behind  out  line,  and 
another  at  Jericho,  and  a  few  dusty  thorn  trees  grew 
along  the  Wadi  el  Auja.  The  rest  of  the  valley  was 
a  barren  and  awful  wilderness  of  dust,  stones,  and 
boulders,  inhabited,  before  we  came,  only  by  snakes 
and  scorpions. 

The  average  maximum  daily  temperature  during 
July,  as  taken  at  the  R.A.  Headquarters  on  the  top  of 
the  Tel  el  Sultan-Abu  TeUul  Ridge,  was  113-2°  F.  in 
the  shade.  The  highest  reading  recorded  during  the 
month  was  122°  and  the  lowest  107°.  At  the  foot  of 
the  ridge  the  temperature  was  about  3°  higher,  and 
at  Ghoraniyeh  it  reached  130°  on  several  occasions. 
During  August  the  temperature  rose  still  higher, 
but  no  daily  record  was  then  kept  of  the  thermometer 
readings.  The  tremendous  evaporation  of  the  Dead 
Sea  keeps  the  atmosphere  moist,  and  adds  to  the 
discomfort  caused  by  the  great  heat,  while  the  in- 
creased air  pressure,  due  to  the  depth  of  the  valley 
floor  below  sea  level  (1200  feet  at  Ghoraniyeh),  in- 
duces a  feeling  of  lassitude  against  which  it  is  difficult 
to  fight. 

The  effect  of  the  climate  on  the  horses  was  most 
remarkable.  After  about  three  weeks  in  the  valley, 
they  became  so  tired  and  dispirited,  though  they  had 
little  or  no  work  to  do,  that  they  could  scarce  drag 
themselves  the  mile  or  so  to  water  and  back  again. 


DISEASE  181 

An  unceasing  campaign  was  carried  on  by  the 
medical  staff  of  the  Corps  against  the  malaria-bear- 
ing mosquitoes  which  infested  the  valley,  and  this 
undoubtedly  did  much  to  lessen  the  incidence  of 
malaria,  especially  of  the  malignant  type,  among  the 
troops.  In  spite  of  all  efforts,  however,  the  sick  rate 
was  high,  as  it  was  bound  to  be  under  such  conditions. 
Deaths  and  evacuations  of  sick  to  hospital  averaged 
together  about  one  per  cent,  of  the  total  strength  per 
day,  which  meant  that  the  whole  force  in  the  valley 
would  have  to  be  replaced  every  three  months. 
Actually,  however,  the  alternate  month  in  the  hills 
enjoyed  by  the  cavalry  enabled  many  men,  who  had 
been  sent  to  hospital,  to  recover  in  time  to  do  another 
tour  of  duty  in  the  valley.  Curiously  enough  the 
Indian  troops  suffered  more  severely  than  did  the 
British. 

In  this  climate,  and  under  such  conditions,  His 
Majesty's  troops,  white,  brown,  and  black,  held  the 
line  throughout  the  summer  of  1918,  and  it  is  safe  to 
say  that  few  other  troops  in  the  Great  War  endured 
greater  hardships  and  discomfort  than  did  the  Jordan 
Valley  force. 

There  was  but  one  action  of  importance  during  the 
summer.  On  the  14th  July  two  Turkish  divisions, 
supported  by  three  battalions  of  German  infantry, 
attacked  our  positions  at  Musallabeh  and  Abu  Tellul 
from  the  west.  Under  cover  of  darkness  the  German 
troops,  having  cut  our  wire,  penetrated  between  two 
of  our  posts,  and  actually  reached  our  second  Hne 
on  the  top  of  Abu  Tellul,  which  was  not  occupied, 
owing  to  lack  of  troops. 

The  1st  A.L.H.  Brigade  was  holding  this  sector  of 
the  line  at  the  time,  supported  by  a  miscellaneous 
collection  of  artillery — horse,  field,  mountain  and  siege. 
The  attack  was  preceded  by  a  very  heavy  enemy 


182        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

bombardment,  which  cut  all  our  telephone  wires.  The 
batteries  were  thus,  early  in  the  fight,  out  of  touch 
with  theii*  observers,  and,  as  the  latter  had  in  some 
cases  to  move  hurriedly  from  their  posts  to  avoid 
capture,  it  was  some  time  before  communications 
could  be  re-established.  In  the  meantime  the  bat- 
teries continued  to  fire  on  their  S.O.S.  lines. 

The  commanding  oflEicer  of  the  2nd  A.L.H.  regi- 
ment, against  which  the  brunt  of  the  attack  fell, 
narrowly  escaped  capture,  l:>ut  succeeded  with  his 
staff  in  reaching  a  post  in  the  second  line  on  Abu 
Tellul.  In  the  uncertain  light  just  before  dawn,  he 
observed  a  large  body  of  troops  coming  up  the  hill 
towards  him,  and  at  first  took  these  for  some  of  his 
own  men  retiring  from  the  outer  posts.  When  they 
reached  the  wire,  however,  and  began  to  cut  it,  he 
realised  that  they  were  the  enemy,  and  at  once  gave 
the  order  to  open  rapid  fire  on  them.  This  had  the 
effect  of  driving  the  Germans,  who  were  ignorant  of 
the  fact  that  there  were  only  twelve  men  in  front  of 
them,  away  to  the  right,  where  they  occupied  a  post 
near  the  end  of  Abu  Tellul,  known  as  the  Bluff. 

Meanwhile  the  artillery  officer  with  this  section  of 
the  defence,  who  had  had  both  his  signallers  wounded, 
succeeded  in  getting  a  runner  back  to  one  of  the 
Horse  Artillery  batteries,  with  news  of  the  state  of 
affairs.  An  officer  at  once  set  out  from  his  battery 
with  two  signallers,  and,  riding  as  far  as  the  foot  of 
Abu  Tellul,  under  very  heavy  shell  fire,  dismounted, 
and  set  to  work  repairing  the  telephone  wires.  Having 
got  into  communication  with  the  battery,  the  officer 
went  forward  on  foot  with  his  signallers,  running  out 
a  fresh  wiie,  and  reached  the  top  of  Abu  TeUul  just 
after  daylight.  Here  he  found  two  officers  and  twelve 
men  of  the  reserve  regiment  of  the  1st  A.L.H.  Brigade, 
who  were  on  their  way  to  counter-attack  the  Bluff,  a 


THE  ACTION  OF  ABU  TELLUL  183 

strongly  entrenched  position  in  whicli  there  were,  at 
the  time,  some  eighty  German  infantry  !  The  party 
moved  forward  cautiously,  taking  advantage  of  the 
cover  afforded  by  the  numerous  rocks,  but  had  not 
gone  far  when  an  enemy  shell  burst  among  them, 
kilHng  and  wounding  six.  One  of  the  officers  there- 
upon went  back  for  reinforcements,  and  the  remain- 
ing nine,  including  the  gunners,  continued  their 
advance.  After  going  a  short  distance  farther,  they 
observed  a  number  of  the  enemy  near  the  Bluff, 
some  200  yards  distant.  Fortunately  the  telephone 
line  still  held,  so  the  fire  of  the  battery  was  directed 
on  the  enemy.  The  little  13-pounder  H.E.  shell 
burst  with  excellent  effect  among  the  rocks  of  the 
position,  and  the  Germans  very  soon  had  enough 
of  them,  and  surrendered.  They  were  collected,  to 
the  number  of  forty,  disarmed,  and  put  in  charge  of 
two  of  the  Australians,  while  the  '  counter-attack,' 
now  reduced  to  seven,  moved  forward  again.  Another 
body  of  the  enemy  was  soon  discovered  occupying 
the  end  part  of  Abu  Tellul.  The  battery  opened 
fire  on  these,  and  after  a  few  minutes,  believing  that 
they  were  cut  off,  they  too  put  up  a  white  flag  and 
laid  down  their  arms.  There  were  six  officers  and 
eighty  men  here,  and  their  chagrin  was  great  on  dis- 
covering that  they  had  surrendered  to  seven  men. 
However,  they  were  told  that  the  rest  of  their  force 
had  been  repulsed,  and  that  our  battery  was  quite 
ready  to  open  fire  again,  if  need  arose.  The  two 
parties  were  quickly  hustled  away  to  the  rear,  being 
liberally  shelled  by  their  own  gunners  on  the  way. 

While  this  little  comedy  was  being  enacted  at  the 
end  of  the  Abu  Tellul  Ridge,  daylight  had  come,  and 
the  enemy's  only  chance  of  capturing  the  position 
had  passed.  Our  outer  posts,  though  surrounded, 
had  all  held  out,  and  turned  the  fire  of  their  machine 


184        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

guns  with  good  effect  on  the  enemy  on  the  southern 
end  of  Abu  Tellul.  Some  of  these  worked  south  to 
the  part  of  the  ridge  overlooking  the  Wadi  el  Auja, 
and  suddenly  found  themselves  looking  down  on  a 
battery  of  mountain  howitzers  that  were  firing  in  the 
opposite  direction,  at  some  Turks  who  were  attempt- 
ing to  cross  the  wadi.  The  howitzers  were  immedi- 
ately turned  end  for  end  in  their  pits,  and  fired  up  the 
hill  straight  into  the  faces  of  the  astonished  Germans, 
who  retired  discomfited,  to  hide  among  the  rocks 
and  trenches  farther  north  till  gathered  in  by  our 
troops  later  on. 

By  now  the  5th  A.L.H.  regiment  and  the  New 
Zealand  Mounted  Brigade,  which  had  been  sent  up 
in  support,  had  arrived  on  the  scene.  Pushing  along 
both  sides  of  the  Abu  Tellul  Ridge,  they  quickly 
drove  out  the  rest  of  the  enemy,  and  restored  the 
position. 

The  two  Turkish  divisions,  which  were  to  have 
attacked  on  each  side  of  the  German  troops,  had 
waited  for  da3dight  to  make  their  assault,  with  the 
result  that  they  were  easily  driven  off.  The  southern 
force,  indeed,  only  attacked  once,  and  that  but  half- 
heartedly, but  the  division  on  the  enemy's  left  made 
three  attempts  on  Musallabeh,  only  to  be  driven 
back  each  time  with  heavy  loss  by  a  murderous 
machine-gun  fire.  The  Turks  left  about  200  dead 
on  the  positions. 

By  ten  o'clock  in  the  morning  the  whole  posi- 
tion was  completely  restored,  and  our  prisoners 
(380  Germans  and  about  200  Turks)  were  on  their 
way  back  to  headquarters. 

At  this  juncture  there  occurred  an  incident  so 
typical  of  the  Hun  that  it  is  worth  recording.  As 
they  were  marching  back,  a  number  of  the  German 
officers  and  men  commenced  to  show  evident  signs 


GERMAN  INDISCIPLINE  185 

of  distress,  and  presently  began  to  drop  insensible 
by  the  wayside.  As  they  had  only  light  field  service 
caps  on  their  heads,  it  was  thought  that  they  had 
been  overcome  by  the  sun.  Ambulance  carts  were 
sent  for,  and  the  sufferers  were  conveyed  to  a  field 
hospital  near  by,  attended  on  the  way  with  the  most 
solicitous  care  by  their  Australian  escort.  On  arrival 
at  the  hospital,  however,  it  was  discovered  that  they 
were  merely  speechlessly  drunk,  whereupon  the  in- 
censed Australians  soused  them  unceremoniously  with 
water,  and  sent  them  on  their  way  to  the  prisoners' 
compounds  without  more  ado.  It  transpired  after- 
wards that  several  small  parties  of  Germans  had  been 
detailed  to  cut  our  telephone  wires  as  soon  as  they 
had  penetrated  our  lines.  While  engaged  on  this 
work  they  had  stumbled  on  a  tent,  pitched  in  a  little 
gully,  in  which  were  stored  several  cases  of  beer  and 
one  or  two  of  whisky,  which  had  been  brought  up 
at  very  great  trouble  for  the  men  of  the  2nd  A.L.H. 
regiment.  Unable  to  resist  this  liquor,  the  Germans, 
officers  and  men,  abandoning  their  task  of  wire 
cutting,  fell  upon  the  cases,  and,  knocking  off  the 
heads  of  the  bottles,  poured  the  contents  down  their 
throats.  When  they  had  drunk  all  they  could  hold, 
they  smashed  the  rest  of  the  bottles,  and  staggered 
away,  to  be  captured  disgracefully  by  our  troops. 
Had  any  of  them  been  on  the  scene  when  the  thirsty 
Australians  repaired  to  the  tent  after  being  relieved 
from  the  trenches,  they  would  undoubtedly  have 
shared  the  fate  of  the  bottles  ! 

During  the  attack  on  Musallabeh  and  Abu  Tellul 
the  enemy  was  observed  to  be  massing  for  an  attack 
east  of  the  river  Jordan,  opposite  El  Henu  ford, 
about  half-way  between  Makhadet  Hajlah  and  the 
Dead  Sea.  The  Imperial  Service  Cavalry  Brigade 
immediately  moved  out  from  Ghoraniyeh  to  attack. 


186        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

Taking  advantage  of  the  cover  afforded  by  the 
broken  ground  and  scrub  on  the  east  bank,  the 
cavalry  arrived  within  charging  distance  before  they 
were  observed.  They  charged  at  once,  and  routed 
the  Turks,  kiUing  ninety  with  the  spear,  and  taking 
about  100  prisoners  and  several  machine  guns. 

During  the  remainder  of  the  period  spent  in  the 
Jordan  Valley,  action  on  both  sides  was  confined  to 
artillery  activity,  in  which  the  enemy,  owing  to  the 
freedom  of  movement  he  enjoyed,  had  the  advan- 
tage of  us,  and  to  patrol  work,  in  which  our  troops, 
more  especially  the  Indian  Cavalrj^,  had  it  all  their 
own  way.  The  only  sources  of  water,  other  than  the 
Jordan,  were  the  Wadi  el  Auja,  which  was  used  by 
the  troops  and  horses  in  the  left  sector,  and  the  Wadi 
Nueiameh,  which  arose  at  Ain  el  Duk,  and  flowed 
into  the  Jordan  at  El  Ghoraniyeh.  The  latter  wadi 
was  used  by  the  Headquarters  of  the  Valley  Defences 
and  by  the  field  ambulances  and  suppty  and  ord- 
nance troops.  The  east  side  of  the  Tel  el  Sultan- 
Abu  Tellul  Ridge,  which  was  only  about  7000  yards 
from  the  Jordan,  was  occupied  by  horse  lines,  ammu- 
nition column  camps,  and  field  hospitals.  Early  in 
July  the  enemj^  who  had  received  considerable 
artillery  reinforcements,  pushed  a  number  of  field 
guns  and  heavy  howitzers  southwards,  east  of  the 
Jordan,  and  commenced  a  systematic  shelling  of 
these  troops.  Camps  and  horse  lines  had  to  be 
moved,  and  scattered  about  in  sections,  in  most  in- 
convenient situations,  along  the  bottoms  of  small 
wadis  running  down  from  the  ridge  into  the  plain. 
Some  protection  was  obtained  by  these  m.easures, 
but  there  was  not  sufficient  room  in  the  wadis  for 
all  the  units,  and  those  which  had  to  remain  in  the 
open  suffered  under  a  constant,  galling  shell  fire,  and 
had  to  shift  their  camps  every  few  days. 


'  JERICHO  JANE  '  187 

The  whole  of  the  Wadis  el  Auja  and  Nueiameh 
was  under  the  enemy's  observation  either  from  Red 
Hill  and  other  high  ground  east  of  the  Jordan,  or 
from  the  foothills  west  and  north-west  of  Abu  Tellul. 
The  Turks  took  full  advantage  of  this  to  shell  our 
watering  parties  almost  every  day.  The  drinking- 
places  were  frequently  changed,  and  every  effort  was 
made  to  distract  the  enemy's  attention,  during  the 
hours  when  horses  were  being  watered,  by  shelling 
his  positions  vigorously.  But  the  dense  clouds  of 
dust  raised  by  even  the  smallest  parties  of  horses  on 
the  move,  generally  gave  the  game  away,  and  we 
had  constant  trouble  and  numerous  casualties  among 
men  and  horses. 

About  the  same  time  as  the  Turks  became  aware 
of  the  possibilities  of  artillery  on  the  east  bank  of  the 
Jordan,  they  got  a  six-inch  long-range  gun  in  posi- 
tion in  the  hills  north-west  of  our  line  in  the  valley, 
and  shelled  Ghoraniyeh,  Jericho,  and  other  back 
areas  at  a  range  of  some  20,000  yards.  The  gun  was 
nicknamed  '  Jericho  Jane '  by  our  gunners,  and  the 
name  found  its  way  eventually  into  the  Corps'  Daily 
Intelligence  Report.  But  when  the  enemy  brought 
up  two  more  such  guns  into  about  the  same  position, 
and  the  three  were  referred  to  in  the  daily  report 
from  one  of  the  R.A.  Headquarters  as  '  Jericho  Jane 
and  her  two  wicked  sisters,'  the  powers  that  were 
decreed  that  such  slang  was  inappropriate  in  official 
reports  ! 

For  the  first  week  '  Jericho  Jane  '  confined  her  un- 
welcome attentions  to  Jericho,  into  which  she  put 
about  thirty  shells,  and  to  various  camps  and  horse 
lines  in  the  neighbourhood.  But,  when  her  wicked 
sisters  arrived,  they  at  once  commenced  to  pay  court 
to  the  13th  Cavalry  Brigade,  which  was  in  reserve  at 
the  time,  and  was  camped  about  Ain  el  Duk  on  the 


188        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

west  side  of  the  ridge.  This  position  had  hitherto 
been  deemed  the  only  safe  spot  in  the  whole  horrible 
valley,  and  it  was  a  sad  blow  to  the  13th  Brigade, 
who  had  a  comfortable  camp  close  to  water,  to 
find  their  sanctuary  invaded  by  these  outrageous 
viragoes. 

The  first  shot  hit  the  top  of  the  Mount  of  Tempta- 
tion, just  above  the  rock-hewn  hermitage  of  a  com- 
munity of  Greek  monks.  The  line  of  fire  then  moved 
slowly  down  the  mountain  side,  the  thunderous 
crashes  of  the  bursting  shells  sending  the  good  monks 
to  the  shelter  of  their  rock  cells  quicker  than  ever  the 
prayer  bell  had  done.  Meantime  the  cavalry  were 
breaking  camp  in  record  time.  Before  the  first  shell 
burst  in  the  camp,  the  whole  brigade  was  mounted 
and  moving  southwards  into  the  Wilderness,  home- 
less as  the  Children  of  Israel.  The  '  safe  '  camp,  the 
envy  of  all  the  valley,  with  its  outlook  over  a  beautiful 
patch  of  vivid  green  at  Ain  el  Duk,  was  abandoned 
to  the  snake  and  the  scorpion,  and  the  indignant 
troops  had  to  find  such  shelter  as  was  available  here 
and  there  in  the  bottoms  of  arid,  dusty  wadis. 

The  three  sisters  were  eventually  spotted  by 
aeroplanes,  and  silenced  by  some  of  our  heavy 
artillery  in  the  mountain  sector.  In  the  valley  itself, 
it  was  almost  impossible  to  locate  the  enemy  guns. 
Owing  to  the  very  broken  nature  of  the  country,  the 
damp  atmosphere  and  the  constant  dust,  our  aero- 
planes were  unable  to  spot  them,  even  when  firing, 
and  they  caused  us  constant  annoyance,  while  remain- 
ing almost  immune  from  our  fire.  Flying  over  the 
valley  was  at  all  times  most  hazardous  work,  owing 
to  the  innumerable  vortices  and  pockets  in  the  air, 
and  there  were  many  bad  accidents. 

The  Australian  Mounted  Division  left  the  valley 
finally  on  the   1st  August,  followed  shortly  after- 


OUT  OF  THE  VALLEY  189 

wards  by  the  5th  Cavaby  Division.  The  two  divi- 
sions were  reHeved  by  the  4th  and  the  Anzac  Divi- 
sions. Marching  by  easy  stages  during  the  night, 
and  remaining  hidden  by  day  among  vineyards  and 
ohve  groves,  they  crossed  the  mountains  to  the 
coastal  plain,  and  went  into  camp  in  the  neighbour- 
hood of  Selmeh  and  Ludd. 

The  blessed  coolness  of  the  nights,  and  the  clear 
and  comparatively  bracing  air  of  the  plain,  soon 
began  to  have  a  good  effect  on  the  jaded  troops  and 
horses,  worn  out  by  their  long  periods  in  the  dis- 
mal Valley  of  Desolation.  Training  recommenced  at 
once,  and  continued  till  the  middle  of  September, 
when  the  two  divisions  marched  into  positions  of 
hiding,  preparatory  to  the  Great  Drive.  The  4tli 
Cavalry  Division,  having  left  the  valley  on  the  11th 
September,  joined  them  on  the  17th. 

The  Anzac  Division  remained  sweltering  by  the 
Jordan  till  after  the  commencement  of  the  Septem- 
ber operations,  suffering  greatly  from  sickness,  but 
'  carrying  on '  with  the  cheerfulness  and  courage 
typical  of  the  Australians. 

Just  before  leaving  the  valley,  the  writer  heard  an 
Australian  trooper  sum  up  the  all-pervading  horror 
of  the  place  in  a  characteristic  sentence.  After 
gazing  for  some  time  at  the  hideous  expanse  of  white 
dust  and  blistering  rocks  at  his  feet,  he  remarked 
slowly :  '  Well,  I  reckon  God  made  the  Jordan 
Valley,  and  when  He  seen  what  He  done,  He  threw 
stones  at  it ! ' 


CHAPTER  XV 
PREPARATIONS  FOR  THE  GREAT  DRIVE 

At  the  end  of  August  1918  the  5th  and  AustraHan 
Cavaky  Divisions  were  encamped  near  Khurbet 
Deiran  and  Ramleh  respectively ;  the  4th  Division 
and  the  Anzac  Mounted  Division  were  still  in  the 
Jordan  Valley.  The  new  5th  A.L.H.  Brigade,  which 
had  only  two  regiments,  was  completed  by  the  in- 
clusion of  the  French  '  Regiment  Mixte  de  Cavalerie.' 
This  was  a  four-squadron  unit,  consisting  of  two 
squadrons  of  regular  French  cavalry  and  two  of 
Algerian  Spahis,  and  was  commanded  by  Colonel  Le 
Bon,  an  officer  who  had  had  many  years'  experience 
in  the  East.  The  Spahis,  with  their  picturesque 
half- Arab  uniforms  and  their  enormous  curved  sabres, 
which  they  carried  under  the  flaps  of  their  saddles, 
added  a  note  of  colour  to  the  division,  and  caused 
endless  diversion  to  the  Australians.  They  were 
mounted  on  good-looking  barbs,  which  could  march 
indefinitely,  if  allowed  to  go  at  their  own  rate,  but 
the  pace  of  our  big  horses  was  rather  too  hot  for 
them,  as  was  proved  by  the  subsequent  operations. 

As  there  were  only  ten  batteries  of  Horse  Artillery 
available,  one  battery  ('  B  '  H.A.C.)  was  withdrawn 
from  the  Australian  Mounted  Division  in  August, 
and  joined  the  5th  Cavalry  Division.  These  two 
divisions  had  thus  only  two  batteries  each. 

During  the  first  half  of  September  preparations 
for  the  Great  Drive  were  pushed  forward  ener- 
getically.    Our  broad-gauge  railwaj^  had  now  been 


THE  ENEMY  COMMUNICATIONS        191 

carried  forward  as  far  north  as  Ludd,  and  the  old 
Turkish  line  from  Ludd  to  Jerusalem  had  been  re- 
laid  for  broad  gauge.  Light  railways  had  been  built 
along  the  coastal  plain,  from  Ludd  up  to  our  front 
line ;  tracks  had  been  improved,  and  roads  made 
behind  the  line  in  the  mountain  sector,  and,  from 
Jiljulie  to  the  sea,  the  gunners  were  working  cease- 
lessly, like  a  legion  of  ants,  preparing  positions  for 
the  considerable  force  of  artiUery  that  was  to  assist 
in  forcing  the  enemy  defences  here. 

The  Turkish  line  west  of  the  Jordan  ran  east  from 
the  coast,  at  a  point  just  north  of  the  old  Crusader 
fortress  of  Arsuf,  over  the  coastal  plain  to  Jiljulie, 
near  the  railhead  at  Kalkili.  Here  it  entered  the 
mountains,  and  ran  a  little  south  of  east,  passing 
roughly  through  Mesha,  Furkha  and  El  Lubban, 
to  the  Jordan  at  Umm  el  Shert. 

Forty  miles  north  of  this  line  lie  the  Plain  of 
Esdraelon,  or  Armageddon,  and  the  Valle}^  of  Jezreel, 
which  cut  a  gap  right  through  the  mountain  range 
from  the  sea  to  the  river  Jordan.  Esdraeloii 
is  sha-ped  roughly  like  a  broad-bladed  arrow  head, 
having  its  point  at  Haifa  on  the  sea  coast,  and  the 
extremities  of  its  blades  at  Mount  Tabor  on  the  north, 
and  at  the  little  town  of  Jenin  on  the  south.  Mid- 
way between  these  two  lies  the  village  of  Afule, 
whence  the  Valley  of  Jezreel,  forming  the  shaft  of 
the  arrow,  runs  down  to  the  Jordan  at  Beisan,  which 
is  about  fifteen  miles  south  of  the  Sea  of  Galilee,  and 
four  miles  west  of  the  Jordan. 

From  Deraa  Junction  on  the  Hedjaz  Railway, 
about  thirty-five  miles  east  of  the  Sea  of  Gahlee,  a 
branch  line  runs  westwards  to  Semakh,  at  the  southern 
end  of  the  lake,  and  thence  southwards  down  the 
Jordan  Valley  to  Beisan.  From  here  two  roads  lead 
south  down  the  valley,  one  on  each  side  of  the  river, 


192        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

and  a  third  goes  south-west  through  the  mountains 
to  Nablus.  Leaving  Beisan,  the  railway  continues 
in  a  north-westerly  direction  up  the  Valley  of  Jezreel, 
through  Afule,  to  Haifa.  From  Afule  a  branch  line 
runs  south  to  Jenin,  and  thence  to  Samaria  and 
Nablus  ;  and  from  Messudieh,  near  Samaria,  another 
branch  winds  through  the  mountains  to  Tul  Keram 
on  the  coastal  plain,  and  thence  south  to  Kalkili. 

Thus,  to  quote  the  Commander-in-Chief's  despatch :  ^ 
'  Afule,  Beisan,  and  Deraa  were  the  vital  points  on 
the  enemy's  communications.  If  they  could  be 
seized,  his  retreat  would  be  cut  off.  Deraa  was 
beyond  my  reach,  but  not  beyond  that  of  mobile 
detachments  of  the  Arab  Army.  It  was  not  to  be 
expected  that  these  detachments  could  hold  this 
junction,  but  it  was  within  their  power  to  dislocate 
all  traffic' 

The  coastal  plain,  consisting  of  rolling  downland, 
is  about  ten  miles  wide  at  Arsuf.  From  this  point 
northwards  it  gradually  narrows,  till  it  is  shut  off 
altogether  at  Haifa,  where  the  Mount  of  Carmel,  an 
offshoot  from  the  main  Judsean  range,  falls  in  steep 
cliffs  to  the  sea.  The  only  track  over  the  Carmel  Range 
into  the  Plain  of  Esdraelon  that  is  possible  for  wheeled 
traffic  is  by  the  famous  Musmus  Pass,  from  Kerkur  to 
Lejjun  on  the  river  Kishon,  over  which  Thothmes  iii. 
led  his  army,  "  horse  behind  horse  and  man  behind 
man,'  to  the  great  victory  of  Megiddo,  in  1479  B.C. 

The  pass,  which  carries  the  age-old  caravan  road 
from  Egypt  to  Mesopotamia,  leads  through  a  narrow, 
rocky  defile,  in  steep  and  difficult  mountain  country, 
and,  near  the  top  of  the  range,  is  enclosed  in  places 
between  sheer  cliffs.  Skilfully  handled,  a  small  body 
of  troops  could  hold  it  for  a  long  time  against  a 
greatly  superior  force. 

1  Dated  October  31,  1918. 


MORALE  OF  THE  TURKISH  ARMY     193 

The  enemy  Vllth  and  Vlllth  Armies  held  the  hne 
from  the  sea  to  the  Jordan  Valley.  His  IVth  Army 
was  disposed  in  the  vaUey  and  east  of  the  Jordan. 
A  fairly  good,  metalled  road  runs  from  JiljuKe, 
thi'ough  Tul  Keram,  to  Nablus.  From  here  two  bad 
mountain  tracks  lead  down  to  the  Jordan,  one 
through  Beit  Dejan,  and  the  other  by  Ain  Shibleh 
and  down  the  Wadi  Farah.  These  two  tracks  join 
one  another  at  El  Makhruk,  four  miles  west  of  the 
river,  and  then  continue  over  the  Jordan  at  Jisr  el 
Damieh,  and  on  to  El  Salt.  This  was  the  enemy's 
only  lateral  communication,  and  the  portion  between 
Nablus  and  El  Salt  was  so  difficult  that  the  IVth 
Army  was  practically  isolated  from  the  rest  of  the 
force. 

The  Turkish  armies  opposed  to  us,  including  re- 
serves and  lines  of  communication  troops,  numbered 
some  90,000  men,  of  whom  perhaps  5000  were  cavalry, 
with  about  400  guns.  Their  Commander-in-Chief 
was  the  German  Marshal  Liman  von  Sanders,  who 
had  his  headquarters  at  Nazareth.  Our  own  troops 
numbered  about  120,000,  including  25,000  cavalry, 
with  540  guns. 

The  morale  of  the  enemy  troops,  both  Turkish  and 
German,  was  lower  than  it  had  been  at  any  time  since 
the  beginning  of  the  campaign.  Many  of  the  Turkish 
soldiers  were  ill-trained  and  of  poor  character.  Dis- 
heartened by  a  long  series  of  successful  small  raids, 
carried  out  by  our  infantry  during  the  past  two 
months,  utterly  weary  of  a  war  the  objects  of  which 
they  little  understood,  racked  with  disease,  and  im- 
bued with  a  bitter  hatred  of  their  German  masters, 
who  despised  and  buUied  them,  they  were  in  no 
state  to  withstand  the  onslaught  that  was  prepar- 
ing. The  ill-feeling  between  Turks  and  Germans, 
which  had  existed  from  the  very  beginning  of  the 

N 


194        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

war,  had  now  reached  an  acute  stage.  The  Germans, 
with  characteristic  stupidity,  failed  to  do  anything 
to  allay  the  irritation  caused  by  their  overbearing 
manner,  and  openly  expressed  contempt  for  their 
allies. 

Numerous  documents,  subsequently  captured  by 
us  at  the  enemy  G.H.Q,,  testified  to  the  deplorable 
state  of  internal  strife  and  suspicion  to  which  the 
enemy  army  was  now  reduced.  Indeed,  with  the 
exception  of  a  few  senior  officers,  the  Germans  seemed 
to  take  a  delight  in  ill-treating  and  insulting  the 
unhappy  Turks. 

These  factors  must  be  borne  in  mind  in  estimating 
the  tactics  adopted  by  the  British  Commander-in- 
Chief.  His  plan  was  one  of  the  boldest  and  simplest 
ever  conceived  by  a  great  captain,  and  will  live  in 
the  text-books  of  the  soldiers  of  all  nations,  as  a  model 
of  the  use  of  cavalry,  as  long  as  war  is  waged.  Such 
risks  as  he  took  in  the  carrying  out  of  that  plan,  and 
they  were  numerous,  were  justified  by  the  state  of 
the  enemy  armies  opposed  to  us,  and  were,  in  every 
instance,  triumphantly  vindicated  by  the  success  of 
the  operations. 

In  broad  outline,  the  plan  was  to  concentrate  an 
overwhelming  force  of  infantry  and  guns  in  the 
coastal  sector,  together  with  three  divisions  of 
cavah'y :  for  the  infantry  to  attack  the  enemy  posi- 
tions from  Jiljulie  to  the  sea,  and,  having  captured 
them,  to  wheel  to  the  right,  pivoting  on  Jiljufie,  and 
bend  back  the  enemy's  right  wing  into  the  hills, 
exactly  like  opening  a  door.  Through  this  open 
door  the  cavahy  were  to  dash,  and  ride  up  the  coast 
and  over  the  Musmus  Pass  into  the  Plain  of  Esdraelon. 
Once  in  the  plain,  their  task  was  to  seize  Afule,  and 
then  ride  down  the  Valley  of  Jezreel  to  Beisan  and 
the  Jordan,  and  cut  the  railways  at  these  two  places. 


DECEIVING  THE  ENEMY  195 

while  an  Arab  force  cut  it  farther  east  at  Deraa. 
Later  on  Haifa  was  to  be  occupied,  and  thus  a  net 
of  cavalry  would  be  drawn  from  the  sea  to  the  Jordan. 
As  soon  as  the  cavalry  were  well  through  the  gap  on 
the  coastal  plain,  our  infantry  were  to  attack  all  along 
the  line  in  the  mountain  sector,  while  the  troops  that 
had  opened  the  door  endeavoured  to  roU  up  the 
enemy  line  from  his  right  flank.  Our  force  in  the 
Jordan  Valley  was  to  advance  simultaneously,  and 
seize  the  bridge  over  the  Jordan  at  El  Damieh.  The 
two  Turkish  armies  west  of  the  Jordan  would  thus 
be  caught  in  a  trap,  with  the  sea  on  their  right  and 
the  Jordan  on  their  left,  and,  with  all  their  com- 
munications cut,  would  be  forced  back  into  the 
cavalrjT^  net  behind  them. 

Once  the  crossing  over  the  Jordan  at  Jisr  el  Damieh 
was  in  our  hands,  the  Turldsh  IVth  Army  east  of  the 
river  would  find  itself  isolated,  with  its  communica- 
tions cut  (at  Deraa),  and  exposed  to  the  converging 
attacks  of  our  force  in  the  valley,  which  would  hold 
the  river  crossings,  and  of  the  Arab  forces  on  the  east. 
At  the  beginning  of  September  a  mobile  column  of 
the  Arab  Army,  accompanied  by  armoured  cars  and 
a  mountain  battery,  was  assembling  at  Kasr  el  Azrak, 
in  the  desert  fifty  miles  east  of  Amman,  under  the 
energetic  direction  of  Lawrence. 

The  first  essential  for  the  success  of  the  plan  was  to 
conceal  from  the  enemy  the  considerable  concentra- 
tion of  troops  on  the  coastal  plain,  especially  that  of 
the  three  cavalry  divisions. 

It  is  doubtful  if  there  has  ever  been  a  greater 
master  of  the  art  of  deception  in  war  than  the  British 
Commander-in-Chief.  No  detail  was  too  small,  no 
dodge  too  insignificant  to  engage  his  full  attention. 
The  two  trans-Jordan  raids  had  given  the  enemy  the 
impression  that  we  intended  to  attack  either  up  the 


196        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

Jordan  Valley,  or  east  of  it,  at  Amman  and  along  the 
Hedjaz  Railway,  and  General  Allenby  now  set  himself 
to  foster  this  belief  by  every  possible  means. 

To  this  end  he  ordered  Major-General  Chaytor, 
who  wa  >  in  the  Jordan  Valley,  in  command  of  a  mixed 
force  consisting  of  the  Anzac  Mounted  Division  and 
eight  battahons  of  infantry,  to  make  a  series  of 
demonstrations,  with  the  object  of  inducing  the 
enemy  to  believe  that  an  attack  east  of  Jordan  was 
intended.  The  camps  in  the  valley  vacated  by  the 
cavalry  were  left  standing,  and  other  camps  were 
pitched  there,  and  occupied  by  a  few  men,  to  show 
signs  of  movement,  and  to  make  tracks  about,  and 
leading  to,  the  camps,  in  order  to  deceive  enemy 
airmen.  New  bridges  were  thrown  across  the  Jordan, 
miles  of  Decauville  railway  were  laid,  and  thousands 
of  dummy  horses  were  erected  on  dummy  horse  lines 
in  the  dummy  camps.  Every  day,  for  some  con- 
siderable time,  a  battalion  or  two  of  infantry  marched 
down  the  Jerusalem- Jericho  road  from  Talaat  el 
Dumm,  and  occupied  one  or  other  of  these  camps. 
During  the  night  they  were  brought  back  to  Talaat 
el  Dumm,  in  returning  empty  motor  lorries,  ready 
to  march  back  again  next  day.  These  troops  could 
be  plainly  seen,  marching  down  into  the  valley,  by 
the  enemy  at  Shunet  Nimrin,  who  was  thus  induced 
to  beheve  that  a  considerable  concentration  was 
taking  place  in  the  valley.  This  unpleasant  daily 
promenade  fell  to  the  lot  of  the  British  West  Indies 
regiments. 

For  the  benefit  of  the  native  population,  elaborate 
bogus  preparations  were  made  for  the  removal  of 
G.H.Q.  to  Jerusalem.  One  of  the  hotels  there  was 
cleared  of  its  occupants,  much  to  their  disgust,  and 
staff  officers  busied  themselves  installing  office  furni- 
ture   and   telephone    equipment,    and    painting    the 


WORK  OF  THE  ROYAL  AIR  FORCE     197 

names  of  a  multitude  of  departments  on  the  doors 
of  the  rooms. 

Lastly,  lest  a  chance  word  should  reach  a  native 
enemy  spy  within  our  hnes,  everjrthing  was  done  to 
further  the  belief  among  our  own  troops  that  we 
were  likely  to  attack  on  the  east  flank.  The  writer 
remembers  receiving  a  visit  one  day  from  his  Divi- 
sional General,  and  being  told  to  do  nothing  to  dis- 
courage the  idea  that  the  cavalry  would  once  again 
find  themselves  in  the  Valley  of  Desolation.  He  also 
remembers  vividly  the  lurid  language  that  arose  on 
all  sides  when  this  report  spread  about  the  camps  ! 

No  orders  were  com^mitted  to  paper  other  than 
those  issued  by  G.H.Q.  and  the  three  Corps.  Secret 
conferences  were  called  in  tmii  at  the  various  Divi- 
sional Headquarters,  when  the  scheme  was  explained 
to  staffs  and  commanders  of  brigades,  each  of  whom 
then  prepared  his  scheme,  and  submitted  it  verbally 
to  his  immediate  superior. 

The  three  cavahy  divisions  on  the  left  of  our  line 
were  liidden  securely  from  the  eyes  of  enemy  aero- 
plane observers ;  the  Australian  Mounted  Division 
in  the  immense,  old  olive  woods  round  Ramleh,  the 
4th  Cavalrj^  Division  in  the  orange  groves  near 
Selmeh,  and  the  5th  Division,  which  had  left  the 
Jordan  Valley  on  September  11,  in  those  north-west 
of  Sarona. 

Shortly  before  the  operations  commenced,  the 
60th  and  75th  Infantry  Divisions  were  brought 
across  to  the  coastal  sector,  where  they  remained, 
unseen  by  the  enemy,  till  the  attack  was  launched. 

During  aU  the  period  of  concentration,  the  magni- 
ficent work  of  the  Royal  Air  Force  played  a  dominant 
part  in  keeping  the  enemy  in  ignorance  of  our  move- 
ments. The  Commander-in-Chief  paid  the  force  a 
well-deserved  compliment  in  his  despatch  when  he 


198        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

said  :  '  The  chief  factor  in  the  secrecy  maintained 
must  be  attributed,  however,  to  the  supremacy  in 
the  air  which  had  been  obtained  by  the  Royal  Air 
Force.  The  process  of  wearing  down  the  enemy's 
aircraft  had  been  going  on  all  through  the  summer. 
During  one  week  in  June  100  hostile  aeroplanes 
had  crossed  our  lines.  During  the  last  week  in 
August  this  number  had  decreased  to  eighteen.  In 
the  next  few  days  a  number  were  shot  down,  with 
the  result  that  only  four  ventured  to  cross  our  lines 
during  the  period  of  concentration.'  ^ 

On  the  18th  of  September,  the  day  before  the 
attack,  a  large  force  of  bombing  aeroplanes  was 
directed  over  Nablus,  where  it  was  known  the  enemy 
had  his  main  telephone  and  telegraph  exchange. 
This  was  completely  destroyed,  a  fact  which  played 
an  important  part  in  enabhng  our  cavalry  to  reach 
the  Plain  of  Esdraelon  next  day,  before  the  enemy 
G.H.Q.  knew  they  had  broken  through. 

The  striking  success  of  these  measures  was  after- 
wards proved  by  captured  enemy  documents.  Among 
these  was  the  German  Intelligence  Service  map,  issued 
on  the  very  day  before  our  attack  commenced.  This 
map  shows  thi'ee  cavalry  divisions  still  in  the  Jordan 
Valley,  and  only  one  in  the  coastal  sector.  Only 
two  infantry  divisions  are  shown  in  the  coastal  sector 
instead  of  five,  and  the  whole  map  points  to  an 
attack  in,  or  east  of,  the  Jordan  Valley.  A  German 
air  reconnaissance  report,  dated  17th  of  September, 
and  found  among  Liman  von  Sanders'  papers  at 
Nazareth,  stated  that  '  far  from  there  being  any 
diminution  in  the  cavalry  in  the  Jordan  VaUey,  there 
are  evidences  of  twenty-three  more  squadrons  there.' 

The  Turkish  line  on  the  plain  consisted  of  two 
defensive   positions,    well    constructed    and    heavily 

1  Despatch  dated  October  31,  1918. 


PLAN  OF  THE  OPERATIONS  199 

wired.  The  first,  14,000  yards  in  length  and  3000 
in  depth,  ran  along  a  sandy  ridge  in  a  north-westerly 
direction  from  Bir  Adas  to  the  sea.  It  consisted  of 
a  series  of  works  connected  by  a  continuous  net- 
work of  fire  trenches.  The  second,  or  El  Tire  system, 
3000  yards  in  the  rear,  ran  from  the  village  of  that 
name  to  the  mouth  of  the  Nahr  el  Falik.  On  the 
enemy's  extreme  right  the  ground,  except  for  a 
narrow  strip  along  the  coast,  was  marshy,  and  could 
only  be  crossed  in  few  places.  The  defence  of  the 
second  system  did  not,  therefore,  require  a  large 
force. 

The  attack  of  these  positions  was  entrusted  to  the 
21st  Corps  (3rd,  7th,  54th,  and  75th  Divisions),  to 
which  were  also  attached  the  60th  Division,  the 
French  Infantry  Detachment,  and  the  5th  A.L.H. 
Brigade  (Australian  Mounted  Division),  together  with 
a  large  number  of  heavy  guns  and  two  brigades  of 
mountain  artillery.  This  force  was  to  break  through 
the  enemy's  defences  between  the  railway  and  the 
sea,  in  order  to  open  the  door  for  the  cavalry,  and, 
at  the  same  time,  to  seize  the  foothills  south-east  of 
Jiljulie.  The  Corps  was  then  to  swing  to  the  right, 
pivoting  on  Jiljulie,  as  already  explained,  on  to  the 
line  Hableh-Tul  Keram,  and  advance  in  a  north- 
easterly direction,  converging  on  Samaria  and  Attara 
(on  the  Jenin- Samaria  Railway  about  five  miles  north- 
west of  the  latter  place),  so  as  to  drive  the  enemy  up 
the  two  roads  from  Messudieh  Junction  and  Samaria 
to  Jenin,  into  the  arms  of  the  cavalry  on  the  Plain 
of  Esdraelon.  The  5th  A.L.H.  Brigade  was  to  cover 
the  outer  (left)  flank  of  the  Corps  during  this  turning 
movement,  capture  Tul  Keram  station,  and  then 
raid  and  cut  the  Messudieh- Jenin  Railway,  near  Ajje. 

As  soon  as  the  infantry  had  broken  through,  the 
three  cavahy  divisions  were  to  advance  rapidly  up 


200        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

the  plaiii,  the  5th  Division  along  the  coast  road, 
through  JMukhahd,  the  4th  via  Tabsor  and  Mughair, 
and  the  Austrahan  Mounted  Division  following  the 
4th. 

Tlie  enemy  had  partially  prepared  an  entrenched 
position  across  the  plain  from  about  Jelameh,  through 
El  Mejdel  and  Liktera,  to  the  sea  near  the  mouth  of 
the  Nahr  Mefju*,  and  this  was  known  to  be  held  by 
a  few  troops.  The  4th  Division  had  orders  to  seize 
the  portion  of  this  line  between  Jelameh  and  Liktera, 
while  the  5th  dealt  with  the  western  haK  from  Liktera 
to  the  coast. 

Having  made  good  the  line  of  the  Nahr  Mefjir, 
they  were  to  turn  north-east  and  cross  the  Carmel 
Range,  the  4th  and  Australian  Divisions  by  the 
Musmus  Pass,  and  the  5th  by  a  httle-known  track 
from  Sindiane  to  Abu  Shusheh,  and  enter  the  Plain 
of  Esdraelon.  Arrived  on  the  plain,  the  4th  Cavalry 
Division  was  to  seize  Afule  and  then  push  rapidly 
down  the  Valley  of  Jezreel  to  Beisan,  occupy  the 
Jordan  bridges  there,  and  send  a  force  to  hold  and, 
if  necessary,  destroy  the  bridge  at  Jisr  Mejamieh, 
twelve  miles  farther  north.  This  programme  en- 
tailed a  ride  of  ninety-seven  miles  on  end,  and 
included  the  crossing  of  a  mountain  range  by  a 
difficult  pass. 

The  5th  Division  was  directed  on  Nazareth  (seventy 
miles)  to  capture  the  enemy  General  Headquarters, 
which  was  located  there,  and,  if  possible,  Liman  von 
Sanders  himself,  and  then  clear  the  plain  as  far  east 
as  Afule.  The  Austrahan  Division  was  to  remain  on 
the  Plain  of  Esdraelon  at  El  Lejjun,  sending  a  force 
to  Jenin  (sixtjT^-eight  miles),  to  intercept  the  Turks 
retiring  from  Samaria,  when  that  place  had  been 
captured  by  our  infantry. 

As  these  immense  distances  had  to  be  covered  in 


THE  ROLE  of  the  INFANTRY       201 

one  '  bound,'  speed  was  essential.  The  4th  and  5th 
Divisions,  were,  therefore,  ordered  to  move  up  the 
coast  on  a  wide  front,  and  sweep  over  the  Jelameh- 
Liktera  positions  with  the  sword  and  lance.  If  un- 
expectedly strong  opposition  was  encountered  there, 
the  Austrahan  Division  was  available,  immediately 
in  rear,  to  reinforce.  The  crossing  of  the  Carmel 
Range  was  to  be  carried  out  as  rapidly  as  possible, 
as  it  was  recognised  that  our  troops  could  only  move 
in  very  narrow  columns  over  the  mountains,  especially 
through  the  Musmus  Pass,  and  flank  guards  would 
be  out  of  the  question.  The  5th  Division  was,  how- 
ever, directed  to  drop  a  small  force  on  the  Sindiane- 
Abu  Shusheh  track,  at  the  top  of  the  range,  to  protect 
the  left  flank  of  the  other  two  divisions,  while  they 
were  passing  through  the  defile. 

The  20th  Corps,  in  the  hills  north  of  Jerusalem, 
was  ordered  to  attack  all  along  its  front  on  the  day 
after  the  attack  in  the  coastal  plain,  and  drive  the 
enemy  northwards  into  the  arms  of  the  cavalry,  while, 
in  the  Jordan  VaUey,  Chay tor's  Force  had  first  to 
seize  the  bridge  over  the  river  at  El  Damieh,  and  then 
to  cross  the  Jordan  for  the  third  and  last  time,  and 
advance  on  Amman. 


CHAPTER  XVI 
ARMAGEDDON 

By  the  evening  of  the  18th  of  September  all  troops 
were  in  readiness  for  the  attack.  The  4th,  5th,  and 
AustraHan  Cavalry  Divisions  were  hidden  in  the 
orange  and  olive  groves  at  Sarona,  Selmeh,  and  Ludd 
respectively.  Their  Horse  Aitillery  batteries  had 
moved  up  into  the  line  on  the  night  of  the  17th,  to 
take  part  in  the  preliminary  bombardment. 

Before  daj^hght  on  the  19th  the  three  divisions 
commenced  their  march  up  to  the  front,  the  5th 
Division  riding  along  the  sea  shore,  at  the  foot  of  the 
high  cUffs  that  fringe  the  coast  in  this  part,  the  4th 
via  JeUl  and  El  Haram,  and  the  Australians  on 
Tabsor.  The  two  first-named  divisions  sent  dis- 
mounted pioneer  parties  from  each  brigade  forward 
with  the  infantry,  to  cut  gaps  in  the  wire,  and  to 
flag  passages  through  it  for  their  brigades.  Their 
horses  were  led  as  close  behind  them  as  possible, 
and  liaison  with  their  brigades  was  maintained  by 
gallopers. 

At  4.30  A.M.  the  400  guns  concentrated  on  the 
front  of  attack  opened  an  intense  fire  on  the  Turkish 
positions,  and  the  five  infantry  divisions  dashed 
forward  to  the  attack. 

The  enemy  was  taken  completely  by  surprise,  and 
our  infantry  broke  through  the  Turkish  lines  with 
hardly  a  pause,  the  guns  maintaining  a  creeping 
baiTage  in  front  of  them  till  they  were  through  the 
first  position.     About  50,000  shells  were  put  over 

202 


ADVANCE  OF  THE  CAVALRY    203 

during  the  short  time  that  the  bombardment  and 
barrage  lasted.  At  eight  minutes  past  five  the 
whole  of  the  front  line  was  reported  taken,  and  by 
eighteen  minutes  to  six  the  whole  of  the  first  position 
was  in  our  hands,  and  our  line  began  to  wheel  to  the 
right. 

The  5th  Cavalry  Division,  being  sheltered  from 
view  by  the  high  cliffs  of  the  sea  shore,  was  able  to 
ride  right  on  the  heels  of  the  infantry,  and  the  13th 
Brigade,  acting  as  advance  guard,  was  across  the 
Nahr  el  Falik  by  half-past  eight,  and  riding  hard  up 
the  plain  towards  Mukhalid.  A  strong  patrol  from 
this  brigade  was  sent  forward  to  reconnoitre  Liktera. 

The  4th  Division,  being  in  the  open,  had  to  wait 
till  the  El  Tire-Naln-  el  Falik  line  had  been  cleared, 
so  as  not  to  interfere  with  our  infantry,  and  thus  did 
not  cross  the  Falik  till  about  ten  o'clock.  The  12th 
Brigade  led  through  the  enemy  positions,  but,  as 
soon  as  they  were  clear  of  the  wire,  the  10th  and 
11th  Brigades  came  up  on  the  left,  and  the  division 
advanced  in  line  of  brigade  columns,  each  finding  its 
own  advance  guard.  The  AustraHan  Division  was 
then  about  five  miles  farther  back,  passing  through 
the  enemy  defences  at  Tabsor.  Each  division  had 
picked  up  its  artillery  on  the  way. 

The  advance  of  the  infantry  had  been  so  rapid  that 
there  had  been  very  little  time  to  collect  prisoners, 
and  as  the  cavalry  advanced  they  came  across 
numerous  small  parties  of  Turks,  wandering  about 
disconsolate  and  bewildered.  They  were  quite  dis- 
organised, and  did  not  attempt  to  interfere  with  our 
troops,  and  later  on  were  all  gathered  in  by  '  mopping 
up '  parties,  and  taken  to  the  collecting  cages  in 
rear.  Farther  east,  disorganised  parties  of  the  enemy 
were  streaming  across  the  plain  towards  Tul  Keram, 
pursued  by  the  5th  A.L.H.  Brigade,  but  these  were 


204        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

out  of  sight  of  the  rest  of  the  cavaky  as  they  crossed 
the  Une.  Looking  at  the  strong  defences  as  we 
passed  through  them,  deserted  and  quiet,  it  was  hard 
to  beheve  that,  only  a  few  hours  before,  these  posi- 
tions had  been  held  by  a  numerous  and  well-organised 
enemy. 

While  the  5th  Division  was  crossing  the  Nahr  el 
Falik,  the  patrol  which  had  been  sent  on  towards 
Liktera  reported  a  small  force  of  enemy  cavalry  some 
two  miles  in  front.  This  force  at  once  made  off  in 
a  north-easterly  direction,  and  was  not  seen  again. 
About  the  same  time,  a  contact  aeroplane  reported 
some  enemy  infantry  holding  a  position  near  Birket 
Ata.  The  9th  Hodson's  Horse,  which  was  vanguard 
to  the  13th  Brigade,  reached  this  position  about  half- 
past  ten,  and  at  once  charged  and  dispersed  the 
enemy,  taking  about  250  prisoners  and  four  guns. 
Pressing  on  at  once,  the  regiment  reached  Liktera, 
half  an  hour  later,  where  the  Turkish  Commandant 
surrendered  at  discretion,  with  his  small  garrison. 
The  first  objective  having  thus  been  secured  without 
difficulty,  the  division  closed  up  and  halted  on  the  line 
of  the  Nahr  Mefjir,  to  water  and  feed.  A  squadron, 
supported  by  two  armoured  cars,  was  sent  ahead  to 
reconnoitre  the  Sindiane-Abu  Shusheh  track. 

The  4th  Division,  which  had  been  somewhat 
delayed  finding  a  way  through  the  enemy's  wire, 
crossed  the  Nahr  Iskanderuneh  about  11.30,  and, 
shortly  afterwards,  the  leading  regiment  of  the  11th 
Brigade,  the  36th  Jacob's  Horse,  came  under  fire 
from  some  Turks  holding  a  portion  of  the  enemy's 
entrenched  position,  just  south  of  Zelefe.  The  regi- 
ment charged  immediately,  and  the  Turks  broke  and 
fled,  leaving  200  prisoners  in  our  hands.  About  the 
same  time  the  6th  Cavalry,  leading  the  12th  Brigade 
on  the  right,  encountered  a  smaU  enemy  rearguard 


OVER  THE  CARMEL  RANGE     205 

near  Jett.  This  force  was  likewise  promptly  charged 
and  dispersed.  A  marked  map,  found  on  a  prisoner 
captured  here,  indicated  that  the  enemy  intended  to 
hold  a  hne  from  Arara,  through  Kefr  Kara  and 
Kannir  to  Mamas,  covering  both  routes  over  the 
mountains.  The  10th  Brigade  was,  therefore,  sent 
on  at  once  with  an  armoured  car  battery  to  seize 
the  Musmus  Pass,  the  rest  of  the  division  remaining 
at  El  Mejdel  and  Tel  el  Dhrur  to  water  and  feed. 

The  Austrahan  Mounted  Division  was  ordered  to 
halt  for  a  time  near  Jelil,  till  word  was  received  that 
the  infantry,  advancing  to  the  line  Hableh-Tul  Keram, 
were  progressing  satisfactorily.  This  information 
came  in  about  mid-day,  and  the  division  was  then 
directed  by  the  Corps  Commander  to  push  on  at 
once  towards  the  Nahr  Iskanderuneh.  The  advanced 
guard  reached  the  river  at  ten  o'clock  at  night, 
without  encountering  any  opposition,  and  the  rest 
of  the  division,  with  the  advanced  Headquarters  of 
the  Corps,  got  in  about  an  hour  later.  Horses  were 
watered  and  fed,  and  the  march  was  resumed  at  one 
o'clock  in  the  morning. 

The  two  leading  divisions  had  marched  again  about 
six  in  the  evening.  The  patrol  from  the  5th  Division, 
which  had  gone  ahead  to  reconnoitre  the  Sindiane 
track,  reported  that  it  was  unfit  for  wheels.  The 
divisional  transport  was,  therefore,  directed  to  cross 
by  the  Musmus  Pass,  in  rear  of  the  Australian  Mounted 
Division,  the  15th  Brigade  to  remain  at  Liktera  for 
the  night,  and  cross  by  the  Sindiane  track,  with  the 
artillery  of  the  division,  the  following  day.  The  rest 
of  the  division,  led  by  the  13th  Brigade,  reached  Sin- 
diane long  after  dark,  and  was  soon  involved  in  a 
tangle  of  hills,  with  no  defined  track  visible,  but  in- 
numerable, shadowy  paths  leading  in  all  directions. 
Our  maps  showed  a  fairly  direct  track,  which  had 


206        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

been  reported  by  natives  as  feasible  for  cavaky  and 
light  guns.  Their  information  was,  however,  merely 
hearsay,  as  we  liad  not  been  able,  before  starting,  to 
find  any  natives  who  actually  knew  the  track. 

Fortunately  the  13th  Brigade  had  in  its  commander  ^ 
an  officer  who  had  had  ten  years'  service  in  the 
Egyptian  cavalry,  and  spoke  Arabic  fluently.  From 
time  to  time,  during  the  night,  he  came  across  a  few 
Arabs  from  whom  he  was  able  to  get  some  informa- 
tion. His  long  experience  of  marching  in  uncharted 
country,  and  a  natural  aptitude  for  finding  his  way, 
stood  him  in  good  stead,  and  he  successfully  led  the 
two  brigades  over  the  range  in  the  dark,  marching  in 
single  file  most  of  the  time.  Two  squadrons  were 
dropped  at  Jarak,  as  left  flank  guard  for  the  remainder 
of  the  Corps,  while  passing  the  Musmus  defile. 

The  two  brigades  reached  Abu  Shusheh  about  half- 
past  two  in  the  morning,  and  continued  the  march 
across  the  plain  in  the  darkness,  crossing  and  cutting 
the  Afule-Haifa  Railway  near  Warakani,  about  half 
an  hour  later.  The  moon  was  nearly  full,  and  the 
light  good.  On  arriving  at  the  foothills,  the  14th 
Brigade  halted  till  dayhght,  and  the  13th  pushed  on  up 
the  track  via  Jebataand  El  Mujeidil,  towards  Nazareth. 

On  nearing  El  Mujeidil,  a  native  guide,  who  had 
been  picked  up  on  Mount  Carmel,  stated  that  the 
place  was  Nazareth.  Though  feeling  sure  that  he 
was  either  mistaken  or  funked  going  any  farther,  the 
Brigadier  decided  to  seize  the  place.  He  directed  the 
18th  Lancers  to  surround  it,  which  they  did,  and, 
having  blocked  all  exits,  sent  a  couple  of  troops  into 
the  village.  By  now  it  was  clear  that  it  was  much 
too  small  a  place  to  be  Nazareth,  but  it  was  thought 

1  Brigadier-General  P.  J.  V.  Kelly,  C.M.G.,  D.S.O.,  3rd  Hussars.  He 
commanded  the  Egyptian  troops  in  the  brilliantly  successful  little  Darfur 
Campaign  of  1916. 


CAPTURE  OF  NAZARETH  207 

worth  while  to  search  it  hurriedly,  as  a  result  of  which 
200  sleepy  Turks  were  dug  out  of  a  large  house.  The 
brigade  then  passed  on  up  the  main  road,  the  Glou- 
cester Yeomanry  taldng  the  lead. 

Shortly  afterwards  the  houses  of  Nazareth  appeared 
in  front,  gleaming  white  and  silent  in  the  moonhght. 
The  advanced  guard  now  halted,  and  the  troop  leaders 
were  given  their  instructions.  The  town  lies  in  a 
cup-shaped  hollow,  and  straggles  up  the  steep  and 
rocky  hills  surrounding  it.  The  principal  houses,  in 
one  of  which  the  enemy  G.H.Q.  would  probably  be 
located,  are  situated  in  the  centre  of  the  town  at  the 
bottom  of  the  hollow,  and  on  the  northern  slopes. 
The  only  information  we  had  as  to  the  exact  location 
of  G.H.Q.  was  that  it  was  near  a  big  motor-lorry  park. 
Two  troops  were  directed  to  make  for  the  centre  of 
the  town,  find  the  lorry  park,  and  rush  any  big  houses 
near  by.  Others  were  directed  to  gallop  on,  and 
seize  tactical  points  on  the  northern  slope,  and  block 
the  roads  leading  north-east  to  Tiberias  and  north- 
west to  Haifa. 

Just  as  day  was  breaking  the  regiment  drew  swords 
and  galloped  into  the  town,  causing  the  most  inde- 
scribable confusion  amongst  the  enemy  troops, 
mostly  German,  there.  Liman  von  Sanders  himself 
only  just  made  his  escape  in  time.  His  housekeeper, 
whom  we  questioned  later,  declared  that,  at  the  fu'st 
alarm,  he  dashed  down  the  stairs  of  his  house  and 
out  into  the  street  in  his  pyjamas,  and  made  off  in  a 
car  along  the  Tiberias  road. 

The  brigade  had  some  hard  street  fighting,  after  the 
enemy  had  recovered  from  his  first  consternation,  but 
the  Germans  and  Turks  were  driven  out  of  the  town 
to  the  north-east.  Here,  however,  a  number  of  them 
got  into  some  houses  on  the  Tiberias  road,  and  put 
up  a  good  fight. 


208        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

Several  machine  guns,  mounted  in  a  big  convent 
which  overlooked  the  centre  of  the  town  from  the 
nortliern  slope,  made  things  very  unpleasant,  and  it 
soon  became  evident  that  a  deliberate  dismounted 
attack  would  be  necessary  to  dislodge  them.  Mean- 
while the  troops  detailed  for  the  duty  had  found  and 
entered  the  enemy  G.H.Q.  They  made  a  hurried 
search  of  the  premises,  covered  by  the  rest  of  the 
regiment  on  the  north  and  north-east,  and  by  Hod- 
son's  Horse  standing  by,  and  seized  all  the  more 
important  documents.  As  soon  as  this  work  was 
finished,  the  advanced  troops  fell  back  fighting,  and 
the  brigade  withdrew  down  the  Afule  road,  taking 
with  it  1200  prisoners.  Before  leaving,  our  troops 
put  out  of  action  all  the  motor  cars  of  the  enemy 
G.H.Q.,  and  the  lorries  of  the  German  lorry  park. 
These  were  all  afterwards  repaired  and  used  by  us. 
On  reaching  the  plain  again,  the  brigade  occupied 
Junjar,  Tel  Shadud  and  Jebata,  holding  the  southern 
exits  from  Nazareth. 

The  14th  Brigade  was  occupied  after  dayHght  clear- 
ing the  north-western  portion  of  the  plain  of  smaU 
parties  of  enemy  troops,  and  entered  Afule  later  on 
in  the  morning. 

The  15th  Brigade,  with  the  guns  and  transport  of 
the  division,  left  the  Nahr  Iskanderuneh  soon  after 
dawn  on  the  20th,  and  marched  by  the  same  route 
to  Afule.  The  gunners  had  a  very  rough  passage  over 
the  mountains,  and  had  to  spend  many  hours  making 
a  roadway  for  the  guns,  so  that  they  did  not  reach 
the  station  till  about  eleven  at  night. 

The  4th  Division  left  the  Nahr  Mefjir  about  the 
same  time  as  the  5th,  the  10th  Brigade  having  gone 
on  in  advance  to  secure  the  Musmus  Pass.  The  2nd 
Lancers  and  an  armoured  car  battery,  acting  as  van- 
guard, entered  the  Pass,  and  reached  Khurbet  Arab 


THE  CHARGE  AT  LEJJUN  209 

without  encountering  any  opposition.  They  placed 
outposts  covering  the  cross  roads  here,  and  sent  back 
a  report  to  the  10th  Brigade.  Unfortunately  this 
brigade  had  lost  its  way  in  the  darkness,  before  moon- 
rise,  and  was  now  somewhere  north  of  Kerkur.  On 
learning  the  state  of  affairs,  General  Barrow  ordered 
the  12th  Brigade  up  to  the  support  of  the  2nd  Lancers, 
and  himself  motored  up  to  Khurbet  Arab,  and  directed 
the  regiment  to  push  on  at  once  through  the  defile  to 
Lejjun.  This  place  was  reached  without  opposition 
about  eleven  at  night,  the  12th  Brigade  arriving  some 
hours  later.  The  11th  Brigade,  followed  by  the  10th, 
which  had  regained  the  road,  came  in  at  five  o'clock 
in  the  morning. 

As  soon  as  it  was  light  enough  to  see,  the  troops 
commenced  to  move  out  into  the  Plain  of  Esdraelon. 
They  were  none  too  soon.  As  the  12th  Brigade, 
forming  the  advanced  guard  of  the  division,  de- 
bouched from  the  defile,  a  Turkish  battalion,  with 
several  machine  guns,  was  deploying  in  the  plain 
below. 

The  2nd  Lancers  were  leading,  accompanied  by  the 
armoured  cars.  Taking  in  the  situation  at  a  glance. 
Captain  Davison,  commanding  the  regiment,  ordered 
the  cars  to  engage  the  enemy  in  front  with  their 
machine  guns,  supported  by  one  squadron  of  his 
regiment.  Taking  the  other  two  squadrons  with  him, 
he  galloped  along  a  slight  depression  to  the  right, 
and  charged  the  Turks  on  their  left  flank.  The  two 
squadrons  went  right  through  the  enemy  from  left 
to  right,  kiUing  forty-six  with  the  lance.  The  sur- 
vivors of  the  battalion,  about  500  in  all,  were  taken 
prisoners.  The  Turks  fought  well,  firing  steadily  till 
they  were  ridden  down,  but  the  rapid  work  of  the 
cavalry  gave  them  no  chance.  The  whole  action  did 
not  take  more  than  five  minutes,  and  furnished  a 

o 


210        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

perfect  little  example  of  sound  shock  tactics — move- 
ment and  fii'e  at  right  angles  to  one  another. 

Had  our  cavalry  been  a  few  hours  later,  this  battalion 
would  have  been  at  the  defile  at  the  top  of  the  pass, 
and  might  have  caused  a  delay  that  would  have  been 
fatal  to  the  success  of  the  operations.  The  battalion 
came  from  Afule,  and  had  been  ordered  to  cross  the 
mountains  and  move  down  the  coast  to  the  support 
of  the  enemy  right  wing.  The  Turks  knew  that  their 
line  had  been  broken  on  the  coast,  but  they  had 
absolutely  no  idea  that  our  cavalry  were  through  the 
gap. 

Without  a  pause  the  12th  Brigade  poured  out  of 
the  pass  and  cantered  across  the  plain  towards  Afule. 
The  leading  troops  charged  into  the  station  at  eight 
o'clock,  capturing  the  place  with  little  opposition. 
A  squadron  from  the  14th  Brigade  (4th  Division) 
rode  in  from  the  north  about  the  same  time.  The 
garrison  of  the  place  having  just  been  disposed  of  at 
Lejjun,  few  enemy  troops  were  found  here,  but  the 
Germans  had  an  aerodrome  close  to  the  station,  and 
this  was  captured  intact,  with  three  aeroplanes  and 
their  pilots  and  ail  the  mechanical  staff.  A  fourth 
aeroplane  succeeded  in  getting  away  in  the  general 
confusion.  So  unconscious  was  the  enemy  of  the 
fact  that  our  cavalry  were  on  the  plain,  that,  shortly 
after  this,  an  enemy  aeroplane,  returning  from  a 
reconnaissance,  actually  landed  on  this  aerodrome, 
and  was  promptly  captured  intact  with  its  pilot  and 
observer  ! 

Afule  proved  a  valuable  prize.  In  addition  to  ten 
locomotives  and  fifty  railway  trucks,  which  were 
found  standing  in  the  station,  there  was  a  fully 
equipped  hospital,  with  a  quantity  of  excellent  drugs. 
One  of  the  most  valuable  finds  was  a  great  store  of 
petrol,  which  was  discovered  in  an  underground  cave. 


OCCUPATION  OF  BEISAN  211 

While  the  12th  Brigade  was  '  mopping  up,'  the 
armoured  cars  were  having  the  time  of  their  Uves 
chasing  twelve  German  motor  lorries  down  the  track 
leaduig  to  Beisan.  They  captured  them  all,  and 
brought  the  drivers  back  to  the  station.  Unfortu- 
nately no  men  could  be  spared  to  guard  these  lorries, 
and,  when  the  5th  Division  arrived  shortly  afterwards, 
and  tried  to  drive  them  back  to  the  station,  it  was 
found  that  the  natives  had  been  there  in  the  mean- 
time, and  cut  open  every  petrol  tank  to  get  the  spirit. 
They  were  afterwards  repaired,  however,  and  did  good 
service  for  us  later  on. 

Having  sent  the  prisoners  back  to  Lejjun  under  a 
small  escort,  the  4th  Division  pressed  on  towards 
Beisan,  after  cutting  the  railway  east,  west,  and  south 
of  Afule. 

Riding  fast  all  day  down  the  Valley  of  Jezreel,  the 
division  reached  Beisan  about  half-past  four  in  the 
afternoon,  having  rounded  up  another  800  prisoners 
on  the  way.  The  Lancers  made  short  work  of  the 
small  garrison  they  met  with  here,  galloping  over  the 
Turks,  and  taking  100  prisoners  and  three  5*9-inch 
howitzers.  These  guns  were  in  position  to  defend 
the  town  against  an  attack  from  the  east,  an  eloquent 
testimony  to  the  manner  in  which  the  enemy  had 
been  deceived.  Our  troops  then  occupied  the  bridge 
over  the  Jordan  at  Jisr  el  Sheikh  Hussein,  and  placed 
outposts  south  and  east  of  Beisan. 

The  division  had  now  marched  eighty-five  miles  in 
thirty-four  hours,  fought  two  skirmishes,  and  cap- 
tured 1400  prisoners,  but  its  day's  work  was  not  yet 
quite  finished.  At  six  in  the  evening,  after  having 
watered  and  fed,  the  19th  Lancers  (12th  Brigade) 
set  out  in  the  dark,  along  a  difiicult  mountain  track 
west  of  the  railway,  to  Jisr  Mejamie,  the  railway 
bridge  over  the  Jordan,  twelve  miles  north  of  Beisan. 


212        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

Tliis  they  reached  and  seized  at  dawn  next  morning, 
having  covered  ninety-seven  miles  since  the  com- 
mencement of  their  march. 

The  AustraUans,  who  had  left  the  Nahr  Iskande- 
runeli  at  one  o'clock  in  the  morning,  reached  Kerkur 
and  Beidus  just  after  dawn,  and  thus  made  the  cross- 
ing of  the  Carmel  Range  in  dayhght.  They  were 
rewarded  by  the  magnificent  view  from  the  top  of  the 
pass,  across  the  Plain  of  Esdraelon  to  Mount  Tabor 
and  Nazareth,  and  over  the  Nazarene  hills  to  the 
great  mass  of  Mount  Hermon,  poised  against  the  sky 
sixty  miles  to  the  north-east.  Scattered  along  the 
track  were  a  number  of  derelict  Turkish  transport 
wagons,  which  had  been  abandoned  as  they  were 
being  driven  over  the  pass,  when  the  4th  Division 
came  upon  them  in  the  dark.  Many  of  the  Turks 
who  had  accompanied  these  wagons,  came  back  to 
the  track  after  daylight,  preferring  capture  by  the 
British  to  facing  the  tender  mercies  of  their  invete- 
rate enemies,  the  local  Arabs.  In  this  way  the  divi- 
sion had  collected  about  100  stragglers  by  the  time 
it  reached  Lejjun.  Near  the  top  of  the  pass  a  large 
gang  of  natives  was  discovered  at  work  on  an  excel- 
lently graded  road,  which  was  being  built  to  the 
village  of  Umm  el  Fahm.  It  appeared  that  the 
Germans  had  intended  to  build  a  sanatorium  there, 
in  connection  with  their  hospitals  at  Afule  and  Jenin. 
The  natives  employed  making  the  road  had  gone  to 
work  as  usual  that  morning,  all  unaware  that  the 
Germans  and  Turks  were  no  longer  masters  in  the 
land.  When  they  learned  the  true  state  of  affairs, 
their  first  thought  was  for  their  wages,  which  had 
not  been  paid,  and  they  were  not  at  all  grateful  to 
us  for  having  driven  their  paymasters  out  of  the 
country  ! 

The  division  reached  Lejjun  at  eleven  o'clock,  and 


Before!    German  motor  lorries  at  Nazareth. 
(From  an  enemy  photograph.) 


After!    The  same  lorries  near  .Afule.  after  our  armoured  t;ars  liael  finished  with  thefii. 


CAPTURE  OF  JENIN  213 

got  water  for  man  and  horse  in  the  beautiful  httle 
Wadi  el  Sitt,  the  '  Lady's  Brook,'  a  tributary  of  the 
river  Kishon,  hard  by  the  ruins  of  an  old  Roman 
fort  and  aqueduct. 

Shortly  after  mid-day  the  3rd  A.L.H.  Brigade,  with 
'  A '  Battery  H.A.C.,  resumed  the  march  to  Jenin, 
to  intercept  the  enemy  troops  that  were  expected  to 
retire  down  the  Dothan  Pass  from  Nablus  and  its 
neighbourhood.  The  brigade  reached  the  town  in 
the  early  afternoon,  and  the  leading  regiment,  the 
10th,  at  once  charged  straight  into  it,  galloping  over 
an  entrenched  position,  and  through  the  streets  of 
the  town.  The  enemy  was  completely  demoralised 
by  this  unexpected  attack  from  the  rear,  and  made 
little  resistance.  Such  opposition  as  was  encoun- 
tered was  speedily  crushed,  and  nearly  2000  prisoners 
fell  into  our  hands.  None  of  the  troops  in  the  place 
had  the  faintest  idea  that  our  cavahy  had  even 
broken  through  their  line,  much  less  that  we  were 
actually  in  the  plain.  The  German  officers,  of  whom 
there  was  a  number  in  the  place,  absolutely  refused 
to  beheve  that  our  troops  had  ridden  the  whole  way, 
and  declared  that  we  must  have  been  landed  at 
Haifa,  covered  by  our  '  Wonderful  Navy,'  as  they 
called  it. 

As  soon  as  the  prisoners  had  been  got  away,  and 
lodged  in  a  little  valley  out  of  sight  of  the  town,  the 
hills  to  the  south  were  picketed,  to  prevent  informa- 
tion getting  to  the  enemy  at  Nablus,  and  the  remainder 
of  the  brigade  was  disposed  by  squadrons  in  hollows 
and  folds  in  the  ground  on  eeich  side  of  the  Jenin- 
Afule  road.  The  battery  came  into  action  north- 
east of  the  town,  covering  the  Nablus  road. 

As  was  expected,  after  dark  the  enemy  began  to 
retire  from  his  positions  at  Nablus  and  Samaria,  and 
all  night  long  his  battalions  marched  down  the  road. 


214        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

through  Jenin,  and  out  on  to  the  plain.  These  were 
not  fugitives,  but  formed  bodies  of  troops,  retiiing 
to  the  Nazarene  hills,  where  they  had  a  partially  pre- 
pared defence  line  extending  from  the  sea  to  Lake 
Tiberias.  It  was  rather  an  eerie  experience  to  watch 
these  troops,  trudging  wearily  along  the  road  in  the 
bright  moonlight,  all  unconscious  of  the  keen  eyes 
of  then'  enemies  on  every  side  of  them.  As  each 
detachment  got  well  out  into  the  plain,  at  a  given 
signal,  the  waiting  squadrons  sprang  from  their 
hiding  places,  and  charged  down  upon  it.  One  can 
imagine  the  terror  of  the  Turks,  nodding  with  half- 
closed  eyes  as  they  trudged  along,  when  their  senses 
were  suddenly  assailed  by  the  thunder  of  hoofs  all 
round  them,  and  by  the  sight  of  wild  horsemen, 
exaggerated  in  size  by  the  moonlight,  charging  down 
upon  them  from  every  side.  Small  wonder  that 
there  was  Uttle  resistance.  Many  flung  themselves 
on  the  ground,  shutting  eyes  and  ears  to  the  horrid 
nightmare,  and  calling  on  Allah  to  deliver  them. 
Others  threw  down  their  rifles  and  held  up  their 
hands. 

Each  lot  was  quickly  hustled  out  of  sight,  and  the 
squadrons  returned  to  their  lairs,  to  await  the  coming 
of  the  next.  Only  one  battalion,  a  German  one, 
tried  to  put  up  any  fight,  and  succeeded  in  getting  a 
machine  gun  into  action,  but  it  was  ridden  down  at 
once.  None  of  the  other  German  troops  did  any 
better  than  the  Turks. 

Some  time  during  the  night,  information  of  the 
state  of  affairs  at  Jenin  evidently  got  back  to  the 
enemy  in  the  hills  about  Nablus,  for  the  supply  of 
prisoners  suddenly  ran  dry.  By  this  time  the  brigade 
had  got  over  8000,  and  needed  help  in  handling 
them.  In  response  to  a  message  sent  back  to  the 
divisional   headquarters   at  Lejjun,  the  4:th  A.L.H. 


BOOTY  AT  JENIN  215 

Brigade,  with  a  section  of  the  Notts  Battery  R.H.A., 
left  that  place  at  half -past  four  on  the  morning  of 
September  the  21st,  and  marched  to  Jenin.  An 
extraordinary  sight  met  the  brigade  on  its  arrival. 
The  whole  plain  seemed  to  be  covered  with  prisoners, 
motor  cars,  lorries,  wagons,  animals,  and  stores,  in 
an  inextricable  confusion.  In  and  out  of  this  mass 
the  sorely  tried  AustraUan  troopers  pushed  their 
way,  sweating  and  swearing,  every  now  and  then 
riding  savagely  at  the  hordes  of  natives  hovering  on 
the  outskirts  of  the  crowd  like  a  flock  of  vultures, 
and  looting  the  stores  that  strewed  the  ground  ;  anon 
pressing  into  the  throng  again,  to  round  up  a  group 
of  straying  prisoners.  Over  all  presided  the  stocky 
figure  of  the  brigadier,  ^  like  the  leader  of  a  gigantic 
school  picnic,  unhurried  and  efficient. 

Jenin  was  the  enemy's  main  supply  and  ordnance 
depot  for  his  Vllth  and  Vlllth  Armies,  and  very 
large  quantities  of  valuable  stores  of  all  sorts  were 
captured  here,  together  with  several  well-equipped 
workshops  and  three  hospitals.  There  were  twenty- 
four  burnt  aeroplanes,  and  one  intact,  on  the  aero- 
drome, and  a  number  of  engines  and  a  quantity  of 
rolhng  stock  in  the  station.  In  some  caves  near  by 
were  found  large  stores  of  German  beer  and  wine, 
and  a  lot  of  excellent  tinned  food,  and,  in  a  wagon 
abandoned  on  the  road,  there  were  nearly  £20,000 
in  gold.  The  two  troopers  who  were  detailed  to 
guard  this  money  sat  on  the  boxes  of  bullion  all 
day,  without  knowing  what  was  in  them,  and  have 
been  kicking  themselves  ever  since  !  This  gold  was 
of  the  greatest  use  to  the  Corps  later  on,  when  we 
were  Uving  on  the  country,  and  had  to  buy  all  our 
food  and  forage.  Among  the  minor  captures  was  a 
quantity  of  photographic  negatives  belonging  to  the 

1  Brigadier-General  L.  Wilson,  C.M.G..  D.S.O.,  A.I.F. 


216        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

official  photographer  with  the  German  forces,  one 
of  which  depicted  some  of  our  guns  which  were  lost 
in  the  second  Amman  raid.  Also  a  British  motor 
cycle,  captured  from  us  at  the  first  battle  of  Gaza, 
eighteen  months  before. 

The  chief  medical  officer  of  the  German  hospital  in 
the  town  volunteered  the  information  that  all  ranks 
there,  German  as  well  as  Turkish,  were  secretly  glad 
to  be  captured.  For  the  past  ten  days,  he  said, 
British  aeroplanes  had  hovered  over  the  place  almost 
continually,  and  a  rain  of  bombs  had  fallen  all  the 
time  on  the  station,  aerodrome,  and  workshops. 
Most  of  the  troops  left  the  town  every  day  before 
dawn,  and  spent  the  hours  of  dayhght  in  caves  in 
the  hills.  All  work  was  practically  at  a  standstill, 
and  none  of  the  German  aeroplanes  had  ever  ventured 
to  leave  the  ground.  He  was  very  puzzled  by  the 
fact  that  we  had  never  bombed  the  town  itself,  and, 
when  one  of  our  officers  replied  that  it  was  not  the 
British  custom  to  bomb  undefended  native  villages, 
he  shrugged  his  shoulders  and  remarked  that  such 
ideas  were  inadmissible  in  war.  The  Germans  never 
brought  themselves  to  believe  that  we  were  serious 
in  our  determination  to  observe  the  rules  of  civilised 
warfare  in  this  respect.  They  realised,  however, 
that  we  never  bombed  hospitals,  a  fact  of  which  they 
were  not  slow  to  take  advantage.  Later  on,  when 
Nazareth  was  reoccupied,  it  was  found  that  every 
house  that  harboured  German  troops,  which  is  to  say 
nearly  every  house  of  substance  in  the  town,  had  a 
red  cross,  or  its  Turkish  equivalent  a  red  crescent, 
painted  on  the  roof. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

DEBACLE 

While  the  cavalry  were  racing  for  the  Plain  of 
Esdraelon  on  the  19th  September  the  21st  Corps,  con- 
tinuing its  wheel  to  the  right,  drove  the  enemy  into 
the  hills.  The  5th  A.L.H.  Brigade,  riding  on  the 
left  flank  of  the  Corps,  and  some  distance  in  advance 
of  it,  approached  Tul  Keram  about  mid-day. 

The  orders  to  the  brigade  were  to  seize  the  town, 
if  possible,  or,  failing  that,  to  engage  the  enemy  there, 
and  endeavour  to  prevent  him  withdrawing  his  troops 
and  guns  till  the  arrival  of  our  infantry.  Knowing 
the  moral  effect  on  the  Turks  of  a  threat  to  their 
rear,  General  Onslow  decided  to  throw  a  portion  of 
his  brigade  across  the  Tul  Keram-Nablus  road,  the 
only  exit  from  the  town  to  the  east.  He  despatched 
the  14th  A.L.H.  regiment  and  part  of  the  brigade 
machine-gun  squadron,  with  instructions  to  find  a 
way  through  the  hills  north  of  the  town,  and  descend 
on  to  the  road  some  two  miles  to  the  north-east. 
With  the  remainder  of  his  brigade  he  approached  the 
town  from  the  north-west,  and  was  met  by  a  very 
heavy  fire  from  the  enemy  there.  Tul  Keram  was  a 
railway  and  store  depot  of  considerable  importance. 
It  had  been  fortified,  and  now  served  the  enemy  as  a 
strong  point,  on  which  his  troops,  defeated  in  the 
coastal  plain,  might  rally,  and  so  save  his  right  flank. 
He  was,  of  course,  stiU  in  ignorance  of  the  fact  that 
three  divisions  of  cavalry  were  already  well  on  their 
way  up  the  coast. 

817 


218        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

As  the  5th  Brigade  approached  the  town,  the  Royal 
Air  Force  swept  down  out  of  the  blue  sky,  and  com- 
menced an  intense  and  systematic  bombing  of  the 
enemy  positions  around  the  town,  and  the  closely 
packed  column  of  transport  and  guns  slowly  retiring 
along  the  road  to  Nablus.  The  utmost  confusion 
broke  out  in  the  enemy  ranks.  About  three  [o'clock 
the  14th  A.L.H.  Regiment,  which  had  moved  with 
extraordinary  rapidity,  descended  on  the  Nablus 
road  about  two  miles  from  Tul  Keram.  The  Turks 
were  now  faced  simultaneously  with  the  three  things 
they  most  feared.  Their  retreat  was  cut  off ;  they 
were  being  heavily  attacked  from  the  air  ;  and  they 
were  threatened  on  both  sides  with  a  cavalry  charge. 
The  demoraUsation  on  the  road  was  complete.  Not 
knowing  the  strength  of  the  cavalry  force  which  had 
suddenly  appeared  on  the  road  in  front  of  them,  and 
evidently  deceived  by  the  volume  of  fire  poured  on 
them  from  our  machine  guns  and  automatic  rifles, 
the  enemy  troops  and  transport  on  the  road  made  no 
attempt  to  break  through,  but  turned  back  towards 
Tul  Keram.  The  persistent  attacks  of  our  aeroplanes 
soon  destroyed  all  semblance  of  discipline  in  the 
column,  and  a  disordered  mass  of  fugitives  streamed 
back  into  Tul  Keram,  increasing  the  confusion  there. 
The  Turks  in  the  positions  surrounding  the  town, 
however,  still  fought  on  gallantly  enough,  and  General 
Onslow,  unable  to  advance  his  brigade  over  the  open 
ground  without  encountering  losses  which  would 
not  have  been  justified,  contented  himself  with  hold- 
ing the  enemy  in  check  on  the  north,  east  and  west, 
and  awaited  the  arrival  of  our  infantry.  A  brigade 
of  the  60th  Division  came  up  about  half-past  five, 
having  marched  and  fought  over  sixteen  miles  of 
heavy  country  since  dawn,  and  rushed  the  town  from 
the  south-west. 


A  FINE  MARCH  219 

General  Onslow  now  reassembled  his  brigade,  and 
succeeded  in  watering  all  the  horses,  which  was  some- 
thing of  a  feat,  considering  the  darkness  and  confu- 
sion. At  two  in  the  morning  the  brigade  started  off 
for  its  second  objective,  the  Messudieh-Jenin  Railway 
east  of  Ajje. 

Regarded  merely  as  a  march,  this  expedition, 
carried  out  in  the  dark  and  without  guides,  over  un- 
known and  almost  trackless  mountain  country,  ranks 
as  one  of  the  finest  episodes  of  the  campaign.  Un- 
able to  use  the  road  or  railway,  along  which  Turkish 
reinforcements  were  known  to  be  hurrying  towards 
Tul  Keram,  the  brigade  struck  straight  across  the 
mountains  to  the  north-east,  and.  passed  through 
Deir  el  Ghusn,  EUar,  Kefr  Ruai,  and  Fahme.  From 
the  last-named  place  a  moderate  pack  road  led 
through  Ajje  to  the  railway,  which  was  reached  at 
seven  in  the  morning  by  the  brigade  headquarters 
and  a  demolition  party,  who  blew  up  a  section  of  the 
line. 

Dawn  found  the  brigade  strung  out  over  fifteen 
miles  of  country.  Its  work  was  done,  and,  as  it 
would  have  taken  several  hours  to  reassemble  the 
regiments  at  Ajje,  the  Brigadier  at  once  turned  back 
along  the  track  by  which  he  had  come,  picking  up  his 
scattered  units  on  the  way,  and  returned  to  Tul  Keram. 
It  was  seven  o'clock  in  the  evening  before  the  whole 
brigade  was  again  concentrated  there. 

In  accordance  with  the  Commander-in-Chief's  plan, 
the  20th  Corps  had  taken  no  part  in  the  advance 
during  the  first  day,  beyond  seizing  one  or  two  tactical 
points,  to  facilitate  its  operations  on  the  following 
day,  but  on  the  20th  it  was  thrown  into  the  battle, 
and  the  whole  line  became  hotly  engaged.  The 
enemy  fought  stubbornly,  especially  in  the  centre  of 
his  line,  where  most  of  the  German  troops  were  con- 


220        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

centrated.  His  positions  were  of  great  natural 
strength,  and  had  been  excellently  entrenched  and 
wired  during  the  summer.  By  nightfall,  however, 
his  resistance  had  been  broken  all  along  the  front, 
and  our  infantry  had  advanced  as  far  as  the  line 
Anebta  (five  miles  east  of  Tul  Keram)-Beit  Lid- 
Funduk-Kefr  Harries-El  Lubban  (on  the  Nablus- 
Jerusalem  road,  eleven  miles  south  of  Nablus)  to 
Dome.  The  enemy  had  thus  been  turned  out  of 
nearly  all  his  entrenched  positions. 

Owing  to  the  breakdown  of  their  communications, 
and  the  virtual  destruction  of  their  air  force,  the 
Turks  had  not  yet  realised  that  our  cavalry  were 
behind  them,  and  that  all  their  lines  of  retreat  to  the 
north  were  thus  closed.  The  only  way  of  escape 
still  left  open  for  their  trapped  armies  was  by  the 
two  difficult  tracks  from  Nablus  and  Ain  el  Subian 
(on  the  Nablus-Beisan  road)  to  Jisr  el  Damieh. 
Chaytor's  Force  was  fighting  hard  in  the  Jordan 
Valley  to  reach  and  block  the  lower  end  of  these 
roads. 

Our  infantry  resumed  the  attack  at  dayhght  on  the 
21st.  The  20th  Corps  made  rapid  progress,  and,  by 
nightfall,  had  estabhshed  itself  across  the  Nablus- 
Jisr  el  Damieh  track  about  Beit  Dejan. 

On  the  21st  Corps  front,  the  advance  was  slower. 
The  enemy  in  this  part  of  the  field  was  not  yet 
demorahsed,  and  his  rearguards  put  up  a  stubborn 
fight,  especially  about  Nablus.  The  5th  A.L.H. 
Brigade,  moving  along  the  main  road  from  Tul  Keram, 
with  an  armoured  car  battery,  was  usefully  employed 
protecting  the  left  flank  of  the  Corps  during  the  day. 
General  Onslow  turned  the  Turks  and  Germans  out 
of  a  series  of  strong  rearguard  positions  astride  the 
road,  by  using  his  machine  guns  and  armoured  cars 
on  the  road,  to  hold  the  enemy  in  front  with  their 


CONFUSION  IN  THE  ENEMY  RANKS    221 

fire,  while  dismounted  parties  from  the  brigade 
worked  round  his  flanks.  The  French  regiment 
particularly  distinguished  itself  in  this  fighting,  and 
earned  generous  praise  from  the  Australians. 

In  the  early  afternoon  some  of  the  guns  of  the  3rd 
(Lahore)  Division  succeeded  in  reaching  a  position 
overlooking  Nablus  from  the  south-west,  and  their 
vigorous  shelling,  coupled  with  the  converging  attacks 
of  the  10th  and  53rd  Divisions,  drove  the  Turkish 
rearguards  out  of  their  positions.  The  5th  Brigade 
rode  into  the  town  hard  on  the  heels  of  the  retreat- 
ing enemy,  and  took  700  prisoners.  One  squadron 
pushed  on  down  the  Jerusalem  road,  and  gained 
touch  with  the  20th  Corps  cavalry  regiment,  the 
Worcester  Yeomanry,  about  Balata.  The  following 
day  the  brigade  marched  to  Jenin  to  rejoin  the 
Australian  Mounted  Division,  having  accounted  for 
3500  prisoners  during  the  three  days. 

Both  at  Tul  Keram  and  in  Nablus  great  quantities 
of  valuable  stores,  which  the  enemy  had  been  unable 
to  remove  or  destroy,  fell  into  our  hands.  Especially 
welcome  were  the  many  railway  engines  and  trucks 
found  intact  at  the  former  place,  which  were  very 
soon  employed  on  the  repaired  railway,  carrying 
ammunition  and  stores  to  our  troops.  Here,  too, 
a  troop  of  the  15th  A.L.H.  Regiment  rounded  up 
and  captured  a  detachment  of  the  Turkish  Field 
Treasury,  with  about  £5000  in  gold  and  a  quantity 
of  notes. 

Throughout  the  day  complete  confusion  had  reigned 
in  the  enemy  rear.  Camps  and  stores  were  hurriedly 
abandoned  or  set  on  fire.  Many  heavy  guns  were 
dropped  over  precipices  to  save  them  from  falling 
intact  into  the  hands  of  the  British.  Driven  out  of 
their  organised  positions,  and  unable  to  keep  touch 
with  one  another  in  this  diflicult,  mountain  countrv. 


222        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

the  enemy  regiments  retii-ed  independently.  Most 
of  them  made  either  for  Beisan  or  Jisr  el  Damieh,  but 
every  wadi  leading  down  to  the  Jordan  was  con- 
gested with  troops.  The  confusion  was  increased  by 
the  repeated  attacks  of  our  aeroplanes,  especially 
along  the  Nablus-Beisan  road,  which  was  packed 
with  a  dense  column  of  troops  and  transport.  Part 
of  this  column  continued  along  the  road  to  Beisan, 
where  it  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  4th  Cavalry  Divi- 
sion. The  greater  part  turned  off  at  Ain  el  Subian, 
and  made  for  Jisr  el  Damieh,  along  the  Wadi  Farah 
track.  About  a  mile  beyond  Ain  Shibleh,  this  track 
passes  through  a  deep  gorge.  The  transport  at  the 
head  of  the  column  was  caught  by  our  aeroplanes  in 
this  gorge,  and  heavily  bombed.  A  general  panic 
ensued.  Drivers  abandoned  their  vehicles,  and  fled 
into  the  hills ;  wagons,  lorries,  and  guns  were  smashed 
or  overturned,  and  in  a  short  time  the  road  was  com- 
pletely blocked.  The  remainder  of  the  column  turned 
off  at  Ain  Shibleh,  along  a  narrow  track  leading  to 
Beisan.  Still  harassed  by  our  aeroplanes,  it  broke 
up  ultimately  into  isolated  parties,  which  scattered 
into  the  hills,  and  were  gathered  in  by  the  4th  Cavalry 
Division  during  the  next  two  days. 

Our  infantry  and  the  Royal  Air  Force  had  done 
their  work  well,  in  face  of  great  difficulties.  To  the 
cavalry  now  fell  the  task  of  gathering  up  the  rem- 
nants of  the  two  Turkish  armies. 

There  was  little  cavalry  movement  of  importance 
on  the  21st.  The  4th  Division  established  posts  right 
across  the  Jordan  Valley,  east  of  the  river,  and  pushed 
patrols  along  the  roads  leading  south  and  south-west 
from  Beisan.  Shortly  after  dark,  the  first  body  of 
retiring  enemy  troops  was  encountered  on  the  Nablus 
road.  It  was  at  once  charged  in  the  moonhght  by 
the  Central  India  Force  (10th  Brigade)  and  dispersed. 


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224        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

leaving  a  number  of  prisoners  in  our  hands.  There 
was  no  serious  fighting  during  the  night,  but  the 
division  had  very  hard  work,  and  got  over  3000 
prisoners  before  daybreak. 

The  5th  Cavaky  Division  had  sent  the  14th  Brigade 
to  Jenin,  at  daylight,  to  assist  the  two  brigades  of  the 
Australian  Mounted  Division  there  in  dealing  with 
the  large  number  of  prisoners,  and  to  help  protect 
the  captured  enemy  stores  from  the  natives.  By  the 
afternoon,  however,  the  prisoners  had  been  got  away 
under  escort  to  Lejjun,  and  the  brigade  was  able  to 
return  to  Afule.  The  14th  and  15th  Brigades  then 
estabhshed  a  line  of  pickets  along  the  railway  to 
near  Beisan,  in  touch  with  the  4th  Division. 

Meanwhile  the  13th  Brigade,  with  '  B '  Battery 
H.A.C.,  had  been  sent  off  early  in  the  morning  to 
reoccupy  Nazareth. 

The  9th  Hodson's  Horse  marched  straight  up  the 
Afule-Nazareth  road  with  the  guns,  and  entered  the 
town  from  the  south.  The  other  two  regiments, 
leaving  the  road  some  distance  south  of  the  town, 
made  their  way  through  the  hills  to  the  Tiberias 
road,  and  attacked  from  the  east  and  north.  All 
thi'ee  regiments  attacked  dismounted.  There  was  a 
good  deal  of  fighting  of  a  difficult  nature  in  the  narrow, 
tortuous  streets  of  the  town,  but  most  of  the  enemy 
troops  remaining  after  our  raid  of  the  previous  day 
had  already  evacuated  the  town,  and  those  still  left 
were  soon  overpowered.  By  ten  o'clock  the  13th 
Brigade  had  possession  of  the  town.  The  roads  lead- 
ing west,  north,  and  east  were  then  picketed,  and 
strong  patrols  were  pushed  out  as  far  as  Seffurie  and 
Kefr  Kenna. 

Shortly  after  midnight  a  Turkish  battalion,  march- 
ing from  Haifa,  attacked  the  outposts  of  the  brigade 
on   the    Acre    road.     The    18th    Lancers    promptly 


RATION  DIFFICULTIES  225 

charged  the  Turks  in  the  moonhght,  and  chased  them 
for  two  miles  down  the  road,  killing  sixty  with  the 
lance  and  taking  over  300  prisoners. 

The  Australian  Mounted  Division  remained  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Jenin  and  Lejjun  during  the  day. 

The  large  numbers  of  prisoners  taken  by  the 
cavalry  during  the  past  twenty-four  hours  were  a 
serious  encumbrance,  and  the  feeding  of  them  became 
a  very  difficult  problem.  The  Corps  ration  convoy 
that  arrived  at  Jenin  on  the  21st  had  to  hand  over 
all  its  rations  to  them.  As  our  own  men  carried 
three-days  men's  and  two-days  horses'  rations  on 
the  man  and  horse,  they  did  not  actually  have  to  go 
hungry,  but  the  food  question  had  become  acute, 
and,  until  the  prisoners  could  be  got  away,  no  further 
move  forward  could  be  contemplated.  Fortunately, 
on  the  following  day,  it  was  found  possible  to  send 
most  of  them  back  to  Kakon,  near  Tul  Keram,  where 
they  were  taken  over  by  a  brigade  of  the  60th  Divi- 
sion. 

The  Commander-in-Chief  motored  to  Lejjun  on  the 
morning  of  the  22nd,  and  met  General  Chauvel. 

'  Well,  how  are  you  getting  on  ?  '  was  his  greeting. 

'  Pretty  well.  Sir,  pretty  well,'  repUed  the  General ; 
'  we  've  got  13,000  prisoners  so  far.' 

'  No  .  .  .  good  to  me  !  '  exclaimed  the  Chief,  with 
a  laugh ;  '  I  want  30,000  from  you  before  you  've 
done.' 

He  was  to  have  over  80,000  from  the  Corps  before 
the  operations  ended. 

The  5th  Cavalry  Division  concentrated  at  Nazareth 
on  the  22nd,  preparatory  to  an  advance  on  Haifa 
and  Acre,  its  place  at  Afule  being  taken  by  the  3rd 
A.L.H.  Brigade.  The  5th  A.L.H.  Brigade  rejoined 
the  Australian  Mounted  Division  at  Jenin  during 
the  day. 


226        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

In  the  early  hours  of  the  morning  an  enemy  column, 
with  transport  and  guns,  was  reported  by  our  aero- 
planes to  be  moving  north  along  the  Ain  Shibleh- 
Beisan  track,  its  head  being  then  nine  miles  south  of 
Beisan.  This  was  part  of  the  force  that  had  been 
caught  and  heavily  bombed  by  our  aeroplanes  the 
day  before  in  the  gorge  of  the  Wadi  Farah,  as  it  was 
trying  to  escape  towards  the  Jordan. 

The  4th  Cavalry  Division  at  once  sent  a  force  from 
Beisan  along  the  Ain  Shibleh  track  to  intercept  the 
column,  and  despatched  Jacob's  Horse  over  the  bridge 
of  Jisr  el  Sheikh  Hussein  to  push  patrols  down  the 
track  which  follows  the  Jordan  on  its  east  bank,  so 
as  to  secure  any  parties  which  might  escape  across 
the  river.  At  the  same  time  the  20th  Corps  cavalry 
regiment,  the  Worcester  Yeomanry,  was  ordered  to 
advance  northwards  from  Ain  Shibleh,  supported  by 
infantry,  to  collect  stragglers,  and  to  drive  any 
formed  bodies  into  the  arms  of  the  4th  Cavalry 
Division. 

Our  airmen  then  proceeded  to  attack  the  column 
with  bombs  and  machine  guns,  and,  in  a  short  time, 
had  completely  broken  it  up.  The  enemy  scattered 
in  panic  into  the  hills  in  small  parties,  which  were 
rounded  up  by  the  4th  Division  next  day.  The 
Worcester  Yeomanry  rode  as  far  as  the  gorge  where 
the  ill-fated  column  had  been  caught  by  our  aero- 
planes, and  here  its  farther  advance  was  stopped, 
as  the  track  was  completely  blocked  by  overturned 
vehicles  and  the  dead  bodies  of  men  and  horses.  On 
one  stretch  of  the  track  just  here,  under  five  miles 
long,  eighty-seven  guns  and  900  motor  lorries  and 
other  vehicles  were  afterwards  found  by  the  infantry, 
when  clearing  up  the  area. 

About  mid- day  the  11th  and  12th  Light  Armoured 
Car  Batteries  were  sent  to  occupy  Haifa,  which  was 


ADVANCE  OF  CHAYTOR'S  FORCE   227 

believed  to  have  been  evacuated  by  the  enemy. 
With  them  went  the  General  commanding  the  artillery 
of  the  Cavalry  Corps,  in  a  large  and  beautiful  Rolls- 
Royce  car,  with  the  Commander-in-Chiefs  Union 
Jack  on  the  bonnet,  and  a  proclamation  in  his  pocket 
to  read  to  the  peaceful  inhabitants. 

He  met  with  a  warm  reception.  As  the  cars 
neared  the  town,  several  enemy  batteries  opened 
fire  on  them,  while  machine  guns  on  Mount  Carmel 
swept  the  road.  The  batteries  had  evidently  regis- 
tered carefully,  for  almost  the  first  salvo  hit  the 
General's  car,  knocking  it  into  the  ditch  and  smash- 
ing the  flag.  The  General  himself,  with  his  staff, 
had  to  take  cover  in  the  same  ditch,  and  quickly  too, 
and  there  they  lay,  getting  the  proclamation  covered 
with  mud,  till  the  armoured  cars  succeeded  in  retriev- 
ing them.  It  was  a  shocking  affair,  and  showed  a 
sad  lack  of  respect  on  the  part  of  the  enemy.  The 
'  Haifa  Annexation  Expedition,'  as  it  was  irreverently 
called,  returned  to  Afule  in  somewhat  chastened  mood, 
but  fortunately  without  any  serious  casualties. 

The  chief  movement  of  the  day  took  place  in  the 
Jordan  Valley.  Early  in  the  morning  the  New  Zea- 
land Mounted  Brigade  succeeded  in  getting  astride 
the  Nablus- Jisr  el  Damieh  roads  at  El  Makhruk,  after 
a  sharp  fight,  taking  500  prisoners,  including  a  divi- 
sional commander.  About  an  hour  previously  the 
38th  Royal  Fusiliers,  one  of  the  two  Jewish  battalions 
with  the  force,  had  captured  the  enemy  position  cover- 
ing the  river  ford  at  Umm  el  Shert,  while,  about  half- 
past  ten,  the  New  Zealand  Brigade,  with  a  West 
Indies  battalion,  seized  the  bridge  at  Jisr  el  Damieh, 
and  crossed  to  the  east  bank.  In  the  attack  on  the 
bridgehead  the  New  Zealanders  and  the  '  coloured 
gentlemen '  both  charged  the  Turks  simultaneously, 
and  had  a  severe  hand-to-hand  struggle  before  achiev- 


228        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

iiig  their  object.  The  2nd  A.L.H.  Brigade  also  crossed 
the  river  at  Ghoraniyeh,  and,  in  conjunction  with 
the  20th  Indian  Infantry  Brigade,  drove  in  the 
Turkish  outposts,  and,  by  nightfall,  was  facing  the 
main  enemy  position  at  Shunet  Nimrin. 

Early  in  the  night  it  became  clear  that  a  general 
retirement  of  the  Turkish  IVth  Army  had  begun, 
and  orders  were  issued  for  the  force  to  follow  it 
vigorously  on  the  morrow. 


German  aircraft  captured  intact  at  Afule.     Mciiint  Tabor  in  the  background. 


In  the  hands  of  the  enemy  I     Some  of  our  Horsj  Artillery  guns  captured 
in  the  second  trans-Jordan  raid.     (From  an  enemy  photograph.) 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

DESTRUCTION 

Next  day,  September  the  23rd,  Chay tor's  Force  was 
on  the  move  at  dayhght,  following  up  the  retreating 
IVth  Army  east  of  the  Jordan.  The  3rd  A.L.H. 
Regiment  (1st  Brigade),  with  the  2nd  B.W.I.  Regi- 
ment, had  a  sharp  fight  at  the  ford  of  Mafid  Jozeleh, 
haH  way  between  El  Damieh  and  Ghoraniyeh,  where 
the  Turks  had  left  a  rearguard.  The  enemy  was 
dispersed,  and  the  AustraUans  crossed  the  river  at 
six  o'clock.  The  remainder  of  the  1st  A.L.H.  Bri- 
gade crossed  at  Umm  el  Shert,  and  moved  on  El 
Salt  up  the  Wadi  Arseniyet  track.  The  2nd  A.L.H. 
Brigade,  having  crossed  the  Jordan  at  Ghoraniyeh, 
pressed  on  up  the  Wadi  Kefrein,  and  seized  Kabr 
Mujahid  at  five  o'clock,  rounding  up  the  small  force 
there  after  a  lively  fight,  and  then  turned  north  along 
the  very  difficult  mountain  track  towards  El  Sir. 
Meanwhile  the  New  Zealand  Brigade,  having  crossed 
at  El  Damieh,  rode  hard  up  the  mountain  track,  and 
occupied  El  Salt  about  seven  in  the  evening.  The 
only  opposition  met  with  was  from  a  small,  wired-in 
post  on  the  El  Damieh-El  Salt  track,  A  brigade  of 
Indian  infantry  reached  Shunet  Nimrin  in  the  even- 
ing, and  found  it  evacuated  by  the  enemy.  One 
battalion  of  the  B.W.I.  Regiment  and  one  squadron 
of  cavahy  were  left  at  El  Damieh,  to  gain  touch 
with  patrols  of  the  4th  Cavalry  Division  moving 
down  the  Jordan. 

Orders  were  issued  to  the  force  in  the  evening  by 


230        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

G.H.Q.,  to  push  on  next  day,  harass  the  enemy,  and 
try  to  cut  his  hne  of  retreat  to  the  north  ;  also  to 
gain  touch  with  the  Arab  Army  advancing  from  the 
south. 

The  4th  Cavalry  Division  also  had  a  busy  day. 
Early  in  the  morning  our  aeroplanes  reported  that 
the  enemy  had  found  a  ford  over  the  Jordan  about 
six  miles  south  of  Beisan  and  was  crossing  the  river 
in  large  numbers.  The  11th  Brigade,  with  the  Hants 
Battery  R.H.A.,  was  at  once  sent  off  to  intercept 
them,  and  moved  south  along  both  banks  of  the 
Jordan.  The  1/1  County  of  London  Yeomanry  and 
the  29th  Lancers  marched  along  the  west  bank,  and 
Jacob's  Horse  east  of  the  river.  At  half -past  eight, 
patrols  of  the  29th  Lancers,  approaching  the  ford  of 
Makhadet  Abu  Naj,  seven  miles  south-east  of  Beisan, 
were  fired  on  by  a  party  of  Turks  covering  the  passage 
of  a  large  force  of  the  enemy  over  the  river.  A  con- 
siderable portion  of  this  force  was  already  across. 
The  29th  Lancers  and  part  of  the  brigade  machine- 
gun  squadron  engaged  the  Turks  on  the  north,  while 
the  Yeomanry  pushed  round  the  left  flank  of  the 
enemy  force,  in  order  to  take  it  in  rear.  The  ground 
was  very  difficult,  and  the  Yeomanry  were  subjected 
to  a  considerable  fire  from  a  low  hill  on  the  west  bank, 
on  which  the  Turks  had  a  number  of  machine  guns. 
This  hill  was  the  central  point  of  resistance  of  the 
enemy  bridgehead. 

As  soon  as  the  Yeomanry  were  clear  of  the  enemy's 
flank,  the  29th  remounted  and  charged  the  hill.  The 
charge  was  completely  successful.  Large  numbers 
of  the  Turks  were  speared,  and  800  prisoners  and  no 
less  than  twenty-five  machine  guns  were  taken.  Like 
all  the  work  of  these  veteran  Indian  cavalry  regi- 
ments in  the  campaign,  this  charge  was  admirably 
carried  out,  but  that  it  succeeded  in  getting  home  in 


THE  ACTION  AT  ABU  NAJ  231 

the  face  of  such  a  potential  volume  of  machine-gun 
and  rifle  fire  is  an  indication  of  the  state  of  demoralisa- 
tion to  which  the  enemy  was  now  reduced. 

Meanwhile,  on  the  east  bank,  Jacob's  Horse,  which 
was  a  little  way  behind,  rode  up  and  instantly  charged 
the  large  force  of  Turks  on  that  side.  This  charge, 
however,  was  held  up  by  a  deep  wadi,  and  the  in- 
tense fire  of  the  enemy  compelled  our  troops  to 
retire  and  take  cover.  The  regiment  re-formed,  and 
again  attempted  to  charge  the  enemy,  but  was  again 
stopped  by  bad  ground,  and  suffered  severe  casualties. 

The  Hants  Battery,  on  the  west  bank,  coming  up 
just  at  this  moment,  immediately  galloped  into  action, 
and  opened  a  rapid  and  accurate  fire  on  the  masses 
of  Turks  across  the  river.  It  was  at  once  hotly 
engaged  by  two  concealed  enemy  batteries  on  the 
east  bank,  and  in  a  few  minutes  every  one  of  the 
guns  had  been  hit.  None  were  put  out  of  action, 
however,  and  all  continued  firing  most  gallantly. 
The  enemy's  fire  was  so  heavy  that  General  Gregory 
ordered  a  troop  of  cavalry  out  into  the  open  to  try 
and  draw  the  fire  of  the  Turkish  guns,  and  so  enable 
the  battery  to  withdraw  and  take  up  a  concealed 
position.  Before  the  guns  could  be  moved,  however, 
the  situation  was  cleared  by  one  of  the  Yeomanry 
squadrons,  which  had  worked  its  way  south  of  the 
enemy  position.  This  squadron  succeeded  in  cross- 
ing the  river  at  Makhadet  Fath  Allah,  and,  wading 
across  the  river,  charged  and  captured  the  enemy 
guns. 

Meanwhile  a  squadron  of  the  29th  had  been  sent 
across  the  river,  a  little  farther  north,  to  assist  Jacob's 
Horse.  Thus  reinforced,  the  regiment  attacked  again, 
and  this  attack,  coupled  with  the  loss  of  their  guns, 
broke  the  resistance  of  the  Turks.  Most  of  them 
surrendered.     A  few  succeeded  in  escaping  for  the 


232        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

time,  amid  the  broken  ground  on  both  banks  of  the 
river.  3000  prisoners,  including  a  divisional  com- 
mander, ten  guns,  and  thirty  machine  gims  fell  into 
our  hands. 

After  the  action,  the  brigade  continued  its  march 
south,  to  Ras  el  Humeiyir,  where  it  bivouacked  for 
the  night,  with  outposts  south  and  west,  along  the 
Wadi  el  Sherar  and  east  of  the  Jordan. 

During  the  night  a  troop  of  the  29th  Lancers  was 
sent  ofE  into  the  hills  to  the  west,  to  try  and  gain 
touch  with  the  20th  Corps,  about  Khurbet  Atuf .  This 
troop  marched  all  night,  along  a  very  difficult  foot- 
path, and  met  the  20th  Corps  cavalry  regiment 
(Worcester  Yeomanry)  at  Atuf  early  in  the  morning. 
It  rejoined  the  11th  Brigade  near  Ras  Umm  Zoka 
during  the  day. 

The  task  assigned  to  the  5th  Cavalry  Division  on 
the  23rd  was  the  capture  of  Acre  and  Haifa.  The 
13th  Brigade,  with  a  Light  Armoured  Car  Battery 
and  a  light  car  patrol,  left  Nazareth  at  five  in  the 
morning.  Marching  via  SefEurie  and  Shefa  Amr,  the 
force  reached  Acre  about  mid-day,  and  captured  it 
without  difficulty,  the  small  enemy  garrison  showing 
little  inclination  to  fight.  260  prisoners  and  two 
guns  were  taken  here. 

The  remainder  of  the  division  left  Nazareth  at  the 
same  hour,  and  reached  the  Kishon  railway  bridge, 
near  El  Harithie,  about  mid-day.  The  14th  Brigade 
remained  here,  while  the  15th  Brigade,  with  '  B  ' 
Battery  H.A.C.,  moved  on  Haifa  along  the  Afule- 
Haifa  road,  which  skirts  the  north-eastern  edge  of 
the  Mount  Carmel  Range.  There  were  only  two  regi- 
ments with  the  brigade,  as  the  Hyderabad  Lancers 
were  absent,  escorting  prisoners  back  from  Lejjun. 
They  rejoined  the  brigade  late  in  the  afternoon,  just 
after  Haifa  had  been  captured. 


CAPTURE  OF  HAIFA  233 

The  Mysore  Lancers,  advance  guard  to  the  brigade, 
reached  the  village  of  Belled  el  Sheikh  about  ten 
o'clock,  and,  on  emerging  from  the  trees  that  sur- 
round the  village,  came  under  heavy  fire  from  a 
number  of  guns  on  Mount  Carmel,  and  from  machine 
guns  and  rifles  in  the  hills  north-west  of  the  village. 
Patrols  sent  out  to  the  north  drew  fire  from  a  large 
number  of  machine  guns  about  Tel  Abu  Hawam, 
and  concealed  among  trees  and  shrubs  near  the  main 
road  south  of  that  place.  It  was  evident  that  the 
position  was  strongly  held. 

General  Harbord  had  arrived  at  Belled  el  Sheikh, 
and  received  the  report  of  his  advance  guard.  He 
had  a  difficult  task  before  him.  South  of  the  road 
the  rocky  wall  of  Carmel  rose  steeply,  1500  feet 
above  the  plain.  To  the  north,  the  country  was 
flat  and  open,  and  afforded  httle  or  no  cover  for 
troops,  except  along  that  portion  of  the  Nahr  el 
Mukatta  (the  river  Kishon)  which  runs  east  and 
west  a  mile  and  a  haK  north  of  Belled  el  Sheikh, 
which  was  bordered  with  trees  and  scrub.  The  Wadi 
Ashlul  el  Wawy  is  practicaUy  dry  at  this  time  of 
year,  but  the  Nahr  el  Mukatta  is  a  perennial  stream, 
the  banks  of  which  are  very  marshy. 

The  Brigadier  decided  that  the  first  thing  to  be 
done  was  to  silence  the  guns  on  Mount  Carmel.  He 
accordingly  despatched  a  squadron  of  the  Mysore 
Lancers,  with  a  couple  of  machine  guns,  to  climb  the 
mountain  by  a  goat  path,  which  follows  the  Wadi  el 
Tabil  from  Belled  el  Sheikh,  and  joins  the  road 
running  along  the  backbone  of  the  range.  This 
squadron  was  ordered  to  move  along  this  road  to 
the  north,  locate  the  guns,  and  attack  them.  With 
the  remainder  of  his  force  the  Brigadier  decided  to 
make  a  mounted  attack  from  the  east  on  the  enemy 
positions  about  Tel  Abu  Hawam,  supported  by  his 


234        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

guns  and  machine  guns  from  the  south-east.  '  B ' 
Battery  H.A.C.  came  into  action  close  to  the  road, 
about  half  a  mile  north  of  Belled  el  Sheikh,  and  the 
remainder  of  the  machine-gun  squadron,  with  two 
squadi'ons  Mysore  Lancers,  a  little  farther  north, 
along  the  Acre  Railway.  The  4th  squadron  Mysore 
Lancers  was  sent  up  the  road  running  north  from 
near  El  Harbaj,  with  instructions  to  turn  westwards 
at  Tel  El  Subat,  and  make  for  the  mouth  of  the  Nahr 
el  Mukatta.  It  was  then  to  push  along  the  sea 
shore,  so  as  to  take  the  enemy  positions  in  reverse. 
The  Jodhpur  Lancers  took  up  a  position  of  readiness, 
about  500  yards  north-east  of  Belled  el  Sheikh,  pre- 
paratory to  making  a  dash  for  the  wooded  portion 
of  the  Mukatta.  They  were  to  cross  this,  and  then 
wheel  to  the  left,  and  charge  the  enemy  on  his  left 
flank. 

These  dispositions  were  soon  completed,  and  the 
troops  then  set  themselves  to  wait  until  the  Mysore 
Lancers'  squadron  had  dealt  with  the  enemy  guns 
on  Mount  Carmel.  Meanwhile  our  artillery  and 
machine  guns  searched  the  palm  groves  and  scrub 
about  Tel  Abu  Huwam  and  along  the  banks  of  the 
Mukatta.  Observation  was  difficult,  as  the  enemy 
was  well  concealed. 

Shortly  before  mid-day  General  Harbord  received 
a  welcome  reinforcement  in  the  Sherwood  Rangers 
Yeomanry,  which  had  been  sent  up  from  El  Harithie. 
He  at  once  despatched  a  squadron  of  this  regiment 
to  the  assistance  of  the  Mysore  Lancers'  squadron 
on  Carmel. 

Desultory  firing  continued  for  the  next  two  hours, 
but  there  was  no  sign  of  any  slackening  of  the  enemy's 
artillery  activity.  At  last  the  Brigadier  came  to  the 
conclusion  that  his  troops  on  Carmel  had  either  been 
unable  to  fulfil  their  task  of  silencing  the  enemy  guns, 


CAPTURE  OF  HAIFA  235 

or  had  lost  their  way.  Time  was  running  on,  and 
he  decided  that  he  couid  wait  no  longer.  The  Jodhpur 
Lancers  were  ordered  out  to  the  attack. 

Moving  off  in  column  of  squadrons,  in  line  of  troop 
columns,  they  cantered  out  into  the  open  towards 
the  stream,  coming  under  intense  fire  as  they  crossed 
the  Acre  Railway.  The  fire,  however,  appeared  ill- 
directed,  which  was  probably  due  to  the  vigorous 
action  of  our  artillery  and  machine  guns  supporting 
the  attack. 

Owing  to  the  exposed  nature  of  the  ground,  it  had 
not  been  possible  to  reconnoitre  the  Mukatta  before- 
hand, and,  when  the  Jodhpur  Lancers  reached  it, 
they  found  it  quite  impassable.  Two  ground  scouts, 
who  jumped  into  the  bed  of  the  stream,  disappeared 
instantaneously  into  the  quicksands.  The  regiment, 
was,  however,  now  committed  to  the  attack,  and  it 
was  impossible  to  turn  back.  Changing  direction 
left,  the  four  squadrons  charged  straight  at  the 
enemy. 

The  leading  squadron,  '  B,'  galloping  over  the 
two  branches  of  the  Wadi  Ashlul  el  Wawy,  dashed 
into  the  enemy  machine  guns,  killed  the  crews,  and 
opened  the  defile  between  the  Wadi  Selman  and  the 
mountain.  The  second  squadron,  'D,'  charged  and 
captured  the  enemy  guns  and  machine  guns  about 
Tel  Abu  Hawam  and  north  of  it.  The  remaining 
two  squadrons  galloped  through  the  defile,  straight 
on  into  the  town.  Meanwhile,  after  clearing  the  defile, 
'  B '  squadron  made  its  way  along  the  lower  slopes  of 
Mount  Carmel,  and  charged  into  the  German  Colony 
west  of  Haifa,  capturing  several  guns,  and  killing 
large  numbers  of  Turks  and  Germans.  '  D '  squadi'on, 
after  clearing  up  the  Tel  Abu  Hawam  area,  galloped 
up  the  east  bank  of  the  Wadi  Selman  and  along  the 
beach,   entering  the  town   on  the  north-east.     All 


236        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

four  squadrons  thus  entered  Haifa  about  the  same 
moment. 

As  soon  as  the  charge  got  home,  the  two  squadrons 
Mysore  Lancers,  who  had  supported  the  attack  with 
their  fire,  mounted,  and  followed  at  a  gallop  into  the 
town.  Of  the  two  detached  squadrons  of  this  regi- 
ment, that  on  the  north  had  been  held  up  about  half 
a  mile  west  of  El  Suriyeh.  This  squadron  now 
mounted,  and  charged  a  body  of  the  enemy  in  posi- 
tion near  the  mouth  of  the  Mukatta,  capturing  two 
guns  and  100  prisoners. 

The  squadron  on  Mount  Carmel,  after  riding  nearly 
six  miles  over  very  bad  country,  had  at  last  located 
the  enemy  guns  at  Karmelheim,  much  farther  north 
than  had  been  expected.  Dropping  his  machine  guns 
and  all  his  Hotchkiss  rifles  on  the  track,  to  provide 
covering  fire,  the  squadron  leader  led  the  remainder 
of  his  troops  away  to  the  left  to  charge  the  guns. 
Owing  to  casualties  on  the  way  up  the  range,  and  to 
some  of  his  men  having  been  delayed  by  the  diffi- 
culties of  the  track,  he  found  that,  after  providing  for 
his  Hotchkiss  rifles,  he  had  only  fifteen  lances  for  the 
charge.  Nevertheless,  he  decided  to  attack  at  once, 
rightly  judging  that  even  an  unsuccessful  charge 
would  probably  divert  the  fire  of  the  enemy  guns  long 
enough  to  permit  the  Jodhpur  Lancers  to  make  their 
attack  in  the  plain.  His  machine  guns  and  Hotch- 
kiss rifles  had  got  close  to  the  guns  unseen,  and  now 
opened  a  sudden  and  accurate  fire  on  them.  The 
fifteen  men  then  galloped  in  from  the  flank,  and 
actually  succeeded  in  silencing  the  battery.  The 
crews  of  two  of  the  guns  were  killed,  but  the  battery 
escort  then  came  up,  and  it  might  have  gone  hardly 
with  the  gallant  little  band  of  cavalry  had  not  the 
squadron  of  the  Sherwood  Rangers  arrived  just  in 
the  nick  of  time  to  complete  the  work.     By  a  fortu- 


6CALE     or    CH0U3H    MILES 


Ly-1 


238        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

nate  coincidence,  this  charge  took  place  just  as  the 
Jodhj^ur  Lancers  attacked  in  the  plain. 

1351  prisoners,  seventeen  guns,  and  eleven  machine 
guns  were  collected  at  Haifa  after  the  action.  The 
captured  artillery  included  two  six-inch  naval  guns, 
which  the  Germans  had  mounted  on  the  top  of  Mount 
Carmel,  to  engage  our  warships  in  the  event  of  an 
attempted  landing. 

The  Turks  had  fought  well,  firing  until  they  were 
ridden  down,  but  once  our  cavalry  were  through  the 
defile,  the  fight  was  practically  over.  They  galloped 
through  the  town,  riding  down  with  the  lance  any 
bodies  of  the  enemy  who  showed  fight,  and,  in  twenty 
minutes,  had  overcome  all  opposition. 

The  Austrahan  Mounted  Division  had  a  day  of 
comparative  rest.  The  3rd  A.L.H.  Brigade  reheved 
the  5th  Cavalry  Division  at  Nazareth,  and  the  rest 
of  the  division  remained  at  Afule,  sending  patrols 
eastwards  as  far  as  Beisan,  to  bring  in  the  prisoners 
taken  on  the  two  previous  days  by  the  4th  Cavalry 
Division.  Towards  evening  the  '  bag '  began  to 
arrive,  and,  long  after  darkness  fell,  the  endless 
column  of  captives  was  still  winding  its  way  up  the 
Valley  of  Jezreel. 

Most  of  these  prisoners  had  marched  over  twenty 
miles  since  their  capture,  and  no  one  knows  how 
many  more  before  they  fell  into  our  hands.  Their 
dragging  feet  raised  a  heavy  cloud  of  dust,  through 
which  they  had  trudged  all  the  long,  hot  march,  and 
they  came  in  raging  with  thirst.  In. anticipation  of 
their  arrival,  several  large  canvas  tanks  had  been 
set  up  and  filled  with  water,  and  elaborate  arrange- 
ments had  been  made  by  the  capable  and  energetic 
water  officer  of  the  Australian  Division.  Each  man 
was  to  file  past  the  tanks,  have  a  drink,  fill  his  water 
bottle,  and  move  on  to  the  concentration  area  with 


'  MOPPING  UP '  239 

a  gentle  sigh  of  satisfaction.  The  water  officer  had 
eight  orderHes.  There  were  8000  prisoners,  and,  as  soon 
as  they  smelt  the  water,  the  8000  charged  the  eight. 
The  charge  was  successful,  and  the  prisoners  there- 
upon all  tried  to  get  into  the  water  together.  In  a 
few  seconds  the  tanks  were  trampled  down,  and  the 
frenzied  Turks  struggled  and  fought  with  one  another 
in  the  darkness  round  the  muddy  ruins.  Eventually 
they  had  to  be  driven  back  at  the  point  of  the  sword. 
More  water  was  procured,  and  the  prisoners  were 
marched  up  to  it  in  small  parties  under  escort.  It 
took  all  night  to  supply  them  all. 

The  following  day  the  4th  Cavalry  Division  con- 
tinued its  '  mopping  up '  operations  in  the  Jordan 
Valley. 

Early  in  the  morning  an  observation  post  of  the 
London  Yeomanry,  who  were  on  outpost  duty, 
observed  a  large  force  of  the  enemy  making  for  the 
ford  of  El  Masudi.  A  squadron  at  once  galloped  for 
the  ford,  but  the  enemy  got  there  first,  and  held 
it  up.  Another  squadron,  coming  up  in  support, 
several  times  charged  the  Turks  debouching  from 
the  hills,  and  captured  a  large  number  of  them.  The 
Yeomen  had  the  greatest  difficulty  in  dealing  with 
their  prisoners,  who,  after  surrendering  and  throwing 
down  their  rifles  when  charged,  repeatedly  picked 
them  up  again,  and  went  on  fighting. 

The  Hants  Battery  now  came  up,  and  got  into 
action  at  close  range  against  the  enemy  holding  the 
ford.  Its  rapid  and  accurate  fire  completely  discon- 
certed the  demoralised  Turks,  and  the  29tli  Lancers 
took  prompt  advantage  of  the  fact  to  charge  them. 
The  enemy,  worn  out  and  dispirited,  made  but  a 
poor  fight  of  it,  and  the  action  was  soon  over.  4000 
Turks,  including  Rushdi  Bey,  Commander  of  the 
16th   Division,    were   taken    prisoner,    and   another 


240        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

1000  were  rounded  up  later  on  in  the  course  of  the 
day.     Very  few  escaped. 

The  horses  of  the  11th  Brigade  were  now  in  a 
very  exhausted  condition,  and  the  ammunition  of  the 
battery  was  running  low.  General  Barrow,  there- 
fore, ordered  the  Brigadier  only  to  continue  his 
southward  movement  as  far  as  Ras  Umm  Zoka  and 
the  Wadi  Kafrinji,  sending  patrols  along  the  Jordan, 
to  gain  touch  with  Chaytor's  Force. 

This  action  completed  the  destruction  of  the 
Vllth  and  Vlllth  Turkish  Armies.  A  few  stragglers 
escaped  across  the  river,  to  wander  miserably  in  the 
barren,  waterless  country  to  the  east,  at  the  mercy 
of  hostile  Arabs.  With  the  exception  of  these,  the 
entile  enemy  force  west  of  the  Jordan  had  been  cap- 
tured or  killed,  and  all  its  guns,  transport,  and  stores 
had  fallen  into  our  hands. 

The  IVth  Army,  east  of  Jordan,  and  the  2nd  Corps 
(Hedjaz  Force)  about  Maan,  remained  to  be  dealt 
with.  Both  these  forces  were  in  full  retreat  to  the 
north,  the  former  pursued  by  Chaytor's  Force  and 
the  northern  portion  of  the  Arab  Army,  the  latter 
harried  by  the  southern  detachment  of  the  Arabs. 
As  the  Hedjaz  Railway  had  been  cut  at  Deraa,  no 
suppHes  could  reach  these  enemy  forces,  and  they 
had  to  depend  for  their  food  on  a  sparsely  populated 
country,  already  almost  denuded  of  supplies  by 
Turkish  requisitions,  and  inhabited  by  bitterly  hostile 
tribes. 

As  the  action  of  Chaytor's  Force  formed  a  separate 
episode  in  the  operations,  it  will  be  convenient  to 
follow  its  fortunes  to  the  conclusion  of  its  work. 

On  the  night  of  the  23rd,  the  dispositions  of  the 
Force  were  as  follows  : — 

New  Zealand  Brigade  in  El  Salt.  1st  A.L.H.  Bri- 
gade approaching  El  Salt,  along  the  Wadi  Arseniyet 


CAPTURE  OF  AMMAN  241 

track.  2nd  A.L.H.  Brigade  on  the  Wadi  Kef  rein 
track,  a  few  miles  west  of  Ain  el  Sir.  Infantry  at 
Shunet  Nimrin.  The  whole  force  resumed  the 
advance  vigorously  at  daylight  on  the  24th.  The 
New  Zealanders  encountered  the  Turkish  rearguards 
at  Sweileh  at  seven  in  the  morning,  and  the  2nd 
Brigade  at  Ain  el  Sir  at  the  same  hour.  In  both 
places  there  was  a  sharp  fight  before  the  enemy 
was  dislodged.  The  Turkish  IVth  Army  was  not 
yet  disorganised,  and  was  retreating  in  good  order, 
fighting  every  step  of  the  way. 

At  night  the  Anzac  Division  held  a  line  north  and 
south,  a  few  miles  east  of  Sweileh  and  Ain  el  Sir,  and 
the  infantry  had  reached  El  Salt.  During  the  night 
a  party  from  the  New  Zealand  Brigade  raided  and 
cut  the  railway  near  Kalaat  el  Zerka.  At  six  o'clock 
next  morning  the  cavalry  advanced  straight  on 
Amman,  with  orders  to  press  into  the  town  if  possible. 
If  unable  to  seize  the  j)lace,  they  were  to  hold  the 
enemy  till  the  arrival  of  the  infantry.  At  eleven 
o'clock  the  New  Zealanders  made  an  attempt  to  gallop 
the  town  from  the  north-west,  but  were  held  up  by  a 
steep  cliff.  Two  mountain  batteries  arrived  half  an 
hour  later,  and  the  division  then  went  in  dismounted, 
in  a  frontal  attack.  It  was  of  the  utmost  import- 
ance to  keep  fighting  the  Turks,  so  as  to  prevent 
them  from  breaking  off  the  action  and  retiring.  For 
this  reason  no  attempt  was  made  to  outflank  them, 
as  the  necessary  movement  to  carry  out  a  flanking 
attack  would,  in  that  very  precipitous  country,  have 
entailed  much  time,  of  which  the  Turks  would  cer- 
tainly have  availed  themselves  to  disengage  their 
forces,  and  make  good  theu*  retreat.  As  it  was, 
Amman  was  not  captured  till  half-past  four  in  the 
afternoon,  and  the  time  spent  in  clearing  up  the 
town  precluded  any  possibility  of  a  further  move- 

Q 


242        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

ment  forward  that  night.  The  place  had  not  fallen 
without  a  sharp  fight,  costing  fairly  heavy  casualties, 
but,  of  the  opposing  forces,  the  Turks  suffered  far  the 
more  severely,  and  left  600  prisoners  in  our  hands. 

Covered  by  the  good  fighting  of  its  rearguards, 
the  Turkish  IVth  Army  had  now  got  some  distance 
to  the  north  of  Amman.  General  AUenby,  there- 
fore, decided  to  leave  it  to  the  4th  Cavalry  Division 
and  the  Arab  Army,  and  directed  General  Chaytor 
to  remain  in  the  Amman  area,  and  intercept  the 
retreat  of  the  enemy  2nd  Corps  from  the  Hedjaz. 

Our  aeroplanes  had  located  this  Corps  on  the 
evening  of  the  25th,  some  fifteen  miles  south  of  El 
Kastal,  hurrying  north  along  the  railway.  On  the 
following  morning.  General  Chaytor  sent  the  2nd 
A.L.H.  Brigade  southwards,  to  gain  touch  with  the 
Turks,  and  to  destroy  as  much  of  the  railway  as 
possible.  Patrols  from  the  5th  A.L.H.  Regiment  got 
as  far  as  Ziza  Station,  about  four  miles  south  of  El 
Kastal,  where  they  blew  up  a  portion  of  the  line. 
The  regiment  remained  at  Ziza  for  the  night,  and  the 
rest  of  the  brigade  took  up  a  position  across  the  rail- 
way, on  some  high  ground  north  of  Leben  Station. 

Now  that  Amman  was  in  our  hands,  the  only 
water  available  for  the  enemy,  between  El  Kastal 
and  Deraa  Junction,  was  in  the  Wadi  el  Hammam, 
seven  miles  north  of  Amman.  The  enemy  had 
dropped  a  rearguard  here,  from  the  IVth  Army,  to 
secure  the  water  supply  for  his  Hedjaz  Force.  The 
1st  A.L.H.  Brigade  was  despatched  on  the  26th  to 
dislodge  this  rearguard,  and  occupy  the  wadi.  The 
brigade  had  a  couple  of  brisk  fights  with  the  Turks, 
and  drove  them  off,  capturing  about  400  prisoners 
and  several  guns,"  and  then  took  up  a  fine  along  the 
wadi,  covering  the  water  areas. 

On  the  morning  of  the  27th,  therefore,  the  2nd 


SURRENDER  OF  THE  HEDJAZ  FORCE    243 

A.L.H.  Brigade  was  in  position  astride  the  Hedjaz 
Railway,  north  of  Leben  Station,  with  one  regiment 
pushed  out  as  far  as  Ziza  ;  the  20th  Indian  Infantry 
Brigade  was  in  Amman,  with  the  New  Zealand 
Brigade  on  the  Darb  el  Haj,  east  of  the  town  ;  and 
the  1st  A.L.H.  Brigade  was  along  the  Wadi  el 
Hammam  and  at  Kalaat  el  Zerka. 

About  half-past  eight  in  the  morning  the  head 
of  the  enemy  corps  was  seen  approaching  Ziza. 
Prisoners,  captured  by  the  5th  A.L.H.  Regiment 
during  the  night,  had  stated  that  the  Turkish  Force 
included  the  Maan  garrison,  and  numbered  about 
8000  men.  This  information  was  subsequently  found 
to  have  been  exaggerated. 

Though  still  retaining  its  cohesion,  the  enemy  force 
was  in  a  highly  nervous  state.  During  its  retreat 
from  Maan,  which  had  been  made  by  forced  marches, 
it  had  been  harried  without  cessation  by  the  Sherifian 
camelry.  Not  strong  enough  to  give  battle  to  such 
a  large  Turkish  force,  the  Arabs,  mounted  on  fast 
trotting  camels,  had  contented  themselves  with  carry- 
ing out  a  series  of  raids,  in  which  they  had  killed  a 
considerable  number  of  Turks,  and  captured  about 
300  prisoners  and  twenty-five  guns.  The  tribes  of 
the  districts  through  which  they  passed  flocked  to 
the  standard  of  King  Hussein,  moved  partly  by  their 
hatred  of  the  Turks,  and,  at  least  as  much,  by  their 
desire  for  loot.  Like  the  men  of  all  semi-civilised 
races,  the  Arab  prizes  a  good  weapon  above  every- 
thing, and  the  news  that  German  Mauser  rifles  were 
to  be  had  in  unlimited  numbers  at  the  expense  of  a 
few  casualties,  soon  raised  the  whole  country.  Con- 
sequently, by  the  time  the  Turks  reached  El  Kastal, 
they  had,  in  their  rear  and  on  both  flanks,  a  formid- 
able force  of  Arab  fighting  men,  grown  bold  by 
repeated  minor  successes. 


244        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

Early  in  the  afternoon  of  the  28th,  General  Chaytor 
summoned  the  Turkish  force,  by  a  message  dropped 
from  an  aeroplane,  to  surrender  by  nine  o'clock  next 
morning.  It  was  pointed  out  to  the  enemy  com- 
mander, that  all  sources  of  water  supply  as  far  north 
as  Deraa  were  in  our  hands,  and  he  was  promised  a 
most  unmerciful  bombing  unless  he  complied  with 
the  order. 

No  reply  was  received  to  this  message  till  the 
following  day,  when  a  Turkish  officer,  with  a  small 
escort,  succeeded  in  penetrating  the  fringe  of  blood- 
thirsty Arabs  surrounding  the  force,  and  met  Colonel 
Cameron,  commanding  the  5th  A.L.H.  Regiment,  to 
whom  he  brought  the  surrender  of  the  enemy  com- 
mander with  all  his  force.  The  Turkish  General 
made  the  unusual  request  that  his  men  might  be 
allowed  to  retain  their  arms  until  they  arrived  at 
Amman,  as  he  was  convinced  that  the  Arabs  would 
attempt  to  rush  in  and  murder  the  whole  of  his 
force  if  the  arms  were  given  up,  and  he  was  doubtful 
if  the  small  British  force  on  the  spot  could  prevent 
this. 

While  this  parley  was  proceeding,  a  deputation 
arrived  from  the  Beni  Sakhr  Arabs,  our  quondam 
allies — and  deserters — in  the  second  trans-Jordan 
raid.  These  gentry  now  coolly  demanded  that  the 
Turkish  force  should  be  handed  over  to  them  to 
'  protect,'  as  it  was  their  right  to  deal  with  it.  Mis- 
understanding their  motives.  Colonel  Cameron  assured 
them  that  the  Turks  would  be  well  looked  after  by 
us,  whereupon  the  sons  of  Ishmael  became  greatly 
excited,  waved  their  weapons  wildly,  and  uttered 
the  most  blood-curdling  threats.  Colonel  Cameron 
temporised  with  them  as  best  he  could,  and  sent  an 
urgent  message  to  hurry  up  the  other  two  regi- 
ments  of  the  2nd   Brigade,   which   were  marching 


BRITISH  AND  TURKS  AS  ALLIES      245 

towards  Ziza.  They  arrived  at  five  o'clock,  and,  as 
the  Arabs  were  now  openly  hostile  to  us,  the  Turks 
were  allowed  to  retain  their  arms.  Under  the  super- 
vision of  our  officers,  they  entrenched  a  line  of  out- 
post positions  round  the  station,  and  these  positions 
were  then  held  by  our  men  and  their  Turkish  prisoners 
side  by  side  !  The  Arabs  made  several  attempts  to 
rush  the  lines  during  the  night,  but  were  driven  off 
by  British  and  Turkish  machine-gun  and  rifle  fire.  It 
would  be  interesting  to  know  if  there  is  any  previous 
instance  of  prisoners  of  war  assisting  their  captors 
to  hold  the  latter' s  own  allies  at  bay. 

It  is  only  fair  to  the  forces  of  the  Emir  Feisal  to 
say  that  the  '  allies  '  whom  we  successfully  held  off 
through  the  night  were  none  of  his  men.  As  soon 
as  the  enemy  force  had  surrendered,  the  Arab  regulars 
had  hurried  north  to  rejoin  their  comrades  pressing 
after  the  IVth  Turkish  Army. 

The  New  Zealand  Brigade  arrived  at  Ziza  next 
day,  and  remained  in  charge  of  the  station,  to  guard 
about  500  Turkish  sick  and  wounded  and  a  large 
amount  of  rolling  stock  and  captured  arms  and 
ammunition,  till  the  railway  had  been  repaired.  The 
Arabs,  frustrated  in  their  amiable  designs  on  the 
Turkish  prisoners,  drew  off  disappointed,  and  followed 
their  compatriots  towards  Damascus.  The2nd  A.L.H. 
Brigade  then  escorted  the  prisoners,  just  over  4000 
in  number,  to  Amman,  whence  they  were  evacuated 
a  few  days  later  across  the  Jordan. 

This  ended  the  operations  of  Chaytor's  Force, 
which  remained  about  Amman  and  El  Salt  to  rest 
and  recuperate.  Since  the  beginning  of  the  opera- 
tions the  force  had  contributed  to  the  bag  about 
11,000  prisoners,  fifty-seven  guns  and  132  machine 
guns,  besides  large  quantities  of  rolling  stock,  ammuni- 
tion, and  other  stores. 


246        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

In  the  last  three  weeks  of  September  the  Anzac 
Division  had  evacuated  just  over  3000  men  from 
sickness  alone.  2700  of  these  were  cases  of  malig- 
nant malaria,  a  terrible  scourge  that  was  with  us 
all  through  these  operations.  The  long  period  spent 
in  the  Jordan  Valley  was  no  doubt  responsible  for 
this  heavy  sick  rate.  The  division  had  lost  a  large 
number  of  men  in  the  months  preceding  September, 
and  it  was  now  reduced  to  considerably  less  than 
half  its  war  strength.  Weak  and  reduced  in  numbers 
as  they  were,  and  suffering  from  the  lassitude  en- 
gendered by  their  prolonged  stay  in  the  valley,  the 
Australians  nevertheless  acted  throughout  the  opera- 
tions with  the  greatest  energy  and  determination, 
and  set  an  unrivalled  example  of  toughness  and 
cheerfulness. 


\ 


-i 


c 


CHAPTER  XIX 

THE  ADVANCE  ON  DAMASCUS 

As  the  Turkish  Vllth  and  Vlllth  Armies  and  the 
2nd  Corps  had  now  been  entirely  destroyed,  and  the 
IVth  Army  was  in  full  retreat,  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  determined  to  push  on  with  his  cavalry  and 
seize  Damascus. 

Apart  from  the  moral  effect  likely  to  be  produced 
on  the  Turks  by  the  capture  of  this  city,  its  occupa- 
tion by  our  troops  was  a  necessary  corollary  to  the 
co-operation  of  King  Hussein  with  our  army.  Damas- 
cus is  an  Arab,  and  particularly  a  Bedouin,  city. 
From  the  time  of  Mohammed,  it  has  been  the  focus 
and  centre  of  Arab  political  life,  constantly  both 
reinforced  and  kept  at  the  same  level  of  civilisation 
by  intercourse  with  the  tribes  of  the  desert,  till  to-day 
they  form  four-fifths  of  the  total  population. 

It  is  an  open  secret  that  General  Allenby  had  been 
urged  by  the  amateur  strategists  of  Downing  Street 
to  make  a  cavalry  raid  on  the  city,  supported  by 
the  forces  of  the  Emir,  but  he  had  steadily  refused 
to  cofnmit  his  cavalry  to  this  hazardous  enterprise 
until  he  had  dealt  with  the  Turkish  Army.  Now, 
however,  the  way  was  clear,  and  he  determined  to 
push  on  with  all  speed. 

The  advance  was  to  be  made  in  two  columns. 
The  Australian  Mounted  Division  and  the  5th 
Cavalry  Division  were  ordered  to  march  via  Nazareth 
and  Tiberias,  crossing  the  upper  Jordan  just  south 
of  Lake  Huleh,  and  march  up  the  Tiberias-Damascus 

247 


248        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

road,  across  the  Hauran.  The  4th  Cavalry  Division 
was  to  cross  the  Jordan  at  Jisr  Mejamie,  north  of 
Beisan,  and  proceed  via  Irbid  and  Deraa  Junction, 
and  thence  up  the  Hedjaz  Railway,  joining  hands 
with  the  Arab  Army  about  Deraa. 

In  order  to  increase  to  the  utmost  the  mobility  of 
the  troops,  all  transport,  even  to  the  regimental 
water-carts,  was  left  behind.  Onty  the  guns  and 
ammunition  wagons  and  a  few  light  motor  ambulances 
per  division  accompanied  the  force.  The  arrange- 
ments as  to  food  and  forage  carried  on  the  man  and 
horse  were  the  same  as  in  the  1917  campaign.  When 
this  two  days'  supply  was  exhausted,  the  cavalry 
were  to  live  on  the  country.  Later  on,  after  the 
capture  of  Damascus,  and  when  our  line  of  com- 
munications had  been  organised,  tea,  milk,  and  sugar 
were  sent  up  by  lorry  to  Damascus,  or  by  sea  to 
Beirut  and  Tripoli,  but,  except  for  this,  the  Corps 
subsisted  entirety  on  the  local  resources  of  the  country 
from  the  25th  September  till  the  administration  of 
the  conquered  territory  was  finally  handed  over  to 
the  French  more  than  a  yeai*  later. 

The  orders  for  the  advance  were  received  on  the 
25th  of  September,  but  certain  preliminary  move- 
ments had  taken  place  on  the  previous  day.  Thus 
the  7th  Infantry  Division  arrived  at  Jenin  on  the 
24th,  preparatory  to  taking  over  Afule,  Nazareth, 
and  Haifa  from  the  cavalry.  The  4th  A.L.H. 
Brigade,  with  one  regiment  of  the  5th  Brigade,  left 
Afule  on  the  evening  of  the  same  day  to  march  via 
Beisan  to  the  village  of  Semakh,  at  the  southern  end 
of  the  Sea  of  Gahlee.  The  enemy  had  a  small  force 
here,  engaged  in  evacuating  the  considerable  quan- 
tities of  stores  at  Deraa.  These  were  sent  by  rail 
to  Semakh,  and  thence  by  boat  to  Tiberias,  where 
lorry  columns  awaited  them,  and  shipped  them  on 


THE  ACTION  AT  SEMAKH  249 

to  Damascus  along  the  Hauran  road.  The  Central 
India  Horse  (10th  Brigade),  who  had  relieved  the 
19th  Lancers  at  Jisr  Mejamie  on  the  23rd,  had  recon- 
noitred the  village  on  the  following  day,  and  found  it 
strongly  held.  The  4th  A.L.H.  Brigade  was  ordered 
to  capture  the  place,  and  then  rejoin  the  Australian 
Division  at  Tiberias. 

On  the  25th  of  September  the  4th  Cavahy  Divi- 
sion concentrated  at  Beisan,  with  the  10th  Brigade 
at  Jisr  Mejamie.  The  Australian  Mounted  Divi- 
sion, less  the  4th  Brigade,  left  Afule  early  in  the 
afternoon,  and  had  concentrated  at  Kefr  Kenna, 
some  five  miles  east  of  Nazareth,  about  ten  o'clock 
that  night.  A  regiment  of  the  3rd  A.L.H.  Brigade, 
supported  by  two  armoured  cars,  was  sent  ahead 
along  the  Tiberias  road  to  reconnoitre  the  town.  The 
5th  Cavalry  Division,  which  was  not  relieved  at 
Haifa  by  the  infantry  till  early  the  next  morning, 
left  that  place  at  once,  and  reached  Kefr  Kenna 
about  five  in  the  evening. 

The  4th  A.L.H.  Brigade,  having  bivouacked  at 
Jisr  Mejamie  on  the  night  of  the  24th,  approached 
Semakh  just  at  daylight  on  the  following  day.  At 
half-past  four  the  advance  guard,  consisting  of  the 
1 1th  Regiment  and  the  brigade  machine-gun  squa- 
dron, came  under  heavy  machine-gun  and  rifle  fire 
from  the  railway  station.  Patrols  from  the  regi- 
ment located  the  enemy  holding  an  entrenched 
position  south  of  the  village  (which  Ues  on  a  bare, 
flat  plain),  with  posts  extending  across  this  plain  to 
the  hills  on  either  side. 

General  Grant  decided  to  attack  at  once,  and 
ordered  the  remainder  of  his  brigade  to  close  up. 
The  machine  guns  and  one  squadron  of  the  11th 
Regiment  at  once  came  into  action  south  of  the 
town,  and  opened  a  hot  fire  on  the  enemy  positions. 


250        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

particularly  on  a  sort  of  fort  that  had  been  built  by 
the  Germans  out  of  railway  material.  The  other  two 
squadrons  of  the  11th  charged  from  the  east,  one  on 
each  side  of  the  railway.  The  charge  was  driven 
home,  over  the  enemy  positions  and  into  the  village, 
where  the  Australians  dismounted,  and  went  in  with 
the  bayonet. 

On  the  arrival  of  the  rest  of  the  brigade,  the  4th 
Regiment  was  sent  in  mounted  on  the  west.  After 
charging  into  the  town,  these  troops  also  dismounted, 
and  continued  the  fight  on  foot. 

The  enemy,  stiffened  by  the  large  number  of 
German  troops,  resisted  desperately,  and  some  of 
the  fiercest  hand-to-hand  fighting  of  the  campaign 
took  place  in  this  village.  We  learnt  afterwards 
that  Liman  von  Sanders  had  paid  a  hurried  visit  to 
the  place  in  a  car,  after  flying  from  Nazareth,  and 
had  given  orders  that  it  was  to  be  held  to  the  last 
man,  so  as  to  clear  the  ammunition  and  stores  from 
Deraa  for  the  defence  of  Damascus. 

Gradually  the  defenders  were  driven  back  through 
the  narrow  streets  of  the  village,  till  only  the  railway 
'  fort '  still  held  out.  This  was  garrisoned  chiefly  by 
Germans,  who  had  a  number  of  machine  guns  cover- 
ing all  approaches.  One  of  these  guns  was  located 
in  a  railway  culvert,  and,  as  a  troop  of  the  12th 
Regiment  was  working  towards  it,  the  crew  suddenly 
stood  up  and  held  up  their  hands,  shouting  out : 
'  We  surrender  !  '  Being  unaccustomed  to  the  ways 
of  the  Hun,  our  men  got  up  and  walked  towards  the 
gun  in  the  open.  When  they  were  about  fifty  yards 
away,  the  crew  dropped  to  their  knees,  at  a  given 
signal,  and  opened  a  murderous  fire  on  our  men, 
killing  or  wounding  nearly  all  of  them.  The  few  who 
escaped  worked  round  to  the  other  side  of  the  rail- 
way, and,  crawling  through  the  culvert,  fell  upon 


GERMAN  TREACHERY  251 

the    treacherous    crew    from    behind,     and     killed 
them  all. 

About  the  same  time,  another  troop  of  the  same 
regiment  encountered  a  German  machine  gun  in 
charge  of  an  officer.  As  our  men  approached,  the 
officer  stood  up  and  waved  a  white  handkerchief, 
whereupon  the  subaltern  in  command  of  the  troop 
went  up  to  him  unsuspectingly.  When  he  was  about 
two  paces  away,  the  German  pulled  out  his  automatic 
and  deUberately  shot  the  unfortunate  officer  dead. 

These  two  pieces  of  treachery  met  with  a  just 
retribution.  The  enraged  Australians  stormed  into 
the  fort,  deaf  now  to  all  offers  of  surrender,  and 
bayoneted  the  defenders  almost  to  a  man.  About 
150  Germans  and  several  hundred  Turkish  prisoners 
were  taken  in  the  action,  and  some  200  corpses, 
mostly  those  of  Germans,  were  left  on  the  position 
to  be  looted  by  the  natives.  None  of  our  men  would 
put  spade  to  the  ground  to  bury  them. 

Two  motor  boats  were  lying  at  the  pier  when  our 
troops  attacked.  One  of  these  succeeded  in  escaping 
to  Tiberias,  where  it  was  abandoned  by  the  crew, 
and  burnt.  The  other  was  set  on  fire  by  Hotchkiss 
rifle  fire,  and  blew  up. 

As  soon  as  the  action  was  over,  a  squadron  from 
the  brigade  was  sent  forward  along  the  lake  road 
towards  Tiberias.  This  squadron  gained  touch  with 
the  regiment  of  the  Australian  Division  advancing 
from  Nazareth,  and  the  two  detachments  captured 
Tiberias,  which  was  lightly  held,  before  dark,  with 
about  120  prisoners. 

The  operations  now  resolved  themselves  into  a 
race  for  Damascus  between  our  cavalry  and  the 
Turkish  IVth  Army.  The  country  about  ten  miles 
south  of  Damascus  is  favourable  for  defence  against 
a  force  advancing  from  that  direction,  and  the  enemy 


252        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

command  hoped,  if  the  IVth  Army  could  reach  this 
position  first,  to  be  able  to  delay  our  troops  long 
enough  for  help  to  arrive  from  Aleppo,  and  thus 
save  Damascus. 

The  survivors  of  the  German  G.H.Q.  troops  and 
garrison  of  Nazareth  had  retired,  via  Tiberias,  to  the 
Jordan  at  Jisr  Benat  Yakub,  just  south  of  Lake 
Huleh.  Crossing  the  river  here,  they  blew  up  the 
bridge  behind  them,  and  took  up  a  strong  position 
on  the  east  bank,  overlooking  the  only  known  fords. 
They  were  joined,  on  the  morning  of  the  26th,  by  a 
few  hundred  Turkish  troops  who  had  been  hurriedly 
collected  in  Damascus,  and  sent  down  in  motor 
lorries  across  the  Hauran.  If  this  force  could  hold 
the  crossing  for  twenty-four  hours,  there  was  a 
chance  of  the  Turks  winning  the  race  to  Damascus. 

The  Australian  Mounted  Division  left  Kefr  Kenna 
at  midnight  on  the  25th,  and,  marching  all  night, 
reached  the  hill  of  Tel  Madli,  overlooking  Tiberias, 
at  dawn.  Continuing  the  march,  after  a  short  halt 
to  water  and  feed,  the  division  arrived  at  El  Mejdel, 
on  the  lake  shore  four  miles  north  of  Tiberias,  in 
the  early  afternoon.  In  order  to  give  time  for  the 
5th  Division  to  close  up,  and  for  the  4th  A.L.H. 
Brigade  to  rejoin  from  Semakh,  the  Austrahans 
bivouacked  here  for  the  night.  Patrols  were  sent 
forward  as  far  as  Jisr  Benat  Yakub,  and  the  rest  of 
the  men  spent  the  afternoon  bathing  in  the  lake. 

Meanwhile,  the  4th  Cavalry  Division,  having 
crossed  the  Jordan  at  Jisr  Mejamie,  on  the  morning 
of  the  26th,  sent  the  10th  Brigade  ahead  as  advance 
guard,  with  orders  to  push  on  towards  Deraa  as 
fast  as  the  difficult  nature  of  the  ground  would 
allow.  The  remainder  of  the  division  followed  at  a 
considerable  distance. 

After  the  fall  of  Amman,  the  enemy  IVth  Army 


Nazareth,  from  the  north. 
Note  the  Red  Crescents  on  the  roofs  of  the  houses. 


Horse  Artillery  enterin^  Tiberias,  on  the  race  for  Damascus 


AN  UNSUCCESSFUL  CHARGE  253 

had  hurried  northwards  along  the  Hedjaz  Railway, 
and,  by  the  morning  of  the  26th,  was  passing  through 
El  Remte,  with  a  strong  flank  guard  thrown  out  to 
the  west.  Late  in  the  afternoon  the  10th  Brigade 
located  this  flank  guard  holding  a  position  astride 
the  Beisan-Deraa  road,  along  a  ridge  from  Beit  Ras, 
through  Irbid,  to  Zebda.  The  country  was  very 
difficult  and  broken,  and  intersected  with  wadis. 

A  reconnaissance  carried  out  by  the  2nd  Lancers, 
the  vanguard  regiment,  indicated  that  Irbid  was  held 
in  strength,  while  Beit  Ras  and  Zebda  were  occupied 
to  protect  the  central  portion  of  the  enemy  posi- 
tion, and  were  not  so  strongly  held.  The  Brigadier 
decided  to  encircle  Irbid  from  both  flanks.  He 
directed  the  2nd  Lancers  to  work  round  to  the  north 
of  the  town,  between  it  and  Beit  Ras,  which  latter 
place  was  apparently  very  lightly  held,  and  the 
Central  India  Horse  to  seize  Zebda,  and  then 
endeavour  to  get  astride  the  Deraa  road  behind 
the  enemy  position.  The  Berks  Battery  R.H.A. 
came  into  action  just  off  the  road,  some  two  miles 
west  of  Irbid,  with  the  Dorset  Yeomanry  in  reserve 
behind  it. 

The  regiments  moved  off  at  once,  and  commenced 
to  work  round  the  enemy's  flanks.  Half  an  hour 
later,  a  squadron  of  the  2nd  Lancers  attempted  to 
charge  the  Irbid  position  from  the  north-west.  Night 
was  approaching,  and  the  officer  in  command  doubt- 
less considered  himself  justified  in  taking  the  risk  of 
a  charge,  in  the  hope  of  breaking  the  Turks'  resist- 
ance before  the  coming  of  darkness  enabled  them  to 
retire.  But  the  horses  were  very  tired,  the  country 
was  broken  and  stony,  and  no  previous  reconnaissance 
of  the  ground  was  possible.  The  charge  was  met 
by  the  enemy  with  very  heavy  machine-gun  fire, 
and  was  brought  to  a  stop.     The  squadron  suft'ered 


254        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

severety,  two  troops  being  practically  wiped  oat 
before  it  reached  cover  again. 

The  Turks  at  Irbid  had  been  retreating  rapidly 
for  three  days,  harassed  by  the  Arabs,  and  their 
morale  was  not  high.  But  they  had  not,  as  yet, 
suffered  any  severe  defeat,  and  they  were  in  con- 
siderably better  case  than  the  miserable  remnants 
of  the  Vllth  and  Vlllth  Armies,  with  which  our 
cavalry  had  been  engaged  since  the  20th  of  September. 
This  fact  would  seem  to  have  been  overlooked  by 
the  2nd  Lancers.  Moreover  the  enemy  was  in  con- 
siderable strength.  Natives  reported  on  the  follow- 
ing day  that  there  had  been  not  less  than  5000 
Turks  at  Irbid.  This  was  manifestly  an  exaggera- 
tion, but  the  mere  mention  of  such  a  number  indicated 
that  there  had  been,  at  any  rate,  a  large  body  of 
them  there.  The  failure  of  the  charge  taught  a 
lesson  that  is  liable  to  be  forgotten  by  cavalry  when 
pursuing  a  broken  and  demoralised  foe ;  namely, 
that,  for  a  small  body  of  horse  to  charge  an  enemy 
force  of  unknown  strength,  without  previous  recon- 
naissance of  the  ground,  and  without  any  fire  support, 
is  to  court  disaster. 

The  rest  of  the  regiment  continued  to  work  gradually 
round  the  enemy's  right  flank.  Nightfall  found  them 
some  distance  to  the  north-east  of  the  village,  where 
they  put  out  pickets  and  remained  during  the  night. 

Meanwhile  the  Central  India  Horse,  advancing 
more  warily,  occupied  Zebda,  after  some  sharp  fight- 
ing, and  then  attempted  to  penetrate  Irbid  dis- 
mounted from  the  south-west.  The  attack  was 
driven  back  by  the  enemy  with  some  loss,  and  the 
regiment  took  up  a  position  south  of  the  village,  and 
engaged  the  Turks  with  machine-gun  and  rifle  fire. 
One  squadron  continued  to  work  eastwards,  and,  by 
the  time  darkness   descended,   had  nearly  reached 


WORK  OF  THE  ARAB  CAMEL  CORPS  255 

the  Deraa  road.  This  squadron  formed  a  defensive 
post  near  the  road,  and  stood  to  till  daylight. 

The  12th  Brigade  spent  the  night  at  El  Shuni, 
on  the  Wadi  el  Arab,  six  miles  east  of  the  Jordan, 
and  the  rest  of  the  division  at  Jisr  Mejamie. 

From  the  summit  of  the  ridge  near  Beit  Ras,  just 
before  sunset,  our  troops  had  seen  the  Arab  Army, 
twenty  miles  away,  on  the  far  side  of  Deraa.  After 
their  raids  on  the  railway  at  this  place,  between  the 
16th  and  18th  of  September,  the  Arabs  had  moved 
east  into  the  wild  fastnesses  of  the  Hauran.  From 
here  they  had  made  several  raids  on  the  IVth  Army, 
harassing  the  Turks'  right  flank,  and  forcing  them 
to  abandon  much  of  their  transport  and  artillery. 
On  the  day  and  night  of  the  26th,  the  Arab  camelry, 
led  by  Lawrence,  pushed  rapidly  northwards,  cutting 
the  railway  at  Ghazale  and  Ezra,  ten  and  twenty 
miles  north  of  Deraa,  and  reached  Sheikh  Saad, 
fifteen  miles  west  of  Ezra,  on  the  morning  of  the 
27th.  Here  they  engaged  and  defeated  an  advanced 
detachment  of  the  IVth  Army,  capturing  500  Turks 
and  a  number  of  German  officers,  and  then  en- 
trenched themselves  astride  the  Damascus  road  to 
await  the  coming  of  the  remainder  of  the  army. 

At  daylight  on  the  27th,  Irbid  was  found  to  have 
been  evacuated  during  the  night.  The  10th  Brigade 
at  once  pushed  on  towards  El  Remte,  with  the 
Dorset  Yeomanry  as  advance  guard.  At  half-past 
ten,  patrols  from  this  regiment  encountered  the 
enemy  in  position  astride  the  road,  just  west  of  EI 
Remte.  The  position  was  not  so  strong  as  that  at 
Irbid,  and  the  country  was  more  open. 

A  quarter  of  an  hour  later,  the  Dorsets  reported 
the  enemy  to  be  retiring  from  the  position  to  the 
south-east.  The  Brigadier  directed  the  regiment  to 
occupy  the  ridges   on  the  left  bank  of  the   Wadi 


256        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

Ratam,  overlooking  the  village  from  the  south-west, 
and  to  make  a  demonstration  against  the  enemy,  in 
order  to  cover  the  assembly  of  the  remainder  of  the 
brigade,  which  was  to  advance  under  cover  of  the 
high  ground  immediately  north  of  El  Remte,  and 
cut  off  the  enemy's  retreat  to  Deraa.  The  Berks 
Battery  came  into  action  west  of  the  village,  to 
support  this  move,  and  to  take  advantage  of  such 
targets  as  offered. 

While  these  movements  were  taking  place,  the 
Yeomanry  were  heavily  counter-attacked  by  the 
enemy  troops  that  they  had  supposed  to  be  retiring. 
The  attack  was  pressed  vigorously,  and  the  Dorsets 
were  forced  back  some  distance.  A  signal  message 
was  sent  to  brigade  headquarters  asking  for  assist- 
ance, but,  before  the  message  could  be  acted  upon, 
Lieutenant  Mason,  skilfully  withdrawing  his  squadron 
in  the  advanced  firing  line,  mounted  it,  and  charged 
the  counter-attack.  The  Turks  were  utterly  sur- 
prised by  this  sudden  charge.  A  number  of  them 
were  killed  with  the  sword,  and  the  rest  driven  back 
in  confusion  into  the  village.  The  Dorsets  then 
continued  to  work  round  to  the  south,  but  were  held 
up  shortly  afterwards  by  heavy  machine-gun  fire 
from  a  fortified  stone  house. 

Just  at  this  moment,  a  body  of  enemy  cavalry 
was  observed  galloping  away  from  the  village  to 
the  east.  The  Yeomanry  were  unable  to  pursue 
them,  but  they  were  effectively  shelled  by  the  Berks 
Battery,  and  dispersed. 

The  Central  India  Horse  had  by  now  reached  a 
point  north-east  of  the  village,  from  where  they 
espied  the  Turkish  infantry  retiring  in  some  dis- 
order. Charging  instantly,  they  went  through  the 
Turks,  killing  many  with  the  lance,  and  rounding  up 
200  prisoners.     This  charge  completed  the  rout  of 


DERAA  257 

the  enemy  force,  the  survivors  of  which  scattered 
in  all  directions. 

The  10th  Brigade  now  received  orders  to  await  the 
arrival  of  the  rest  of  the  division  at  El  Remte.  The 
12th  Brigade  came  up  about  half -past  five  in  the 
evening,  and  the  11th  some  two  hours  later.  Patrols 
from  the  2nd  Lancers,  on  outpost  duty,  gained  touch 
with  the  Arab  Army  during  the  night. 

At  dawn  on  the  28th,  the  brigade  moved  out  to 
the  hills  east  of  El  Remte  to  cover  the  assembly  of 
the  division,  which  then  marched  to  Deraa.  The 
advanced  troops  reached  the  town  at  seven  in  the 
morning,  and  were  met  by  Lawrence  and  Sherif 
Nasir.  The  Arab  troops  had  arrived  there  about 
midnight,  and  found  the  place  evacuated  and  in 
flames.  They  at  once  sent  mounted  scouts  to  the 
north,  who  located  the  main  body  of  the  enemy 
forces  retiring  towards  Mezerib,  ten  miles  north- 
west of  Deraa.  The  road  from  Mezerib  to  Damascus 
runs  through  Sheikh  Saad,  where  Lawrence's  camel 
corps  was  lying  in  wait  for  them. 


B 


CHAPTER  XX 

THE  ADVANCE  ON  DAMASCUS  (Continued) 

While  the  4th  Cavalry  Division  was  treading  on  the 
heels  of  the  enemy  east  of  the  Jordan,  the  Australians 
had  not  been  idle.  Leaving  El  Mejdel  soon  after 
daylight  on  the  27th,  they  reached  the  Jordan  at 
Jisr  Benat  Yakub  about  mid-day.  The  news  that 
the  bridge  had  been  destroyed,  and  that  the  crossing 
was  held  by  the  enemy,  had  been  brought  back  by 
the  patrols  that  had  reconnoitred  as  far  as  the  river 
the  night  before. 

The  division  had  no  easy  task  before  it.  Napoleon 
rated  the  forcing  of  a  river  crossing  as  one  of  the 
most  difficult  operations  in  war.  In  this  case  the 
difficulties  were  increased  by  several  factors.  West 
of  the  river  the  ground  sloped  gently  upwards  for 
about  3000  yards,  in  a  wide  expanse  of  plough  and 
grass  land,  unbroken  by  a  single  tree  or  bush.  On 
the  east  the  ground  was  much  steeper,  thus  giving 
good  command  of  the  river,  and  was  thickly  covered 
with  scrub  and  innumerable  big  boulders,  which 
afforded  excellent  protection  to  the  enemy.  The 
river  was  deep  and  very  swift,  and  the  only  known 
ford,  some  few  hundred  yards  south  of  the  bridge, 
was  commanded  by  the  fire  of  numbers  of  enemy 
machine  guns.  The  only  cover  on  the  west  bank 
was  afforded  by  a  small  group  of  buildings  close  to 
the  bridge,  and  by  the  insignificant  ruins  of  the  castle 
of  Baldwin  ii.  (Kusr  Atra),  a  few  hundred  yards 
farther  down  stream. 


ACTION  OF  JISR  BENAT  YAKUB       259 

A  local  native  stated  that  he  thought  the  south 
end  of  Lake  Huleh  was  shallow  enough  to  be  waded 
by  mounted  men,  and  it  was  accordingly  decided  to 
send  the  3rd  Brigade,  by  a  long  detour,  to  attempt 
a  passage  here.  To  the  French  troops  was  assigned 
the  task  of  endeavouring  to  reach  the  buildings  at 
the  west  end  of  the  bridge,  from  where  they  could 
engage  the  enemy  with  rifle  and  machine-gun  fire, 
and,  possibly,  force  a  passage  over  the  river.  The 
remainder  of  the  5th  Brigade  was  to  reconnoitre  for 
a  ford  farther  south,  and,  if  successful  in  finding  one, 
to  cross  the  river,  and  get  astride  the  enemy's  line 
of  retreat.  One  regiment  of  the  4th  Brigade,  which 
had  rejoined  the  division  at  El  Mejdel,  accompanied 
the  5th  Brigade.  The  rest  of  the  4th  did  not  arrive 
till  the  evening. 

While  the  two  brigades  were  moving  to  the  north 
and  south,  the  two  batteries  of  the  division,  in  action 
due  west  of  the  bridge,  amused  themselves  by  knock- 
ing out  the  enemy  guns.  Having  silenced  these, 
they  turned  their  attention  to  a  column  of  motor 
lorries  that  had  brought  some  of  the  Turks  from 
Damascus,  and  were  now  waiting  to  take  the  Germans 
back  again,  when  they  judged  it  expedient  to  retire, 
and  leave  their  allies  to  be  captured.  Two  of  the 
lorries  were  knocked  out,  and  the  remainder  chased 
out  of  range.  Our  guns  were  then  occupied  with  the 
more  serious  business  of  registering  such  of  the 
enemy  machine  guns  as  had  been  located. 

While  thus  engaged,  the  two  batteries  received 
orders  to  report  to  the  3rd  and  5th  Brigades  respec- 
tively. Following  instructions  from  the  brigadiers 
concerned,  they  Umbered  up,  and  moved  off  to 
accompany  the  brigades  moving  north  and  south. 
Owing  to  the  difficulties  of  the  country  over  which 
they  had  to  move,  and  the  long  distance  they  were 


260        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

required  to  go,  it  was  nearly  two  hours  before  they 
were  in  action  again. 

The  French  regiment,  moving  over  the  open,  dis- 
mounted and  widely  extended,  reached  the  buildings 
with  some  loss,  but  was  unable  to  attempt  the  ford, 
in  face  of  the  very  heavy  fire  from  the  east  bank. 
No  artillery  support  was  available,  as  our  batteries 
were  on  the  move. 

The  3rd  Brigade  scouts  found  Lake  Huleh  quite 
unfordable,  but  one  regiment  succeeded  in  workmg 
its  way  dismounted  down  to  the  river  bank  south  of 
the  lake.  It  came  under  very  heavy  fire  here — indeed 
the  water  in  the  river  was  bubbling  with  machine- 
gun  bullets — but  the  men  gradually  worked  south 
by  twos  and  threes,  towards  what  looked  like  a 
possible  crossing  just  north  of  the  bridge. 

Meanwhile  the  regiments  with  the  5th  Brigade, 
after  riding  for  two  miles  south  of  the  bridge,  without 
finding  any  sign  of  a  ford,  waded  boldly  into  the 
river  at  a  hkely  looking  place,  and  succeeded  in 
struggling  across.  Arrived  on  the  other  side,  they 
found  themselves  involved  in  a  perfect  maze  of  pre- 
cipitous wadis  running  in  every  direction,  in  a  forma- 
tion of  old  lava,  broken  into  huge,  jagged  boulders. 
They  wandered  about  in  this  wilderness  for  the  rest 
of  the  afternoon  and  evening,  and  only  gained  the 
Damascus  road  after  dark,  too  late  to  intercept  the 
retiring  enemy.  The  threat  to  their  communica- 
tions, however,  had  had  its  invariable  effect  on  the 
Turks,  and,  as  soon  as  darkness  fell,  they  retreated 
hurriedly.  All  the  Germans,  and  as  many  Turks  as 
could  find  room,  piled  themselves  on  to  the  lorries. 
The  rest  of  the  Turks  had  to  walk. 

At  dusk  the  regiment  of  the  3rd  Brigade  on  the 
river  bank,  taking  advantage  of  the  failing  light, 
plunged  into  the  river,  and  swam  across.     The  cold 


A  MEMORY  OF  NAPOLEON  261 

plunge,  and  the  prospect  of  a  night  in  their  wet 
clothes,  induced  in  the  men  a  suitable  frame  of  mind 
for  dealing  efficiently  with  any  Turks  they  might 
meet,  and,  in  the  ensuing  bayonet  fight  on  the  east 
bank,  they  killed  a  large  number  of  the  enemy  and 
took  eighty-five  prisoners.  They  then  pushed  on  up 
the  road  as  far  as  Deir  el  Saras,  where  they  met 
patrols  of  the  5th  Brigade. 

Just  before  dark  a  German  aeroplane  flew  over 
our  troops  at  a  great  height,  and  dropped  a  couple 
of  bombs,  which  did  no  harm.  This  was  the  first 
enemy  aeroplane  seen  in  the  air  by  our  cavalry 
since  the  commencement  of  the  operations,  a  fine 
tribute  to  the  work  of  the  Royal  Air  Force. 

The  name  Jisr  Benat  Yakub  means  the  Bridge  of 
the  Daughters  of  Jacob.  The  bridge  carries  on  its 
grey,  old  arches  the  oldest  known  road  in  the  world, 
the  caravan  way  from  Egypt  to  Mesopotamia.  All 
the  armies  of  time  have  trod  this  trail.  Egyptian, 
Ass3^ian,  Hittite,  Jew  ;  Saracen  Arab  and  Christian 
Knight ;  Turkish  Janissary  and  soldier  of  Napoleon — 
all  have  crossed  the  sacred  river  at  this  point.  So 
it  is  conceivable  that  the  name  really  comes,  as  the 
Arabs  aver,  from  the  daughters  of  the  patriarch, 
though  a  local  tradition  ascribes  it  to  a  massacre 
of  some  Jacobin  nuns,  which  took  place  here  in  the 
tweKth  century.  The  bridge  marks  the  northern 
limit  of  Napoleon's  advance  through  Syria,  and  it  was 
a  strange  turn  of  the  wheel  of  fate  that  again  brought 
French  soldiers  here  fighting  the  Turks,  a  hundred 
and  twenty  years  later,  but  this  time  as  allies  of  the 
English. 

The  action  had  delayed  the  division  for  the  better 
part  of  a  day,  thus  increasing  the  chance  of  the  enemy 
army  reaching  Damascus  first.  Indeed,  had  it  not  been 
for  the  vigorous  and  effective  action  of  Lawrence's 


262       THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

camel  corps  on  the  following  day,  it  is  just  possible 
that  the  Turks  might  have  won  the  race. 

The  delay  had,  however,  permitted  the  5th  Cavalry 
Division,  which  had  left  Kefr  Kenna  at  dawn,  to 
close  up,  and  it  lay  that  night  near  Rosh  Pina,  a 
Jewish  village  about  eight  miles  west  of  the  Jordan. 

The  Corps  bridging  train  came  up  during  the  night, 
and  the  Sappers  set  to  work  repairing  the  bridge. 
This  proved  a  big  task,  as  one  of  the  four  arches  had 
been  completely  demolished.  At  daylight  on  the 
28th,  as  the  work  was  still  far  from  finished,  the  rest 
of  the  Australian  Mounted  Division  forded  the  river, 
and  at  once  pressed  on  up  the  road  towards  El 
Kuneitra.  The  passage  of  the  guns  was  very  arduous. 
The  river  was  only  about  four  feet  deep  at  the  ford, 
but  there  v/ere  deep  holes  on  either  side,  and  the 
current  was  torrential.  The  ground  on  the  other 
side  proved  to  be  a  marsh,  covered  with  a  tangle  of 
high,  stiff  scrub,  and  interspersed  with  large  boulders. 
A  road  had  to  be  cut  through  this  scrub,  boggy  places 
filled  in  with  tree  trunks  nnd  bushes,  and  the  ford 
improved.  All  this  took  time,  and  it  was  nine 
o'clock  before  the  first  gun  was  across  the  ford,  and 
safely  on  the  road. 

For  the  first  two  miles  from  the  Jordan,  the  road 
climbs  out  of  the  valley  in  a  series  of  steep  zigzags, 
and  the  surface  was  atrocious.  Once  out  of  the 
valley,  however,  an  excellent,  metalled  road  stretched 
ahead  all  the  way  to  Damascus.  Four  Turkish  guns, 
three  of  them  destroyed  by  direct  hits  from  our 
artillery,  two  motor  lorries,  and  a  number  of  machine 
guns  were  found  on  the  east  bank. 

The  division  made  good  progress,  and  the  advanced 
troops  reached  the  Circassian  village  of  El  Kuneitra, 
at  the  top  of  the  watershed,  about  one  o'clock.  The 
5th  Division  got  in  about  five  hours  later,  and  the 


CIRCASSIANS  AND  DRUSES  263 

two  divisions  bivouacked  for  the  night  east  and  west 
of  the  village. 

The  cavalry  were  now  over  sixty  miles  from 
Nazareth,  the  nearest  post  held  by  our  infantry,  and 
Damascus  was  forty  miles  farther  on.  The  whole 
country  was,  very  naturally,  in  a  most  disturbed 
state.  Bands  of  marauding  Arabs  and  Druses 
patrolled  the  Hauran,  ostensibly  at  war  with  the 
Turks,  but  always  ready  to  fall  on  and  plunder  any 
weakly-guarded  convoy.  To  protect  our  communi- 
cations, therefore.  General  Grant,  with  the  head- 
quarters of  the  4th  A.L.H.  Brigade  and  the  11th 
Regiment,  was  stationed  at  Kuneitra.  The  Hyder- 
abad Lancers,  who  had  been  left  at  the  Jordan, 
near  Jisr  Benat  Yakub,  were  also  placed  under  his 
command. 

Kuneitra  is  the  seat  of  government  of  a  Kaza,  and 
one  of  the  most  important  of  the  Circassian  villages 
that  are  found  scattered  throughout  the  Hauran, 
and  as  far  south  as  Amman.  Their  origin  dates 
back  to  the  annexation  by  Russia  of  the  Turkish 
provinces  of  Kars,  Batoum,  and  Ardahan  in  1877. 
The  Circassians,  being  Moslems,  left  the  annexed 
provinces  in  considerable  numbers,  and  were  planted 
by  the  Turks  along  the  fringe  of  the  desert,  to  act 
as  a  check  on  the  turbulent  Arab  tribes.  They  were 
given  land  and  favoured  in  other  ways  by  the  Turks, 
and  are  consequently  cordially  hated  by  the  local 
Arab  population.  Our  cavalry  had  encountered 
them  before,  during  the  Amman  raids.  They  used 
to  enlist  freely  in  the  Turkish  cavalry,  and  should 
make  good  soldiers  if  properly  trained.  Now,  how- 
ever, the  defeat  of  their  protectors  laid  them  open 
to  the  vengeance  of  the  Arabs,  whom  they  had 
always  despised  and  insulted,  and  they  were  com- 
pletely cowed.     On  the  afternoon  of  the  26tli,  our 


264        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

aircraft  had  reported  a  force  of  enemy  cavalry, 
estimated  at  3000,  in  the  neighbourhood  of  El 
Kuneitra.  This  large  force  made  no  attempt  to 
assist  in  holding  the  passage  of  the  Jordan,  and,  by 
the  time  our  troops  reached  El  Kuneitra,  it  had  all 
melted  away.  Arms  were  buried  or  hidden,  uniforms 
thrown  away,  and  the  big,  sturdy,  fair-haired  louts 
were  all  wandering  about  their  villages,  with  their 
hands  in  the  pockets  of  their  baggy  breeches,  trying 
to  look  as  much  like  peaceful  agriculturists  as  possible. 

A  party  of  Hauran  Druses  had  looted  the  village 
before  our  troops  arrived.  Some  of  them  were 
rounded  up  near  by  and  questioned,  but,  as  they 
were  fighting  with  the  Arabs,  and  were  thus  our 
'  allies,'  albeit  their  methods  were  not  ours,  they  had 
to  be  set  free  again. 

While  the  Australians  and  the  ^5th  Cavalry  Divi- 
sion were  advancing  on  El  Kuneitra,  the  4th  Cavalry 
Division  passed  through  Deraa,  and  pressed  on  to 
El  Mezerib  and  Tafas,  with  the  Arabs  on  its  right 
flank,  harassing  the  rear  of  the  retreating  IVth 
Army.  The  main  Turkish  force  had  got  some  dis- 
tance farther  north,  but  it  had  been  delayed  for 
many  hours  on  the  previous  day  at  Sheikh  Saad, 
by  the  skilful  fighting  of  Lawrence's  Arabs.  It  was 
this  delay  that  finally  decided  the  fate  of  the  Turks 
in  the  race  for  Damascus.  The  remnants  of  the 
IVth  Army  did,  in  fact,  reach  the  city,  but  our 
troops  were  close  on  their  heels,  and  they  got  no 
farther.  Of  the  units  that  left  Deraa  on  the  27th, 
however,  not  one  man  lived  to  reach  Damascus. 
Passing  through  Tafas  on  the  afternoon  of  that  day, 
they  seized  eighty  Arab  women  and  children,  and 
butchered  them  in  cold  blood,  with  every  refinement 
of  torture  and  outrage  that  the  bestial  mind  of  the 
Turk    could    conceive.     For    this    deed    the    Arabs 


ARAB  VENGEANCE  265 

exacted  vengeance  to  the  last  man.  Not  only  was 
every  man  of  the  Turkish  rearguard  killed,  but  two 
trains  full  of  sick  and  wounded,  which  were  captured 
by  the  Arabs  on  the  railway  farther  north,  were  set 
on  fire,  and  burnt  with  their  human  freight.  It  was 
a  terrible  vengeance,  but  characteristic  of  the  Arabs, 
and  one  can  hardly  blame  them.  It  is  to  be  noted 
that  the  Turks  who  perpetrated  this  horrible  massacre 
were  accompanied  by  a  number  of  German  officers, 
who  appear  to  have  made  no  effort  to  stop  the 
hideous  work. 


CHAPTER  XXI 

THE  FALL  OF  DAMASCUS 

At  two  o'clock  on  the  afternoon  of  the  29th,  the 
Austrahan  Mounted  Division  started  on  the  last  lap 
of  the  race  to  Damascus.  The  5th  Cavalry  Division 
followed  a  few  miles  in  rear  of  the  Australians.  The 
distance  to  be  covered  was  about  forty  miles,  and  it 
was  hoped  that,  if  the  two  divisions  marched  all 
night,  they  would  be  able  to  surround  the  city  soon 
after  dawn  on  the  30th. 

It  was  arranged  that  the  Australian  Mounted  Divi- 
sion should  send  two  brigades  along  the  foot  of  the 
hills  west  of  Damascus,  to  close  the  two  roads  lead- 
ing north-west  to  Beirut,  and  north-east  to  Horns. 
The  5th  Division  was  to  send  one  brigade  round  the 
east  side  of  the  city,  to  gain  touch  with  the  Australians 
on  the  Horns  road,  and  place  the  remainder  of  the 
division  astride  the  Deraa-Damascus  road,  at  or 
near  Kiswe,  to  receive  the  remnants  of  the  Turkish 
IVth  Army,  which  was  to  be  driven  into  their  wel- 
coming arms  by  the  4th  Division. 

It  must  be  explained  that  the  only  available  maps 
were  very  inaccurate  and  greatly  lacking  in  detail. 
Thus,  there  was  no  indication  that  the  steep  and 
rocky  hiUs,  which  press  right  on  to  Damascus  on  the 
west,  were  almost  impassable  for  cavalry ;  or  that 
the  Beirut  road  runs  along  the  bottom  of  a  deep, 
precipitous  gorge,  into  which  it  was  impossible  for 
cavalry  to  descend ;  or  that,  to  reach  the  Homs 
road,   it  would  be  necessary  to   pass  through  the 

268 


THE  ACTION  AT  SASA  267 

western  suburbs  of  the  city,  always  a  difficult  and 
dangerous  operation  in  a  hostile  country,  and  doubly 
so  for  mounted  troops. 

For  political  reasons,  strict  orders  had  been  given 
that  no  British  troops  were  to  enter  Damascus,  and 
these  orders  considerably  hampered  our  subsequent 
operations,  and  made  our  task  more  difficult. 

In  the  end,  however,  it  was  the  action  of  the  enemy 
that  was  the  chief  cause  of  our  delay.  A  couple  of 
armoured  cars  went  ahead  of  the  Australian  Division 
to  reconnoitre,  and  returned,  shortly  after  the  division 
had  started,  with  the  information  that  the  enemy 
was  holding  a  position  astride  the  road,  near  the 
village  of  Sasa,  a  little  north  of  the  Nahr  Mughaniye. 
The  cars  had  drawn  a  considerable  fire  from  guns 
and  machine  guns.  Patrols  of  the  3rd  A.L.H. 
Brigade  crossed  the  river  just  before  dark,  and  had 
located  the  enemy's  position  fairly  accurately  by 
the  time  the  rest  of  the  brigade  arrived.  The  posi- 
tion had  been  well  sited  by  the  enemy,  on  a  rocky 
ridge  running  about  east  and  west.  An  impassable 
morass  of  unknown  extent  protected  his  right  flank, 
north  of  the  road,  and  the  country  to  the  south  was 
a  wilderness  of  broken  lava  boulders,  most  difficult 
even  for  infantry  and  in  the  daylight. 

The  8th  and  9th  A.L.H.  Regiments  dismounted, 
and  advanced  in  pitch  darkness  against  the  pre- 
sumed position  of  the  enemy's  left  flank.  The  going 
was  so  bad  that  it  was  nearly  two  in  the  morning 
before  they  got  to  grips  with  the  Turks.  There  was 
a  half -hour's  very  confused  bayonet  fighting  among 
the  rocks  in  the  darkness,  during  which  it  was  almost 
impossible  to  distinguish  friend  from  foe.  The  Turks 
then  broke,  most  of  them  making  for  the  road.  A 
pre-arranged  signal  of  Verey  lights,  sent  up  by  the 
attackers,  apprised  the  division  of  this,  and,  immedi- 


268        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

ately  it  was  seen,  a  squadron  of  the  10th  A.L.H. 
Regiment,  which  had  been  held  in  readiness,  galloped 
straight  down  the  road  in  the  dark,  to  get  ahead  of 
the  retreating  Turks  and  cut  them  off.  It  verj'' 
nearly  came  to  grief  over  one  of  the  enemy  guns 
which  had  been  abandoned  on  the  road,  but  fortu- 
nately the  leading  horses  saw  it,  and  swerved  aside 
just  in  time.  The  squadron  was  followed,  at  a  more 
sober  pace,  by  the  4th  and  12th  Regiments  of  the  4th 
Brigade,  which  now  took  the  lead. 

About  100  prisoners,  three  guns,  and  a  number  of 
machine  guns  were  captured  on  the  position,  and, 
after  daylight,  about  250  more  stragglers  were  gathered 
in,  including  a  party  of  150  Germans,  who  had  retired 
before  the  10th  Regiment  charged  down  the  road. 
Our  casualties  had  been  rather  heavy  for  so  small  an 
affair,  and,  by  some  strange  chance,  the  Turks  cap- 
tured and  carried  off  with  them  in  their  retreat  eight 
of  our  men.  These  we  came  upon  and  rescued  near 
the  village  of  Sasa,  shortly  after  daybreak. 

The  net  result  of  this  action  was  that,  instead  of 
being  on  the  outskirts  of  Damascus  at  dawn  on  the 
30th,  our  troops  were  still  nearly  twenty  miles  away. 

Pressing  on  as  fast  as  possible,  the  division  reached 
Kaukab  about  ten  o'clock,  and  here  encountered  the 
enemy  again.  At  some  time  or  other  the  Turks  had 
constructed  a  long  line  of  entrenchments  stretching 
from  near  Katana  (north  of  the  El  Kuneitra  road) 
across  the  road  at  Kaukab,  along  the  high  ridge  of 
the  Jebel  el  Aswad,  over  the  Deraa  road  north  of 
Kiswe,  and  thence  over  the  Jebel  el  Mania  to  near 
Deir  Ali.  It  was  the  western  portion  of  this  hne, 
astride  the  El  Kuneitra  road,  that  they  were  now 
holding.  The  position  looked  strong,  and,  had  the 
Turks  put  up  a  determined  fight  here,  they  might 
have  saved  many  of  their  friends  in  Damascus,  to 


THE  ACTION  AT  KAUKAB  269 

say  nothing  of  their  masters  the  Germans,  from 
capture. 

'  A '  Battery  H.A.C.  and  the  Notts  Battery  R.H.A., 
which  were  marching  near  the  head  of  the  advance 
guard,  came  into  action  at  once,  and  opened  a  rapid 
and  effective  fire  on  the  enemy  position.  After  a 
few  minutes'  bombardment,  the  4th  A.L.H.  Regiment 
was  launched  at  the  village  of  Kaukab,  and  the  12th 
at  a  spur  of  the  Jebel  el  Aswad,  against  the  enemy's 
left  flank.  The  going  here  was  good,  and  the  cavalry 
were  able  to  gallop  right  on  to  the  position,  which 
they  proceeded  to  do,  covered  by  the  fire  of  the  guns. 
The  combination  of  gun  fire  and  charging  cavalry 
was  too  much  for  the  shattered  nerves  of  the  Turks, 
who  broke  and  fled,  pursued  by  the  Australians. 
The  whole  force  was  killed  or  captured. 

The  5th  Brigade  now  took  the  lead,  and  rode  hard 
up  the  road  towards  Damascus,  followed  by  the  3rd 
Brigade,  which  had  rejoined  from  Sasa  just  after  the 
action.  The  leading  troops  came  under  fire  from 
the  houses  and  gardens  of  the  suburb  of  El  Mezze. 
The  Notts  Battery  came  into  action,  and  shelled  the 
enemy  satisfactorily,  while  the  5th  Brigade  plunged 
into  the  maze  of  hills  north  of  the  road,  and  made 
for  the  Beirut  road.  Seeing  their  right  threatened, 
the  Turks  retired  into  the  town,  and  the  3rd  Brigade 
was  free  to  move  on.  Patrols  from  this  brigade 
then  found  that  it  was  impossible  to  reach  the  Homs 
road,  except  by  going  right  through  the  town,  as 
the  river  Barada,  running  between  rock  chffs,  barred 
their  path  farther  west.  As  the  orders  against  enter- 
ing the  town  were  peremptory,  there  was  nothing 
to  be  done  but  send  back  word  of  the  state  of 
affairs,  and  wait  for  permission  to  advance.  This 
permission  was  not  received  till  late  at  night,  when 
it  was  impossible  for  the  brigade  to  make  its  way 


270        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

through  the  narrov/,  tortuous  streets  of  the  town, 
which  was  still  full  of  enemy  troops. 

Meanwhile  the  5th  Brigade  was  encountering  great 
difficulties  in  the  bare,  rocky  hills  west  and  north  of 
El  Mezze,  but  the  advanced  troops  reached  the 
gorge  of  the  Barada,  above  El  Rabue,  about  five  in 
the  evening.  Here  they  found  themselves  on  the 
top  of  a  cliff  about  200  feet  high,  overhanging  the 
road  and  railway  to  Beirut,  and  looked  down  upon 
an  extraordinary  sight.  The  whole  of  the  bottom 
of  the  gorge,  from  side  to  side,  was  packed  with  a 
strugghng  mass  of  fugitives,  on  horse  and  afoot,  in 
motors,  cabs  and  carts,  surging  along  like  a  tidal 
wave.  There  was  a  train  on  the  line,  packed  with 
Germans,  but  it  was  completely  blocked  by  the  mass 
of  people  who  struggled  and  fought  along  the  rail- 
way, and  the  engine  driver  had  long  since  been  sub- 
merged in  the  tide  of  frenzied  Turks.  Even  the 
river  was  full  of  men  and  horses. 

There  was  no  possible  way  of  getting  down  on  to 
the  road  from  the  top  of  the  cliffs,  but  the  fugitives 
had  to  be  stopped  somehow.  A  few  machine  guns 
were  brought  into  action,  and  ordered  to  open  fire 
on  the  head  of  the  column  below.  General  Onslow, 
who  commanded  the  brigade,  told  the  writer  after- 
wards that  he  had  never  given  an  order  with  greater 
reluctance  and  horror.  With  a  view  to  minimising 
the  inevitable  slaughter,  he  instructed  his  machine 
gunners  to  concentrate  their  fire  as  much  as  possible 
on  the  vehicles  at  the  head  of  the  column,  in  order 
to  disable  them  and  so  block  the  road.  When  the 
firing  commenced,  the  Turks  in  front  tried  to  turn 
back  towards  the  city,  but  the  pressure  behind  them 
was  so  great  that  they  were  constantly  pushed  along 
into  the  zone  of  the  bullets.  At  last,  however,  the 
growing  pile  of  corpses  and  broken  vehicles  at  the 


•*^  >,>>r^'*i«r1 


Royal   Horse  Artillery  f'ordinji  the  Jonlan  at  Jisr  Benat  \'akub 


The   Beiriit  road  in  the  (Jorge  of  the  River  Barada.     1st  October,   1918. 


MARCH  OF  THE  4TH  CAVALRY  DIVISION   271 

head  of  the  column  completely  blocked  the  gorge, 
and  the  Turks  realised  that  then:  escape  was  barred. 
They  turned  and  streamed  miserably  back  towards 
the  city.  Part  of  the  crowd  was  intercepted  by 
troops  of  the  3rd  Brigade,  who  took  about  5000 
prisoners.  The  rest  reached  the  city,  and  were 
collected  next  day.  How  many  perished  in  the 
defile  will  never  be  known,  but  it  took  a  large  force 
of  German  prisoners  ten  days  to  dispose  of  the  bodies. 
It  was  fitting  that  they,  who  by  their  insane  ambi- 
tion had  brought  the  Turks  to  this  sorry  end,  should 
have  had  the  task  of  burying  the  victims  of  their 
lust  for  power. 

Before  dark,  the  5th  Brigade  got  a  small  party 
down  on  to  the  road,  and  picketed  it  during  the 
night. 

While  the  Australian  Mounted  Division  had  been 
pushing  round  west  of  Damascus,  the  4th  and  5th 
Cavalry  Divisions  had  been  slowly  closing  in  on  the 
city.  The  former  had  pursued  the  retreating  IVth 
Army  relentlessly  all  through  the  29th  of  September, 
and,  on  the  morning  of  the  30th,  the  11th  Brigade, 
which  was  acting  as  advance  guard,  reached  El 
Ghabaghib  Station,  on  the  old  French  railway  from 
Damascus  to  Mezerib,  about  thirty  miles  south  of 
Damascus. 

The  main  body  of  the  enemy,  which  had  been 
marching  hard  all  night,  was  now  some  distance 
ahead  of  the  division,  but  its  retreat  was  constantly 
harassed  by  Lawrence's  Arabs,  who  made  repeated 
raids  on  the  right  flank  of  the  Turks,  and  had  by 
now  reduced  them  to  a  state  of  extreme  disorganisa- 
tion. It  must  be  remembered  that  the  4th  Cavalry 
Division  had  about  thirty  miles  farther  to  go  before 
reaching  Damascus  than  the  other  two  divisions. 
Moreover,  although  there  had  been  no  opposition 


272        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

from  the  enemy  after  the  action  at  El  Remte,  the 
division  had  been  much  delayed  by  the  bad  road 
fi-om  Deraa  to  Damascus,  across  the  southern  Hauran. 
The  whole  of  this  area  is  overlaid  with  the  debris  of 
extinct  volcanoes,  mostly  in  the  form  of  huge  boulders 
of  black  basalt,  which  ever^'^where  cover  the  ground. 
Much  time  was  spent  in  clearing  away  these  boulders, 
to  make  a  passage  for  the  guns  and  transport  of  the 
division.  The  whole  country  from  Deraa  to  Damascus 
was  strewn  with  the  bodies  of  Turks  that  had  died 
from  exhaustion.  Dead  horses,  broken-down  vehicles, 
and  abandoned  guns  were  scattered  everywhere.  It 
was  estimated  that  2000  enemy  dead  were  passed  on 
the  march,  and  many  more  than  that  number  of 
dead  animals.  The  hot  sun,  beating  down  on  the 
black  rocks,  burnt  like  the  blast  from  a  furnace,  and 
the  heavy  air,  poisoned  by  the  unburied  corpses  of 
men  and  beasts,  hung  like  a  pall  over  the  land.  There 
is  little  water  to  be  found  in  the  Hauran  in  summer, 
and  less  food,  and  not  a  single  tree  and  scarce  a 
human  habitation  soften  the  desolation  of  this  hor- 
rible region. 

The  5th  Cavalry  Division  reached  Sasa  at  about 
eight  on  the  morning  of  the  30th,  and  there  received 
a  message  from  an  aeroplane  that  a  large  body  of 
the  enemy,  which  was,  in  fact,  the  leading  portion  of 
the  IVth  Army,  was  approaching  Kiswe,  along  the 
Deraa-Damascus  road.  The  13th  Brigade,  followed 
by  the  Mth,  was  at  once  despatched  to  try  and  inter- 
cept this  force.  Before  they  moved  off.  General 
MacAndrew  ^  issued  the  following  characteristic 
order  to  his  brigades :  '  Push  on  !  Kill  or  capture 
all  you  can,  and  seize  Damascus.'' 

This  day  marked  the  end  of  the  Turkish  IVth 

^  Major-General  Sir  H.  J.  M.  MacAndrew,  K.C.B.,  Indian  Army.  He 
died  from  burns  received  in  an  accident  at  Aleppo  in  July  1919. 


END  OF  THE  TURKISH  FOURTH  ARMY  273 

Army,  but,  as  it  split  up  into  a  number  of  detached 
groups,  which  were  attacked  throughout  the  day  by 
brigades,  regiments,  and  even  single  squadrons  of 
the  4th  and  5th  Cavalry  Divisions,  it  is  impossible 
to  give  any  very  concise  account  of  its  destruction. 
It  is  clear,  however,  that,  on  the  morning  of  the  30th, 
the  army  was  marching  in  two  main  bodies.  The 
leading  portion,  that  which  had  been  seen  and  re- 
ported by  our  aircraft,  consisted  of  the  remains  of 
the  Turldsh  3rd  Cavalry  Division,  with  such  of  the 
infantry  as  had  been  able  to  keep  up  with  the  mounted 
troops.  The  following  portion,  evidently  much  more 
disorganised,  was  marching  some  eight  to  ten  miles 
in  rear. 

The  13th  Brigade,  moving  along  the  south  bank  of 
the  Wadi  el  Zabirani,  encountered  some  opposition 
on  the  ridge  of  the  Jebel  el  Aswad,  north  of  Deir 
Khabiye,  from  enemy  troops  occupying  a  portion 
of  the  entrenched  position  that  has  been  mentioned 
above.  By  mid-day,  however,  the  brigade  had  suc- 
ceeded in  dispersing  the  enemy,  taking  some  700 
prisoners.  Meanwhile  the  14th  Brigade  had  got 
astride  the  Deraa-Damascus  road,  north  of  Kiswe. 
It  was  just  in  time  to  intercept  the  leading  portion 
of  the  Turkish  force,  the  advanced  elements  of  which 
had  cleared  Kiswe,  and  were  hurrying  up  the  road 
over  the  Jebel  el  Aswad  towards  Damascus. 

In  the  somewhat  confused  fighting  which  followed 
the  encounter,  the  greater  part  of  what  was  left  of 
the  Turkish  3rd  Cavalry  Division,  including  the 
divisional  commander  and  his  staff,  fell  into  our 
hands.  The  remainder  of  the  force  was  driven  back, 
completely  broken,  to  Kiswe. 

At  this  time  the  15th  Brigade  was  in  divisional 
reserve  a  little  east  of  Khan  el  Shiha. 

Shortly  afterwards,  about  four  in  the  afternoon, 


274        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

the  second  portion  of  the  Turkish  army  was  seen 
aj^proaching  Kiswe,  followed  by  the  11th  Brigade 
of  the  4th  Cavalry  Division.  This  brigade  had  been 
checked  for  a  time  at  Khiyara  Chiftlik,  about  six 
miles  south  of  Kiswe,  by  a  body  of  the  enemy  who 
took  up  a  position  behind  the  mud  walls  of  a  farm 
there.  The  brigade  was  rather  heavily  shelled  from 
the  direction  of  Kalaat  el  Nuhas  at  the  same  time. 
The  farm  was  cleared  by  a  mounted  charge,  and  the 
Turks  dispersed.  Some  escaped  up  the  steep  slopes 
of  the  Jebel  el  Mania  to  the  east,  but  the  bulk  of 
them  continued  along  the  main  road  to  Kiswe.  On 
their  arrival  there,  they  joined  the  demoralised 
remnants  of  the  leading  portion  of  their  force,  that 
had  escaped  the  onslaught  of  the  14th  Brigade. 
Here  they  learnt  that  the  road  to  Damascus  was 
barred,  and,  looking  backwards,  saw  the  lances  of 
the  4th  Cavalry  Division  approaching.  Caught  be- 
tween the  two  forces,  they  made  a  last  despairing 
attempt  to  break  through.  There  appears  to  have 
been  a  general  sauve  qui  pent.  Some  attempted  the 
Damascus  road,  and  were  ridden  down  and  captured 
by  the  14th  Brigade.  Others  made  their  way  north- 
east up  the  Nahr  el  Awaj,  and  attempted  a  counter- 
attack against  the  left  flank  of  this  brigade,  but 
were  broken  up  by  the  fire  of  the  Essex  Battery. 
They  split  up  into  small  groups,  and  disappeared 
among  the  gardens  of  the  Damascus  plain  east  of 
the  city,  where  the  majority  of  them  were  almost 
certainly  murdered  by  the  natives.  The  largest 
body  broke  out  to  the  north-west,  and  fell  into  the 
arms  of  the  13th  Brigade  near  Sahnaya,  where  about 
1500  prisoners  were  taken,  and  many  were  killed. 
Others  again  were  observed  trying  to  escape  to  the 
east.  The  Ajrrshire  Battery,  attached  to  the  11th 
Brigade,  galloped  forward,  supported  by  two  machine 


THE  LIBERATION  OF  DAMASCUS        275 

guns  and  a  few  Hotchkiss  rifles,  and  came  into  action 
at  close  range,  causing  the  Turks  to  scatter  wildly. 
The  29th  Lancers  pursued  these  disorganised  parties 
up  the  slopes  of  the  Jebel  el  Mania,  and  had  rounded 
up  large  numbers  of  them  before  darkness  put  an 
end  to  the  pursuit.  Finally,  a  number  remained  in 
Kiswe,  and  tried  to  organise  some  sort  of  resistance 
there.  At  five  o'clock,  however,  the  13th  Brigade 
swept  suddenly  down  upon  the  village  and  captured 
it,  with  about  700  prisoners  and  several  guns. 

It  was  now  nearly  dark,  and  nothing  further  could 
be  done  that  day.  The  5th  Division  remained  for 
the  night  along  a  line  north  of  the  Wadi  el  Zabii'ani, 
from  the  Kuneitra-Damascus  road  to  a  few  miles 
north-east  of  Kiswe.  The  4th  Division  concentrated 
south  of  Kiswe. 

Two  troops  of  the  Gloucester  Yeomanry,  13th 
Brigade,  and  a  troop  of  the  12th  Regiment,  4th 
A.L.H.  Brigade,  starting  from  south  and  west  of 
the  town  respectively,  attempted  to  reach  the  big 
German  wireless  installation  at  Kadem  Station  in 
the  southern  suburb.  The  wireless  plant  had,  how- 
ever, been  prepared  for  demolition,  and  was  blown 
up  before  our  troops  reached  it.  Both  parties  had 
a  warm  time,  and  were  continually  sniped  at  by 
wandering  bodies  of  the  enemy  from  the  houses  and 
wooded  gardens.  Eventually  they  came  upon  a 
number  of  large  ammunition  dumps,  which  had 
been  set  on  fii'e  and  were  going  off  like  a  monstrous 
Brock's  Benefit,  and  they  had  to  beat  a  hurried 
retreat.  All  through  the  early  part  of  the  night 
tremendous  explosions  shook  the  air,  as  the  fire 
reached  fresh  stacks  of  shells.  Kadem  railway 
station  and  all  the  houses  round  it  were  completely 
destroyed,  but  there  was  little  other  damage  in  the 
city.     The  Turks  were  too  dispirited  and  worn  out 


276        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

for  deeds  of  frightfulness,  and  the  Germans  too 
intent  on  trying  to  make  good  their  escape.  The 
independence  of  the  city  from  Turkish  rule  was 
actually  publicly  proclaimed  in  the  Serai  early  on 
the  afternoon  of  September  the  30th,  without  any 
opposition  from  the  Turks,  although  there  were  at 
the  time  some  15,000  Turkish  and  German  soldiers 
in  the  town,  including  Jemal  Pasha,  the  commander 
of  the  IVth  Army.  A  number  of  these  troops  had 
come  from  Aleppo  and  Beirut,  and  the  remainder 
were  stragglers  who  had  made  their  way  in,  by  rail 
and  road,  from  the  south,  after  the  debdcle  of  Sep- 
tember the  19th  and  succeeding  days.  Nearly  all 
of  them  were  half  starved  and  worn  out  by  continual 
marching,  and  their  morale  had  sunk  so  low  that  they 
made  no  protest  when  the  whole  city  broke  out  in  a 
blaze  of  Sherifian  flags.  Insulted  and  beaten  by  the 
people,  who  refused  to  give  or  sell  them  food,  aban- 
doned by  their  German  masters  in  the  most  callous 
manner,  diseased  and  starving,  many  of  the  poor 
wretches  died  in  the  streets  that  night.  Many  others, 
less  fortunate,  met  a  brutal  death  at  the  hands  of 
the  populace.  Several  thousand  dragged  themselves 
to  the  Turkish  barracks,  which  they  filled,  and  over- 
flowed into  the  parade  ground,  where  some  300 
perished  during  the  night.  Two  considerable  bodies 
did  indeed  attempt  to  escape,  one  along  the  Beirut 
road,  and  the  other  towards  Homs.  The  fate  of  the 
former  has  already  been  told.  The  latter  body, 
which  consisted  of  fresher  troops,  from  Aleppo  and 
Beirut,  got  out  of  the  town  on  the  north-east,  and 
marched  all  night  along  the  Homs  road. 

The  next  day,  October  the  1st,  as  soon  as  it  was 
light,  the  5th  Cavalry  Division  concentrated  and 
moved  round  to  the  east  of  the  city,  pushing  the 
13th  Brigade  as  far  north  as  the  Homs  road,  where 


WORK  OF  THE  3RD  A.L.H.  BRIGADE  277 

it  got  into  touch  with  the  3rd  A.L.H.  Brigade  of  the 
Austrahan  Mounted  Division.  This  brigade  passed 
through  the  city  at  dawn,  patrols  of  the  10th  A.L.H. 
Regiment  reaching  the  Serai  square  about  six  in  the 
morning,  and  being  thus  actually  the  first  troops  to 
enter  the  city.  Passing  the  Baramkie  railway  station 
on  the  way,  they  found  there  a  train  just  about  to 
start  for  Bekut,  the  troops  in  it  being  ignorant  of 
the  fact  that  the  railway  had  been  cut  (by  the  5th 
A.L.H.  Brigade)  the  previous  night.  They  were 
speedily  undeceived,  and  about  500  prisoners  and 
a  number  of  guns  and  machine  guns  were  taken 
from  the  train,  and  handed  over  to  the  4th  and  12th 
Regiments  of  the  4th  Brigade,  which  marched  to  the 
station  later  in  the  morning. 

Hurrying  through  the  town,  the  3rd  Brigade 
reached  the  Homs  road,  and  pressed  along  it  on  the 
track  of  the  enemy  force  that  had  escaped  that  way 
the  previous  evening.  The  10th  Regiment  came  up 
with  part  of  this  force  about  nine  o'clock  in  the 
morning,  on  the  Wadi  Maraba,  near  Harista  el  Basal, 
and  promptly  charged  it,  killing  many  with  the  sword, 
and  capturing  about  600  prisoners  and  some  forty 
machine  guns.  Continuing  the  pursuit,  the  cavalry 
came  upon  more  of  the  enemy  near  Duma,  and  again 
at  Khan  Kusseir,  twelve  miles  from  Damascus,  in 
the  evening.  They  were  engaged  in  continual  skir- 
mishing throughout  the  day,  and  the  action  at  Khan 
Kusseir,  where  they  were  opposed  by  Germans, 
though  short,  was  severe.  The  enemy  troops  had 
a  number  of  machine  guns,  and  put  up  a  good  fight, 
but  were  broken  by  a  charge  delivered  from  the 
cover  of  some  vineyards  and  olive  groves  on  their 
right  flank,  and  all  of  them  were  killed  or  captured. 
The  brigade  remained  at  Duma  for  the  night. 

The   advance  troops   of  the  Arab   Army,   under 


278        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

Lawrence,  reached  Damascus  about  half-past  eight 
in  the  morning,  and  estabUshed  their  headquarters 
in  the  Government  buildings. 

Meanwhile  the  two  regiments  of  the  4th  A.L.H. 
Brigade  were  at  work  collecting  prisoners  in  the 
town,  and  evacuating  them  to  a  concentration  area 
near  Daraya.  All  day  long  the  sorry  business  con- 
tinued, and  by  evening  nearly  12,000  had  been 
collected.  They  were  in  a  pitiable  state.  Many  of 
them,  the  remnants  of  the  IVth  Army,  had  been 
chased  for  150  miles  by  our  cavalry  and  by  the  Arab 
forces.  Constantly  bombed  by  our  aircraft,  harassed 
day  and  night  by  the  Arab  Camel  Corps  and  the 
hostile  population  of  the  country  through  which 
they  passed,  denied  all  food,  and  often  short  of  water, 
it  is  one  of  the  marvels  of  war  that  they  had  struggled 
so  far.  The  task  of  getting  them  out  of  the  city  was 
a  horrible  one.  Many  fell  by  the  wayside,  and  all 
the  efforts  of  our  cavahy  failed  to  get  them  on  their 
feet  again,  and  they  had  to  be  left  to  die.  All  night 
long  our  over-worked  ambulances  toiled  among  them, 
bringing  water  and  food  and  what  medical  assistance 
was  possible,  but  they  were  utterly  unable  to  cope 
with  the  numbers,  and  by  morning  over  600  were 
dead. 

For  the  first  fortnight,  and  until  the  rest  and  good 
food  had  had  time  to  take  effect,  the  mortality  in  the 
prisoners'  camp,  though  decreasing  daily,  averaged 
over  a  hundred  a  day. 

The  whole  Turkish  force  was  riddled  with  disease. 
Nearly  all  were  suffering  from  either  malaria  or 
dysentery,  and  there  were  several  cases  of  smallpox. 
Venereal  disease  is  endemic  among  the  Turks,  and, 
in  normal  times,  seems  to  have  little  effect  upon  their 
general  health ;  but,  in  the  exhausted  and  weakened 
condition  in  which  they  now  were,  it  laid  hold  on 


The  Emir  Feisals'   Headquarters  at  Damascus. 
Note  the  Sheritian  standards  on  tlie  balcony. 


Tripoli.     The  old  Crusader  Citadel. 


A  RECORD  CAVALRY  CHARGE         279 

them  virulently,  and  took  a  heavy  toll  of  lives.  An 
indication  of  the  spread  of  this  disease  among  the 
Germans  was  afforded  by  a  room  in  the  hospital  at 
Afule,  which  was  filled  with  boxes  of  salvarsan. 
This  drug,  we  were  informed  by  German  medical 
officers,  was  reserved  exclusively  for  the  use  of 
German  troops. 

The  operations  closed  on  the  2nd  October  with  an 
extraordinary  charge  by  the  3rd  A.L.H.  Brigade. 
Early  in  the  morning,  a  column  of  the  enemy  was 
seen  moving  north,  parallel  to  the  Homs  road,  and 
some  miles  to  the  east.  This  column  had  evidently 
hoped,  by  avoiding  the  road,  to  make  its  way  unseen 
to  Khan  Ayash,  where  it  would  have  entered  the 
hills,  and  probably  then  made  its  escape. 

The  whole  brigade  immediately  mounted,  galloped 
six  miles  over  the  open  plain,  and  charged  the  enemy 
with  the  sword.  The  Turks  had  with  them  a  few 
guns  and  a  number  of  machine  guns,  which  they 
brought  into  action  and  fought  to  the  last.  The 
brigade  galloped  on,  through  a  hot  fire,  and  charged 
clean  through  the  enemy  force,  killing  a  large  number 
of  them,  and  capturing  1500  prisoners,  including  a 
divisional  commander,  three  guns,  and  twenty-six 
machine  guns.  In  point  of  distance  this  must  be  a 
record  cavalry  charge. 

On  the  same  day,  detachments  from  each  brigade 
of  the  Corps  and  some  of  the  guns  paraded  at  the 
village  of  Sbeine,  south  of  Damascus,  and  marched 
through  the  city  from  end  to  end,  led  by  the  Corps 
Commander.  This  was  not  intended  as  a  triumphal 
march,  but  was  a  necessary  display  of  force,  to 
overawe  the  turbulent  elements  in  the  town,  who 
threatened  to  create  a  state  of  absolute  anarchy. 

For  political  reasons  the  city  was  supposed  to  be 
in  charge  of  the  Arab  forces,  and  an  Arab  Governor 


280        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

was  actually  appointed.  But,  v/ith  the  best  inten- 
tions in  the  world,  the  small  force  of  so-called 
'  regular '  Arab  soldiers  could  do  little  or  nothing  to 
keep  order.  The  irregular — higlily  irregular — forces 
of  King  Hussein  far  outnumbered  the  Arab  Army. 
Dming  the  advance  on  the  city,  hordes  of  nomad 
Arabs  had  joined  his  standard,  drawn  thereto  partly, 
no  doubt,  by  their  genuine  and  deep-rooted  hatred 
of  the  Turks,  but  also,  and  far  more  strongly,  by 
their  equally  genuine  and  deep-rooted  love  of  plunder. 
Till  they  reached  Damascus,  the  loot  had  consisted 
almost  entirely  of  rifles  and  ammunition,  best  of  all 
loot  from  the  desert  Arab's  point  of  view,  but  now 
that  "each  son  of  Ishmael  was  in  possession  of  at 
least  two  good  rifles,  and  was  festooned  with  machine 
gun  belts  full  of  cartridges,  he  felt  that  he  could  toy 
with  some  more  fancy  trifles,  should  they  come  his 
way.  So  it  was  not  surprising  that,  as  soon  as  they 
entered  the  city,  they  all  set  to  work  at  once  to 
collect  what  Thomas  Atkins  would  call  '  souvenirs.' 
They  were  perfectly  good-tempered  about  it,  and 
only  killed  a  few  shopkeepers  who  made  an  un- 
conscionable fuss  about  having  their  booths  looted. 
No  mercy  was  shown  to  the  Turks,  however.  They 
were  hunted  down  and  killed  remorselessly  where- 
ever  found.  Some  of  the  Arabs  even  broke  into  the 
Turkish  hospital,  and  set  about  murdering  the  mori- 
bund wretches  whom  they  found  there,  till  driven 
away  by  our  troops. 

The  desert-bred  Arabs  are  probably  the  most  inde- 
pendent of  mankind.  They  acknowledge  no  authority, 
and  will  take  orders  only  from  those  who  are  able  to 
exact  obedience  by  force  of  arms.  This  the  Emir 
Feisal  was  quite  unable  to  do,  even  had  he  been 
wilhng,  which  is  doubtful.  His  attitude  seemed  to 
be  that  boys  will  be  bo\^s,  and  it  would  be  a  shame 


Sou  I  r-:  -       K-^ti 

BNIVEF^SH     uf  ^ALifORNlS 
LIE^RARY 

LOS    ANGELES.  CAUF] 


# 


DISORDERS  IN  THE  CITY  281 

to  interfere  with  their  simple  pleasures,  after  the 
hard  time  they  had  had.  One  of  the  first  things  the 
'  Boys '  did  was  to  open  the  jail  and  release  all  the 
ruffians  therein,  who  added  to  the  liveliness  of  the 
city. 

After  two  days  of  something  like  pandemonium, 
the  powers  that  were  recognised  the  necessity  of  im- 
posing some  sort  of  restraint  on  the  lawless  elements, 
and  two  regiments  of  the  Australian  Mounted  Divi- 
sion were  stationed  in  the  city  for  police  duties.  The 
Australian  troopers  speedily  had  the  situation  in 
hand,  and  the  normal  life  of  Damascus  was  resumed 
within  forty-eight  hours. 


CHAPTER  XXII 

THE  LAST  PHASE 

Arabian  Syria  extends  northwards  a  little  beyond 
Aleppo.  A  study  of  the  place-names  on  the  map 
will  establish  a  fairly  well-defined  line,  running  from 
about  Jerablus  on  the  Euphrates  to  the  sea  near 
Antioch,  north  of  which  the  Arabic  names  give  place 
to  Turkish.  From  the  political  point  of  view  it 
was  highly  desirable  that  all  the  country  south  of 
this  line  should  be  in  our  hands  before  the  Turks 
should  have  had  enough,  and  ask  for  a  cessation  of 
hostilities.  But  Aleppo  is  a  far  cry  from  Damascus, 
230  miles  by  the  Rayak  road,  and  it  is  doubtful 
whether  the  Commander-in-Chief  had  in  his  mind  at 
this  date  so  extended  an  enterprise  as  the  capture 
of  that  city. 

Strategically,  however,  an  advance  as  far  as  Rayak 
and  Beirut  offered  several  advantages.  The  posses- 
sion of  Beirut  would  give  us  a  good,  if  small,  port, 
connected  by  rail  and  road  with  Damascus,  thus 
greatly  shortening  our  line  of  supply.  And,  with 
Rayak  Junction  in  our  hands,  we  should  control  the 
important  broad-gauge  line  that  runs  northwards 
from  this  place,  through  Horns,  Hama,  and  Aleppo, 
to  join  the  Baghdad  line  at  Muslimie. 

The  total  destruction  of  the  Turkish  armies  had 
ensured  us  freedom  of  movement  at  least  as  far  as 
the  line  Rayak-Beirut,  and  the  only  obstacle  to  an 
advance  lay  in  the  weak  and  reduced  condition  of 
the  Corps. 


SICKNESS  IN  THE  CORPS  283 

In  the  twelve  days  from  the  19th  to  the  30th  of 
September  inclusive,  the  three  cavalry  divisions  had 
marched  over  200  miles,  fought  a  number  of  minor 
actions,  and  captured  more  than  60,000  prisoners, 
140  guns,  and  500  machine  guns. 

Long  marches,  especially  at  night,  and  half  rations 
during  the  whole  period,  had  rendered  the  horses 
thin  and  tired,  and  they  were  in  urgent  need  of  a 
rest.  The  men  were  in  considerably  worse  case.  In 
the  course  of  the  operations,  the  Australian  Mounted 
Division  had  lain  one  night  beside  the  Jordan  at 
Jisr  Benat  Yakub,  and  the  4th  Cavalry  Division  had 
spent  several  nights  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Beisan. 
In  both  places  the  men  were  exposed  to  the  attacks 
of  swarms  of  malaria-bearing  mosquitoes.  Though 
the  outbreak  of  malignant  malaria,  which  was  the 
fruit  of  these  nights,  did  not  begin  to  make  its  appear- 
ance till  about  the  5th  of  October,  the  day  on  which 
the  advance  was  resumed,  there  were  many  cases 
of  influenza  in  the  Corps,  and  the  hospitals  were  full 
of  sick  men,  especially  Indians.  The  5th  Division, 
which  had  not  been  in  the  mosquito  districts,  suffered 
less  severely  from  malaria,  and  was  thus  able  to 
continue  the  advance  later  on,  at  a  time  when  the 
other  two  divisions  were  so  weakened  by  the  disease 
as  to  be  almost  incapable  of  moving. 

After  weighing  all  the  factors  of  the  situation, 
however,  the  Commander-in-Chief  decided  that  the 
advantages  to  be  gained  by  securing  the  port  of 
Beirut  and  the  railway  to  Damascus,  justified  a 
farther  advance,  and  he  determined  to  push  on  with 
his  cavalry  at  least  as  far  as  the  Rayak-Beirut  line. 

The  4th  and  5th  Cavalry  Divisions  were  detailed 
for  this  task,  the  Australian  Division  remaining  in 
and  around  Damascus,  to  keep  order  in  the  city  and 
throughout  the  surrounding  country. 


284        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

The  two  divisions  started  on  tlie  morning  of  the 
5th  of  October.  At  Khan  Meizelun,  eighteen  miles 
from  Damascus,  their  roads  parted,  the  4th  Division 
moving  on  Zebdani,  on  the  railway  between  Damascus 
and  Rayak,  the  5th  making  for  Rayak  by  the  main 
road  through  Shtora.  Both  objectives  were  reached 
without  difficulty  the  following  afternoon.  In  the 
course  of  the  advance  the  14th  Brigade  entered  Zahle, 
capturing  177  prisoners  and  a  few  guns.  Thirty 
burnt  aeroplanes  were  found  on  the  aerodrome  at 
Rayak,  and  in  the  station  a  quantity  of  rolling 
stock  and  a  number  of  engines  of  both  the  broad  and 
the  narrow  gauge.  Though  damaged,  most  of  these 
were  subsequently  repaired  and  put  into  use. 

On  the  next  day  (the  7th)  the  armoured  cars 
attached  to  the  5th  Cavalry  Division  made  a  re- 
connaissance to  Beirut,  which  they  entered  without 
opposition  about  mid-day.  The  townspeople  received 
them  with  acclamation,  and  showed  with  pride  a 
party  of  about  600  Turkish  soldiers  whom  they  had 
collected  and  disarmed.  The  7th  Indian  Infantry 
Division,  which  had  left  Haifa  on  October  the  3rd, 
reached  Beirut  on  the  8th,  and  took  over  these 
prisoners. 

On  the  10th  the  cars  reconnoitred  northwards  as 
far  as  Baalbek,  without  encountering  any  of  the 
enemy,  and  the  Commander-in-Chief  thereupon  de- 
cided to  make  a  farther  advance  as  far  as  Homs. 

Unfortunately  malaria  had  b}^  now  laid  such  a 
hold  upon  the  men  of  the  4th  Division,  that  the 
surviving  hale  scarce  sufficed  to  carry  on  the  ordinary 
duties  of  camp,  and  anj^  further  work  by  this  divi- 
sion was  out  of  the  question.  This  left  only  the  5th 
Division,  itself  much  reduced  in  numbers,  to  carry 
on  the  advance. 

The  7th  Infantry  Division  was  directed  to  send  a 


OCCUPATION  OF  HOMS  285 

brigade  to  Tripoli,  where  there  was  a  small  port, 
with  jetties  suitable  for  landing  stores  in  fine  weather, 
and  a  fairly  good,  metalled  road  running  inland  to 
Horns,  which  would  facilitate  the  sending  of  supplies 
to  the  cavalry  at  the  latter  place.  The  5th  Divi- 
sion was  then  ordered  to  occupy  Homs  as  soon  as 
possible,  the  4th  remaining  in  the  Zahle-Rayak- 
Baalbek  area. 

The  13th  Brigade  entered  Baalbek  on  the  11th  of 
October,  and  collected  500  Turks  who  had  sur- 
rendered to  the  inhabitants,  and  who  had  been 
'  offered '  to  the  armoured  cars  the  previous  day. 

The  railway  from  Aleppo  to  Rayak  was  in  working 
order,  and  it  was  quite  possible  for  the  enemy  to 
send  troops  south  to  delay  our  advance.  It  was 
very  important,  therefore,  that  any  further  move 
forward,  once  decided  upon,  should  be  carried  out 
as  rapidly  as  possible. 

To  this  end  General  MacAndrew  organised  his 
division  at  Baalbek  in  two  columns.  Column  ^A,' 
which  was  to  lead  the  advance,  consisted  of  the  divi- 
sional headquarters,  three  batteries  of  armoured  cars, 
and  three  light  car  patrols,  supported  by  the  15th 
Brigade.  This  brigade  had  only  two  regiments,  the 
Hyderabad  Lancers  being  still  on  the  line  of  com- 
munications. The  remainder  of  the  division  formed 
Column  *  B.'  It  will  be  apparent  that  Column  *  A '  was 
little  more  than  a  raiding  force,  but  it  was  considered 
that  the  heavy  volume  of  machine-gun  fire  provided 
by  the  twenty-four  cars  would  be  sufficient  to  dis- 
perse, or  at  least  to  break  up  and  disorganise,  any 
body  of  the  enemy  that  might  be  encountered.  The 
country  was  very  suitable  for  the  employment  of 
armoured  cars,  being  open  and  fairly  flat,  with  a 
hard  surface. 

A  wing  of  the  Royal  Air  Force  was  attached  to  the 


286        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

division  for  reconnaissance  purposes.  Throughout 
the  campaign,  the  close  co-operation  between  our 
aeroplanes  and  the  cavalry  had  given  most  excel- 
lent results.  During  the  advance  on  Damascus,  Air 
Force  motor  cars  had  accompanied  the  advanced 
headquarters  of  the  Corps,  carrying  a  party  who 
selected  and  marked  landing  grounds  at  each  halting 
place.  Lorries  carrying  petrol  and  stores  followed 
a  few  miles  in  rear.  These  arrangements  resulted 
in  maintaining  that  close  personal  contact  between 
the  two  forces  without  which  satisfactory  work  is 
impossible.  Moreover,  the  provision  of  a  landing 
ground  beside  the  advanced  Corps  headquarters 
meant  that  there  was  always  an  aeroplane  ready  at 
hand  for  instant  use,  if  any  special  work  was  required. 

Similar  arrangements  were  now  made  with  the 
5th  Division,  and  the  subsequent  assistance  of  the  wing 
attached  to  the  division  was  of  the  highest  value. 

At  this  time  no  orders  had  been  received  as  to 
Aleppo,  but  it  is  evident  that  General  MacAndrew 
had  in  his  mind  the  probability  of  an  advance  to 
seize  that  city.  At  any  rate,  this  organisation  of 
his  division  enabled  him  to  do  so  when  the  time 
came,  and  by  a  piece  of  sheer  bluff. 

The  march  proceeded  without  incident  up  the 
valley  of  the  Orontes,  and  the  armoured  cars  of 
Column  'A'  entered  Homs  unopposed  on  the  15th, 
where  they  met  a  force  of  Sherifian  troops,  under 
Sherif  Nasir,  who  had  marched  from  Damascus  by 
the  direct  north  road.  Two  days  previously  the 
20th  Corps  cavalry  regiment  had  occupied  Tripoli, 
where  it  was  joined  a  few  days  later  by  part  of  the 
7th  Infantry  Division,  and  arrangements  were  at 
once  put  in  hand  to  land  stores  at  the  little  port, 
and  send  them  up  by  road  to  Homs.  Column  *  B ' 
arrived  on  the  16th. 


ADVANCE  ON  ALEPPO  287 

The  Commander-in-Chief  now  determined  to  com- 
plete the  poUtical  part  of  the  campaign  by  seizing 
Aleppo,  and  occupying  all  the  Arab-speaking  country 
from  the  sea  to  the  Euphrates. 

The  only  troops  available  for  the  enterprise  were 
the  5th  Cavalry  Division  and  the  armoured  cars. 
The  Australian  Division  was  at  Damascus,  over 
100  miles  away,  and  could  not  be  brought  up  in 
time.  The  4th  Division,  reduced  in  strength  and 
exhausted  by  disease,  was  incapable  of  any  work 
till  men  and  horses  had  been  given  a  thorough  rest 
and  time  to  recover  from  sickness.  This  division 
and  the  Australian  Division  had  suffered  some  300 
deaths  from  disease  since  reaching  Damascus,  a 
fortnight  before.  Even  the  5th  Division,  which  had 
suffered  far  less  severely  than  the  other  two,  was 
in  a  deplorable  state.  The  whole  division  hardly 
mustered  1500  sabres.  The  two  R.H.A.  batteries 
with  the  division  numbered  between  them  but  four 
officers  and  eighty  men. 

It  was  known  that  there  were  about  20,000  Turks 
and  Germans  at  Aleppo,  or  south  of  that  place,  and 
it  was  believed  that  about  half  of  these  were  com- 
batants, though  probably  ill-armed  and  disorganised. 
Aleppo  is  over  100  miles  from  Homs,  and  180  from 
Tripoli  or  Baalbek,  the  two  nearest  points  from 
which  any  possible  reinforcements  could  be  sent. 

In  the  face  of  these  facts,  the  boldest  of  commanders 
might  well  have  been  excused  for  deciding  to  call  a 
halt.  But  the  political  and  moral  advantages  to  be 
gained  by  a  farther  advance  into  the  enemy's  country 
appeared  so  great  that  General  Allenby  determined 
to  accept  the  risk.  On  the  19th  of  October  he 
directed  General  MacAndrew  to  advance  to  Aleppo. 

The  divisional  field  squadron  Royal  Engineers, 
covered  by  the  15th  Brigade,  at  once  moved  out  to 


288        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

El  Rastan,  to  repair  the  bridge  over  the  Orontes  at 
that  place,  which  had  been  blown  up  by  the  Turks 
during  their  retreat.  The  following  day  the  divi- 
sional headquarters  and  the  cars  joined  the  15th 
Brigade  at  El  Rastan,  and,  on  the  morning  of  the 
21st,  Column  'A'  crossed  the  repaired  bridge,  and, 
making  a  long  march,  reached  Zor  Defai,  five  miles 
north  of  Hama,  that  evening.  No  opposition  was 
encountered  during  the  march. 

Next  morning  the  cars  pushed  off  early  on 
an  extended  reconnaissance.  Reaching  Ma'arit  el 
Na'aman,  thirty-five  miles  distant,  about  mid-day, 
without  meeting  any  of  the  enemy,  they  made  a 
short  halt,  and  then  started  off  again  towards  Aleppo. 
Seven  miles  farther  north,  near  Khan  Sebil,  they 
sighted  some  enemy  armoured  cars  and  armed  motor 
lorries.  These  at  once  turned  and  fled,  pursued  by 
our  cars,  and  a  nice  little  hunt  ensued.  Hounds  were 
stopped  after  a  fifteen  mile  point,  as  it  was  getting 
late,  but  not  before  a  German  armoured  car,  two 
armed  lorries,  and  thirty-seven  prisoners  had  been 
captured.  Just  as  our  cars  drew  off,  two  enemy 
aeroplanes  appeared,  and,  evidently  mistaking  the 
German  lorries  for  our  troops,  promptly  dived,  and 
machine-gunned  them  vigorously !  The  armoured 
cars  had  reached  a  point  fifty-five  miles  from  Zor 
Defai,  and  only  twenty  miles  south  of  Aleppo,  before 
they  turned  back.  They  withdrew  to  a  point  four 
miles  north  of  Seraikin,  where  they  bivouacked  for 
the  night,  finding  their  own  outposts.  The  15th 
Brigade  reached  Khan  Shaikhun  late  in  the  after- 
noon. 

On  the  23rd  the  cars  pushed  on  again,  and  encoun- 
tered some  enemy  cavalry  at  Khan  Tuman,  about 
ten  miles  south  of  Aleppo.  These  they  brushed 
aside  without  much  difficulty,  and  proceeded  along 


f^'tmrnktSm. 


Aleppo.     TliL'  old  citadel. 


r^' 


Bedouin  iind  Sheiitian  soklieis.     Near  the  Euphrates. 


A  FLAG  OF  TRUCE  289 

the  road.  Some  miles  farther  on,  however,  they 
were  held  up  by  strong  Turkish  rearguards  holding 
an  entrenched  position  astride  the  road,  through  El 
Ansarie  and  Sheikh  Said.  A  reconnaissance  of  this 
position,  carried  out  by  the  cars  and  some  aeroplanes, 
indicated  that  it  was  held  by  a  force  of  2000  to  3000 
infantry.  It  was  reported  locally  that  there  were 
six  or  seven  thousand  more  in  Aleppo. 

General  MacAndrew  thereupon  determined  to  try 
and  bluff  the  enemy  into  surrendering,  and,  to  this 
end,  sent  an  officer  with  a  flag  of  truce  into  Aleppo 
in  a  car,  to  demand  the  capitulation  of  the  city.  The 
Turks  took  this  officer  through  their  defences  without 
blindfolding  him,  apparently  in  order  to  show  him 
that  the  position  was  a  strong  one,  which  it  was, 
and  adequately  held.  Having  done  so,  they  enter- 
tained him  most  courteously  with  cigarettes,  coffee, 
and  small  talk  for  half  an  hour  or  so,  and  then  handed 
him  a  reply  to  take  back  to  the  British  General. 
The  officer  got  back  to  Divisional  Headquarters  about 
four  in  the  afternoon,  and  delivered  his  letter,  which 
proved  brief  and  to  the  point.  '  The  Commander  of 
the  Turkish  garrison  of  Aleppo,'  it  ran,  '  does  not  find 
it  necessary  to  answer  your  note.'  Fortunately  for 
us,  however,  the  Turkish  Commander,  after  making 
this  bold  reply,  began  to  get  uneasy,  and,  in  the 
course  of  the  next  three  days,  evidently  came  to  the 
conclusion  that  discretion  was  the  better  part  of 
valour.  During  the  night  of  the  25th  he  commenced 
to  withdraw  his  forces  to  the  north. 

At  seven  o'clock  the  cars  were  withdrawn  into 
bivouac  on  the  open  plain  south  of  Khan  Tuman,  so 
as  to  give  them  freedom  of  movement  if  attacked 
during  the  night. 

The  24th  was  occupied  in  further  reconnaissance 
of  the  enemy  positions.     The  Turks  were  found  in 


290        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

occupation  of  the  same  trenches,  with  cavalry  out- 
posts pushed  forward  on  to  the  hills  north  of  Khan 
Tuman.  Some  of  the  cars  were  sent  off  in  a  north- 
westerly direction,  with  the  object  of  discovering  a 
practicable  way  through  the  rocky  hills  south-west 
of  Aleppo,  to  the  Alexandretta  road.  They  were 
unable,  however,  to  find  any  track  that  was  possible 
for  cars. 

Further  reconnaissances  on  the  25th  disclosed  the 
enemy  positions  more  fully,  and  drew  considerable  fire 
from  guns,  machine  guns,  and  rifles  all  along  the 
Hne.  The  15th  Brigade  came  up  in  the  evening, 
and  relieved  the  cars  on  outpost  duty  that  night. 
Sherif  Nasir's  Arabs,  who  had  been  marching  at  a 
great  pace  along  the  railway,  had  arrived  earlier  in 
the  day,  and  moved  east  towards  Tel  Hasil,  to  attack 
the  city  from  that  side. 

Column  '  B,'  which  had  been  steadily  plodding 
along,  a  day's  march  in  rear  of  Column  '  A,'  reached 
Seraikin  the  same  evening. 

With  the  arrival  of  the  15th  Brigade  and  the  Arabs, 
General  MacAndrew  deemed  himself  strong  enough 
to  take  Aleppo.  He  ordered  the  15th  to  advance 
early  next  morning,  through  the  hills  west  of  Aleppo, 
via  Turmanin,  and  get  astride  the  Aleppo-Alexan- 
dretta  road,  while  the  Arabs  and  the  armoured  cars 
attacked  from  the  east  and  south  respectively.  During 
the  night  of  the  25th,  however,  the  Arabs,  assisted 
by  friends  in  Aleppo,  succeeded  in  entering  the  city. 
They  enjoyed  a  first-rate,  old-fashioned,  hand-to- 
hand  fight  with  the  Turks,  and  beat  them  decisively. 
By  ten  o'clock  in  the  morning  the  city  was  in  their 
hands,  and  General  MacAndrew  motored  in  with  the 
armoured  cars.  Sherif  Nasir  had  lost  about  sixty 
killed,  but  he  had  inflicted  far  heavier  casualties  on  his 
enemies,  and  driven  them  out  of  Aleppo  full  speed. 


FALL  OF  ALEPPO  291 

Meanwhile  the  15th  Brigade  had  started  at  seven 
in  the  morning,  and  reached  the  Alexandretta  road, 
without  opposition,  about  ten  o'clock.  The  only- 
definite  information  the  brigade  had  received  at  this 
time,  was  that  about  300  Turkish  cavalry  were  on 
the  road,  eight  miles  north  of  Aleppo.  Shortly  after- 
wards a  verbal  message  was  brought  in  by  a  car,  to 
the  effect  that  about  a  thousand  '  scalljrwags '  of  all 
descriptions,  with  two  field  guns,  had  left  Aleppo, 
going  north,  about  half -past  seven  in  the  morning. 

The  brigade  proceeded  along  the  road,  and,  about 
eleven  o'clock,  two  squadrons  of  the  Jodhpur  Lancers, 
who  were  acting  as  advanced  guard,  topped  the  ridge 
overlooking  the  village  of  Haritan  from  the  south- 
east, and  about  a  mile  and  a  half  distant.  They  imme- 
diately came  under  heavy  rifle  fire  from  the  village, 
and  took  up  a  dismounted  position  on  the  ridge. 

Rightly  deeming  that  instant  action  was  all 
important,  and  relying  on  the  information  he  had 
received  as  to  the  strength  and  composition  of  the 
enemy  force  in  front  of  him.  General  Harbord 
decided  to  attack  at  once.  He  ordered  the  Mysore 
Lancers  to  move  out  to  the  east,  and  endeavour  to 
charge  the  enemy  on  his  left  flank.  Two  squadrons 
of  the  Jodhpur  Lancers  were  directed  to  move  in 
support  of  the  Mysores,  as  a  '  mopping  up '  party, 
while  the  remainder  of  this  regiment,  with  the 
machine  gun  squadron,  held  the  Turks  in  front,  with 
fire  directed  from  the  ridge  on  which  the  advance 
guard  had  first  taken  up  its  position. 

Just  after  the  Mysore  Lancers  commenced  their 
move  eastwards.  General  Harbord  was  reinforced  by 
a  battery  of  armoured  cars,  which  had  been  sent  out 
from  Aleppo  to  join  him.  He  directed  these  cars 
to  approach  the  enemy  positions  along  the  road,  and 
assist  the  attack  with  their  machine-gun  fire.     Un- 


292        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

fortunately  something  went  wrong  with  the  battery 
leader's  car,  and  it  was  withdrawn  and  driven  back 
to  Aleppo.  The  remaining  tliree  cars,  through  some 
misunderstanding,  followed  it,  and  the  brigade  was 
thus  deprived  of  their  support. 

Meanwhile  the  Mysore  Lancers,  finding  that  the 
enemy's  position  extended  farther  than  was  expected, 
moved  more  to  the  east  to  gain  the  flank.  At  twelve 
o'clock,  Major  Lambert,  finding  himself  in  a  favour- 
able position,  ordered  a  charge.  The  ground  was 
rather  rocky,  and  gave  some  trouble  to  the  horses, 
but  the  charge  was  driven  well  home,  and  a  con- 
siderable number  of  the  enemy  was  killed.  The 
Turks,  however,  were  to  be  found  in  much  greater 
strength  than  had  been  expected,  and,  after  driving 
through  their  flank,  the  Lancers  were  heavily  fired 
on  by  Turks  farther  west.  Many  of  those  who  had 
been  ridden  over,  and  had  thrown  down  their  arms, 
now  picked  them  up  again,  and  continued  the  fight. 
Seeing  that  his  regiment  had  not  sufficient  weight 
to  charge  through  the  large  body  of  Turks  farther 
west.  Major  Lambert  rallied  his  squadrons  behind 
the  Turkish  line,  and  took  up  a  dismounted  position 
on  the  left  rear  of  the  enemy,  where  the  two  squadrons 
of  the  Jodhpur  Lancers  joined  him. 

The  charge  had  compelled  the  Turks  to  reveal 
their  full  strength,  which  turned  out  to  be  about 
3000  infantry  and  400  cavalry,  with  ten  or  twelve 
guns  and  about  thirty-five  machine  guns.  Seeing 
the  smallness  of  the  force  opposed  to  them,  they 
now  advanced  boldly  to  the  attack,  but,  when  about 
800  yards  away,  thought  better  of  it,  and  began  to 
dig  themselves  in. 

The  15th  Brigade  remained  in  observation  of  the 
Turks,  and  desultory  firing  continued  till  about  nine 
o'clock  at  night,  when  the  enemy  faded  gradually 


THE  ARMISTICE  293 

and  silently  away.  Two  hours  later  the  14th  Cavalry 
Brigade,  which  had  reached  Aleppo  with  Column  *  B ' 
late  in  the  evening,  arrived  on  the  scene,  and  re- 
lieved the  15th  Brigade.  The  casualties  in  the  latter 
brigade  totalled  sixty-three  killed,  wounded,  and 
missing,  which  comparatively  Ught  bill  might  have 
been  very  much  heavier  had  the  Turks  showed  any 
real  disposition  to  fight.  They  outnumbered  our 
men  by  at  least  seven  to  one,  and  were  well  supplied 
with  artiUery  and  machine  guns,  but  their  morale 
had  sunk  so  low  that  it  was  only  surprising  that  they 
did  not  all  surrender,  or  break  into  helpless  flight, 
when  charged.  We  learnt  afterwards  that  the 
Turkish  Commander  in  Aleppo  had  been  completely 
deceived  by  General  MacAndrew,  whose  boldness  in 
detaching  the  whole  of  his  cavalry  to  cut  the  Alexan- 
dretta  road  led  him  to  believe  that  we  had  a  much 
larger  force  at  our  disposal  than  was  actually  the 
case. 

On  the  28th  the  Arab  forces  seized  Muslimie  Junc- 
tion, on  the  Baghdad  Railway  twelve  miles  north  of 
Aleppo,  dislodging  a  small  Turkish  rearguard  there, 
and  this  inglorious  little  action  ended  the  war  for 
Turkey.  The  few  surviving  Turks  retired  rapidly 
in  the  general  direction  of  Constantinople,  and  that 
was  the  last  seen  of  their  army.  The  Armistice  ^ 
came  into  operation  at  noon  on  the  31st  of  October. 

In  the  thirty-eight  days  since  the  commencement 
of  the  operations,  the  5th  Cavalry  Division  had 
marched  567  miles,  fought  six  actions,  and  taken 
over  11,000  prisoners  and  fifty-eight  guns.  The 
total  captures  of  the  Desert  Mounted  Corps  in  the 
same  period  were  83,700  prisoners  and  about  160 
guns. 

The  Australian  Mounted  Division  left  Damascus 

*  See  Appendix  m.  for  terms  uf  Armistice. 


294        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

on  October  the  27th  to  march  to  Aleppo,  a  distance 
of  rather  over  200  miles.  Marching  by  the  direct 
road  to  Homs,  which  runs  almost  due  north  from 
Damascus,  the  division  reached  the  small  village  of 
Jendar,  eighteen  miles  south  of  Homs,  at  nine  o'clock 
on  the  night  of  the  31st.  Here  the  news  of  the 
Armistice  was  received  by  wireless,  but,  as  there 
was  no  water  available  in  the  neighbourhood,  the 
Australians  continued  the  march  the  same  night, 
and  arrived  at  Homs  at  eight  o'clock  on  the  morning 
of  the  1st  of  November.  Three  days  later  they 
moved  down  to  Tripoh,  on  the  coast,  where  they 
remained  until  sent  to  Egypt,  en  route  for  Australia, 
at  the  end  of  Februar}^  1919. 

The  Commander-in-Chief  made  his  official  entry 
into  Aleppo  on  the  12th  of  December.  As  at  Damas- 
cus, we  had  installed  an  Arab  Governor  here, 
but,  in  view  of  the  disorders  that  had  occurred  at 
the  former  place,  his  powers  were  restricted  to 
giving  advice,  and  the  whole  of  the  policing  of  the 
city  was  in  the  hands  of  our  troops.  The  '  Chief ' 
took  the  occasion  to  give  him  some  good  advice, 
couched  in  the  vigorous  language  for  which  he  was 
famous. 

One  of  the  first  things  General  Allenby  did,  when 
order  had  been  restored  in  the  country,  was  to  direct 
that  a  day  should  be  set  aside  to  be  observed  through- 
out the  force  as  one  of  thanksgiving  for  victory. 
Tuesday,  December  the  16th,  was  selected  for  the 
purpose,  and  was  celebrated  by  the  holding  of  reli- 
gious services  in  the  morning  by  all  the  many  reh- 
gions  and  denominations  in  the  Corps.  The  afternoon 
was  spent  in  such  games  and  sports  as  could  be 
organised. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 

POLICE  WORK 

The  cavalry  had  reached  their  final  goal,  and  their 
fighting  work  was  over.  But  there  was  still  much 
to  be  done.  The  Desert  Mounted  Corps  took  over 
the  administration  of  the  conquered  country  from 
Damascus  in  the  south  to  Marash,  in  Cilicia,  120 
miles  north  of  Aleppo  ;  and  from  the  sea  coast  to 
Ras  el  Ain,  120  miles  east  of  the  Euphrates,  an  area 
of  about  35,000  square  miles.  Corps  headquarters 
was  established  at  Homs.  The  5th  Cavalry  Division, 
at  Aleppo,  had  a  brigade  at  Aintab,  eighty  miles 
farther  north,  and  detachments  at  Alexandretta, 
Islahie,  Marash,  Arab  Punar  and  Jerablus  on  the 
Euphrates.  Later  on,  infantry,  attached  to  the 
Corps,  occupied  Alexandretta,  Adana,  Tarsus,  Smyrna, 
and  other  towns  on  or  near  the  coast.  The  4th 
Cavalry  Division  remained  at  Beirut  and  in  the 
neighbourhood,  and  the  Australian  Division  at 
Tripoli,  with  a  brigade  at  Baalbek,  and  detachments  at 
Shtora,  Lebwe,  and  Rayak.  At  the  end  of  February 
1919,  when  the  Australians  returned  to  Egjrpt,  the 
4th  Division  handed  over  Beirut  to  the  French, 
and  was  quartered  at  Homs,  Baalbek,  Rayak,  and 
Deraa. 

As  was  only  to  be  expected  after  the  events  of  the 
past  four  years,  the  country  was  in  a  most  unsettled 
state.  The  crops  and  live  stock  had  been  merci- 
lessly requisitioned  by  the  Turks  over  large  areas, 
and  many  of  the  peasants,  left  callously  to  starve, 

295 


296        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

had  taken  to  a  life  of  brigandage.  The  whole 
countiy  was  infested  with  robber  bands.  Even 
large  parties  dared  not  travel  at  night,  and  indeed 
few  ventured  to  travel  at  all.  Those  whose  busi- 
ness or  duty  took  them  about  the  country  crept 
from  village  to  village  by  unfrequented  bye-paths, 
avoiding  the  roads.  Merchants  and  shopkeepers 
buried  most  of  their  wares,  displaying  in  their  places 
of  business  only  a  few  miserable  samples. 

The  direct  road  from  Damascus  to  Homs  was  so 
overrun  with  robbers  that  even  considerable  bodies 
of  Turkish  soldiers  marching  along  it  had  been 
attacked  and  massacred ;  so  that  it  had  been,  at 
last,  altogether  abandoned  as  a  line  of  communica- 
tions in  favour  of  the  longer,  and  far  worse,  road 
through  Baalbek. 

Within  three  weeks  of  the  signing  of  the  Armistice, 
unarmed  pedestrians  travelled  alone  and  unafraid 
through  all  the  land.  On  every  road  were  to  be 
seen  throngs  of  refugees  returning  to  their  ravished 
homes,  accompanied  by  carts  piled  high  with  house- 
hold goods.  When  night  came  on,  these  people 
pulled  off  the  road,  and  slept  in  peace  and  safety 
till  morning.  Merchants  brought  out  their  wares 
from  secret  places,  and  buyers  crowded  into  the 
cities  in  thousands. 

During  the  whole  time  the  British  forces  were  in 
occupation  of  the  country,  from  the  end  of  October 
1918  till  November  1919,  there  were  only  two  attempts 
to  disturb  the  peace,  and  both  of  these  were  nipped 
in  the  bud  at  once.  The  j&rst  occurred  on  the  night 
of  November  the  30th,  1918,  when  a  notorious  robber 
chief,  who  lived  in  an  almost  inaccessible  village  up 
in  the  Anti-Lebanon,  attempted  to  raid  one  of  our 
ammunition  and  store  depots  at  Rayak.  The  robbers 
were  driven  off,  with  the  loss  of  six  men  killed  and 


Within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Desert  Mounted  Corps. 
The  River  Euphrates  at  Ralil;a. 


GOOD  WORK  OF  THE  ARAB  ARMY      297 

twenty  prisoners,  and  we  had  no  more  trouble  of 
that  sort. 

The  second  attempt  took  place  at  Aleppo  on  the 
23rd  February  1919.  A  plot  was  engineered  by 
Turkish  ex-officers  and  local  Arabs,  to  bring  about  a 
massacre  of  the  hated  Armenians  in  the  city.  The 
disturbance  was  quickly  put  down,  but  not  before  a 
few  persons  on  both  sides  had  been  killed.  Several 
prominent  natives  were  arrested  in  connection  with 
the  plot,  and  tried  by  a  mixed  court  of  British  and 
Arab  officers.  Those  of  the  conspirators  who  were 
proved  actually  to  have  taken  life  were  executed,  and 
others  were  sentenced  to  various  terms  of  imprison- 
ment. These  sentences  had  a  most  salutary  effect, 
and  there  was  no  further  effort  to  disturb  the  peace. 

There  was  a  detachment  of  the  Arab  Army,  about 
200  strong,  at  Aleppo,  and  one  or  two  soldiers  were 
quartered  in  all  outlying  villages  of  any  importance. 
It  is  pleasant  to  be  able  to  record  that  the  Arab 
Government  made  a  genuine,  and  successful,  effort 
to  assist  in  maintaining  law  and  order  in  the  country, 
and  the  Arab  Governor  of  Aleppo  was  always  on  the 
best  of  terms  with  our  officials.  The  Governor  at 
this  time  was  Gafar  Pasha,  who  had  been  a  general 
in  the  Turkish  Army,  and  had  fought  against  us  in 
the  Senussi  Campaign,  where  he  was  taken  prisoner, 
and  sent  to  Cairo  to  be  interned.  He  was  liberated, 
at  his  own  request,  in  order  to  join  the  Arab  Army, 
in  which  he  commanded  a  division  with  distinction 
from  the  latter  part  of  1917  till  the  end  of  the  war. 

One  of  the  most  difficult  tasks  carried  out  by  the 
Corps  was  that  of  restoring  to  the  Armenians  their 
houses  and  property.  A  Reparation  Committee  was 
formed  in  Aleppo,  with  representatives  at  Aintab 
and  Marash,  and  much  useful  work  was  done.  All 
houses  that  formerly  belonged  to  Armenians  were 


298        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

evacuated  by  their  Moslem  occupiers,  and,  as  far  as 
possible,  restored  to  their  rightful  owners.  Very 
many  of  these  had,  however,  been  killed  or  had 
disappeared.  Others,  attracted  by  tales  of  the 
fabulous  sums  to  be  made  in  Aleppo  by  trading  with 
the  British,  flocked  into  the  city,  and  refused  to  return 
to  their  own  homes.  Many  Armenian  women  had 
entered  the  harems  of  Turks  or  Arabs,  and  a  number 
of  these  did  not  now  wish  to  leave.  They  were  well 
treated  there,  and  protected,  and  they  preferred  the 
comfort  of  the  harem  to  the  prospect  of  starting 
again  in  the  cold  world  outside. 

The  difficulties  of  the  Reparations  Committee  were 
much  increased  by  the  intrigues  and  lies  of  the 
members  of  local  branches  of  the  Turkish  Committee 
of  Union  and  Progress.  These  people  had  been  the 
chief  offenders  in  the  persecution  of  the  unhappy 
Armenians,  and  they,  more  than  any  others,  had 
grown  fat  on  the  plundered  property.  Now  that 
their  power  was  broken,  they  feared  not  only  the 
confiscation  of  their  ill-gotten  goods,  but  drastic 
punishment,  possibly  even  death,  for  the  many 
murders  they  had  committed.  It  was  not  to  be 
wondered  at,  therefore,  that  they  should  seize  every 
opportunity  to  hamper  and  embarrass  our  officials 
in  their  investigations.  More  than  one  prominent 
local  member  of  the  C.U.P.  had  to  be  removed  from 
his  position  as  headman  of  a  village,  in  consequence 
of  his  obstructive  tactics. 

Notwithstanding  all  these  difficulties,  very  large 
numbers  of  Armenians  were  restored  to  their  houses, 
furniture  and  effects  were  recovered  or  made  good, 
and  families  were  re-united.  Some  3000,  who  were 
awaiting  repatriation,  were  housed  in  the  barracks 
at  Aleppo,  fed  by  the  British,  and  given  work  at 
high  wages. 


GAMBLES  IN  EXCHANGE  299 

It  must  be  confessed  that  the  Armenians  are,  as 
a  nation,  a  very  unpleasant  people.  That  this  is 
largely  due  to  the  treatment  they  have  received  in 
the  past  does  not  alter  the  fact.  Deprived  of  their 
land  many  centuries  ago,  and  debarred,  to  a  great 
extent,  from  engaging  in  industry,  they  have  become 
moneylenders,  as  have  the  Jews  in  similar  circum- 
stances. Usurers  in  all  countries  are  a  detested 
class,  and  the  Armenians  are  no  exception  to  the 
rule.  They  are  the  usurers  of  Turkey,  grasping  and 
avaricious,  the  holders  of  mortgages  on  the  peasants' 
land,  the  speculators  in  food,  hated  and  despised  by 
all  classes.  Small  wonder  that  the  Turk,  blood- 
thirsty as  he  is  by  nature,  needs  little  encouragement 
to  start  a  massacre  of  them,  whenever  he  has  the 
chance. 

Another  important  task  undertaken  by  the  Corps 
was  the  stabilising  of  the  exchange.  At  the  time 
when  we  first  occupied  Aintab,  shortly  after  the 
Armistice,  Turkish  100  piastre  notes  were  worth 
about  4s.  6d.  in  Aleppo.  The  ten  piastre  notes  had 
practically  no  value,  and  most  of  the  merchants 
refused  to  accept  them.  All  the  Egyptian  notes 
were  accepted  at  about  their  face  value.  In  Aintab, 
on  the  other  hand,  which  was  only  eighty  miles  away, 
traders  were  suspicious  of  the  Turkish  100  piastre 
notes,  but  those  of  ten  piastres  were  readily  accepted, 
and  were  worth  nearly  twice  as  much  as  the  equiva- 
lent Egyptian  note.  Similar  apparently  unreasonable 
anomalies  were  to  be  observed  in  other  places.  A 
good  example  occurred  at  the  beginning  of  February. 
One  day  a  merchant  of  Aleppo  came  to  General 
Mac  Andrew,  and  stated  that  he  had  just  heard  that 
his  business  in  Baghdad,  which  was  his  principal 
source  of  livelihood,  had  been  nearly  ruined  by  an 
enemy.     If,  said  he,  he  could  get  there  at  once,  he 


300        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

could  save  it,  but  it  was  a  matter  of  days,  almost  of 
hours.  Under  the  circumstances,  would  his  Excel- 
lency permit  him  to  ride  to  Baghdad  and  back  in 
one  of  the  British  aeroplanes,  for  which  he  would 
pay  any  sum  that  was  demanded.  He  was  turned 
over  to  the  Intelligence  Branch,  who,  after  making 
inquiries,  reported  that  he  was  a  man  of  substance, 
much  respected  in  Aleppo,  and  with  considerable 
local  influence,  which  might  be  useful  to  us.  His 
request  was  accordingly  granted,  and  he  was  taken 
to  Baghdad  in  one  of  our  aeroplanes.  He  only 
remained  there  twenty-four  hours,  and  then  flew 
back  to  Aleppo.  He  paid  £160  for  the  trip,  and 
seemed  to  think  his  journey  cheap.  A  few  days 
later  the  General's  headquarters  were  besieged  by  a 
crowd  of  applicants,  each  of  whom  had  a  business 
in  Baghdad  which  was  on  the  point  of  being  ruined 
by  an  enemy !  Further  inquiries  by  the  Intelli- 
gence Branch  ehcited  the  facts  of  the  case.  It 
appeared  that  the  Russian  one-rouble  note  was  worth 
about  half  its  face  value  in  Aleppo.  In  Baghdad, 
where  there  was  a  large  number  of  them,  they  were 
not  worth  the  paper  on  which  they  were  printed. 
The  astute  merchant,  hearing  of  this,  and  reaUsing 
that  such  a  state  of  affairs  could  not  last  an  hour, 
once  telegraphic  communication  was  estabUshed  be- 
tween the  two  places,  determined  to  bring  as  many 
of  the  notes  as  he  could'  to  Aleppo  at  once.  There 
was  no  time  to  be  lost,  as  the  telegraph  line  was 
nearly  through,  so  he  hit  upon  the  plan  of  hiring  an 
aeroplane,  and  cleared,  according  to  repute,  nearly 
£40,000  as  the  reward  of  his  initiative  ! 

This  was  the  last  and  greatest  of  the  many  gambles 
in  exchange  that  enlivened  the  days  of  the  merchants 
of  Aleppo  during  the  early  period  of  our  occupation 
of  the  place.     Gradually,   by  means  of  a  vigorous 


•    SPORTS  AND  GAMES  301 

publicity  campaign,  and  by  selling  surplus  enemy 
stores  for  Egyptian  money  only,  the  monetary  posi- 
tion was  stabilised,  and,  by  the  end  of  May,  Egyptian 
paper  was  generally  accepted  all  over  the  country. 

It  must  not  be  supposed  that  the  life  of  the  Corps 
was  all  work  and  no  play.  At  Beirut  and  Tripoli 
racecourses  were  laid  out  very  soon  after  the  cavalry 
occupied  those  places,  and  several  capital  little 
meetings  were  held.  Later  on  an  excellent  course 
was  made  at  Aleppo,  with  two  grand  stands,  paddock, 
judge's  box,  parade  ring,  and  everything  complete, 
even  to  a  fully  equipped  totalisator  (run  by  the 
Corps  cashier).  Races  were  held  every  fortnight, 
and  the  social  amenities  were  provided  for  by  a 
tastefully  laid  out  '  lawn,'  and  first-rate  catering 
arrangements  !  Aleppo  also  boasted  a  really  good 
polo  ground  and  several  football  and  cricket  grounds. 
Both  the  racing  and  the  polo  were  considerably 
better  than  were  to  be  had  in  Cairo  or  Alexandretta. 

There  was  also  a  pack  of  '  fox  hounds '  at  Aleppo 
and  another  at  Tripoli.  The  '  Lebanon  Hounds,'  at 
the  latter  place,  showed  some  quite  good  sport  over 
the  comparatively  flat  country  near  the  coast,  but 
the  '  Aleppo  Hunt '  was  handicapped  by  the  rocky 
nature  of  the  country,  and  by  the  fact  that  most  of 
the  '  earths '  were  holes  in  solid  rock,  out  of  which 
it  was  impossible  to  dig  a  fox  that  had  got  to  ground. 
Moreover,  as  they  met  at  five  o'clock  on  Sunday 
mornings  only,  the  fields  were  never  very  large  ! 

The  13th  Brigade,  at  Aintab,  held  a  series  of  point- 
to-point  meetings  in  the  vale  of  the  Kuwaik  Su,  and 
the  regiment  at  Marash  organised  a  pig-sticking 
club,  which  met  once  or  twice  near  the  Ak  Su  lakes. 
There  was  not  much  sport,  as  the  pigs  came  from  the 
hills,  which  were  unridable,  and  to  which  they  speedily 
retired,  as  soon  as  they  were  disturbed. 


302        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

Expeditions  to  the  ruins  of  the  Hittite  City  of 
Carchemish,  near  Jerablus,  to  the  summer  palace  of 
Haroun  al  Rashid  at  Rakka  on  the  Euphrates,  150 
miles  east  of  Aleppo,  to  Palmyra,  the  city  of  Zenobia, 
in  the  desert  eighty  miles  east  of  Homs,  and  to  various 
other  historical  remains,  added  interest  to  life,  and, 
at  the  same  time,  served  to  give  officers  and  men  a 
knowledge  of  the  country  that  they  could  have 
obtained  in  no  other  way. 

The  Anzac  and  Australian  Mounted  Divisions  left 
for  Egypt  in  the  spring  of  1919,  and  on  the  7th 
June  the  Desert  Mounted  Corps  was  broken  up.  The 
administration  of  the  conquered  territory  was  taken 
over  by  the  newly-created  '  Northforce,'  which  con- 
sisted of  the  4th  and  5th  Cavalry  Divisions  and  two 
divisions  of  Infantry,  the  whole  under  the  command 
of  Major-General  Barrow.  This  force  found  garrisons 
for  places  up  the  coast  as  far  as  Smyrna,  and  also 
took  over  the  administration  of  the  Baghdad  Railway 
from  Constantinople  to  the  railhead  east  of  Nisibin 
in  Mesopotamia. 

In  November  of  the  same  year  the  administration 
of  northern  Syria  was  finally  handed  over  to  our 
French  Allies,  and  the  last  of  the  British  and  Indian 
Cavalry  marched  out  of  the  country  they  had  con- 
quered and  held  for  over  a  year. 


vIlH^  BriLis'b  D^-'.erLiI.L,u[,(  (IGorps 

aided  by 

Eb^rabBoreos  of  KinO  R^isse'm. 

capUired 

Damascus Roms  andj^^ppo. 

Ocbberl918. 


Inscription  cut  on  the  rock  cliffs  of  tlie  Dog  River,  near  Beirut,  amongst  those 
of  Rameses  II,  Nebuchadnezar,  Senacherib  and  other  early  conquerors  of  Syria. 


CHAPTER  XXIV 

HORSE  ARTILLERY 

Command. — Of  all  the  matters  concerning  the  employ- 
ment of  horse  artillery  which  came  under  discussion 
during  the  campaign,  none  was  more  important  than 
the  vexed  question  of  command. 

The  cavalry  brigadier  is  naturally  eager  to  have 
a  battery  attached  to  him  permanently,  and  con- 
sidered as  part  of  his  brigade.  Apart  from  the  con- 
viction that  a  battery  always  on  hand  and  under  his 
own  orders  will  be  of  more  value  to  him  than  one 
over  which  he  has  no  direct  control,  there  is  the  feel- 
ing that  the  battery  rounds  off  his  command,  and 
makes  it,  in  effect,  a  miniature  army,  complete  with 
all  modern  conveniences.  If  the  powers  that  be 
would  only  throw  in  a  couple  of  armoured  cars  and 
a  private  aeroplane,  the  cavalry  brigadier  would  be 
the  happiest  man  on  earth  ! 

Most  R.H.A.  battery  commanders  will  agree  with 
the  brigadiers.  Attached  to  a  brigade,  the  battery 
commander  is  freer  and  more  independent,  and  gets, 
perhaps,  more  of  the  '  fun  of  the  fair '  and  less  of 
the  drudgery  than  he  does  when  acting  as  a  divi- 
sional unit. 

In  spite  of  these  opinions,  however,  the  hard  facts 
of  this  campaign  go  to  prove  that  our  guns  invariably 
rendered  more  efficient  aid  to  the  cavalry  they  were 
supporting  when  employed  under  the  orders  of  the 
divisional  commander  than  when  attached  to  brigades. 
The  divisional  commander  must  always  know  more 

303 


304        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

of  the  fortunes  of  the  battle  than  any  of  his  brigadiers, 
and  is  thus  generally  in  the  better  position  to  decide 
where  artillery  support  is  most  needed.  Moreover, 
if  each  battery  is  attached  to  a  brigade,  and  acting 
under  the  orders  of  a  brigadier,  each  brigade  can 
only  receive  the  support  of  one  battery.  But  there 
are  occasions,  in  most  engagements,  when  one  bri- 
gade needs  all  the  artillery  support  available,  while 
another,  in  reserve,  or  not  yet  heavily  engaged, 
requires  none.  If  the  control  of  the  artillery  is  left 
to  one  individual,  fire  can  be  concentrated  quickly 
in  support  of  those  brigades  or  regiments  that  are 
most  in  need  of  it,  and  no  gun  is  ever  idle.  There 
were  one  or  two  lamentable  instances,  in  the  1917 
operations,  of  a  brigade  remaining  in  reserve  all  day 
with  its  attached  battery  sleeping  peacefully  beside  it. 

The  actions  of  Summeil  in  the  1917  operations  and 
of  Kaukab  in  1918  may  be  taken  as  fair  illustrations 
of  the  employment  of  artillery  as  a  divisional  unit. 
That  of  Jisr  Benat  Yakub  in  1918  was  an  example  of 
the  principle  of  attaching  each  battery  to  a  brigade. 

With  the  small,  three-brigade  cavalry  division  of 
the  present  day  the  former  arrangement  will  prac- 
tically always  yield  better  results  than  the  latter. 
Direct  artillery  liaison  should,  of  course,  be  main- 
tained between  the  divisional  artillery  commander 
and  each  brigade,  if  it  is  at  all  possible  to  do  so. 

Reserves, — There  were,  in  the  early  days  of  the  cam- 
paign, indications  of  an  idea  on  the  part  of.^ome 
commanders  that  a  certain  proportion  of  the  artillery 
should  be  held  in  reserve,  in  the  same  way  as  a 
brigade  or  regiment.  This  idea  probably  arose  from 
the  fact  that  one  of  the  essential  differences  between 
artillery  and  other  arms  had  been  overlooked.  When 
once  a  brigade  or  regiment  has  been  committed  to  an 
attack,  in  a  moving  battle,  and  is  in  contact  with 


HORSE  ARTILLERY  305 

the  enemy,  it  can  seldom  be  easily  withdrawn  in 
order  to  be  transferred  to  another  part  of  the  field. 
Guns,  on  the  other  hand,  do  not  come  into  direct 
contact  with  the  enemy^ — at  least  the  gunners  try 
their  best  to  avoid  doing  so  !  They  can,  therefore, 
as  a  rule,  be  withdrawn  without  dijBficulty,  if  their 
services  are  required  elsewhere.  All  guns  in  action 
may  thus,  in  a  sense,  be  said  to  be  in  reserve,  since 
they  can  readily  be  moved  to  another  part  of  the 
field  if  required.  Except,  therefore,  for  the  purposes 
of  conserving  ammunition,  guns  sliould  rarely  be 
unemployed  during  the  progress  of  an  action. 

Artillery  with  Advance  and  Rearguards.— At  the 
beginning  of  the  campaign,  most  divisional  com- 
manders, when  moving  with  one  brigade  as 
advance  guard,  allotted  one  battery  to  it.  As  the 
operations  progressed,  however,  the  view  that  a 
larger  force  of  artillery  might  profitably  accompany 
the  advance  guard  began  to  gain  ground.  The  ex- 
perience of  the  whole  campaign  points  to  the  con- 
clusion that,  in  view  of  the  small  number  of  guns 
available  in  a  cavalry  division,  two  of  the  three 
batteries  should  normally  accompany  the  advance 
guard  brigade.  The  practice  may  be  open  to  the 
objections  that  it  makes  the  advance  guard  column 
unduly  long,  and  that  some  risk  is  involved  in  leaving 
the  main  body  so  short  of  artillery.  Both  these 
objections  appear,  however,  to  be  outweighed  by 
the  advantages  of  having  a  large  proportion  of  the 
artillery  in  front.  Whether  the  enemy's  resistance 
is  stubborn  or  feeble,  artillery  fire  can  assist  in 
breaking  it,  and  the  greater  the  number  of  guns 
available,  the  quicker  will  that  object  be  achieved, 
and  the  less  delay  will  there  be  to  the  advance  of 
the  main  body. 

The  battery  or  batteries  with  the  advance  guard 

u 


306        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

should,  of  course,  march  as  far  forward  as  is  com- 
patible with  safety.  Guns  must  always  take  longer 
than  cavalry  to  move  a  given  distance,  and,  if  they 
are  well  to  the  front,  no  time  will  be  lost  in  getting 
them  into  the  only  formation  in  which  they  are  of 
any  use,  i.e.  in  action. 

The  divisional  artillery  commander  should  accom- 
pany the  vanguard  commander.  When  contact  is 
established  with  the  enemy,  he  is  then  on  the  spot, 
and  able  to  make  a  personal  reconnaissance  at  once, 
and  decide,  subject  to  the  orders  of  the  advance 
guard  commander,  how  his  guns  can  best  and  most 
quickly  assist  the  cavalry.  No  time  will  then  be 
lost  in  getting  the  guns  into  action.  In  the  final 
series  of  operations,  the  enemy  was  in  too  demoralised 
a  state  for  his  action  to  form  a  very  reliable  guide  in 
future  wars,  but  it  was  found  that  vigorous  artillery 
fire,  delivered  immediately  after  the  first  coritact  of  our 
cavalry  with  his  rearguards,  invariably  exercised  a 
powerfully  adverse  effect  on  his  morale.  The  little 
action  of  Kaukab  well  exemplifies  this  fact. 

The  above  remarks  as  to  artillery  with  the  advance 
guard  apply  with  equal  force,  mutatis  mutandis,  to 
the  artillery  of  a  rearguard  during  a  retirement. 

Escorts. — The  campaign  afforded  few  opportunities 
on  our  side  to  test  the  efficacy  of  artillery  escorts. 
The  action  at  Huj,  however,  in  November  1917,  was  an 
excellent  example  of  bad  escort  work  on  the  part  of 
the  enemy.  Our  gunners  have  always  maintained 
that  the  role  of  an  escort  is  to  obtain  information 
rather  than  to  afford  protection.  Guns  on  the  march 
are  vulnerable  to  a  sudden  attack,  especially  from 
cavalry ;  in  action  they  are,  or  should  be,  well  able 
to  take  care  of  themselves.  If  this  contention  is 
right,  it  follows  that  escorts  need  not  be  large,  and 
should  not  be  kept  near  the  guns,  but  should  patrol 


HORSE  ARTILLERY  307 

the  country  in  any  quarter  from  which  attack  may 
be  expected,  search  dead  ground,  woods,  etc.,  and 
give  early  information  to  the  guns  of  the  approach 
of  the  enemy. 

At  Huj  the  enemy  had  two  battahons  of  infantry 
and  several  machine  guns  disposed  about  his  batteries, 
but  he  had  not  a  single  patrol  pushed  out  to  the  east. 
Our  cavalry  were  thus  able  to  approach  to  within 
800  yards  of  the  position  of  the  guns  unseen  and 
unsuspected.  The  result  of  the  Turks'  negUgence 
was  a  severe  disaster,  and  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  the 
lesson  will  not  be  thrown  away  on  future  commanders 
of  artillery  escorts  in  the  British  Army.  The  escort 
work  in  our  cavahy  in  Palestine  and  Syria  was 
almost  invariably  very  good,  especially  amongst  the 
Australians. 

R.H.A,  Howitzers. — Most  officers,  both  of  the 
R.H.A.  and  the  cavalry,  who  served  in  Syria, 
agreed  as  to  the  desirability  of  having  a  few  light 
howitzers  attached  to  each  cavalry  division.  Such 
a  gun  as  the  3 '7 -inch  mountain  howitzer,  if 
it  could  be  mounted  on  a  suitable  field  carriage, 
would  be  admirably  adapted  for  use  with  cavalry. 
Had  a  few  howitzers  been  available  during  the 
attack  on  Beersheba,  the  stone  block-houses  and 
the  rocky  sangars  of  Tel  el  Saba  would  soon  have 
been  rendered  untenable  by  the  enemy,  and  would 
not  have  delayed  our  advance  as  they  did. 

As  to  whether  two  guns  in  each  six-gun  battery 
should  be  replaced  by  howitzers,  or  a  separate  battery 
of  four  howitzers  should  be  provided  for  each  divi- 
sion, opinion  varied  amongst  the  gunners  on  the 
spot.  The  writer  is  strongly  in  favour  of  the  latter 
alternative,  as  being  simpler,  and  in  conformity  with 
the  existing  practice  in  field  artillery. 

Shrapnel   and   H.E. — The    question    of    the    best 


308        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

proportions  of  shrapnel  and  high  explosive  shell 
to  be  carried  in  a  horse  artillery  battery  came 
under  discussion  at  various  times  during  the 
campaign,  and  opinions  varied  according  to  the 
nature  of  fighting  in  progress  at  the  time.  Amongst 
the  rocks  of  the  hill  country,  most  battery  com- 
manders preferred  a  large  preponderance  of  H.E., 
while,  in  open  country,  they  wanted  more  shrapnel. 
One  thing  certain  is  that  the  Turks  themselves 
di'eaded  the  former  far  more  than  the  latter.  On 
several  occasions  enemy  officer  prisoners  told  the 
writer  that  they  always  had  greater  difficulty  in 
getting  their  men  to  attack  through  H.E.  shell  fire 
than  through  shrapnel,  even  though,  as  they  averred, 
the  latter  invariably  caused  them  more  casualties 
than  the  former.  As  before  remarked,  the  behaviour 
of  the  Tm^ks  was  not  a  very  reliable  guide  for  future 
wars,  but  it  is  to  be  noted  that  the  same  aversion 
to  H.E.  shell  was  observed  amongst  the  Germans, 
and  even  amongst  our  own  troops. 

There  seems  little  doubt,  therefore,  that  the  moral 
effect  of  H.E.  is  much  greater  than  that  of  shrapnel. 
If  this  be  so,  R.H.A.  13-pounder  guns,  whose  lethal 
effect  is  so  comparatively  small,  should  be  provided 
with  a  large  proportion  of  it.  The  writer  suggests, 
on  the  experience  of  this  campaign,  that  the  due 
proportion  lies  somewhere  between  50  and  75  per 
cent,  of  the  total  ammunition  carried. 

General. — The  batteries  serving  with  the  Desert 
Mounted  Corps,  being  Territorial  units,  had  each  only 
four  guns.  There  is  no  doubt  that  cavalry  divisions 
with  four-gun  batteries  are  seriously  under-gunned, 
and  it  is  satisfactory  to  note  that,  under  the  new 
Territorial  War  Estabhshments,  all  R.H.A.  batteries 
are  to  have  six  guns. 

Before  leaving  the  subject  of  artillery,  the  writer 


HORSE  ARTILLERY  309 

would  draw  attention  to  a  fact  that  is  often  over- 
looked by  cavalrymen.  It  is  that,  with  the  best 
will  in  the  world,  and  the  best  of  horsemanship  and 
driving,  guns  cannot  move  as  fast  as  cavalry.  There 
were  several  instances  during  the  campaign  where  a 
brigade,  detached  with  a  battery  on  some  special 
duty,  pushed  along  very  fast  for  several  miles, 
clashed  with  the  enemy,  and  then  reproached  the 
gunners  for  not  being  on  the  spot  to  help.  It  is 
often  forgotten  that  the  artillery  draught  horse  has 
to  carry  nearly  the  same  weight  as  a  cavalryman's 
and,  at  the  same  time,  do  his  share  in  dragging  along, 
'  over  hill  over  dale,  thorough  bush,  thorough  briar,'  a 
clumsy  mass  of  steel  weighing  a  ton  and  a  half. 

A  consideration  of  this  fact  leads  to  the  conclu- 
sion that,  if  guns  are  to  keep  up  with  cavalry  when 
moving  fast  and  far,  certain  advantages  must  be 
allowed  them. 

In  the  first  place  orders  should  reach  the  artillery 
early,  in  order  to  enable  it  to  get  on  the  move  before 
the  cavalry  start,  when  the  situation  allows. 

On  the  move,  guns  should  march  close  to  the  head 
of  the  column.  This  order  of  march  is  also  desirable 
from  the  fighting  point  of  view,  as  has  been  pointed 
out  above.  The  advisability  of  keeping  the  guns 
well  to  the  front  was  generally  recognised  towards 
the  end  of  the  campaign,  but,  in  the  early  days, 
there  was  a  tendency  to  keep  them  too  far  back. 

If  there  is  a  shortage  of  water  or  forage,  the 
artillery  horses  should  be  the  last  to  suffer  from  it. 

Though  the  writer  happens  to  be  a  gunner,  these 
remarks  are  not  set  down  as  a  special  appeal  on 
behalf  of  the  artillery,  but  in  the  belief  that,  only  by 
giving  to  the  guns  some  such  special  privileges,  will 
they  be  able  to  do  the  work  that  is  required  of  them. 
Horse  guns  are  the  servants  of  cavalry  as  field  guns 


310        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

are  of  infantry,  but,  unless  the  servant  is  adequately 
fed  and  looked  after,  he  cannot  serve  his  master 
properly. 

Needless  to  say,  if  a  cavalry  commander  con- 
siders that  he  can  carry  out  the  task  assigned  to  him 
without  the  help  of  his  guns,  and  time  presses,  he  is 
perfectty  justified  in  pushing  on  at  once  with  his 
cavalry,  and  leaving  the  guns  to  follow  as  best  they 
can,  as  was  done,  quite  properly,  by  the  5th  Cavalry 
Division  when  crossing  the  Carmel  Range  in  Sep- 
tember 1918. 


CHAPTER  XXV 

HORSES 

One  of  the  greatest  difficulties  with  which  the  cavalry- 
had  to  contend  throughout  the  operations  arose 
from  the  constant  struggle  to  keep  the  horses  suffi- 
ciently fit  to  carry  on.  This  is,  of  course,  always  the 
case  in  war  time,  but  the  difficulties  in  the  Syrian 
campaign  were  probably  greater  than  in  any  previous 
one  in  which  the  British  Army  had  taken  part. 

Climate. — To  begin  with,  the  climate  encountered 
included  every  extreme  of  heat,  cold,  drought,  and 
rain.  For  the  first  three  weeks  from  the  commence- 
ment of  the  1917  campaign,  the  weather  was  extremely 
hot,  the  temperature  running  up  to  110°  in  the  shade. 
For  two  days,  November  the  10th  and  11th,  matters 
were  rendered  worse  by  a  burning  hot  east  wind, 
which  raised  clouds  of  suffocating  dust.  Then  the 
rains  broke,  and,  for  the  next  six  weeks,  constant 
wet,  deep  mud  and  piercing  cold  winds  were  the 
order  of  the  day.  After  a  short  period  of  good 
weather,  the  cavalry  moved  to  the  Jordan  Valley, 
where  they  spent  the  summer  of  1918,  under  condi- 
tions of  heat  and  discomfort  which  have  already 
been  described.  Finally,  in  the  following  winter, 
the  horses  found  themselves  sometimes  standing  in 
six  inches  of  snow.^ 

Condition. — In  the  second  place,  the  health  of  the 

^  Snow  lay  on  the  ground  in  the  Baalbek-Rayak  area  for  a  considerable 
part  of  the  winter,  and  on  the  western  side  of  the  Lebanon,  in  the 
Beirut-Tripoli  area,  for  short  periods  from  time  to  time. 

311 


312        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

horses    was    in    an    unsatisfactory    state    when    the 
cavahy  operations  commenced. 

Whatever  their  outward  appearance  might  have 
been,  and  it  varied  considerably  in  different  units, 
their  internal  condition  was  by  no  means  good.  The 
great  bulk  of  them  liad  taken  part  in  the  advance 
across  Sinai,  and  had  been  in  Egypt  for  a  long  time 
prior  to  that.  Two  years  of  unaccustomed  and  in- 
different forage,  added  to  the  large  quantities  of 
sand  they  had  consumed  in  their  food  while  in  the 
desert,  had  more  or  less  permanently  injured  their 
digestive  organs.  It  is  true  that  sand  cohc,  that 
scourge  of  the  desert,  had  almost  ceased  to  trouble 
the  force  by  the  end  of  the  summer  of  1917,  but  the 
dire  effects  of  the  sand  were  evident  in  every  post- 
mortem. In  a  large  number  of  cases  the  membrane 
of  the  stomach  and  intestines  was  freely  marked  with 
the  scars  of  old  ulcers,  and  in  some  instances  large 
portions  of  it  had  sloughed  away.  Sand  muzzles 
were  almost  universally  employed  up  to  the  com- 
mencement of  the  advance  on  Beersheba,  but  it  was 
impossible  to  prevent  sand  getting  into  the  forage ; 
indeed  quantities  of  it  had  been  purposely  placed 
there  by  the  dishonest  native  merchants,  in  order 
to  increase  the  weight  of  bales  and  sacks. 

It  is  probable  that  90  per  cent,  of  the  draught 
horses  of  the  artillery  and  transport  had  strained 
their  hearts  to  some  extent  during  the  terrible  work 
in  the  heavy  sands  of  the  desert.  The  writer  carried 
out,  or  was  present  at,  upwards  of  twenty  post- 
mortems on  draught  horses  that  died  during  the 
advance  across  Sinai,  and,  in  every  case,  found  an 
enlargement  of  the  heart  greater  than  could  possibly 
be  accounted  for  by  the  age  of  the  horse.  In  one 
instance,  the  wall  of  the  heart  was  ruptured  right 
through.     This  horse  had  been  led  four  miles  back 


HORSES  313 

to  camp  after  first  showing  signs  of  extreme  distress. 
On  arriving  in  camp  he  drank  well,  ate  a  bran  mash, 
and  lived  for  six  hours  afterwards,  a  wonderful 
example  of  endurance. 

The  experience  of  the  campaign  proved  that  horses 
cannot  be  in  too  '  big '  condition  at  the  commence- 
ment of  operations,  provided  they  have  been  kept 
adequately  exercised  while  being  conditioned.  The 
really  fat,  round  horses  finished  both  series  of  opera- 
tions in  better  condition  than  those  which  had  looked 
harder  and  more  muscular,  but  not  so  fat,  at  the 
beginning.  This  was  especially  the  case  in  the  first 
series,  during  which  the  shortage  of  water  was  so 
acute. 

Forage. — During  both  campaigns  the  forage  was 
of  very  poor  quality  and  woefully  scanty.  Up  to 
the  commencement  of  the  1917  operations,  the  daily 
issue  had  consisted  of  10  lb.  of  barley,  gram  or  maize 
and  10  lb.  of  tibben  (chopped  barley  straw)  and 
bursym  (a  kind  of  hay  made  of  a  coarse  species  of 
lucerne,  of  good  feeding  value  and  much  liked  by 
the  horses).  The  food  value  of  the  whole  daily  ration 
was  about  23  per  cent,  below  that  of  an  average 
horse  in  England  doing  the  same  work.  The  barley 
and  tibben,  being  produced  in  Egypt,  were  very 
dusty,  and  contained  a  large  proportion  of  earth  and 
small  stones.  The  gram  and  maize  were  of  fair 
quahty,  but  the  latter  was  sometimes  issued  whole, 
and,  when  issued  crushed,  was  often  very  dusty. 
The  daily  ration  during  operations  in  both  campaigns 
was  9J  lb.  of  grain  per  day,  and  nothing  else.  So 
that  the  horses  were  called  upon  to  do  very  much 
harder  work  on  less  than  haK  the  amount  of  food  to 
which  they  had  been  accustomed,  and  only  about 
36  per  cent,  of  the  normal  ration  for  such  horses  in 
England. 


314        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

For  the  first  month  of  the  1917  campaign  this  ration 
was  exclusively  gram.  As  the  horses  had  previously 
only  been  accustomed  to  a  small  proportion  of  this 
grain  in  their  daily  feeds,  it  caused  them  to  scour 
badl}^  thus  increasing  the  weakness  engendered  by 
hard  work  and  starvation.  It  is  difficult  to  under- 
stand why  gram  was  decided  upon  in  preference  to 
barley,  of  which  there  was  plenty  available,  but, 
at  all  events,  the  lesson  was  taken  to  heart,  and,  for 
the  remainder  of  the  campaign,  the  marching  ration 
was  always  barley. 

From  the  25th  September  1918  till  the  cavalry 
left  the  country  in  November  1919,  all  forage  was 
bought  locaUy.  It  was  generally  of  good  quality, 
and  there  was  a  certain  amount  of  grazing  available. 

Water. — The  water  difficulties  during*  the  1917 
operations  have  been  referred  to  before.  Prior  to 
this  campaign  it  was  generally  accepted  that  cavalry 
horses  could  continue  to  work  for  a  maximum  period 
of  about  sixty  hours  without  water,  after  which  it 
would  be  necessary  to  give  them  some  days'  rest; 
Arab  ponies  were  thought  to  be  able  to  last  about 
ten  hours  longer.  During  the  Darfur  Campaign, 
KeUy  Pasha  ^  marched  ninety  miles  in  three  nights 
and  two  days  with  a  mounted  infantry  regiment 
equipped  with  the  hardy  little  mules  of  Abyssinia. 
All  these  estimates  were  proved  to  have  been  erroneous. 
It  has  already  been  pointed  out  that  one  battery  of 
the  Corps  marched  and  fought  for  nine  consecutive 
days,  during  which  period  its  horses  were  only  watered 
three  times,-  and  this  was  no  isolated  example.  Even 
when  water  was  obtainable,  the  difficulty  of  raising 

1  Brigadier-General  P.  J.  V.  KeUy,  C.M.G.,  D.S.O.,  commanded 
oth  Mounted  Brigade  in  1917  operations  and  13th  Cavalry  Brigade  in 
1918 

-  See  p.  94. 


HORSES  315 

it  from  very  deep  wells,  and  the  pressing  need  for 
haste,  often  resulted  in  many  horses  being  unable 
to  drink  their  fill. 

During  the  advance  across  the  Sinai  desert  a 
number  of  experiments  had  been  carried  out,  both 
by  the  Royal  Army  Veterinary  Corps  and  by  the 
commanders  of  different  units,  with  a  view  to  ascer- 
taining whether  horses  would  do  better,  under  the 
existing  conditions,  with  two  drinks  a  day  or  three. 
The  usual  plan  was  to  select  a  large  number  of  horses 
of  the  same  type  and  of  about  equal  condition,  and 
put  half  of  these  on  two  waterings  and  half  on  three. 
The  result  of  these  experiments  was  conclusively  in 
favour  of  the  two  drinks  a  day.  Not  only  did  the 
horses  on  this  regime  improve  in  condition  quicker 
than  those  which  were  watered  three  times,  but  it 
was  proved  by  actual  measurement  that  they  drank 
more  water  in  the  day.  By  the  time  the  force 
arrived  at  El  Arish,  watering  twice  a  day  was  gene- 
rally accepted  as  the  standard. 

Later  on,  during  the  period  between  the  second 
battle  of  Gaza  and  the  commencement  of  General 
AUenby's  operations  (May  to  October  1917  inclu- 
sive) many  of  the  horses  of  the  cavalry  division  in 
the  line  had  so  far  to  go  for  water  that  they  could 
only  be  watered  once  a  day.  It  is  probable  that 
this  resulted  in  some  loss  of  condition,  though,  as 
there  were  other  contributory  causes,  such  as  the 
periodical  long  reconnaissances,  the  heat,  dust  and 
flies,  it  is  not  possible  to  apportion  the  blame  exactly. 
During  operations,  so  long  as  the  horses  got  water 
once  a  day,  they  kept  fairly  fit,  and,  given  anything 
in  the  nature  of  bulk  food,  such  as  might  be  got  in 
many  countries  by  grazing,  there  seemed  no  reason 
why  they  should  not  have  been  able  to  continue 
indefinitely  on  this  regime.     During  the  Beersheba- 


316        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

Jerusalem  operations,  however,  the  average  number 
of  waterings  per  horse  in  the  Corps  was  only  one 
every  thirty-six  hours. 

During  the  1918  campaign  there  was  no  lack  of 
water,  except  for  the  few  days  during  which  the 
4th  Cavalry  Division  was  advancing  on  Damascus 
east  of  the  Jordan.  At  all  other  times,  water  was 
always  available  for  horses  at  least  once  a  day. 

When  marching  in  waterless  country,  the  writer 
used  to  have  a  large  biscuit  tin  full  of  water  (or, 
better  still,  a  petrol  tin,  when  it  could  be  '  acquired ') 
carried  on  the  dash-board  of  every  gun  and  wagon. 
At  each  hourly  halt  the  horses'  mouths,  nostrils,  and 
eyes  used  to  be  wiped  with  a  wet — not  merely  damp — 
cloth,  and  this  always  seemed  to  refresh  them  greatly, 
and  to  relieve  the  symptoms  of  distress  due  to  thirst. 
A  little  water  was  also  mixed  with  the  feeds,  and, 
when  the  grain  was  crushed,  or  there  was  any  bran 
available,  it  was  found  that  horses  which  were  off 
their  feed  owing  to  exhaustion  would  often  eat  well 
if  fed  by  hand  with  small  balls  made  of  grain  shghtly 
moistened  with  water.  This  plan  was  suggested  to 
the  writer  by  the  late  Brigadier-General  Paul  Kenna, 
V.C.,  21st  Lancers,  who  had  used  it  successfully  in 
the  Sudan  Campaign. 

Much  has  been  said  and  written  about  the  ability 
of  horses  to  scent  water  afar  off.  The  experience  of 
this  campaign  seems  to  prove  that  this  ability  does 
not  extend  to  water  in  deep  wells,  even  when  the 
supply  is  plentiful.  There  were  many  instances  of 
horses,  which  had  been  without  water  for  a  long 
period,  passing  quite  close  to  wells,  without  evincing 
any  signs  of  knowledge  of  the  proximity  of  water. 
That  they  can,  and  do,  scent  water  lying  in  large 
pools  or  rivers  was  made  clear  on  several  occasions, 
but  this  power  was  shared  by  many  of  the  Australian 


HORSES  317 

soldiers  and  by  a  few  Englishmen.  Brigadier-General 
Grant,  Commanding  the  4th  A.L.H.  Brigade,  a  noted 
'  bushman,'  had  this  useful  sense  highly  developed. 
The  '  sensation '  of  water,  once  experienced,  is  quite 
unmistakable,  though  it  is  difficult  to  describe.  The 
sense  of  smell  undoubtedly  plays  a  part,  but  the 
sensation  is  more  one  of  a  sudden  freshness  and  sweet- 
ness of  the  atmosphere  than  a  scent.  It  is  notice- 
able particularly  just  after  sunset,  when  the  pre- 
sence of  water  lying  in  pools  may  often  be  detected 
several  miles  away.  Unfortunately,  damp  ground, 
from  which  water  has  recently  evaporated,  produces 
the  same  sensation,  and  frequently  deceived  horses 
as  well  as  men. 

Remounts. — The  last  horses  shipped  to  Egypt 
arrived  in  May  or  June  1917,  and  most  of  these  were 
issued  to  units  before  the  commencement  of  the 
Beersheba-Gaza  operations.  From  that  date  till  the 
end  of  the  war,  no  more  horses  arrived  in  the  country ; 
8000  remounts,  which  had  been  bought  by  the 
British  Government  in  Australia,  could  never  be 
moved,  owing  to  the  shortage  of  shipping.  When 
the  stock  of  remounts  in  Palestine  was  exhausted, 
casualties  were  replaced  by  horses  that  had  already 
seen  service,  and  had  been  sent,  sick  or  wounded,  to 
remount  hospitals,  and  reissued  as  soon  as  the}^ 
were  reasonably  fit  for  further  work.  At  the  com- 
mencement of  the  advance  in  September  1918  the 
remount  depots  were  emptied,  and  there  was  scarcely 
a  single  fit  horse  left  behind  the  fighting  troops. 

Such  remounts  as  reached  the  country,  nearly  all 
from  Australia  or  Canada,  were  of  a  good  type,  sound 
and  reliable.  The  depots  were  admirably  managed, 
and  the  whole  remount  service  was  a  model  of  effici- 
ency. 

Some  1500  Arab  ponies  and  a  considerable  number 


318        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

of  mules  and  camels  were  captured  from  the  Turks 
in  1917.  They  were  nearly  all  in  wretched  condi- 
tion and  covered  with  galls,  but,  after  being  well 
fed  and  looked  after  for  a  few  weeks,  fetched  the 
most  astonishing  prices.  £50  was  the  average  price 
paid  at  Jerusalem  for  a  pony,  £40  for  a  small  mule, 
and  £35  for  a  camel.  We  were  able  to  make  use  of 
the  camels,  and  a  few  of  the  stouter  ponies  were 
issued  to  the  infantry  as  '  cobs,'  but  the  great  majority 
of  ponies  and  mules  were  of  no  use  to  us.  During 
the  1918  operations  about  2000  enemy  animals  fell 
into  our  hands,  and  these  realised  even  higher  prices 
in  northern  S3iTia  and  the  Lebanon. 

Horsemastership. — In  the  early  days  in  Egypt  the 
standard  of  horsemastership  was  not  high.  Among 
the  English  troops  there  was  a  large  proportion  in 
the  mounted  branches,  both  of  officers  and  men,  who 
had  had  little  previous  experience  of  horses,  and 
none  at  all  under  the  severe  conditions  of  active 
service.  The  Australian  Light  Horsemen,  though 
fine  riders  and  thoroughly  experienced  with  horses, 
were  unaccustomed  to  having  to  use  the  same  horse 
day  after  day,  and  did  not  at  first  realise  the  necessity 
of  saving  their  mounts  in  every  possible  way,  e.g.  by 
dismounting  at  every  halt,  however  short,  off- 
saddling  whenever  possible,  etc.  But  they  have  the 
same,  almost  instinctive,  love  of  horses  as  the  Irish, 
and  they  very  soon  realised  the  difference  between 
active  service  conditions  and  those  in  their  own 
country.  The  Territorials,  too,  gained  valuable  ex- 
perience during  the  advance  across  Sinai  and  in  the 
Western  Desert,  and,  by  the  time  General  AUenby 
arrived  in  Egjrpt,  the  standard  of  horsemastership 
in  the  force  had  reached  a  high  level.  As  an  indica- 
tion of  this  fact,  it  may  be  mentioned  that,  at  the 
end  of  each  series  of  operations,  there  was  hardly  a 


HORSES  319 

sore  back  in  the  force.  A  striking  contrast  to  this 
record  was  afforded  by  the  French  cavalry  regi- 
ment which  took  part  in  the  1918  operations.  On 
arrival  at  Damascus,  nearly  every  horse  in  the  regi- 
ment had  a  sore  back.  The  Frenchmen  carried  an 
astonishing  quantity  of  kit  on  their  saddles,  and, 
though  it  was  all  put  on  in  a  very  neat  and  soldier- 
like manner,  the  weight  was  undoubtedly  far  too 
great.  Owing  to  the  difficulty  of  removing  the 
saddle  without  taking  off  all  this  kit,  the  horses 
were  scarcely  ever  off-saddled.  The  men,  too,  were 
far  too  prone  to  remain  mounted  when  halted. 

Type. — Some  remarks  on  type  have  already  been 
made  in  Chapter  viii.  The  experience  of  the  latter 
part  of  the  campaign  served  but  to  confirm  the 
conclusion  as  to  the  superiority  of  well-bred,  fairly 
lightly-built  horses  over  those  of  coarser  fibre.  Well- 
bred  horses  will  go  farther  and  faster,  eat  less,  and 
recover  condition  more  quickly  than  the  coarse-bred 
ones.  In  this  connection,  when  is  the  dismal  prac- 
tice of  subdividing  the  horses  of  a  battery  into 
'  Riders '  and  '  Draught  Horses '  going  to  be  aban- 
doned ?  Every  gunner  wants  to  have  practically 
nothing  but  light  draught  horses,  so  that  every 
horse  in  the  battery  shall  be  capable  of  taking  its 
turn  in  a  gun  team  if  necessary.  The  result  of 
classifying  nearly  half  the  horses  in  a  horse  artillery 
battery  as  '  riders  '  too  often  results  in  all  the  weedy, 
fifteen  hand  ponies  in  the  remount  depots  being 
issued  to  the  gunners.  Such  horses  are  even  more 
useless  in  a  battery  than  they  would  be  in  a  cavalry 
regiment.  In  the  latter  they  might  carry  a  trumpeter ; 
in  the  former  even  the  trumpeter's  horse  is  expected 
to  be  able  to  take  his  turn  in  draught.  On  more 
than  one  occasion  in  1917  even  officers'  chargers 
were  used  in  the  teams. 


320        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

Diseases. — The  horses  of  the  Corps  were  remark- 
ably free  from  disease.  In  the  summer  of  1918  there 
were  a  few  sporadic  cases  of  anthrax.  The  disease  is 
found  here  and  there  among  the  native  horses  and 
cattle  all  over  Palestine.  The  spores  are  deposited 
on  the  ground  by  the  infected  animals,  with  the  result 
that  there  is  always  a  danger  of  picking  it  up.  Prompt 
destruction  of  all  horses  affected  with  the  disease, 
and  the  removal  to  a  fresh  piece  of  ground  of  the 
unit  in  which  the  case  occurred,  leaving  the  old 
ground  clearly  labelled  as  '  unclean,'  prevented  any 
outbreak  of  the  disease.  Except  for  these  few  cases, 
there  was  an  almost  entire  absence  of  disease  through- 
out the  campaign,  which  may  be  considered  some- 
what remarkable,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  glanders, 
antlirax,  lymphangitis,  and  other  diseases  are  rife 
among  the  beasts  of  the  native  population.  Our 
immunity  from  these  scourges  may  be  attributed  to 
the  facts  that  our  horses  were  seldom  camped  for 
long  in  the  same  place  ;  that  they  were  never  camped 
near  villages  if  it  could  be  avoided ;  and  that  no 
native  animals  were  ever  allowed  in  or  near  our 
camps,  or  to  drink  where  our  horses  drank. 

The  5th  Cavalry  Division  suffered  somewhat  from 
laminitis  in  September  1918,  as  a  result  of  the  rather 
unnecessarily  fast  pace  the  division  had  set  on  the 
morning  of  the  19th.  Thirty  or  forty  horses  had 
to  be  destroyed  on  the  following  day.  Neither  of 
the  other  two  divisions,  however,  had  any  trouble 
of  this  sort. 

Equipment. — Leather  muzzles  proved  a  necessity 
in  all  units  whose  horses  were  picketed  on  ropes 
stretched  between  wagon  wheels  instead  of  on 
ground  lines.  Otherwise  the  hungry  brutes  ate  the 
woodwork  of  the  wheels  voraciously.  It  was  only 
necessary  to  muzzle  the  two  or  three  horses  picketed 


HORSES  321 

next  to  the  wheels.  The  nostril  holes  of  the  service 
pattern  muzzle  are  much  too  small,  and  should  be 
enlarged  downwards  and  outwards  to  an  oval  shape 
at  least  tln-ee  inches  long. 

The  steel  wire  picketing  ropes  issued  toi  the 
artillery  were  very  much  superior  in  every  way  to 
the  old  pattern  hemp  ropes,  whether  5  feet  9  inch 
or  66  feet.  It  is  suggested  that  the  5  feet  9  inch 
ropes,  with  loop  and  toggle,  and  the  heel  peg  ropes 
might  also  in  future  be  made  of  wire  instead  of  hemp. 
The  wire  rope  is  much  stronger  and  no  heavier,  and 
is  not  so  hkely  to  gall  horses  that  get  their  feet  over 
it.  The  great  objection  to  it  is,  of  course,  its  high 
initial  cost,  but  against  this  may  be  set  the  fact  that 
it  is  practically  indestructible,  and  lasts  indefinitely. 
Active  service  head  ropes  might  also  be  made  of  wire 
with  a  spring  hook  at  each  end.  A  few  raw  hide 
head  ropes  were  issued  at  one  time,  and  these  were 
excellent,  except  for  the  fact  that  the  horses  ate  them 
wholesale  when  really  hungry. 

In  the  Australian  Light  Horse  regiments  neither 
manes  nor  tails  were  ever  cut  or  pulled.  During 
operations  there  was  little  time  to  care  for  manes 
and  tails,  and  they  looked  somewhat  untidy,  but 
there  is  no  doubt  that  in  a  hot  country,  it  is  prefer- 
able to  let  them  grow  freely.  Not  only  does  a  mane 
assist  the  horse  to  rid  itself  of  flies,  but  it  appears  to 
give  some  protection  from  the  fierce  rays  of  the  sun, 
and  a  long  thick  tail  is  unquestionably  a  very  great 
blessing  to  a  horse  in  a  fly  country. 


CHAPTER  XXVI 

TRANSPORT  AND  AMMUNITION  SUPPLY 

The  advance  to  Damascus  and  Aleppo  in  September 
and  October  1918  proved  with  what  a  small  amount 
of  transport  cavalry  can  operate,  when  local  supplies 
are  available.  As  already  explained,  during  this 
advance  no  transport  accompanied  the  divisions, 
except  ammunition  wagons  and  a  few  motor  ambu- 
lance cars. 

The  opportunities  for  cavalry  making  a  raid  such 
a  great  distance  into  enemy  country  have  seldom 
occurred  in  the  past,  and  are  hkely  to  become  even 
more  rare  in  the  future.  When  they  do  occur, 
however,  the  experience  of  this  campaign  points  to 
the  conclusion  that  there  can  be  few  countries  in 
which  cavalry  can  operate  as  such  effectively,  where 
they  would  not  be  able  to  dispense  almost  entirely 
with  transport.  The  fact  that  mounted  troops 
can  move  freely,  denotes  that  the  country  is  not 
excessively  mountainous,  and  is,  therefore  (excluding 
desert  land),  more  or  less  cultivated,  thus  providing 
food  for  man  and  horse.  It  must  be  remembered 
that  much  of  the  country  through  which  the  cavalry 
passed  between  the  25th  of  September  and  the  28th 
of  October  is  poorly  cultivated,  and  all  of  it  had  been 
mercilessly  laid  under  requisition  by  the  Turks  and 
Germans  for  the  supply  of  their  armies.  Yet  it  was 
found  possible  to  secure  food  and  forage  for  three 
cavalry  divisions,  a  total  of  nearly  20,000  men  and 

322 


TRANSPORT  AND  AMMUNITION  SUPPLY  323 

a  similar  number  of  horses,  without  extreme  diffi- 
culty, and  without  in  any  way  depriving  the  in- 
habitants of  essential  food. 

If,  however,  the  country  through  which  it  is  pro- 
posed to  advance  is  incapable  of  supporting  the  force, 
sufficient  transport  must  be  taken  to  carry  supplies 
for  such  a  number  of  days  as  may  be  requisite.  The 
pace  of  the  cavalry  will  then  be,  to  a  great  extent, 
Umited  by  the  pace  of  their  transport,  and  for  this 
reason  every  effort  should  be  made  to  increase  the 
mobiUty  of  cavalry  transport  vehicles. 

Vehicles. — At  the  beginning  of  the  1917  operations 
the  cavalry  ammunition  columns  and  supply  trains 
were  equipped  partly  with  G.S.  and  partly  with 
limbered  G.S. wagons.  During  the  subsequent  opera- 
tions, both  at  the  beginning,  when  movement  took 
place  over  a  sandy  or  dusty  plain,  and  later  on,  when 
the  whole  country  was  a  sea  of  mud,  and  vast  areas 
were  under  water,  the  G.S.  wagons  were  constantly 
in  trouble.  The  experience  of  the  whole  campaign 
was  overwhelmingly  in  favour  of  the  L.G.S.  wagon. 
The  sole  advantage  of  the  G.S.  wagon  Ues  in  its  greater 
capacity  for  carrying  bulky  loads.  For  this  reason 
it  is  very  suitable  for  use  in  barracks  or  standing 
camps,  where  such  stuff  as  hay,  straw,  etc.,  have  to 
be  carried.  As  regards  weight,  however,  the  L.G.S. 
wagon  holds  its  own  against  the  G.S.  on  roads,  and 
is  superior  in  roadless  or  hilly  country.  That  is  to 
say,  the  L.G.S.  wagon,  with  two  men  and  four  horses, 
can,  in  such  country,  carry  more  than  two-thirds  of 
the  load  possible  for  the  G.S.  wagon,  with  its  three 
drivers  and  six  horses.  Further,  the  lower  centre 
of  gravity,  four  large  wheels  and  much  greater  lock 
angle  of  the  former,  enables  it  to  cross  country  over 
which  the  latter  cannot  move  at  all.  One  advan- 
tage claimed  for  the  G.S.  type  is  that  the  wagon  body 


324        THE  DESEUT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

is  supposed  to  be  capable  of  being  used  as  a  pontoon. 
The  writer  has  tried  it  as  such,  in  peace  time,  and 
his  experience  has  decided  him  that  he  would  rather 
swim. 

The  above  remarks  are,  of  course,  to  be  taken  as 
applying  to  cavalry  transport  only. 

There  is  one  weakness  in  the  L.G.S.  wagon  which 
is  commended  to  the  notice  of  the  Royal  Ordnance 
Corps.  The  bolt  which  fastens  the  wagon  body  on 
to  the  carriage  passes  through  the  axle.  Towards 
the  end  of  the  campaign,  after  several  years'  hard 
and  continuous  work,  a  number  of  these  axles  began 
to  break,  and  always  at  tlie  place  where  the  bolt 
passed  through  them.  It  is  suggested  that,  in 
future  manufacture,  the  fastening  might  consist  of 
a  steel  collar  over  the  axle,  instead  of  a  bolt 
through  it. 

Horses. — The  remarks  on  type,  which  have  been 
made  with  regard  to  the  cavalry  riding  horse,  apply 
with  equal  force  to  the  cavahy  draught  horse.  Many 
of  our  English  draught  animals  were  of  far  too  heavy 
a  type,  either  for  horse  artillery  or  for  cavalry  trans- 
port. It  is  sometimes  argued  that  a  proportion  of 
heavy  horses  is  very  useful  when  wagons  begin  to 
get  stuck  in  boggy  places.  But  it  is  not  much  use 
having  these  equine  Samsons  at  all,  if  they  are  not 
available  at  the  time  their  services  are  required.  And 
this  is  what  invariably  happens.  Nothing  in  the 
nature  of  a  cart  horse  can  Hve  with  cavalry  in  a 
march  of  forty  miles,  and,  in  this  campaign,  there 
was  one  of  over  ninety  miles  on  end,  and  marches  of 
forty,  fifty  and  sixty  miles  were  comparatively 
common.  If  heavy  horses  are  forced  to  keep  up 
with  cavalry  over  such  distances,  they  very  soon 
give  up  the  unequal  fight  and  die  ;  if  they  are  allowed 
to  go  their  own  pace,  they  are  a  day's  march  in  rear 


t 


«^l 


TRANSPORT  AND  AMMUNITION  SUPPLY  325 

at  the  end  of  twenty-four  hours,  and  the  transport 
thus  requu*es  an  escort  of  a  size  that  can  ill  be  spared 
from  the  fighting  forces. 

Another  advantage  of  having  a  lighter-built,  better- 
bred  type  of  horse  for  transport,  is  that  they  then 
form  a  reserve  for  the  cavahy.  In  the  artillery  it  is 
the  rule  for  riding  and  draught  horses  to  change 
places  frequently,  thus  resting  both  kinds  in  turn. 
This  custom  might  profitably  be  employed  occasion- 
ally in  the  cavalry. 

The  Austrahans  have  an  admirable  type  of  cavalry 
draught  horse  :  15  to  15.2  hands  high,  short-backed, 
well-coupled,  and  showing  a  good  deal  of  breeding. 
The  disappearance  from  our  English  roads  first  of 
the  coaches  and  then  of  the  horse-drawn  buses, 
has  deprived  us  almost  entirely  of  our  once  fine  type 
of  light  draught  horse,  and  it  seems  as  if  we  shaU,  in 
the  future,  have  to  depend  more  and  more  on  the 
Dominions  for  our  supply  of  such  horses.  There 
were  a  certain  number  of  Canadian  horses  in  the 
Corps  transport.  They  were  hard  and  sound,  but 
of  a  coarser  type,  with  heavier  shoulders  and  less 
handy  than  those  from  Australia. 

Other  transport  ayiimals. — At  different  times,  camels, 
mules,  and  donkeys  were  used  by  the  cavalry  for 
transport  purposes.  The  first  named  are,  of  course, 
entirely  unsuitable,  except  for  work  in  the  desert, 
but,  as  we  had  some  30,000  of  them  in  our  posses- 
sion in  1917,  a  legacy  from  Sinai,  and  there  was  a 
shortage  of  other  transport,  they  were  largely  used 
during  the  1917  operations.  No  attempt  was  made 
to  keep  up,  or  even  near,  the  cavahy  on  the  march, 
but  the  camels  worked  in  a  system  of  convoys  along 
defined  routes,  forming  dumps  behind  the  advancing 
line  of  cavahy,  from  which  the  divisional  trains  drew 
supphes.     The  uselessness  and  danger  of  camels  in 


» 


326        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

mountainous  country  was  convincingly  demonstrated 
in  the  mountains  of  Judaea  and  in  the  two  trans- 
Jordan  raids,  and,  after  the  second  of  these,  the 
Imperial  Camel  Corps  Brigade  was  disbanded,  and 
the  cavalry  saw  no  more  of  the  patient  but  unlovable 
beasts  that  had  worked  for  them  for  more  than  two 
years. 

Mules  were  in  use  in  the  transport  to  a  certain 
extent  all  through  the  campaign,  but  the  experience 
of  the  1917  operations  led  to  their  being  replaced 
by  horses  in  all  transport  that  was  required  to  keep 
up  with  the  cavalry.  Their  hardihood,  soundness, 
and  remarkable  freedom  from  disease,  no  less  than 
their  patience  and  docility,  render  them  admirable 
for  infantry  transport,  and  even,  possibly,  for  field 
artillery,  but  they  suffer  from  the  serious  disability, 
from  the  cavalry  or  horse  artillery  point  of  view, 
that  they  cannot  go  the  pace.  Left  to  themselves, 
they  can  march  indefinitely,  but,  if  pushed  along 
faster  than  their  natural  gait,  they  rapidly  lose  con- 
dition, and  soon  become  so  debihtated  as  to  be  well- 
nigh  useless.  As  this  natural  pace  is  slower  than 
that  of  horses,  they  must  always  be  pushed  when 
acting  with  cavalry,  and  this  fact  renders  them  un- 
suitable for  use  with  mounted  troops. 

Donkeys  were  first  used  in  supply  convoys  in  the 
Judsean  Hills  in  the  winter  of  1917,  some  400  being 
sent  up  from  Egypt  for  this  purpose.  They  did  most 
excellent  work,  supplying  the  troops  in  the  fine  at 
a  time  when  there  were  no  roads  available.  They 
are  admirably  adapted  for  such  special  work,  being 
small,  hardy,  and  easily  handled,  and  requiring  no 
attention.  For  any  other  purpose  they  are,  of 
course,  not  to  be  seriously  considered.  Owing  to 
the  chronic  shortage  of  horses  in  the  country,  those 
details  of  regiments  who  did  not  usually  accompany 


« 


TRANSPORT  AND  AMMUNITION  SUPPLY  327 

their  units  into  action  were,  in  1917,  given  donkeys 
to  ride.  There  were  about  half  a  dozen  in  each 
cavah-y   regiment   or   similar   unit.     Most   of   these 


were  gradually  exchanged  for  Arab  ponies  captured 
from  the  enemy,  but  a  few  carried  on  right  through 
the  campaign,  up  to  the  capture  of  Aleppo.  How 
they  kept  up  through  some  of  the  long  marches  of 


% 


328        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

1918,  carrying  a  heavy  man  and  all  his  kit,  is  a 
mystery,  but  they  contrived  to  do  so  somehow. 

Ammunitioyi. — Prior  to  the  commencement  of  the 
1917  operations  in  Palestine,  the  amount  of  small 
arm  ammunition  laid  down  to  be  carried  in  a  cavalry 
divisional  ammunition  column  was  250,000  rounds 
per  brigade,  or  1,000,000  in  the  column  for  the  four- 
brigade  divisions  of  that  time.  This  was  a  ridicu- 
lously over-large  amount.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
amount  of  gun  ammunition  was  very  small.  Indeed 
the  divisional  column  commander  who  said  that  he 
carried  in  his  column  three  weeks'  supply  for  the 
small  arms  and  three  hours'  for  the  guns,  can  scarcely 
be  accused  of  hyperbole. 

After  the  second  battle  of  Gaza,  during  which  the 
cavalry  were  engaged  all  daj^  long  dismounted,  in  a 
very  heavy  fire  fight,  it  was  found  that,  after  replenish- 
ing the  regimental  reserves,  only  about  one-sixth  of 
the  small  arm  ammunition  in  the  divisional  ammuni- 
tion columns  had  been  issued.  The  guns,  on  the 
other  hand,  had  expended  nearly  three  times  the 
total  quantity  of  ammunition  carried  in  the  column. 

As  a  result  of  this  action,  the  whole  question  of 
ammunition  supply  was  considered  afresh,  and  the 
columns  were  reorganised  with  an  establishment  of 
200  rounds  of  shell  per  gun,  and  120,000  of  small  arm 
ammunition  per  brigade,  calculated  as  to  84,000 
rounds  for  the  machine  gun  squadron  and  12,000 
rounds  for  each  regiment.  These  proportions  worked 
satisfactorily,  though  the  gun  ammunition  might 
still  be  somewhat  increased,  even  at  the  expense  of 
the  small  arms.  The  result  of  the  whole  series  of 
operations  seems  to  point  to  the  fact  that  an  estab- 
Hshment  of  100,000  rounds  of  small  arm  ammunition 
per  brigade,  or  300,000  per  division,  and  250  rounds 
of  gun  ammunition  per  gun,  or  4500  for  a  division, 


J" 


TRANSPORT  AND  AMMUNITION  SUPPLY  329 

would  form  the  best  proportion.  This  would  give 
a  total  of  442  rounds  of  shell  per  gun,  carried  in  the 
field,  not  an  unduly  large  amount  for  a  modern, 
quick-firing  gun,  when  it  is  remembered  that  Napoleon 
considered  that  the  muzzle-loading,  slow-firing  field 
pieces  of  his  day  should  be  suppUed  with  not  less 
than  300  rounds  apiece. 

Loads. — The  weights  laid  down  in  the  1914  War 
Establishments  to  be  carried  both  in  G.S.  and  L.G.S. 
wagons  were  found  to  be  only  suitable  for  transport 
accompanying  infantry  along  well-metalled  roads. 
After  the  second  battle  of  Gaza,  a  new  load  table 
was  drawn  up  empirically.  A  series  of  experi- 
ments, carried  out  just  prior  to  the  commencement 
of  the  Beersheba  operations,  demonstrated  that  even 
these  reduced  loads  were  far  too  heavy  for  G.S. 
wagons  in  such  country.  Unfortunately  these  experi- 
ments were  ignored,  and  the  G.S.  wagons  started  the 
operations  with  the  loads  as  laid  down  in  the  new 
tables.  The  result  was  that,  during  the  march  from 
the  Shellal  area  to  Khalasa,  the  G.S.  wagons  were 
strewn  over  twenty  miles  of  country,  and  some  200 
camels  had  to  be  requisitioned  at  short  notice  from 
the  supply  columns  to  lighten  the  wagons. 

After  the  fall  of  Beersheba,  the  G.S.  wagons  of  the 
divisional  ammunition  column  were  taken  over  by 
the  Corps,  as  already  narrated,  and  they  took  no 
further  part  in  the  operations  until  they  rejoined 
their  respective  divisions  on  the  19th  November. 

As  a  result  of  the  1917  series  of  operations,  the 
load  question  was  again  reviewed,  and  the  following 
loads  were  decided  upon. 

G.S.  wagons,  23  boxes  of  13-pounder  gun  ammuni- 
tion or  26  boxes  of  smaU  arm  ammunition,  a  total 
load  behind  the  6  horses  of  about  35  cwt. 

L.G.S.  wagons,   16  boxes  of  gun  or  18  boxes  of 


330        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

small  arm  ammunition,  a  total  load  behind  the  4 
horses  of  about  24  cwt. 

These  loads  were  proved  by  considerable  subse- 
quent experience  to  be  the  maximum  with  which 
wagons  could  operate  efficiently  with  cavahy  in 
such  country.  It  is  to  be  remarked  that  practically 
no  sandy  country  was  encountered  after  the  fall  of 
Beersheba,  but  the  unmetalled  tracks  along  which 
the  transport  had  to  march  were,  in  the  winters  of 
1917  and  1918,  often  almost  impassable  owing  to  the 
mud. 

Before  leaving  the  subject  of  ammunition  supply, 
attention  should  be  drawn  to  the  vital  necessity  of 
cavah-y  regiments  replenishing  their  regimental  reserve 
of  small  arm  ammunition  from  the  ammunition 
column  every  clay.  Obvious  as  this  duty  may  appear, 
it  is  one  that  is  frequently  neglected,  especially 
during  a  time  of  long  marches.  It  frequently 
happened  that,  in  spite  of  repeated  applications,  the 
ammunition  column  commanders  could  not  get  in- 
dents from  the  regiments  for  days  at  a  time.  Such 
delays  were  often  followed  by  sudden  demands  for 
the  immediate  supply  of  a  large  quantity  of  ammuni- 
tion, which,  perhaps,  was  not  all  available  at  the 
moment.  There  ensued  mutual  recriminations,  and 
much  extra  work  for  the  tired  horses  of  both  the 
columns  and  the  regimental  ammunition  wagons,  all 
of  which  might  have  been  avoided  by  more  fore- 
thought and  attention  to  detail. 


APPENDIX  I 

(a)  THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

When  the  Desert  Mounted  Corps  officially  came  into 
being,  it  was  constituted  as  follows  : — 

Commander  :  Lieutenant-Greneral  Sir  Harry  Chauvel,  K.C.B., 
K.C.M.G.,  Australian  Imperial  Forces. 

AUSTRALIAN  AND  NEW  ZEALAND  MOUNTED 
DIVISION  (ANZAC). 

Commander  :  Major-General  Sir  E.  W.  C.  Chaytor,  K.C.M.G., 
C.B,,  p.s.c,  A.D.C.,  New  Zealand  Imperial 
Forces. 

1st  Australian  Light  Horse  Brigade. 

Commander  :  Brigadier-Greneral  C.  F.  Cox,  C.B.,  C.M.G., 
D.S.O.,  A.I.F. 

1st,  2nd,  and  3rd  Regiments  Australian  light  Horse. 

2nd  x4lustratjan  Light  Horse  Brigade. 

Commander  :  Brigadier-General  G.  de  L.  Ryrie,  C.B.,  C.M.G., 
A.I.F. 

5th,  6th,  and  7th  Regiments  AustraUan  Light  Horse. 

New  Zealand  Mounted  Brigade. 

Commander  :  Brigadier-GeneralW.Meldrum,C.M.G.,D.S.O., 
N.Z.I.F. 

Auckland,  Canterbury,  and  Wellington  Regiments   of 
Mounted  Rifles. 

ARTILLERY. 

18th  Brigade  R.HA.  (Inverness,  Ayrshire,  and 
Somerset  Batteries)  and  Divisional  Ammunition 
Column. 

?3l 


332        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 


YEOMANRY  DIVISION. 

Commander  :   Major-General  Sir  G.  de  S.  Barrow,  K.C.M.G., 
C.B.,  p.s.c,  Indian  Army. 

6th  Mounted  Brigade. 
Commander  :   Brigadier-General  C.A.C.  Godwin,  D.S.O.,  I.A. 
Dorset,  Bucks,  and  Berks  Yeomanry  Regiments. 

8th  Mounted  Brigade. 
Commander  :   Brigadier-Greneral  C.  S.  Rome,  D.S.O. 

1st  City  of  London  and  1st  and  3rd  County  of  London 
Yeomanry  Regiments. 

22nd  Mounted  Brigade. 

Commander  :   Brigadier-General  F.  A.  B.  Fryer  (relinquished 
command  December  1917). 
Brigadier-General  P.  D.  FitzGerald,  D.S.O,, 
p.s.c. 
Stafford,  Lincoln,  and  East  Riding  Yeomanry  Regiments. 

ARTILLERY. 

20th  Brigade  R.H.A.   (Berks,  Hants,  and  Leicester 
Batteries)  and  Divisional  Ammunition  Column. 

AUSTRALIAN  MOUNTED  DIVISION. 

Commander  :   Major-General  Sir  H.  W.  Hodgson,  K.C.M.G., 
C.V.O.,  C.B. 

3rd  Australian  Light  Horse  Brigade. 

Commander :     Brigadier-General    L.     C.    Wilson,     C.M.G., 
D.S.O.,  A.I.F. 

8th,  9th,  and  10th  Regiments  Australian  Light  Horse. 

4th  Australian  Light  Horse  Brigade. 

Commander  :   Brigadier-General  W.  Grant,  C.M.G.,  D.S.O., 
A.I.F. 

4th,  11th,  and  12th  Regiments  AustraUan  Light  Horse. 


APPENDIX  I  333 


5th  MotnsTTED  Brigade. 

Commander :  Brigadier-General   P.    D.    Fitzgerald,    D.S.O., 
p. s.c.  (relinquished  command  November  1917). 
Brigadier-General    P.    J.    V.    KeUy,    C.M.G., 
D.S.O. 

ARTILLERY. 
19th  Brigade  R.H.A.  ('  A  '  and  '  B  '  Batteries  Honour- 
able Artillery  Company,  and  Notts  Battery  R.H  A.) 
and  Divisional  Ammunition  Column. 

CORPS  RESERVE. 

7th  Mounted  Brigade. 

Commander  :   Brigadier-General  J.  T.  Wigan,  C.M.G.,  D.S.O., 
(rehnquished  command  December  1917). 
Brigadier-General  G.  V.  Clarke,  D.S.O, 

Sherwood  Rangers,  South  Notts  and  Herts  Yeomanry 
Regiments,  with  Essex  Battery  R.H  .A.,  and  Brigade 
Ammunition  Column. 

Imperial  Camel  Corps  Brigade. 

Commander  :   Brigadier-General  S.  Smith,  F.C,  D.S.O. 

Two  Austrahan  and  one  British  Camel  BattaUons, 
with  the  Hongkong  and  Singapore  Mountain  Battery 
R.G.A. 

After  the  reorganisation  consequent  on  the  despatch 
of  many  of  the  Yeomanry  regiments  to  France,  in 
April  and  May  1918,  and  the  arrival  of  Indian  Cavalry 
Regiments  from  Europe,  the  Corps  was  expanded 
into  four  divisions  as  foUows  : — 

4th  CAVALRY  DIVISION. 

Commander  :   Major-General      Sir      G.      de      S.      Barrow, 
K.C.M.G.,  etc. 

10th  Cavalry  Brigade. 

Commander  :   Brigadier-General  W.  G.  K.    Green,  D.S.O., 
I.A. 
Dorset   Yeomanry,    2nd   Lancers,    38th   Central    India 
Horse. 


334        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

11th  Cavalry  Brigade. 

Commander  :  Brigadier-Greneral C.L.Gregory, C.B.,p.s.c.,I.A. 

1st  County  of  London  Yeomanry,  29th  Lancers,  36th 
Jacob's  Horse. 

12th  Cavalry  Brigade. 

Commander  :   Brigadier-General  J.  T.  Wigan,  C.M.G.,  D.S.O. 

Stafford  Yeomanry,  6th  Cavalry,  1 9th  Lancers. 

ARTILLERY. 

20th    Brigade    R.H.A.    and    Divisional    Ammunition 
Column. 

5th  CAVALRY  DIVISION. 

Commander :   Major-General    Sir    H,    J.    M.    MacAndrew, 
K.C.M.G.,  C.B.,  D.S.O.,  Indian  Army. 

13th  Cavalry  Brigade. 

Commander :   Brigadier-General   P.    J.    V.   KeUy,    C.M.G., 
D.S.O.   (relinquished  command  September 
1918). 
Brigadier-General  G.  A.  Weir,  D.S.O. 

Gloucester    Yeomanry,     9th    Hodson's    Horse,     1 8th 
Lancers . 

14th  Cavalry  Brigade. 

Commander  :   Brigadier-General  G.  V.  Clarke,  D.S.O. 

Sherwood  Rangers  Yeomanry,  20th  Deccan  Horse,  34th 
Poona  Horse. 

15th  (Imperial  Service)  Cavalry  Brigade. 
Commander  :   Brigadier-General  C.  R.  Harbord,  D.S.O.,  LA. 
Jodhpur,  Mysore  and  1st  Hyderabad  Lancers.^ 

ARTILLERY. 
'  B  '    Battery   H.A.C.   and    Essex   Battery    R.H.A., 
with  Divisional  Ammunition  Column. 

The  Anzac  and  the  Australian  Mounted  Divisions 
remained  the  same,  except  that  the  5th  Mounted 

*  These  regiments  were  all  maintained  by  the  Ruling  Princes  of  their 
respective  States  in  India. 


i 


APPENDIX  I 


335 


Brigade  was  replaced  in  the  latter  by  the  5th  A.L.H. 
Brigade,  which  consisted  of  the  14th  and  15th  Regi- 
ments A.L.H.  (composed  of  men  of  the  Camel  Corps 
Brigade,  which  had  been  disbanded  after  the  second 
trans- Jordan  raid),  and  the  French  Regiment  Mixte 
de  Ca valeric.  Swords  were  issued  to  the  Australian 
Mounted  Division  at  the  beginning  of  August  1918, 
and  the  men  had  about  six  weeks'  training  in  the 
use  of  them  before  the  operations  commenced.  The 
Australian  troopers  took  to  their  new  weapon  en- 
thusiastically, and  showed,  later  on,  that  they  knew 
how  to  use  it. 


(b)  INFANTRY 

During   the   1917    operations,    the   infantry   were 
organised  as  follows  : — 

20th  corps. 

Commander  :    Lieutenant -General  Sir  Philip  Chetwode,  Bart., 
K.C.B.,  K.C.M.G.,  D.S.O. 

10th  Division. 
Commander  :   Major-Greneral  J.  R.  Longley,  C.B.,  C.M.G. 

53rd  Division. 
Commander  :   Major-General  S.  F.  Mott,  C.B.,  p.s.c. 

60th  Division. 

Commander  :   Major-General  Sir  J.  S.   M.   Shea,   K  C  M  G 
D.S.O.,  p.s.c.,  LA. 

74th  Division. 
Commander  :   Major-General  E.  S.  Girdwood,  C.B. 


21sT  CORPS. 

Commander  :   Lieutenant-General  Sir  Edward  Bulfin  K  C  B 
C.V.O.  '     •   •    ♦. 


336        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 


52nd  Division. 

Commander  :   Major-General  J.  Hill,  C.B.,  D.S.O. 
I.A. 


a.HB.OD., 


54th  Division. 
Commander  :   Major-General  S.  W.  Hare,  C.B. 

75th  Division. 
Commander  :    Major-General  P.  C.  Palin,  C.B.,  C.M.G.,  I.A. 

On  the  reorganisation  of  the  infantry  in  the 
spring  of  1918,  the  3rd  (Lahore)  and  7th  (Meerut) 
Divisions  replaced  the  52nd  and  74th  Divisions,  which 
were  sent  to  France.  The  3rd  was  commanded  by 
Major-General  A.  R.  Hoskins,  C.M.G.,  D.S.O.,  p.s.c, 
and  the  7tli  by  Major-General  Sir  V.  B.  Fane, 
K.C.LE.,  C.B. 

Three-quarters  of  the  British  troops  in  all  divi- 
sions except  the  54th  were  replaced  by  Indians. 


APPENDIX  II 

NOTE  ON  THE  ARAB  MOVEMENT 

A  SHERiF  (plur.  Ashraf)  is  one  who  claims  descent 
direct  from  the  Prophet  Mohammed,  through  his 
daughter  Fatima,  wife  of  AH,  the  third  Khahf.  These 
Ashraf  are  found  all  over  the  Arabic-speaking  world, 
but  only  those  whose  pedigrees  are  inscribed  in  the 
Register  of  Mecca  are  universally  accepted  as  true 
descendants  of  the  Prophet.  This  register  has  been 
kept  with  extraordinary  care,  and  it  is  probable  that 
it  dates  back  to  the  time  of  Mohammed  himseK. 
There  are  in  the  Hedjaz  several  families  of  these 
true  Ashraf,  who  form  the  aristocracy  of  the  Arab 
world,  live  under  a  law  of  their  own,  and  enjoy  a 
number  of  special  privileges. 

For  the  first  four  centuries  after  the  death  of  the 
Prophet,  the  Ashraf,  though  regarded  with  venera- 
tion and  respect  by  the  Arabs,  held  no  temporal 
power.  At  the  end  of  the  tenth  century,  however,  a 
Sherif  of  Mecca  proclaimed  himseK  Emir  of  the 
Ashraf,  and  succeeded  in  establishing  his  dynasty  as 
the  temporal  chiefs  (under  the  Khalif)  of  the  Hedjaz. 
The  ruling  prince  of  the  Ashraf  of  Mecca  was  known 
for  centuries  in  Europe  as  '  The  Grand  Sherif  of 
Mecca,'  and,  in  former  times,  when  the  city  was  not 
as  jealously  guarded  as  it  now  is,  more  than  one 
Christian  sovereign  sent  an  embassy  to  him  there. 

During  the  succeeding  five  hundred  years,  inter- 
necine strife,  resulting  in  frequent  changes  of  djmasty, 
weakened  the  temporal  power  of  the  Emirs  of  Mecca, 
and  correspondingly  increased  the  ascendancy  of  the 
Turks.  In  the  sixteenth  century,  however,  the  Emir 
Katada,  by  a  series  of  conquests  of  rival  claimants, 
possessed  himself  of  the  chief  power  in  the  Hedjaz, 


338        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

and  established  his  own  family  as  the  head  of  the 
Ashraf. 

Slierif  Hussein,  a  lineal  descendant  of  Katada, 
succeeded  to  the  Emirate  in  1908.  A  man  of  power- 
ful will  and  strong  ambitions,  Hussein  began  almost 
at  once  to  consider  the  possibility  of  securing  the 
independence  of  the  Hedjaz,  and  possibly  even  of  all 
the  Arabs,  from  Turkish  dominion.  His  task  was  an 
exceedingly  difficult  one.  The  Sultan  of  Turkey, 
as  Khalif  of  Islam,  was  regarded  as  the  spmtual  head 
of  all  Moslems,  and  any  open  action  against  him 
would  be  likely  to  meet  with  strong  opposition  in 
all  Moslem  countries  outside  Arabia.  A  Turkish 
Army  Corps,  with  its  headquarters  at  Sanah,  near 
Aden,  garrisoned  and  controlled  the  country ;  and 
the  Emir's  own  people,  split  up  into  innumerable 
tribes  and  clans,  were  torn  by  bitter  inter-tribal 
feuds,  many  of  which  dated  back  for  centuries. 

The  ease  with  which  the  Sultan  Abdul  Hamid  was 
overthrown  by  the  Committee  of  Union  and  Progress 
at  the  time  of  the  Turkish  Revolution,  encouraged 
the  Sherif  in  his  dream  of  establishing  an  independent 
Arab  State.  He  became  the  representative  of  the 
Hedjaz  in  the  Turkish  Parliament,  and  for  a  time 
lived  in  Constantinople.  Very  soon,  however,  dis- 
gusted with  the  intrigues  and  jealousies  of  the  C.U.P., 
and  realising  that  he  had  nothing  to  hope  for  from  this 
body  of  needy  adventurers,  he  retired  from  his  posi- 
tion, and  went  back  into  the  desert,  where  for  the 
next  four  or  five  years  he  hved  the  rigorous  life  of  a 
patriarchal  desert  Sheikh,  preparing  his  four  sons  for 
the  struggle  to  come,  and  gathering  round  him  a 
small  number  of  chiefs  pledged  to  the  cause  of 
Arabian  independence. 

The  declaration  of  war  by  Turkey  on  Great  Britain 
furnished  the  Emir  with  the  chance  which  he  had 
long  awaited,  and  the  atrocities  committed  by  the 
Turks  in  Syi'ia  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  caused  the 
oppressed  Arabs  to  turn  to  him  as  then-  national 
champion.     He  at  once  threw  in  his  lot  with  the 


APPENDIX  II  339 

British,  though  not  openly  at  first,  and  set  to  work, 
with  the  fierce  energy  characteristic  of  him,  to  stir 
up  the  tribes  of  the  Hedjaz  against  the  Turks. 

The  outbreak  of  the  rebellion  was  precipitated  by 
the  arrival  at  Medina  in  May  1916  of  a  large  Turkish 
force,  charged  with  the  task  of  re-establishing  the 
waning  authority  of  the  Sultan  in  the  Hedjaz.  The 
Emir  himself,  though  as  fuU  of  energy  and  deter- 
mination as  ever,  was  now  too  old  to  bear  the  rigours 
of  a  desert  campaign,  and  accordingly  placed  the 
command  of  his  Bedouin  followers  in  the  hands  of 
his  three  eldest  sons  Ali,  Abdullah,  and  Feisal.  Of 
Ah  we  know  little,  though  he  was  active  in  the  sum- 
mer of  1918  and  in  the  early  part  of  1917.  Abdullah, 
the  second  son,  was  of  a  retiring  disposition,  a  theo- 
logian and  philosopher,  and  a  deep  student  of  the 
Koran.  Feisal  alone  inherited  his  father's  energy  and 
power  of  command,  without,  however,  the  old  man's 
ungovernable  temper.  The  youngest  son,  Zeid,  was 
stiU  only  a  boy. 

A   line    of   Arab    pickets  was   established    round 
Medina,  under  the  command  of  Feisal,  and  the  rail- 
way north  of  the  town  was  cut  in  several  places. 
But  the  Arabs,  not  being  provided  at  this  time  with 
explosives,  and  being  ignorant  of  modern  methods 
of  demolition,   did  not  effect  enough  before  being 
driven  off  by  relief  parties  with  machine  guns,  to 
interrupt   seriously   the   communication   of   Medina 
with  the  north,  and  the  besieging  force,  short  of  arms 
and  supplies,  and  without  artillery,  could  do  little 
more  than  watch  the  city  from  afar.     Jiddah,  how- 
ever, the  port  of  Mecca,  which  was  attacked  on  June 
9th,  held  out  barely  a  week.     Cut  off  from  Mecca  by 
the  loss  of  the  military  blockhouses  on  the  road,  and 
bombarded  by  British  warships  and  aeroplanes,  the 
Turkish  garrison  surrendered  on  the  16th  June.     The 
fall  of  Mecca  followed  a  month  later,  and  an  Arab 
force    under    Sherif    Abdullah    then    proceeded    to 
blockade  the  hill  town  of  Taif ,  where  the  bulk  of  the 
Turkish  forces,  outside  Medina,  was  established  in 


340        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

summer  quarters.  This  place  held  out  till  near  the 
end  of  September,  when  Ghahb  Pasha,  the  G.O.C., 
despairing  of  help,  and  cut  off  by  the  Arabs  from  all 
sources  of  supply,  surrendered  with  the  garrison  of 
2000  men. 

By  the  end  of  the  year  all  the  small  Turkish  posts 
scattered  throughout  the  Hedjaz  had  fallen  to  the 
Arabs.  Medina  still  held  out,  and  it  was  clear  that 
the  Arab  forces,  indifferently  armed,  and  inexperi- 
enced in  modern  siege  warfare,  could  not  hope  to 
reduce  this  city.  The  Turkish  garrison,  with  the 
Hues  of  communication  troops  along  the  railway  to 
the  north,  numbered  some  15,000  men,  well-armed 
and  equipped,  and  in  all  respects  capable  of  prolonged 
resistance. 

Acting  on  the  advice  of  the  British  officers  with 
them,  the  Arabs,  therefore,  abandoned  for  the  time 
being  all  attempts  on  Medina,  and  concentrated  all 
their  efforts  on  a  systematic  attack  on  the  Hedjaz 
Railway  north  of  the  town.  During  the  first  six 
months  of  1917  a  constant  succession  of  raids  so 
interrupted  the  traffic  on  the  railway  that  the  Turks 
could  with  difficulty  keep  open  their  communica- 
tions between  Medina  and  Damascus. 

In  July  1917  the  Emir  Feisal  seized  Akaba,  at  the 
north  end  of  the  Red  Sea,  and  made  this  place  his 
base  for  further  raiding  operations  on  the  railway  as 
far  north  as  Maan. 

In  January  1918  he  succeeded  in  destroying  the 
branch  line  to  the  Hish  Forest,  from  which  the 
Turkish  locomotives  were  drawing  their  fuel,  and 
then  attacked  Maan  itself  (see  p.  153.)  Though 
unable  to  capture  the  town,  the  Arabs  estabhshed 
themselves  across  the  railway  two  miles  farther 
south,  and,  in  the  course  of  the  succeeding  three 
months,  destroyed  seventy  miles  of  the  hne.  Medina 
was  thus  finally  isolated,  and  the  garrison  was  faced 
with  the  two  alternatives  of  holding  out  in  the  town 
till  the  end  of  the  war,  or  of  attempting  to  cut  a 
way  out  to  the  north.     As  the  latter  alternative 


APPENDIX  II  341 

meant  almost  certain  destruction,  the  Turks  decided 
to  stay  where  they  were.  They  remained  in  Medina 
tiE  they  were  compelled  to  surrender,  under  the 
terms  of  the  Ai^mistice  of  the  31st  October  1918. 

The  strong  position  taken  up  by  the  Turkish  IVth 
Army  east  of  the  Jordan  during  the  summer  of  1918, 
prevented  the  Emir  from  making  any  further  move 
northwards.  He  remained  about  Maan,  collecting 
his  resources  for  the  coming  struggle,  and  carrying 
on  a  vigorous  propaganda  among  the  surrounding 
tribes,  till  the  British  advance  in  September  caused 
the  IVth  Army  to  retire,  and  gave  the  Arabs  the 
opportunity  of  completing  the  task  to  which  they 
had  set  themselves  in  1916. 


APPENDIX  III 

SUMMARY  OF  TERMS  OF  THE  TURKISH  ARMISTICE 

WHICH  CAME  INTO  FORCE  ON  OCTOBER  31,  1918. 

Art.  1. — Opening  of  the  Dardanelles  and  Bosphorus  and 
access  to  the  Black  Sea.  The  AlUed  occupation  of  the 
Dardanelles  and  Bosphorus  forts. 

Art.  2. — The  position  of  all  minefields,  torpedo  tubes,  and 
other  obstructions  in  Turkish  waters  to  be  indicated,  and 
assistance  to  be  given  to  sweep  or  remove  them  as  may  be 
required. 

Art  3. — All  available  information  regarding  the  mines  in 
the  Black  Sea  to  be  communicated. 

Art.  4. — All  Allied  prisoners  and  Armenians  interned  to 
be  collected  in  Constantinople,  and  handed  over  uncondi- 
tionally to  the  AUies. 

Art.  5. — ^The  immediate  demobiUsation  of  the  army  except 
troops  required  for  the  surveillance  of  the  frontier  and 
maintenance  of  internal  order,  their  number  and  disposal  to 
be  determined  later  by  the  AUies,  after  consultation  with 
the  Turkish  Government. 

Art.  6. — The  surrender  of  all  war  vessels  in  Turkish  waters 
or  the  waters  occupied  by  Turkey.  These  ships  to  be  in- 
terned at  such  Turkish  port  or  ports,  as  may  be  directed, 
except  such  small  vessels  as  are  required  for  poUce  or  similar 
purposes  in  Turkish  territorial  waters. 

Art.  7. — The  Allies  to  have  the  right  to  occupy  any 
strategic  points,  in  the  event  of  any  situation  arising  which 
threatens  the  security  of  the  AUies. 

Art.  8. — ^The  free  use  by  AUied  ships  of  all  ports  and 
anchorages  now  in  Turkish  occupation,  and  the  denial  of 
their  use  to  the  enemy.     Similar  conditions  to  apply  to 

312 


APPENDIX  III  343 

Turkish   mercantile   shipping   in   Turkish   waters,   for   the 
purposes  of  trade  and  the  demobiUsation  of  the  army. 

Art.  9.  —  The  use  of  all  ship-repairing  facihties  at  all 
Turkish  ports  and  arsenals. 

Art.  10. — AUied  occupation  of  the  Taurus  tunnel  system. 

Art.  11. — Withdrawal  of  Turkish  troops  from  north- 
western Persia.  Part  of  Trans -Caucasia  to  be  evacuated  ; 
the  remainder  to  be  evacuated  if  the  Allies  require,  after 
they  study  the  situation  there. 

Art.  12. — ^Wireless  and  cable  stations  to  be  under  Allied 
control ;    Turkish  Government  messages  excepted. 

Art.  13. — Prohibition  of  the  destruction  of  any  naval, 
military,  or  commercial  material  by  the  Turks. 

Art.  14. — Facihties  to  be  given  for  the  purchase  of  coal, 
oil-fuel,  and  naval  material  from  Turkish  sources,  after  the 
requirements  of  the  country  have  been  met.  None  of  the 
above  material  to  be  exported. 

Art.  15. — ^AUied  control  of  all  railways,  and  AUied  occupa- 
tion of  Batoum.  Turkey  not  to  object  to  the  AUied  occupa- 
tion of  Baku. 

Art.  16. — The  surrender  of  the  garrisons  of  the  Hedjaz, 
Asir,  Yemen,  Syria,  and  Mesopotamia,  and  the  withdrawal 
of  troops  from  CiHcia,  except  those  maintaining  order,  as 
determined  under  Clause  5.  The  surrender  of  all  ports  in 
CiUcia, 

Art.  17. — The  surrender  of  aU  Turkish  officers  in  Tripoh- 
tania  and  Cyrenaica  to  the  nearest  Itahan  garrison.  Turkey 
to  guarantee  to  stop  supphes  to,  and  communication  with, 
these  officers,  if  they  do  not  obey  the  order  of  surrender. 

Art.  18. — The  surrender  of  aU  ports  occupied  in  TripoH- 
tania  and  Cyrenaica,  including  Misurata,  to  the  nearest 
AUied  garrison. 

Art.  19. — AU  Germans  and  Austrians,  naval,  miUtary,  and 
civihan,  to  quit  Turkey  within  a  month.  Those  in  remote 
districts  to  do  so  as  soon  as  possible  thereafter. 

Art.  20. — CompHance  with  the  AUies'  orders  as  regards 
the  disposal  of  arms  and  the  transport  of  the  demobiUsed, 
under  Clause  5. 


344        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 

Art.  21. — An  Allied  representative  to  be  attached  to  the 
Turkish  Ministry  of  SuppHes,  to  safeguard  AUied  interests. 

Art.  22. — Turkish  prisoners  to  be  kept  at  the  disposal  of 
the  Alhes.  The  release  of  Turkish  civlUan  prisoners  and 
prisoners  over  mihtary  age  to  be  considered. 

Art.  23. — Turkey  to  cease  all  relations  with  the  Central 
Powers. 

Art.  24, — In  case  of  disorder  in  the  six  Armenian  vilayets 
the  AUies  reserve  the  right  to  occupy  any  of  them. 


INDEX 


Abasajst  el  Kebib,  12. 
Abdullah,  Emir,  339. 
Abid  Miriam,  177. 
Abraham's  Well,  41. 
Abu  el  Teaha,  3. 

Jei-wal,  32. 

—  Shusheh   (Plain   of   Philistia). 

85,  89. 
(Plain  of  Esdraelon),  200, 

206. 

Tellul,  178. 

Action  of,  181,  185. 


el  Hareira,  3. 

Acre,  capture  of,  232. 

Adana,  295. 

Administration  of  Enemy  Territory. 

See  Enemy  Territory. 
Advance  Guards,  252-257,  267-269, 

285-289. 

Artillery  with,  305,  306. 

Afghanistan,  2. 
Afule,  4,  191,  192. 

capture  of,  210. 

Ain  Arik.  105. 

el  Duk,  177,  180. 

el  Hekr,  137. 

el  Sir,  135,  241. 

el  Subian,  222. 

Hemar,  159. 

Kohleh,  38. 

Shibleh,  193,  222. 

Aintab,  295,  301. 

Aircraft,  British,  xv,  15,  188,  197, 

198,  204. 

superiority  of,  6,  261. 

co-operation  with  cavalry, 

285,  286. 
bombing  operations,  198, 

216,  218,  222,  226. 
Enemy,  6,  9,  15, 174,  210,  216, 

261,  288. 
Ajalon,  Vale  of,  89,  102. 
Ajje,  199,  219. 
Akaba,  129,  340. 
Akir,  79,  84. 


Ak  Su  Lakes,  301. 
Aleppo,  4,  282,  295. 

advance  on,  287,  288,  289. 

capture  of,  290. 

riots  in,  297. 

'  Aleppo  Hunt,'  301. 

Alexandretta,  295. 

Ali,  Emir,  339. 

Allenby,  Field-Marshal  Viscount,  1, 

7,  247. 
tactics  of,  xiv,  xv,  20,  39, 

194. 


success     in     deceiving 

enemy,  5,  17,  195. 

good  judgment  of,  39,  76. 

meeting    with    General 


Chauvel,  226. 
Amman,  5,  126,  132. 
unsuccessful  attacks  on,   143, 

145,  147-149. 

capture  of,  241. 

Ammunition — 

Captured  enemy,  56,  85. 

Columns,  46,  48,  63,  96,  328,  329, 
330. 

Gun,  328,  329,  330. 

Loads  of,  for  wagons,  329^  330. 

Replenishment  of,  46,  330. 

Sent  up  to  El  Salt,  166,  167. 

SmaU  arm,  328,  329,  330. 

Supply,  328,  329,  330. 
Amwas,  88,  102. 
Anatolians,  68. 
Anebta,  220. 
Ansarie,  289. 
Anthrax,  320. 

Anti-Lebanon  Mountains,  296. 
Antioch,  282. 
Anzac  Mounted  Division,  7,  8,  24, 

38,  40,  45,  122,  127, 133,  155,  175, 

179,  190,  241,  302,  App.  i.  a. 
A.P.M.,  adventure  of  the,  97-99. 
Arab  Movement.     Appendix  n. 
Arab  ponies.     See  Horses. 
Arab  Punar,  295. 

345 


346        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 


Arabs — 

Beni  Sakhr  Tribe,  155,  156,  165, 

244,  245. 
Butchered  by  Turks,  264, 
Character  of,  130,  280. 
Christian,  98,  144. 
Friendly,  37,  145. 
Guides,  23,  206. 
Hostile  to  British,   15,  35,   150, 

244,  245. 
Hostile  to  Turks,  212,  240,  243, 

244,  245,  275,  280. 
Huweitat  Tribe,  130. 
Intertribal  feuds  among,  130, 144, 

338. 
Looting  by,  211,  243,  280,  281. 
Regular  army  of.     Sec  Shcrifian 

Army. 
Spies,  5,  119. 
Unreliable   information    of,    104, 

135,  206,  259,  260. 
Vengeance  of,  265. 
Ardahan,  263. 
Arak  el  Menshiye,  59,  61,  62,  74. 

Suweidan,  60. 

Arara,  205. 

Arish,  16. 

Arkub  el  Khaluf,  165. 

Armageddon,  191. 

Armenians,  character  of,  299. 

attempt  to  massacre,  297. 

Armenian  refugees,  296. 

Reparations  Committee,  297, 

298. 
Armistice,  293. 

terms  of,  342. 

Armoured  cars,  xv,  85,  109,  160, 
195,  204,  205,  208,  209,  211,  220, 
226,  232,  249,  267,  284. 

in   advance   on   Aleppo, 

285-292. 

Enemy,  288. 

Arsuf,  191. 

Artillery,  Royal  Horse.  See  Horse 
Artillery. 

loss  of.     See  Guns, 

loss  of. 

shortage  of,  179,  190. 

Enemy  field,  xiv,  26,  186. 

heavy,   xiv,   9,   45,    186, 


187,  188. 

66,  183. 
Asluj,  7. 


shelling  own  troops,  60, 


Atawineh,  3. 
Attara,  199. 
Auja,  4. 

Australian      and      New      Zealand 

Mounted    Division.     See    Anzac 

Mounted  Division. 

Australian  Light  Horse  Brigades — ■ 

1st,  7,  8,  24,  45,  51,  59,  65,  b9,  71, 

128, 136, 154, 157, 165, 174, 181, 

229,  240,  243. 

2nd,  7,  8,  24,  45,  51,  59,  137, 154, 

157,  165,  228,  229,  241,  242. 
3rd,  7,  8,  21,  26,  52,  72,  102,  115, 
117,    157,   165,  213,  249,   259, 
267,  277,  279. 
4th,  8,  28,  31,  45,  52,  56,  72,  115, 

157,  160,  175,  248,  249,  268. 
5th,  190,  199,  217,  220,  259,  269. 
Australian  Light  Horse  Regiments — 
1st,  157. 

2nd,  27,  28,  69,  182. 
3rd,  28,  229. 
4th,  162,  250,  268,  269. 
5th,  184,  242. 
6th,  170. 

8th,  158,  159,  172,  267. 
9th,  158,  267. 

10th,  158,  159,  213,  268,  277. 
nth,  157,  160,  249,  263. 
12th,  250,  268,  269,  275. 
14th,  217. 
15th,  221. 
Austrahan  Mounted  Division,  8,  24, 
26,  72,  102,  113,  155,  175,  179, 
190,  197,  200,  202,  212,  247,  249, 
252,  258,  266,  293,  296,  302,  App. 
I,  a. 
Australians  as  scouts,  140. 

weight  of,  95. 

Austrians,  9. 
Ayun  Kara,  86. 

Baalbek,  284,  285,  287,  295. 

Baghdad,  1. 

Balata,  221. 

Baldwin  ii..  Castle  of,  258. 

Balin,  66,  72. 

Barada,  River,  269. 

Baramkie  Station,  277. 

Barley,  313,  314. 

Barrow,  Major- General  Sir  G.  de  S., 

42,  80,  89,  209,  240,  302. 
Barrow's  Detachment,  42. 
Batoum,  263. 


INDEX 


347 


Bayonets,  used  in  cavalry  charge, 

29,  56. 
Becke,  Major  A.  F.,  xv. 
Beersheba,  Arabs  in,  36,  37,  38. 

capture  of,  30. 

defences  of,  3,  20. 

description    of,    20,    33,     34, 

35. 

Railway,  4. 

Beirut,  282.  284,  295. 
Beisan,  134,  191,  211. 
Beit  Dejan,  19,  220. 

Dukka,  107. 

Duras,  60. 

Hanun,  48,  52. 

Jibrin,  66,  70,  97. 

—  Lid,  220. 

Likia,  107. 

Ras,  253. 

Sira,  103. 

Ur  el  Foka,  106,  113. 

Ur  el  Tahta,  101,  103,  113. 

Beitunia,  105. 
BeUed  el  Sheikh,  233. 
Berfilya,  101. 
Berkusie,  66,  72. 
Beshshit,  80. 
Bethlehem,  98. 
Bire,  101. 
Bir  Adas,  199. 

el  Arara,  23. 

el  Hammam,  23. 

el  Makruneh,  32. 

el  Nettar,  39. 

Jemameh,  44,  51. 

SaUm  Abu  Irgeig,  23. 

Birket  Ata,  204. 
Bivouac  shelters,  12. 
Blockhouses,  20,  27,  28,  256. 
Bluff,  the,  182,  183. 
Bridges,  and  bridgeheads — 

Beersheba,  35. 

Benat  Yakub,  258. 

El  Rastan,  288. 

Enemy,  128,  129,  157,  158. 

Esdud,  65,  69,  118. 

Jordan,  128,  129,  135,  136,  146, 
153,  157,  158,  175. 

Nahr  el  Auja,  108,  109,  110. 

SheUal,  17. 
Brigandage,  296. 
Brisbane,  Captain,  142. 
British  Forces.    See  Troops,  British. 
Buggar,  21. 


Bulfin,  Lieutenant-General  Sir  Ed- 
ward, 9. 
Bureir,  50,  59. 
Burj,  115. 
Burka,  65,  71.'j:^ 
Bursym,  313.    -. 
Butler,  Lady,  55. 

Cacolets,  151,  173. 

Camel  Corps  Brigade,   8,   69,   133, 

137,  154,  App.  I.  a. 
Camel  Transport  Corps,  36,  62,  63. 
Camels,  36,  63,  325. 

Arabs  impressed  by  British,  36. 

prices  reahsed  by  captured,  318. 

unsuitability  of,  in  hill  country, 

141,  173,  325,  326. 
Cameron,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  244. 
Carchemish,  302. 
Carmel,  Mount,  192,  212,  233. 
Casualties,  British,  31,  54, 84,  92, 94, 

114,  151,  152,  181,  268,  287,  293. 
Enemy,  31,  54,  83,  85,  92,  117, 

153,  154,  184,  251,  272,  276,  278. 
Cavalry — 

Detail  of,  8,  App.  i.  a. 

Disease  amongst.     See  Disease. 

Enemy.     See  Turks. 

French,  ix,  190,  221,  259,  319. 

in  mountain  country,  102, 104-108, 
112-122,  127, 128, 136-151, 165- 
175,  219. 

in  trenches,  155,  156. 

Organisation  for  the  advance  on 
Aleppo,  285. 

Reorganisation  of,  154, 179,  App. 
I.  a. 

Training,  12,  13,  14,  55. 

Withdrawal  of,  from  Syria,  302. 
Charges  of  Cavalry — 

Abu  Naj,  230,  231. 

Abu  Shusheh,  90. 

Beersheba,  29. 

Haifa,  235,  236. 

Haritan,  292. 

Henu  Ford,  185,  186. 

Huj,  53. 

bbid,  253. 

Kaukab,  269. 

Khan  Ayash,  279. 

Remte,  256. 

training  for,  55,  56. 

unsuccessful,  230,  253,  254,  292. 

of  Turkish  Cavalry,  22. 


348        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 


Chauvel,     Ldeutenant-General     Sir 

H.  G.,  K.C.B.,  K.C.M.G.,  xvi,  8, 

169,  279. 
Chaytor,  Major-General  Sir  E.  W.  C, 

108,  138,  143,  149,  164. 
Chaytor's  Force,  196,  201,  220,  227, 

229,  240-246. 
Chetwode,    Lieutenant-General   Sir 

Philip,  Bart.,  viii,  7,  9,  33. 
Christians,  98,  144. 
Cihcia,  295. 

Circassians,  144,  263,  264. 
Climate,  15,  63,  104,  117,  177,  179, 

180,  189,  311. 
Cold,  104,  118,  119,  137,  144. 
Committee  of  Union  and  Progress, 

298. 
Communications,    British,    16,    17, 

112,  129,  164,  263. 

Enemy,  4,  129,  191,  192,  193. 

Communiques,  Enemy,  16,  100. 
Counter-attacks,  Enemy — 

Balin,  72,  73,  74. 

El  Burj,  117. 

Jisr  el  Damieh,  160. 

Khuweilfeh,  38,  39,  40. 

Nebi  Samwil,  107. 

Richon-le-Zion,  86. 
Country,  description  of.    See  Topo- 
graphy. 
Cox,  Brigadier-General,  27,  65. 
Cripps,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  90. 
Crusaders,  103. 

Damascus,  4. 

capture  of,  275,  279. 

disorders  in,  280,  281. 

importance  of,  247. 

the  race  for,  251-275. 

Daraya,  278. 

Darb  el  Haj,  243. 

Darfur  campaign,  314. 

Davison,  Captain,  209. 

Dead  Sea,  126,  179,  180. 

Deceiving   the   enemy,  5,  17,  175, 

176,  177,  195,  196,  197,  210,  211, 

213,  214,  293. 
Defences,  British — 

Gaza-Beersheba,  5,  12. 

Jaffa- Jerusalem,  114. 

Jordan  Valley,  175,  178,  179. 
Defences,  Turkish — 

Gaza-Beersheba,  3,  20. 

Damascus,  268. 


Defences,  Turkish — 

Jaffa- Jerusalem,  114. 

On  19th  September  1918, 191, 193, 
199,  200,  220. 

Nazareth,  214. 

Trans-Jordan,  133,  156. 

Nahr  Rubin,  70,  71. 

Aleppo,  289. 
Deir  Ah,  268. 

el  Belah,  16,  17. 

el  Ghusn,  219. 

el  Hawa,  39. 

elKuddis,  119. 

el  Saras,  261. 

Khabiye,  273. 

Sineid,  4. 

Deraa  Junction,  4,   191,   192,  248, 

252,  257,  264,  295. 
Desert  Column,  the,  viii,  7,  16. 
Desert  Mounted  Corps,  ix,  9,  293. 

detail  of,  8,  App.  i. 

reorganisation    of, 

179,  App.  I.  a. 
adminietration    of 

Syria  by,  295-301. 

■  disbandment  of,  302. 


Dhahariyeh,  21. 

Disease,  among  British  troops,  x, 

181,  246,  283,  284,  287. 

Enemy,  60,  276,  278,  279. 

Dobell,  Major-General  Sir  C,  viii. 
Documents,  captured  enemy,  5,  57, 

178,  194,  198,  208. 
Dome,  220. 

Donkeys,  166,  325,  326,  327. 
Dothan  Pass,  213. 
Druses,  263,  264. 
Duma,  277. 

Dust,  71,  179,  180,  187,  311. 
Dysentery,  60,  278. 

Easteen  Force,  viii. 
Egypt,  2. 

Egyptian  Expeditionary  Force,  1,  7. 
Enemy    Territory,    advances    into, 
122,  293. 

administration    of,    295- 


301. 

disorder  in,  296,  297. 

Engineers,  Royal,  16,  17,  287,  288. 

Australian,  16,  17. 

Enemy,  49,  132. 

Entrenching  tools,  13. 
Ellar,  219. 


INDEX 


349 


Equipment,  12,  13,  320,  321. 

weight  of,  95. 

Esani,  7. 

Escorts.     See  Horse  Artillery. 

Esdraelon,  Plain  of,  191,  209. 

Esdud,  60,  118. 

Euphrates,  River,  282. 

Exchange,  stabilisation  of,  299,  301. 

gambles  in,  299,  300. 

Ezra,  255. 

Fahme,  219. 

FalkenhajTi,  Marshal  von,  2,  72. 

Faluje,  59,  61,  62,  66. 

Feisal,  Emir,  130, 153,  280,  281,  339, 

340,  341. 
Fevzi  Pasha,  9. 
Fire  support,  29,  55,  82,  90,  209, 

254,  260,  269,  291,  304,  305. 
Flag  of  truce,  289. 
Forage,  13,  62,  248,  313,  314. 

local,  248,  314. 

Fox  hounds,  301. 
Fuheis,  144,  168. 
Funduk,  220. 
Furkha,  191. 

Gafar  Pasha,  297. 

Galilee,  Sea  of,  134,  191. 

Gallipolis  1. 

Games,  301. 

Gamli,  5. 

Gaza,  defences  of,  3. 

attack  of,  22,  32. 

capture  of,  48. 

description  of,  124,  125. 

Gebel  el  Shegeib,  23. 

Grerman  Emperor,  121. 

Germans,  9,  154,  181,  214,  219,  250, 
251. 

ill-treatment  of  Turks  by,  xiii, 

xiv,  193,  194,  260,  276. 

breaches  of  laws  of  war  by, 

216,  250,  251. 

drunkenness,  185. 

venereal  disease  among,  279. 

indifference  to  Turkish  bru- 
tality, 265. 

spies,  5. 

Gezer,  89. 

Ghabaghib,  271. 

Ghalib  Pasha,  340. 

Ghazale,  255. 

Gheyadah,  80. 


Ghoraniyeh,  128,  133,  135,  153,  228. 

Enemy  attack  on,  154. 

Glanders,  320. 

Godwin,  Brigadier  General  C.  A.,  80, 

90. 
Good  Samaritan  Inn,  127. 
Gram,  313,  314. 
Grant,  Brigadier- General  W.,  28,  29, 

31,  161,  249,  263,  317. 
Gray-Cheape,  Lieut. -Colonel  H.,  53. 
Gregory,  Brigadier- General,  231. 
Grenades,  117. 
Guns,  captured,  xii,  30,  52,  55,  85, 

100,  102,  122,  205,  211,  226,  232, 

238,  245,  262,  268,  279,  283,  293. 
loss  of  R.H.A.,  163. 

Hableh,  199. 
Haifa,  191,  192,  232. 

capture  of,  232-238. 

annexation  expedition,  227. 

Hama,  282,  288. 

Hamame,  66. 

Haram,  202. 

Harbaj,  234. 

Harbord,Brigadier-General,233,291. 

Hareira,  43. 

Harista  el  Basal,  277. 

Haritan,  action  of,  291. 

Harithie,  232. 

Haroun  al  Rashid,  302. 

Hand,  133,  136,  157,  165. 

Hauran,  248,  263,  272. 

Head  ropes.     See  Picketing  gear. 

Heat,  15,  63,  177,  179,  180,  311. 

Hebron,  21. 

Hedjaz,  126,  337. 

Force,  129,  130,  131,  133,  153, 

240,  242,  243. 

— —  surrender  of,  244,  245. 

King  of.     See  Hussein. 

Heel  ropes.     See  Picketing  gear. 

Henu  Ford,  185. 

Hermon,  Mount,  212. 

Hills.     See  Topography. 

Hiseia,  21. 

Hish  Forest,  130,  340. 

Hodgson,  Major- General  Sir  H.  W., 

21,  73,  74,  75,  167,  169. 
Horns,  282,  286,  287,  294,  295. 
Horse  Artillery,  27. 

Ammunition,  308,  309,  328,  329. 

Command,  303,  304. 

Detail  of,  App.  i.  a. 


350        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 


Horse  Artillery — 

Employment  of,  74,  75,  259,  260, 
269. 

Escorts  for,  306,  307. 

Horses  for,  319. 

Howitzers,  307. 

Reserve^  304,  305. 

Special  requirements  of,  309. 

With  advance  guard,  269, 305, 306. 
See  also  R.H.A.  Batteries. 
Horsemastership,  318,  319. 
Horses — 

Arab,  314,  317,  318. 

Australian,  94,  95,  325. 

Barb,  190. 

Canadian,  317,  325. 

Condition,  119.  123, 180,  240,  283, 
312,  313. 

Detecting  presence  of  water,  316. 

Disease  amongst,  312,  320. 

Draught,  319,  324. 

English,  95,  317. 

Hardships  of,  58,  61,  63,  77,  94, 
119. 

in  waterless  country,  316. 

Manes  and  tails  of,  321. 

Muzzles  for,  312,  320,  321. 

Pack,  13,  82. 

Remounts,  123,  317. 

Type,  319,  324,  325. 

Watering  of,  58,  61,  64,  94,  314, 
315,  316. 

Weight  carried  by,  95. 
Hotchkiss  rifles,  236,  274. 
Howeij,  165. 

Howitzers.     See  Horse  Artillery. 
Huj,  44,  52,  53,  54. 
Huleh,  Lake,  247,  259. 
Huleikat,  59. 
Hunting,  301. 

Hussein,  Sherif,  130,  247,  338,  339. 
Character  of,  338. 

India,  2. 

Indian  Cavalry  Divisions — 

4th,  179.  190,  197,  200,  202,  222, 
226,  230,  239,  248,  249,  252, 
264,  271,  284,  287,  295,  302, 
App.  I.  a. 

5th,  179,  190,  197,  200,  202,  224, 
232,  247,  249,  262.  266,  272, 
284,  287,  293,  295,  302,  320, 
App.  I.  a. 

Organisation  of,  for  Aleppo,  285. 


Indian  Cavalry  Brigades — 
10th,  208,  252,  255. 
nth,  230,  239,  240,  271,  274. 
12th,  209. 
13th,  187,  224,  232,  272,  274,  275, 

285,  301. 
14th,  210,  272,  274,  293. 
15th  (Imperial  Service),  8,  9,  48, 
155,  185,  232,  285,  290,  291. 
Indian  Cavalry  Regiments — 
Central   India   Horse,   222,   249, 

253,  256. 
Hodson's  Horse  (9th),  204,  224. 
18th  Lancers,  206,  224. 
2nd  Lancers,  208,  209,  253. 
Jacob's   Horse  (36th),  204,  226, 

230. 
Mysore  Lancers,  233,  291. 
Hyderabad    Lancers,    232,   263, 

285. 
Jodhpur  Lancers,  234,  291. 
29th  Lancers,  230,  232,  239,  275. 
6th  Cavalry,  204. 
19th  Lancers,  211,  249. 
Infantry,  British — 
Detail  of,  9,  App.  i.  h. 
Reorganisation  of,  154,  App.  i.  h. 
Infantry,  Enemy.     See  Turks. 

French,  199. 

Infantry  Corps,  British — 
20th,  9,  42,  43,  63,  201,  219,  220, 

App.  I.  h. 
21st,  9,  43,  48,  59,  63,  199,  217, 
220,  App.  I.  h. 
Infantry  Divisions,  British — 
3rd,  199,  221,  App.  i.  6. 
7th,  199,  248,  App.  i.  6. 
10th,  9,  43,  45,  122,  221,  App.  i.  6. 
42nd,  7,  284,  286,  App.  i.  6. 
52nd,  7,  48,  49,  60,  63,  71,  107, 

114,  App.  I.  h. 
53rd,    9,    40,    63,   84,    121,   221, 

App.  I.  h. 
54th,  9,  63,  199,  App.  i.  6. 
60th,  9,  24,  43,  45,  121,  127,  129, 
133, 155. 197,  199,  218,  App.  1.6. 
74th,  9,  43,  115,  App.  i.  h. 
75th,  9,   63,   84,   106,   197,    199, 
App.  I.  h. 
Influenza,  283. 
Intelligence,  British,  xv,  36. 

Enemy,  5,  6,  57,  178,  194,  198. 

Irbid,  248,  253. 
Islahie,  295. 


INDEX 


351 


Ismet  Bey,  24,  30. 
Iswaiwin,  23. 
Itweil  el  Semin,  23. 

Jackals,  120. 
Jaffa,  88. 

Gate,  121. 

Jarak,  206. 
Jebata,  206. 
Jebel  Ekteif,  127. 

el  Aswad,  268,  273,  275. 

el  Mania,  269. 

Kalimun,  127. 

Kuruntul,  127. 

Jelameh,  200. 
Jelil,  202. 
Jemal  Pasha,  276. 
Jendar,  294. 
Jenin,  4,  191,  192. 

capture  of,  213,  214,  215. 

Jerablus,  282,  295. 

Jericho,  5,  126,  127,  128,  177,  180, 

187. 
'  Jericho  Jane,'  187. 
Jerisheh,  108. 
Jerusalem,  3,  4,  5,  21. 

surrender  of,  121. 

Jeshimon,  Wilderness  of,  127. 

Jett,  205. 

Jezreel,  Valley  of,  191. 

Jib,  108. 

Jiddah,  339. 

Jiljulie,  191. 

Jisr  Benat  Yakub,  252,  261. 

action  of,  258-261. 

Esdud,  65. 

el  Damieh,  146,  157. 

el  Sheikh  Hussein,  211. 

Mejamieh,  200,  211,  248,  252. 

Jordan  River,  125,  134,  146,  211. 
raids     across,     135-152, 

154-176. 

VaUey,  128,  129,  177,  227. 

cUmate,  177,  179,  180. 

defences.     See  Defences, 


British. 


description  of,  ix,  189. 

Joyce,  Lieut. -Colonel,  130. 

Julis,  59. 

Junction  Station,  importance  of,  4. 

capture  of,  85. 

description  of,  96. 

Junjar,  208. 

Jurat  el  Mikreh,  44. 


Kabb  Mujahid,  229. 
Kadem  Station,  275. 
Kaimakam,  66. 
Kakon,  225. 
Kalaat  Aneiza,  130. 

el  Zerka,  241. 

el  Nuhas,  274. 

Kaikili,  191,  192. 

Kannir,  205. 

Kantara,  16. 

Kami,  17. 

Karmelheim,  236. 

Kars,  263. 

Kasr  el  Azrak,  195. 

Kastal,  242. 

Katada,  Emir,  337. 

Katana,  268. 

Katrah,  70,  79. 

Kaukab,  action  of,  268,  269. 

Kauwukah,  43. 

Kaza,  66. 

Kefr  Harris,  220. 

Kara,  205. 

Kenna,  224. 

•  Ruai,  219. 

Kelly,  Brigadier- General  P.  J.  V., 

168,  169,  170,  206,  314. 
Kenna,      Brigadier-General     Paul, 

V.C,  316. 
Kerak,  125. 
Kerkur,  192. 
Khalasa,  7. 
Khan  Ayash,  279. 

el  Shiha,  273. 

——  Kusseir,  277. 

Meizelun,  284. 

Sebil,  288. 

Shaikhun,  288. 

—  Tuman,  289. 
Khashim  Zanna,  24,  25. 
Khiyara  ChiftUk,  274. 
Khurbet  Arab,  208. 

Atuf ,  232. 

Deiran,  86. 

el  Likiye,  39. 

■  el  Mujeidilat,  58. 

el  Muweileh,  32. 

el  Raseife,  143. 

Hadrah,  88,  108. 

Jeladiyeh,  73. 

Kauwukah,  43. 

Surafend,  86. 

Kishon,  River.  192,  213,  233. 
Kiswe,  266,  268,  275. 


352        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 


Kress  von  Kressenstein,  Greneral,  9, 

57. 
Kubeibe,  70,  79,  84. 
Kuneitra,  262. 
Kuryet  el  Enab,  101. 
Kusr  Atra,  258. 
Kustine,  65. 
KustuI,  107. 
Kut  el  Amara,  1. 
Kuwaik  Su,  301. 

Lady's  Brook,  the,  213. 

Lambert,  Major,  292. 

Laminitis,  320. 

Latron,  88. 

Lawrence,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  130, 

195,  255,  257,  278. 
Lawrence,  Lieut. -General  the  Hon. 

Sir  H.,  viii. 
'  Lebanon  Hounds,'  301. 
Lebanon  Mountains,  311. 
Leben  Station,  242. 
Lebon,  Colonel,  190. 
Lebwe,  295. 
Lejjun,  192. 

Light  Car  Patrols,  97,  232. 
in     advance     on 

Aleppo,  285-292. 
Liktera,  200,  204. 
Liman  von  Sanders,  193,  207,  250. 
Lorries,  British,  13,  63,  64. 

Enemy,  208,  211,  288. 

Lubban,  191,  220. 
Ludd,  101,  189. 
Lymphangitis,  320. 

Maan,  129,  130,  153,  340. 

Ma'arit  el  Na'aman,  288. 

Mac  Andrew,     Major  -  General      Sir 

H.  J.  M.,  272. 
orders   to   5th    Cavalry 


Division  at  Damascus,  272. 

captures  Aleppo,  290. 

Machine  guns,  British,  56,  82,  90, 

220,  274,  285. 

— — ammunition  for,  328. 

Enemy,  xiv,  27,  91. 

Ma  el  Mallaka,  23. 
Mafid  Jozeleh,  229. 
Makhadet  Hajlah,  135. 

■ Abu  Naj,  230. 

- — -  Fath  Allah,  231. 

Makhi-uk,  193,  227. 

Malaria,x,177,181, 246,278,283,284.  |       209,212. 

Mamas,  205.  {  Mutasserif ,  66. 


Mandesi,  136.  > 

Maps,  23,  266. 

Marash,  295,  301. 

Marches,  xii,  11,  18,  94,  139,  148, 

166,  200,  211,  212,  219,  266,  283. 

night,  23,  61. 

Mason,  Lieutenant,  256. 
Masudi,  action  of,  239. 
Mecca,  3,  339. 

Register  of  Ashraf  at,  337. 

Grand  Sherif  of,  337. 

Medina,  339,  340,  341. 

Megiddo,  192. 

Meissner  Pasha,  35. 

Mejdel  (Plain  of  Philistia),  59,  60. 

(Plain  of  Sharon),  200. 

(Sea  of  GalUee),  252,  259. 

Merchants,  native,  296,  299,  300. 

Mesha,  191. 

Mesmiye,  84. 

Mesopotamia,  261. 

Messudieh  Junction,  4,  192. 

Mezerib,  257,  264. 

Mezze,  269. 

Moab,  125. 

Money,    stabilisation   of   exchange. 

See  Exchange. 
Morale.     See  Turks. 
Mosques,  Beersheba,  35. 

Gaza,  125. 

Motor    Boats,    German,    126,    128, 

129,  251. 
used  by  British,  129, 

136. 
Mountains.     See  Topography. 
Mounted  attacks,  methods  employed 

in,  55,  56. 
Mud,  104,  118,  119,  138,  140,  311. 
Mudir,  66. 
Mughar,  70. 

action  of,  78. 

Mughair,  200. 
Mujeidil,  206. 
Mukhalid,  200. 
Mulebbis,  109. 
Mules,  318,  325,  326. 

prices  realised  by  captured,  318. 

Muntar,  127. 
Musallabeh,  178,  181. 
Muslimie  Junction,  282,  293. 
Musmus  Pass,  192. 

crossing  of,  205,  206,  208, 


INDEX 


353 


Naane,  86. 
Xaaur,  133. 
Nablus,  101,  192,  198. 

capture  of,  221. 

Nahie,  66. 

Nahr  e]  Auja,  88. 

first  crossing  of,  108, 


109,  110. 


second  crossing  of, 


122. 

el  Awaj,  274. 

el  Falik,  199,  203. 

el  Mukatta,  233. 

el  Zerka,  158,  160. 

Iskanderuneh,  204. 

Mef  jir,  200. 

Mughaniye,  267. 

Rubin,  70. 

Sukereir,  65. 

Napoleon,  a  memory  of,  261. 

Nasir,  Sherif,  257,  286. 

seizes  Aleppo,  290. 

Natives.     See  Arabs. 

Navy,  the  Royal,  17,  48,  69,  93,  129, 
213. 

Nazareth,  193,  208. 

capture  of,  207,  224. 

Nebi  Samwil,  107. 

Tari,  110. 

Musa,  127. 

New  Zealand  Mounted  Brigade,  7, 
24,  26,  28,  69,  86,  88,  128,  136, 
175,  184,  227,  229,  240,  243. 

Night  Marches.     See  Marches. 

Nisibin,  302. 

Northforce,  302. 

Nose  bags,  13. 

Olives,  Mount  of,  121. 

Onslow,  Brigadier-General,  217,  219, 

220,  270. 
Operating  Unit,  152. 
Orontes,  River,  286. 
Osborne,  Lieut.-Col.  R.  H.,  xv. 

Pack  AnimjVls,  13,  82. 

Palestine,  description  of.  See  Topo- 
graphy. 

Palmyra,  302. 

Paper  money,  values  of.  See  Ex- 
change. 

Persia,  2. 

Philiatia,  Plain  of,  7. 

Picketing  gear,  321. 


Pig-sticking,  301. 

Plans  of  Major  Operations — 

Gaza-Beersheba,  10-11,  18,20,42. 

Jerusalem,  101. 

1st  Trans-Jordan  Raid,  132,  133, 

134. 
2nd  Trans- Jordan  Raid.  154,  155, 

156,  157. 
Esdraelon,  194, 195, 199,  200,  201. 
Relief  of  Damascus,  247,  248. 
Political  objectives,  3,  247,  282. 
Polo,  301. 

Ponies,  Arab.     See  Horses. 
Port  Said,  17. 
Prisoners — 

As  aUies  of  British,  245. 
Attitude  of,  30,  60. 
Difficulty  of  feeding,  225. 
Mortality  amongst,  278. 
Numbers  taken,  xii,  30,  31.  32, 
59,  60,  83,  84,  88,  92,  100,  117, 
122,   153,   154.   172,   175,   184, 
186,  204,  207,  208,  209,  211, 
213,  214,  215,  221,  224,  225, 
227,  230,  232,  236,  238,  239, 
242,  245,  251,  256,  268,  271, 
273,  274,  275,  277,   278,  279, 
283,  284,  285,  293. 
Water  for,  65,  238,  239. 
Protection  on  march,  61,  201,  206. 

Raad,  Mr.  C,  XV. 
Rabue,  270. 
Racing,  301. 
Railways — 

British,  16,  93. 

British,  construction  of,  16,  93, 
103, 191, 196. 

Demolition  of  enemy,  4,  62,  130, 
139,  142,  143,  153,  206,  219, 
241,  242,  339,  340. 

Hedjaz,  4,  129,  130,  131,  191,  240, 
339,  340. 

Northern  Palestine,  191,  192. 

Southern  Palestine,  4, 16, 17, 18,35. 

Syrian,  271,  282. 
Rain,  104,  117,  118,  119,  122,  127, 

137,  138,  146,  147,  151,  311. 
Rakka,  302. 
Ram  Allah,  105. 
Ram  AUah  Rakhman,  98. 
Ramleh,  86,  197. 
Ras  el  Ain,  295. 
el  Humeiyir,  232. 


354        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 


Ras  el  Nukb,  39,  42. 

Ghannara,  18,  20. 

Umm  Zoka,  232,  240. 

Rastan,  288. 
Rations,  13,  225,  248. 
Rayak,  282,  284,  295. 

attempted  raid  on,  296. 

Rearguard  actions,  Amman,  150, 151. 

El  Salt,  173,  174,  175. 

Reconnaissance,  14,  15,  16,  235,  254. 

method  of,  of  villages,  78. 

Red  Hill,  157,  160,  161,  187. 
Red  Sea,  129. 
Remounts.     See  Horses. 
Remte,  253,  255. 
Reserves,  British,  8,  141. 

See  also  Horse  Artillery. 

Enemy,  17. 

R.H.A.  Batteries — 

'  A '  Battery,  H. A.C.,  29, 162, 213, 
269. 

'  B  '  Battery,    H.A.C.,    72,    161, 
163,  190,*224,  232. 

Ayrshire  Battery,  R.H.A.,  274. 

Berks  Batterv,  R.H.A.,  80,  90,  91, 
253,  256. 

Essex  Battery,  R.H.A.,  274. 

Hants  Battery,  R.H.A.,  230,  239. 

Notts  Battery,R.H.A.,  21,  29, 162, 
215,  269. 

Somerset  Battery,   R.H.A.,   109, 
148. 
Richard  Coeur  de  Lion,  107. 
Richon-le-Zion,  86,  96. 
Rivers,  passage  of,  Auja,  108,  109, 

110,  122. 
Jordan      (Ghorani- 

yeh),  134,  135,  136,  157. 
(Benat  Yakub),  258- 

261,  262. 
Roads — 

Northern  Palestine,  191,  192,  193, 
205. 

Southern    Palestine,    4,    21,    62, 
101,  103,  127. 

Syria,  261,  262,  266,  272,  282,  285, 
294,  296. 

Trans-Jordan,  126,  133,  134,  137, 
156,  159. 
Robbers.     See  Brigandage. 
Rosh  Pina,  262. 

Royal  Air  Force.     See  Aircraft. 
Rujm  el  Bahr.  128. 
el  Oshir,  137. 


Rushdi,  43. 

Rushdi  Bey,  239. 

Russian  notes,  300. 

Ryrie,  Brigadier-Greneral,  143. 

SADDLE-WiVIxLETS,   12. 

Sahnaya,  274. 

Salt,  133,  146,  149,  157,  167.  170. 
229. 

first  capture  of,  139. 

withdrawal  from,  150, 151. 

second  capture  of,  158,  159. 

•  withdrawal  from,  174, 176. 


Samaria,  192. 

Sanah,  338. 

Sand,  6. 

colic,  312. 

Sanjak,  66. 

Sarona,  197. 

Sasa,  267. 

Sbeine,  279. 

Sea  traffic,  17,  69,  93,  248. 

Second  Mounted  Division,  8. 

Seffurie,  224. 

Selmeh,  189,  197. 

Semakh,  191,  248,  249. 

capture  of,  250,  251. 

Senussi  Campaign,  8,  297. 

Seraikin,  288. 

720  Point,  21. 

Shannon,  Major,  172. 

Shea,  Major-General  Sir  J.  M.,  53. 

Shefa  Amr,  232. 

Sheikh  Hassan,  32. 

Muannis,  109. 

Saad,  255,  257,  264. 

Said,  289. 

Shellal,  7. 

Sherif,  337. 

Sherifian  Army,  129,  130,  192,  195, 
240,  243,  245,  255,  264,  271,  277, 
279,  280,  286,  290,  293,  294. 

police  work  of,  297. 

History  of,  App.  ii. 

Shilta,  103. 

Shtora,  284,  295. 

Shunet  Nimrin,  133,  170,  228. 

unsuccessful    attack    of, 

158  ef  seq. 

Shuni,  255. 

Sidun,  89. 

Sihan,  3. 

Sinai  Desert,  7,  16. 

Sindiane,  200. 


INDEX 


355 


630  Point,  21. 

Smallpox,  278. 

Smyrna,  295,  302. 

Snow,  311. 

Spahis,  190. 

Spies,  enemy,  5,  97,  119,  120. 

Sport,  301,  302. 

Stamboul,  3. 

Strategical  objectives,  4,  192,  282. 

Suafir  el  Sharkiye,  60. 

Suez  Canal,  2,  7,  16. 

SufEa,  114. 

Summeil,  72. 

Supply,  difficulties  of,  62,  63,  105, 
107,  118,  225. 

drawn  from  country,  248,  322, 

323. 

Suriyeh,  236. 

SweHeh,  140,  144,  241. 

Swords,  cavalry,  8,  54,  83,  92. 

Australian  Mounted  Divi- 
sion armed  with,  App.  i.  a. 

Tabor,  Mount,  191,  212. 

Tabsor,  200. 

Tactics,    General     AUenby's.     See 

Allenby. 
Cavalry,  55,  56,  78,  90-92,  235, 

236,  253,  254.  256,  269,  292. 
Tafas,  264. 
Tafile,  130. 
Taif,  339. 

Talaat  el  Dumm,  127. 
Tarsus,  295. 
Tel  Abu  Dilakb,  46. 

Hawam,  233. 

el  Dhrur,  205. 

el  Hesi,  61. 

el  Marrakeb,  12. 

el  Murre,  65,  69.  ~ 

el  Nejile,  44,  51,  52. 

el  Saba,  20,  23,  24,  27. 

capture  of,  28. 


el  Safi,  72. 

el  Sakaty,  20,  23,  24. 

el  Sharia,  3,  45. 

el  Subat,  234. 

el  Sultan,  178. 

el  Turmus,  70,  84. 

Hasil,  290. 

Jezer,  89. 

Khuweilfeh,  38,  39,  58. 

capture  of,  40. 

Madh,  252. 


Tel  Shadud,  208. 

Temptation,  Mount  of,  127,  188. 

Thothmes  m.,  192. 

3039  Point,  147,  148. 

Tibben,  313. 

Tiberias,  249,  251,  252. 

Lake,  134,  191. 

Tine  Station,  72,  85. 
Tire  (Philistia),  113. 

(Sharon),  199. 

Topography — 

Northern  Palestine,  191,  192. 

Southern  Palestine,  6,  7,  20,  50, 
78,  89,  106,  126,  127. 

Syria,  260,  266,  272,  285,  290. 

Trans-Jordan,  133,  134. 
Training.     See  Cavalry. 
Trains,  Divisional,  63. 
Transport,  62,  63,  248,  323-330. 
Trench  warfare,  3-5,  123. 
unsuitability  of   cavalry 

for,  155,  156. 
Tripoli,  285,  286,  287,  294,  295. 
Troops,  British — 

Disease  among,  x,  181,  246,  283, 
284,  287. 

Reorganisation  of,  154,  179,  App. 
I.  a,  I.  6. 

Strength  of,  9,  193. 
Tubk  el  Kaneitra,  127. 
Tul  Keram,  4,  192,  217,  218,  221. 
Turks— 

As  allies  of  British,  245. 

Bad  shooting  of,  xiv. 

Cavaky,  22,  264. 

Committee  of  Union  and  Pro- 
gress, 298. 

Desertion,  67. 

Dread  of  high  explosive  shells, 
308. 

Fighting  value  of,  xiii,  68. 

Health,  xiii,  60. 

Ill-treatment  of.  by  Germans, 
xiii,  xiv,  193,  194,  260. 

Marching  powers  of,  50,  64. 

Morale,  xiii,  60,  92,  193.  216,  231, 
254,  270,  271,  273,  274,  276, 
293  306. 

Numbers,  9,  154,  193. 

Recruiting  methods  of,  66. 

Spies,  97,  120. 

Treatment  of  Arabs  by,  264,  338. 

Three  things  feared  by,  xiv,  218. 
Turmanin,  290. 


356        THE  DESERT  MOUNTED  CORPS 


Umbeella  Hill,  32. 
Um  el  Ameidat,  46. 

el  Fahm,  212. 

el  Shert,  156,   164,   191,  227, 

229. 

Venereal  Disease,  278,  279. 
Villages,  description  of,  78. 
method  of  reconnoitring,  78. 

Wadi  Amman,  141. 

Arseniyet,  138. 

Aslilul  el  Wawy,  233. 

Dhahr,  72, 

el  Arab,  255. 

el  Auja,  126, 129, 153, 178, 186. 

el  Hammam,  242. 

el  Retem,  163,  164. 

el  Shreikiye,  23. 

el  Sitt,  213. 

el  Sunt,  105. 

el  Tabil,  233. 

el  Zabirani,  273. 

Farah,  193,  222. 

Ghuzze,  7. 

Hanafish  43. 

Hesi,  48,  52,  61. 

Jamus,  79. 

Jofet  el  Ghazlaniye,  137. 

Kafrinji,  240. 

Kef  rein,  137. 

Kumran,  128. 

Maraba,  277. 

Mejma,  60. 

Nueiameh,  186,  187. 

Ratam,  256. 

Saba,  20. 

•  Selman,  235. 

Sharia,  21,  45. 

SheUal  el  Ghor,  82. 

Sherar,  232. 

Surar,  102. 

Wagons,  13,  323. 

loads  of,  329,  330. 

G.S.    and    L.G.S.    compared, 

323,  324. 
Warakani,  206. 

Water,  detecting  presence  of,  317. 
supply,  16,  33,  38,  52,  61,  95, 

96,  178,  186,  244. 


Water,  shortage  of,  7, 14,  32,  33,  41, 

44,  58,  63,  64,  94,  105,  314,  315, 

316,  317. 
Water-carts,  14,  248. 
Weather,  63,  104,  117,  311. 
Wells,  destruction  of,  7,  30,  33,  57, 

64. 

depth  of,  44,  57,  64. 

pumping  plant,  44,  51,  59,  95, 

96. 
West   Indies   Regiment,    179,   227, 

229. 
Wilson,  Brigadier- General  L.,  215. 
Wind,  63,  71,  118,  119, 179,  180,  311. 
Wounded,  Evacuation  of,  151,  152, 

173. 

Yahudieh,  110. 

Yebnah,  78. 

Yeomanry  Division,  8,  58,  85,  103, 

112,  115,  App.  I.  a. 

disbandment  of,  116,  154. 

Yeomanry  Brigades — 

5th,  7,  8,  55,  72,  94,  157,  165. 

6th,  8,  79,  89,  104,  112. 

7th,  8,  24,  39,  51,  113. 

8th,  8,  21,  22,  58,  78,  103. 

22nd,  8,  79,  103,  113. 
Yeomanry  Regiments — 

Berks,  80,  90. 

Bucks,  80,  90. 

Dorsets,  80,  90,  253,  255. 

Gloucester,  117,  207,  275. 

Middlesex,  21,  22,  230,  239. 

Sherwood  Rangers,  234. 

Warwick,  53. 

Worcester,  53,  221,  226,  232. 
Yilderim  Army  Group,  1,  4,  70,  105. 

Zahle,  284. 
Zebda,  253. 
Zebdani,  284. 
Zeid,  Emir,  339. 
Zeita,  68. 
Zeitun,  112. 
Zelefe,  204. 
Zenobia,  302. 
Zernuka,  70,  79,  84. 
Ziza  Station,  242. 
Zor  Defai,  288. 


Edinburgh :  Printed  by  T.  and  A.  Constable  Ltd. 


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